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INTRODUCTION

This volume of the Indian Philosophical Annual is for the year 1971. Part One gives the proceedings of the All-India Seminar on 'Advaita Vedānta and Western Thought' held at this Centre in April, 1971. Part Two presents the proceedings of the next All-India Seminar held at the Centre in March, 1972, the theme of which was 'The Concept of God'. Part Three contains four special articles.

This volume, like the previous ones, has been published by utilizing the grants made by the University Grants Commission for publications by this Centre. We are grateful to the Commission for these grants. We thank the authorities of the University of Madras for the facilities they have given us for the publication of the Annual.

MADRAS
31-1-1973

T. M. P. Mahadevan
Director

PART ONE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND WESTERN THOUGHT

Kalidas Bhattacharyya

ADVAITA AND WESTERN THOUGHT

(with special reference to the concept of subjectivity)

The object of this paper is only to present the Advaita concept of *I* in a language intelligible to Western thinkers. There is no attempt in this paper either to defend the Advaita position or launch a counter-attack, except where needed in the interest of clarification. The method I have followed is mainly that of phenomenology. As far as possible, I have avoided parade of logic and demonstration of the factual truth of propositions. This, I believe, is next to impossible in a field of enquiry like the present.

I

Essence and accidens taken together, *I* is an individual unit consisting of a body, a mind and—what will be shown as its essence—pure subjectivity, called also pure consciousness. Not that the particular body and mind and that pure consciousness remain side by side in clear distinction, nor as even half distinct from one another, from the beginning. It is a given unity from out of which the three, with all the sub-stages involved, are only progressively distinguished through a sort of deepening of reflection, much as what happens when forms are distinguished from out of a given situation. In a given situation, at the unreflective level, neither forms nor the residuary matter stand distinguished, even so much as half distinguished ; and when subtler and subtler forms progressively unfold themselves in their respective autonomy — autonomy implying that the forms discovered at each stage can be imagined and tackled by themselves — every lower stage is, from the point of view of distinguishing, understood as one where the form had stood undistinguishedly fused, and the residuary matter = the fused state *minus* the form distinguished appears as never realizable

in its autonomy but only as an *indefinite*, speakable only in terms of the form distinguished — as what the form *is not* — its positivity (not denied) being only spoken of as a dark, indefinite positive base which that form had somehow been dragged into and fused with. In other words, matter as such is but the self-negation of form, and whatever positivity it has is only that of the unreflective given situation which just *was* positive, there being no question as to why it was so. The relation between body and the world, between mind and body and between pure subjectivity and mind has to be understood in the same manner. This is unlike any ordinary case of distinguishing where when X is distinguished the remainder is understood as a clear, positive definite Y equivalent to the base *minus* X. Dissociation of the stages of freedom, as thus of a different sort, can be best represented by saying that what is now dissociated had earlier, by an inscrutable act of self-negation, deformed itself positively as the given that was started from. This is the Advaita principle of *ajñāna*, details of which, however, we are not to discuss in this paper.

The given that is started from is the ordinary world of things, and what is first distinguished from out of it, as more subjective and, therefore, free so far, is one's body. Body which is otherwise a thing among things of the world called objects is yet in a way not in it. Somehow it has a privileged position. If the world is an *object* of experience to a *subject* that experiences it, body as the medium of this experience finds a distinct position for itself in that world of objects. When an object finds itself to be a medium (means), to that extent it transcends the world and feels drawn toward the subject. As a matter of fact, in that aspect it is felt as *I*, which is never the lot of any other thing of the world. Other things of the world can at most be *mine*, never felt as *I*.

This relative subjectivity of body is evident in other ways also. The absolute distance and direction of every thing, and, for that very reason, their distances and directions in relation to one another, are due ultimately to the reference of each to my body; and add to this the more intriguing phenomenon that my body is not a mere point and — what is still more intriguing — that even its different parts have distances and directions relatively to one another, and what it all points to is that when this body is considered as the centre of all reference it is somehow understood as other than a spatial object. It follows that space itself is to be understood as in some reference to the body that is non-spatial. Not merely that, anything can be called 'this' only in relation to my body, and as this body too is often called 'this' there is no escape from the phenomenological conclusion that it is subjective relatively to every other thing of the world. The so-called

objective *this* is only another name for the *self-identity* of the thing miscalled that way and falling considerably short of the full meaning of the term, the full meaning being 'present before me'.[1]

Mental states come next to be distinguished in their freedom from this bodily subjectivity. They are the states of cognition, feeling and willing.[2] There may be an order of relative subjectivity among them, and each of these may have phases relatively more toward the subject than others. But these questions we may ignore for the present. The main point here is that the mental is more subjective than the bodily. That mental states have a sort of subjectivity which is freer than that of body is almost universally recognised nowadays. If the behaviourists and men like Ryle demur, let them note, first, that body itself is either mine or yours or his, and often even felt as *I*, *you* or *he*, and, secondly, that though many statements of peculiar mental occurrences and behaviours can be reduced to ones that need not mean these, this does not affect other simpler statements which are not so reducible. Whether these simpler statemets point or not to existent mental states as qualitatively different from physical ones depends entirely on the theory of meaning one upholds. Like most Indian thinkers, the Advaitin upholds the commonsense theory of meaning which is that whatever is spoken of in a way exists exactly that way, unless in particular specific cases there are reasons to the contrary.

These states are mental, but they are *objects* at the same time. They are objects because they are discovered that way by introspection or mental perception, quite in the same way as things of the world are discovered by the first-order cognition. Mental states which are cognitions of the first-order are objects to introspection, and other states which are non-cognitive feelings and wills, for example — are objects of mental perception. There is, of course, a difference of opinion among the Advaitins regarding whether mental perception is itself a case of introspection or not.

Mental states are objects. Yet as discovered by introspection they evince relative freedom, forming a class apart from other things of the world and also from body. When I am introspectively aware of my cognition of X, where X is a thing of the world, no doubt that X also appears before the introspection, but only as loosely attached to that cognition, tending all the while to slip from it, attention being focussed more on the cognition side than on it; and what all this means is that the mental side not only demands a sort of freedom but has actually half attained it. We may feel more assured of this if we distinguish this act of introspection from another of its kind where, instead of being aware of the cognition of an object, we are aware rather of the object-

as-cognised. The object in this latter case stands more in the focus and cognition hangs on to it adjectivally in order just to bring to the focus of introspection characters of the object that were not noticed before.

That cognition as a mental state is nearer introspection is clear from another fact also. It is that one finds it extremely difficult to distinguish between this cognition and introspection, so far as their stuff is concerned — a thing we seldom experience in our first-order cognition of worldly objects where between that cognition and the objects there is a clear distinction in stuff. Not that there is no stuff-distinction between cognition and introspection. What we emphasize here is that there is a bit of too much similarity between the two. The Advaitin holds that cognition as a mental state is made of *sattva* which not only makes it phosphorescent but also works as a bridgeway from all that is object to subjectivity proper. If feelings and willings also are phosphorescent, they too are so far made of *sattva*, but they do not claim as much nearness to introspection as cognition does. While cognition, when introspected, shows itself as dissociate from worldly objects and from relevant bodily states and proves that way its (greater) subjectivity, feelings and willings never show themselves as dissociate to that degree : if there is any question of dissociation from worldly objects it is oblique of a sort, and from bodily states like organic sensations and general coanaesthesia they appear as much free as not, perpetually alternating between freedom and fusion. Their stuff contains some dominant duller elements, called *rajas* and *tamas*.

II

Phosphorescence of cognition, or, for the matter of that, of any mental state, is entirely an objective property belonging to it. A cognition that is revealed to introspection as an object is revealed *ipso facto* as phsophorescent. Introspective awareness of cognition is thus widely different from its phoshorescence : introspection stands apart as subjective in relation to that phosphorescent cognition as an object. The cognition in question may indeed be subjective relatively to the thing that is cognised, but, assuredly, it is an object *vis-a-vis* introspection.

We never deny that even in the absence of introspection we are aware of the cognition *unreflectively*. This unreflective awareness is definitely more than mere phosphorescence. For while many phosphorescent things may go unnoticed there is no case of a cognition that is not noticed immediately even though no introspection has intervened. The whole thing may, however, be understood as follows :

Introspection not to intervene does not mean that it is not there. Introspection to intervene is no other than its showing itself *in proper form*, viz. as standing apart from the cognition and holding it as an object; which, in turn, implies that before the intervention it was there *in an improper form*, i.e. as undistinguishedly fused with the phosphorescent cognition. It is this undistinguished presence, called, from another angle, its reflection (*pratibimba*) on that cognition, which makes the cognition pseudo-conscious. Introspection to note it as an object is only another name for it to dissociate itself as a freer stage of subjectivity.

While mental states are more subjective than bodily states and outer objects, what is still more subjective is this introspection as freed from its fusion with those mental states. In a sense it is subjectivity itself, for, unlike mental states, it is never an object to any further subjectivity. Introspection is never an object to another higher-order introspection. Were it so, there would be an unending series of introspection behind introspection, but no one feels like that. And if we have to stop anywhere, why not stop with the first of them? Nor can it be said that one and the same introspection folds itself into two, one looking upon the other as an object; for even then the introspection *as looking* would be felt as more of its real nature than the one *looked at*, so that the latter would only be a false double. Introspection as *spoken of* is also no object. At the most it is a symbolic object, its so-called objectivity being either felt as self-nullifying or understood only in the context of a past objective situation, as in retrospection.

Genuine subjectivity of introspection can be shown in yet another way. The ultimate court of appeal for any thing to prove its existence is my direct cognition of it or of any of its invariable associates. But what certificate can cognition itself put forward for its own existence? It will not be enough to say that its *associate* — any object — is directly cognised. For no certificate is acceptable till it is itself certified. What then certifies that there has been a cognition at all? It must be some other cognition, viz. introspection. But what if one asks for a certificate for this introspection itself? Postulation of a third cognition would be self-defeating here; for not only would there be no reason why there should not be a fourth, fifth and so on ad indefinitum, there would be the further difficulty that what is sought to be certified fails of that, and, despairingly enough, just because of the indefinite regress. Unless a certificate is itself certified, either by itself or by another, it fails to certify. The only way out is to hold that the second cognition, viz. introspection, is self-certifying, self-certification meaning that it is not cognised as an object by another cognition.

There may, or course, be other alternative solutions. Some have actually held that when in answer to the question 'Why X?' one replies 'Because Y' there is *in that context* no immediate question like 'Why Y?' *In that context* Y stands accepted as a sufficient answer, though it may be questioned *in another context* which has nothing logically to do with the present one. What it all points to is that, contexts thus differing, one may go on admitting introspection after introspection *ad indefinitum*. The Advaitin would only reply that for the sake of discovering truth one should be as much questioning as possible, if only to avoid pitfalls.

Still some others have held that as there is this difficulty in proving the existence of introspection it should better be understood as outside the question of existence and non-existence altogether. It should, in other words, be understood, in the Kantian or Semi-Buddhist fashion, as only a logical or transcendental presupposition — as the pure *I think* that neither exists not does not exist. The Advaita rejoinder, however, would be quite simple. Advaita would readily agree that introspection = subjectivity is qualitatively different from the first-order cognition but would add that the difference is not so catastrophic as to forfeit its ontological import altogether. The difficulty in proving the existence of introspection could be avoided if only it were recognised as self-certifying.

III

Introspecton is subjectivity proper. Yet there is something wrong about it, even as distinguished : it is still introspection of a *mental state*. It is still compelled, as it were, to refer to a state that is an object, and so far not fully dissociate or free. It is not fully free for another reason also—ordinary introspections however prolonged, are yet temporary affairs relapsing every time into unreflective work-a-day life. The final essence of an individual, as completely dissociate from all that is accident, should, on the other hand, be a never-lapsing introspection that is under no compulsion to refer to a mental state.

Introspection can be prolonged, as much as one likes, through concentration on a particular state of mind, usually a cognitive one, and the chances of lapse into unreflective life are eliminated through continuous culture of detachment, love of truth and freedom, etc., which all tend to paralyse distracting factors. But though introspection could be made permanent that way it would still remain introspection *of a mental state*, of the state, viz. which has been concentrated on. How can it get away from this need of referring and realize its pure essential being as subjectivity untarnished?

What is required for that is that the particular mental state to concentrate on will have to be nothing but the conviction (reached through systematic analysis) that from out of every mental state and, therefore, from mind itself as their objective substratum introspection, which had stood so long as undistinguishedly fused there, is to get dissociated in its free subjectivity. This demand on which introspection now concentrates is undoubtedly an objective mental state, but as a demand for the realization of subjectivity proper it is an object that continually dissipates itself, making room for that subjectivity to get dissociated. The demand, in other words, is just for the objective mental state to forgo its objectivity. In so far, then, as introspection has for its object a mental state that goes on liquidating itself, it cannot be said to be *bound* by that state. In plain language, it is not so far compelled to refer. Whatever reference is there is *free* so far. So far, again, as the reference is free, so far the subjectivity of introspection is not jeopardised. Whatever of non-freedom appears to linger is evidently in the process of self-dissolution. It follows inevitably that the ultimate freedom of man lies in purest non-referring subjectivity—subjectivity which is wholly in itself.

Freed from the task of referring, introspection as pure subjectivity is no longer the individual *I* as distinct from *you* and *he*. Individuality of introspection consists just in its reference to a mental state or mind which is mine or me. Freed from these, therefore, it is cosmic, according to Advaita Vedānta. The final essence of *I*, the body-mind-consciousness complex, is this cosmic purest subjectivity, called *pure consciousness by itself*.

IV

Western thinkers would ask some questions here which the Advaitin will have to answer, if only to clarify his position. The questions are as follows:

(a) Should not subjectivity = consciousness, no matter whether pure or otherwise, belong to some substantive, some self which *is subjective* or *conscious*?

(b) May not the self to which it belongs be just the objective mind?

(c) Is consciousness separable at all from mental states? Is it a distinct metaphysical entity at all?

(d) Even if there be anything purely subjective as constituting the essence of an individual man, should it on that ground be cosmic, constituting the essence of *other individual men* also?

The Advaita reply would be as follows:

X could be said to belong to a substantive Y conceivably on two conditions: either if Y were capable of remaining without X or if it could have anything else belonging to it. But a substantive which can remain without consciousness and is, therefore, intrinsically as dark as matter would be a useless supposition, and only a very few philosophers have admitted this, and even so they have insisted more on its *capability* of remaining with consciousness than without it. As for the other alternative, viz. that it could have something else belonging to it, it may be noted that besides pure subjectivity there is no scope for anything else to belong to the so-called substantive here. The Advaitin has indeed spoken of pure existence and pure bliss as equally the ultimate essence of man. But these are non-distinct from pure subjectivity. For the Advaitin, as we have already seen, subjectivity = consciousness is no mere logical or transcendental presupposition, but exists, so that, as in other cases of existent things, pure existence here too is an ultimate metaphysical essence, with only this much of difference that, as the ultimate essence of subjectivities of different grades, it shows itself as non-different from *pure subjectivity*. *I am* is not merely *I think*, but also *I exist*; only quite as much as in the case of 'am' denoting thinking, here too there is no distinction between *I* and *am*. Pure consciousness and pure existence are the same ultimate essence, only spoken of differently. Or, they are the same essence discovered through different approaches of metaphysical dissociation. Pure bliss too might, in the same manner, be extracted as the ultimate essence of every man's life and shown as non-different from pure consciousness and pure existence.[8] The three being non-different, there remains no special reason for admitting a substantive self over and above them.

The solution which many Śaivas and Śāktas have offered may just be mentioned in this connexion (without any comment as to which of the solutions is better). They do not deny a substantive behind pure consciousness which latter they regard as a power, the substantive being that which has the power. But a power and that which has it are only different sides of one and the same situation and, as such, are also hardly distinguishable from each other, like burning power and fire that has it. The distinction between a power and that which has it may be stated in simpler language as that between *what* and *that*. These Śaivas and Śāktas now add that pure existence is precisely the *that* aspect of pure consciousness which latter is the *what* aspect of pure existence, and pure bliss is just the identity of the situation in which the two sides participate. Advaita Vedānta, simply, has not accepted this solution.

To turn now to the question (b). It is whether the substantive, called self, to which pure consciousness is often said to belong may not be the mind to which, assuredly, mental states like cognitions, feelings and willings belong. The Advaitin would reject this possibility on the following grounds :—

Like mental states, mind too is revealed to introspection as an *object*, and so this introspection = pure consciousness which is subjectivity *par excellence* cannot have that mind as its substratum. That which something reveals as its object is nowhere found to be its substratum. If it be objected that a transparent liquid is found to reveal a cup both as its substratum and as an object, the pertinent reply would be that it is never revealed as *its* (i.e. that liquid's) object.

Mind could somehow be called a substratum of consciousness if only the latter were understood, in the Kantian manner, as a transcendental presupposition — or act or function — which by itself is neither existent nor non-existent, for in that case whatever existence it may appear to have in common parlance could be understood as having been borrowed from mind which as an object exists. But the Advaitin, we have seen, would not regard consciousness as neither existent nor non-existent.

If consciousness could at all belong to a substratum, the latter would have to be itself also subjective — a self that is often called 'rational', as distinct from mind, loosely called 'empirical'. To this, however, the Advaita reply would be straight and simple. It is that the rational self as so conceived is different only in name from pure subjectivity considered as existent (literally, pure subjectivity = pure existence).

When Cartesians, including Spinoza — and much later, Schelling — understood consciousness as belonging, as an attribute or aspect, to another principle called Substance or Indifference, this other principle was but Existence reified; only, while the Cartesians took it as a *definite* something Schelling took it as indefinite. The Advaitin, here, would only point out (i) that, metaphysically, Existence is but pure consciousness, space being an affair at a much lower level, viz. that of body long transcended, and (ii) that the theory of Existence as indefinite Indifference is only a re-statement of the Śaiva and Śākta position, already referred to, that existence is but the *that* aspect scarcely distinguishable as definite from the *what* = pure consciousness.

Hegel understands pure subjectivity as after all an abstraction — though a living abstraction at that, because it can operate by itself and weave out a whole system of abstractions — but he adds that as

these abstractions inevitably lack a sense of reality the whole system — which means, in effect, the basic pure subjectivity — has to concretize itself through dialectical amalgamation with its *other*, this *other* being nothing positive but just the self-negation of that subjectivity. Advaita would not very much question this mechanism of self-negation and dialectical amalgamation, for its own theory in this respect is not altogether different. It would only point out that the Hegelian notion of concretization of the abstract is in sharp contrast to the central Advaita thesis that the reality of a thing consists just in its essence, an essence which is freed from whatever entanglement it has with other things, whether those other things are definite positives or a dark indefinite background or even the mere self-negation of that essence.

Hegel insists indeed that true freedom consists in absorbing the *other* rather than in escaping from it. Somehow this is the dominant trend of western thought. But the Advaitin would, like some present-day Existentialists, prefer to argue as follows:

(i) The so-called concrete freedom is not attainable until one has first realized freedom-in-itself.

(ii) Otherwise, what Hegel calls concrete freedom might in some cases be a form of entanglement which is bondage to whatever degree.

(iii) Once freedom-in-itself is attained there is no need for getting entangled again.

(iv) This is true equally in the case of cognition, for introspection, as we have seen, is only half-free, the compulsion to refer still lingering — a compulsion that demands to be got rid of.

(v) Even the cognitions and actions of a *jīvanmukta*, i.e. of one who has attained freedom-in-itself but is yet living, fall short of the ideal, because they are impermanent and traceable to some last legacy of bondage.

The main point of the Advaitin is that whatever of subjectivity is realized as essence, there is no need for going back to the objects got over. *If one likes*, one *may* forgo this intrinsic joy of realization and turn to others for doing good to them and may even have a sort of vicarious joy; but one *need not*. Realization of subjectivity-by-itself is at least a full alternative to moral life that is said to be of intrinsic worth. The Advaitin just prefers the former. It is because he prefers this that he preaches *no-action* too. Not indeed complete no-action before full realization of subjectivity, but either partial

no-action before that or complete no-action after that. Partial no-action means that as a particular stage of subjectivity is attained we need not repeat the good actions that were necessary for coming up to that stage. But other good actions are necessary for further progress along the line. Necessary, of course, as only an extrinsic means! For, realization, at whatever stage, is *sui generis* — it is subjectivity discovering itself.

The Hegelians have spoken of another type of concrete freedom. It is the freedom enjoyed in all theoretical pursuit of Nature — the freedom of Science. In so far as Science is a dispassionate study it is free, and in so far as it is rich in content it is concrete — at least more concrete than the Advaitin's pure consciousness which either has no content or, at the most, looks dispassionately at one as in introspection. The Advaitin, however, would reply that introspection's dispassionate 'looking at' is just a step for it to realize its *in-itself*, and that once this in itself is realised there is no need felt for turning outward and looking at the contents once again, even to study them dispassionately. This does not, of course, prevent anyone from coming out of the shell. One may choose not to remain engrossed in the bliss of self-awareness but come out for dispassionate study of the contents, as in Science. But that is, at its best, only another alternative which the Advaitin does not, simply, prefer.

There is a third alternative too — one advocated by the Tāntrikas and probably also by Hegel. It is that every upward process of realization of pure subjectivity is, *in that very process*, equally a downward free construction in knowledge and creation in action. The Advaita has no preference for this alternative. Regarding ultimate alternatives, there is no scope for logical decision. Whatever decision one takes is either existential (the method being phenomenological) or pragmatic.

V

To turn now to the third question (c), namely, whether consciousness is at all realizable apart from mental states. Many philosophers in India and the West have not admitted this possibility. They cannot understand how there can be mere consciousness which is not some cognition, feeling or will. According to them, these states are themselves modes of consciousness, and they are modes exactly in the sense in which red, blue, yellow, etc. are modes of colour. There is no mere colour apart from these modes, so is the case with consciousness.

The Advaitin, however, would reply that such a thesis could at all be entertained if consciousness = subjectivity were regarded as an object — to be more precise, as an objective character of mental states. But that it is not so is clear, as we have seen, from the analysis of introspection as subjectivity proper realizing itself as freed from the mental states that are introspected. The Advaitin has also shown that the apparent subjectivity of these states are really either their objective phosphorescence or introspection remaining undistinguishedly fused with them.

In other ways too the Advaitin has sought to demonstrate the separateness of consciousness. One of these is the analysis of dreamless sleep and the other of the phenomenon that we sometimes know a thing *as unknown*. Let us see how.

On awaking from dreamless sleep I feel sure that during the period of the sleep there was no mental state. This assurance relating directly to something that is past cannot but be a case of memory. But nothing that was not once known can possibly be remembered. It follows that the absence-of-all-mental-states that is now remembered was somehow known during that dreamless sleep. It follows further that this *knowledge of*......could not have itself been a mental state, for all mental states were absent then. It must have, therefore, been mere consciousness standing apart from all mental states. This *knowledge of* ...... must have been introspection, it being presumed that if introspection can reveal a positive mental state it can also reveal tbe absence of all such states.

This absence as revealed in dreamless sleep is, according to the Advaitin, the primaeval object, the first object of introspection as its (introspection's) self-negation — a self-negation, again, that forms at the same time a dark positive ground capable of developing, in other interests, into different stages of objectivity and also into detailed objects. Objectivity as this primary self-negation *cum* dark positive ground is precisely what is known in Advaita as the principle of *ajñāna*. With this, however, we are not concerned in this paper. We are not also concerned immediately with another thing which, Advaita believes, we equally remember after awaking: it is that there was a feeling of peace too during the sleep. The only important point to note in this connection is that according to the Advaitin this feeling is no mental state: it is non-different from pure consciousness.

Another way in which the Advaitin seeks to demonstrate the separateness of conciousness is through the analysis of the phenomenon

he calls 'knowledge of a thing as unknown'. Normally, when we know a thing as such and such, some aspects of it are, *in the same cognitive situation,* implicity admitted, although they are not known in the way in which that thing is known. The *reality* of the thing, for example — meaning by that its being there (for whatever period) *prior to* the cognition — is admitted this way. This prior being of the thing is *known as unknown.*[4] In contrast, therefore, we should say that its being *now* and being *such and such* are *known as known*, the only intelligible meaning of the latter phrase being that these are known *as revealed through mental states.* It follows that its prior being is known as *not revealed through states*; from which, again, it follows that there is a kind of knowledge, however mysteriously related to the thing known, which is independent of mental states altogether. This is exactly what the Advaitin calls pure consciousness which not only, as already seen, reveals mental states but, as just seen, somehow reveals other things also, and in either case without any mental state intervening as a medium.

The two additional ways in which the Advaitin has sought to demonstrate the separateness of consicousness, viz. through the study of dreamless sleep and analysis of knowing-a-thing-as-unknown, are, however, neither of them convincing, if consciousness is not already taken as *subjectivity* and, therefore, virtually separate from mental states. There are people, for example, who hold that consciousness, even as introspection, is an object among objects, its subjectivity, like that of any other mental state called 'cognition', being only a relational character explicable as its being in a cognitive situation along with another which, as in relation to it, is, technically, *its* object. Such people, unable to recognise any intrinsic subjectivity of consciousness would interpret dreamless sleep, if there is any according to them, as only a *total blank*, not even with some consciousness of it at that stage. Awareness of this blank on awaking they would never interpret as *its* memory or retrospection but either as the memory of what was just before the blank coupled with the normal experience on awaking or, in case the period of dreamless sleep is very short, as that normal experience along with the *experience* that was before the blank, not the memory of that experience. The former alternative is maintained by those who hold that it is introspection which reveals an experience and the latter by those who, like Alexander and some Buddhists, hold that mental states are themselves self-revealing. In the former case the memory of the pre-sleep experience establishes the continuity of that experience with the post-sleep one and thereby proves the blank between the two, assuming of course, that memory refers to the past as past and direct experience carries with it its presentness as an overtone. In the latter case, the

blank period being very short, the pre-sleep experience continues with the post-sleep one and thereby exposes the blank, quite as much as two successive sounds expose the aching void in between, or as a ring perceived presents the emply space it has bounded. If the gap be long, the pre-sleep experience may be taken as revived in memory.

As for the phenomenon 'knowing something as unknown', those who are not prepared to admit consciousness as subjectivity will not hesitate to interpret this phenomenon differently. Reality of a thing that is known, whether equated with its being prior to its cognition or not, they would not for example understand as itself in any way known, but just being a postulate of all knowledge, meaning that it consists just in *that thing being known*. Reality of the thing known is, according to them, no content that is known: it is neither an immanent part of the thing known nor any content transcending it. The proposition 'A thing is real' is equivalent, according to them, to 'A thing is known'.[5]

A question is often asked as to whether consciousness — at least, specifically, I-consciousness — can be separated even from body. Dialectical Materialists hold that all forms of consciousness are somehow linked with physiological complications, though consciousness has, according to them, a cycle of life all its own, as reflecting or reacting upon, in specific autonomous manners, bodily or extra-bodily stimuli. Others, less revolutionary, hold that at least the sense of personal identity is no other than that of the identity of body.

To the Dialectical Materialists Advaita would reply as follows :—

First, Dialectical materialism has not distinguished between pure consciousness and mental states, and secondly, whether distinguished or not, consciousness has been understood throughout as an *object*, though otherwise qualitatively different. The question of linking consciousness to complications of body disappears altogether as soon as it is realized that it is subjectivity, i.e. freedom either from all that is *object* or as *in itself*. As object, consciousness can at the most be understood as an adjectival fringe of a highly complicated set of matter, called body; but as soon as these fringes are found to have specific behaviours of their own, irrespective of body, they, however manipulable cybernetically, appear to have attained a dignity of their own, which is none other than their realization of freedom, to whatever degree, from what they appear to have originated from. From the point of view of genesis the concept of evolution may connect them, through lower stages, with microcosmic matter, but the old problem of emergent *vs* mechanical evolution remains unsolved. The inevitable

logic of the theory of emergent evolution is that what emerges in a distinct form had been at the lower stage standing undistinguishedly fused. Emergence of X cannot be understood except as X realizing itself in freedom. Unless this is admitted there is no getting away from hiatus after hiatus, and the *unity* of matter, which these Dialectical Materialists vaunt of, disappears.

As for personal identity, another name of which is 'individuality of the subject', Advaita would not object to the view that it is due ultimately to its reference to body which alone is individual in itself. Only, the Advaitin would include mind also in his concept of body, mind being called 'subtle body' Whatever that may be, the net position of the Advaitin is that subjectivity as such is never individual, it appears to be so only so long as it refers, freely or as compelled, to mental states, i.e. to mind which is subtle body (and, through it, to the physical body), as in introspection.

The problem of real metaphysical significance is not whether personal identity is that of body or not, it is whether consciousness = subjectivity, understood as autonomous and, therefore, separate from body (including mind), can be individual. The Advaita answer is 'No'.

Yet, however, there are two questions he will have to answer in this connexion. First, supposing that it is not individual, should it on that account be *cosmic*, covering or referring to or being in some intelligible relation to other bodies and minds? Should it not be considered rather as neutral, neither individual nor cosmic? The second question is: Would the heavens fall if the free-est sujectivity were still individual? Free-est from all that is object, it may still fall short of the highest essence of man. There may be another course of advance even in the region of freedom, where the free *I* may have to encounter — it may be in supreme love — free — *you*s and *he*s and may only that way realize the cosmic Subjectivity as the truest immanent essence. These are all extremely important questions, but left unanswered here because of space-limitation of this paper.

1. The so-called objective space with fixed positions, distances and directions of objects is a conceptual construction.

2. Unconscious traces (*saṁskāras*) as never intuitively distinguishable I keep apart.

3. The advaitin has sometimes demonstrated the non-difference of pure consciousness, pure existence and pure bliss from one another very ingeniously through interpreting each in terms of double negation. We need not discuss that logical demonstration here.

4. There are also other cases of *knowing a thing as unknown.* Asking questions about a thing is one such case.

5. Asking questions about a thing may also be interpreted as no form of knowing the thing as unknown. It may well be interpreted as knowing that thing partly and partly not knowing it, and even then the part said to be known may often be second-hand, i.e. just supposed or entertained on the *ipse dixit* of others.

The Advaitins also hold that when we misperceive a rope as a snake, that false snake is known as unknown. Non-Advaitic thinkers have quite different theories of error.

Herbert Herring

THE CONCEPT OF APPEARANCE IN PLATO, ŚAṄKARA AND KANT

One of the perennial problems, of the cardinal questions in philosophy, is as to whether the human mind perceives, apprehends, knows the worldly things—and probably the world in its totality—as they really are, in their real structure or whether all human knowledge is restricted to what is given in space and / or time. And this gnoseological question implies the ontological one whether there are two different worlds, two different realms of Being: one world of the unchangeable, true and absolute Being and another one of the spatio-temporal matters of fact and events (our common and contingent world of experience), ruled by the laws of causality.

This question forms the core of *Plato's philosophy*; and some thousand years later it becomes the fundamental question of *Sankara's Advaita-Vedanta*; and again a thousand years later it lies at the bottom of *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*. In dealing with this question, the concept of *appearance* is the key-concept for all these three thinkers.

Let us first see how Plato treats this problem. In Book VII of Plato's famous dialogue *The State* Socrates tells a story which is meant to illustrate the difference between true knowledge and putative knowledge or ignorance, between the realms of reality and appearance. For this purpose he uses the imagery of a deep and dark cave where men live in very particular circumstances: their necks and legs are chained in such a way that they are unable to move or even to turn their heads, thus compelled to stare constantly at a wall in front of them. On this wall are seen the shadows of the things carried across the entrance of the cave, projected onto the wall by a bright light shining outside. Now it happens that one of the cave-dwellers gets free of his chains thus being enabled to turn round and direct his gaze towards the light. But since his eyes have been accustomed to

the darkness of the cave, he would, of course, at first be unable to stand the brightness of the light, and he would lose his orientation. Then somebody shows him the steep and narrow path upto the entrance of the cave, and gradually his eyes will become accustomed to the brightness of the light until, finally, he stands in the light itself. Having left the cave behind, he would soon become aware that the things he had been experiencing previously where but shadows, appearances as compared with the reality of their originals, and he would feel extremely happy to have escaped from the world of illusions.

Now, supposing this man would return to the cave and should try to convince the other cave-dwellers that all the things experienced by them were not real, were phantoms and illusions, they would certainly not believe him ; they would laugh at him and think either that his eyesight had been spoilt or that he was trying to lead them astrary, and if they could get hold of him, they would even kill him.

So far this parable. What does it mean? The cave obviously stands for the world of our everyday experience, the realm of what is given in space and/or time, the realm of appearances, of that which shows itself to man as the natural things and which, therefore, are taken for granted as being real, accepted as the only real beings. In this gloomy world of shadows (*skias*) men feel at home, it is their familiar environment which they trust. The things carried across the cave's entrance mean the real things in their essence or structure (eidos, idea). Of these the fire (symbolizing the sun which again is meant to symbolize the basic idea of everything being, Being as such, the Absolute, giving rise to all earthly beings as well as to our knowledge of these beings) throws shadows onto the wall in front of the cave-dwellers. These shadows or images are to men that which can be known by means of sense-experience and are, therefore, taken to be real and true.

The ascent to the entrance of the cave and towards the brightness of the light itself illustrates the gradual and difficult way from ignorance and lack of education (*apaideusia*) to knowledge and education (*paideia*), to true reality (*aletheia*). It has to be noticed that in order to gain a proper knowledge of the true reality it is not sufficient — according to Plato — to turn one's head only. We find, on the contrary, that he speaks of the necessity to turn round the whole person (*periagoge*) by which the following is meant : in order to leave behind our putative knowledge of appearances (*sophia*) in favour of the knowledge of the true and real beings (philosophia), it is necessary to turn away completely from our world of everyday experience and instead to surrender to the world of ideas, the original forms, the Being in its perfection.

And this Becoming-aware-of-the-perfect-Being takes place through a gradual progression. There is no immediate transition from ignorance to knowledge but a gradual approach passing through the realm of what Plato calls *doxa alethes*, meaning this process of getting closer to truth, which, in its real essence, has not yet become evident.

The relation of these two worlds — the natural world of appearances in space and / or time on the one hand and the metaphysical world of the real Being on the other — has to be seen in a four-fold manner.

1. as participation of the appearances in the real things or ideas (*methexis*)
2. as representation of the ideas in the appearances (*parusia*)
3. as the relation of original and image (*paradeigma*)
4. as imitation of the ideas through the appearances (*mimesis*)

Being in its absoluteness, that which is both the original root of all worldly beings as well as the source of all (actual and possible) knowledge, this Absolute Plato calls the Idea of the Good (*tu agathu idea*),— a somewhat misleading expression since it has nothing to do, primarily, with the morally good. The Greek term *agathon* means originally that which makes something suitable for something else, that which imparts reality and thus value and goodness. This ultimate and absolute idea is also called *tu ontos to phanotaton*, i. e. the plain appearing, the Being in its revelation (namely to the one who knows), and in this sense the idea of the *agathon* may just as well be called *to alethestaton*, i.e. the highest, unconditional truth : " That which imparts truth to the Known and simultaneously the ability of knowing to the Knower, that I call the idea of the Good. " *The State*, book VI, 508 e; see also 517 c 4).

If we now turn especially to the concept of *appearance* as used by Plato in order to characterize the worldly beings, it has first to be seen that the appearances are not nothing ; they are not called *me on* but *skias*, i.e. shadows or images. They are not the real Being, but they are, nevertheless, existent, namely as images thus participating in the Being of the ideas without ever being able to reach the perfection of the ideas or even to reflect them adequately. In this sense the appearances may be called illusions causing in us the impression that they are real beings, the impression of being the real. But since human beings themselves are — as existing in space and time — finite beings, they are unable to become aware of the absolute truth, at least by means of sense-experience and rational thinking. This awareness occurs only when we transcend this world of sense-perception towards

a synoptic intuition, when we go beyond the natural things; it occurs only by means of an unconditional submission to the origin and final aim of all beings.

Now it is very interesting and even exciting to note in which way the basic theories of this Socratic-Platonic world-view are rediscovered in Advaita-Vedānta more than a thousand years later, particularly the theory of the so-called *ontological dualism* which was and still is, as you know, one of the fundamental themes in metaphysics. But is the statement that Advaita-Vedānta implies an ontological dualism not a contradiction in terms ? We shall see that it is not, definitely not for Śaṅkara's doctrine of Advaita-Vedānta. In dealing with Śaṅkara we shall confine ourselves, on the whole, to his commentaries on the *Vedānta Brahma Sūtras* which contain his most important philosophical ideas. And in doing so, we want to stress particularly the passage in book II, 1, 14 wherein he extensively discusses the Being of Brahman, the Being of the world and the question of their interrelation. Referring to the corresponding passages in the *Upaniṣads*, he states that we cannot but acknowledge the following doctrine as true :

> "In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of a salty steppe — for the nature of the water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next......, so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman."

It has to be noticed that Śaṅkara does not say that this manifold world has no existence; he says that it has no existence "apart from Brahman" and this means — positively speaking — that it also is Brahman, — Brahman, of course, not in his absolute reality (*pāramārthika*) but as the world of appearances, the world of causation and contingency, i. e. nature: Brahman as *vyāvahārika*. To the human mind the world is appearance of the Absolute; it is not the Absolute itself, and compared with its perfection it is non-existent, even Nothing. It is only the phenomenal field of the Absolute, in so far as the Absolute appears as plurality, as manifold. Śaṅkara always and persistently describes this world in space and time as empirical, as objective, as existent but never as real.

Śaṅkara relates the appearance-structure of the world to the imperfection and insecurity of human knowledge, thus, for instance, when he says :

> "...... as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of action is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects ... as forming part and belonging to his self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all."

This passage reminds us of Plato's parable where man as long as he has not yet reached the realm of the light itself, i.e. as long as he has not yet been enlightened, mistakes the images for the real and true Being. But for those who have entered the realm of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist as real but as a mere illusion, as *māyā*.

We do not intend to discuss the terms *māyā* and *avidyā*, key-terms in Śaṅkara's thinking, in detail. For our present purposes the following explanation will be sufficient:

Māyā has two characteristic qualities, the quality of concealing the one and true reality (*āvaraṇa*) and the quality of misinterpreting, of misrepresenting this true reality by the human mind (*vikṣepa*). In this second meaning as *vikṣepa, māyā* is identical with *avidyā*, i.e. misunderstanding or putative knowledge. The inclination of the limited human mind to take the one and only real to be manifold or, vice versa, to take the manifoldness of our common experience for the one and only real is expressed by the Sanskrit term *avidyā*. *Māyā* and *avidyā* are thus synonymous: looking upon the problem of appearance and reality from the objective side we may speak of *māyā*, and looking upon it from the subjective side we may speak of *avidyā*. (See Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, 8, xxxiii)

There can be no doubt that for Śaṅkara the phenomenal world is rooted in the Absolute, in Brahman, for otherwise there would be something else besides the Absolute, and if so the Absolute would not be the Absolute. Thus he says in his Commentaries on the *Vedānta/Brahma-Sūtras*, I, 4, 23, that "from Brahman proceed the origination, sustentation and retractation of this world." Brahman is the operative cause (causa formalis and causa efficiens) of the world; but Brahman is at the same time the material cause (causa materialis). He is the operative cause "because there is no other ruling principle", and he is the material cause "because there is no other substance from which the world could originate". With regard to Brahman the distinction between material cause and operative cause, which applies to worldly things only, makes really no sense.

At some other place in his Commentary (I, 1, 11) Śaṅkara explains how we have to understand the origin and structure of the empirical world :

> "Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in form of various dignity and power ..."

Thus we may call *māyā* both "the principle of cosmic illusion" (see Santosh Sengupta in *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. II, p. 197, University of Madras, 1968) as well as "the infinite power of creative self-expression and self-manifestation of the Absolute in terms of relativity and under the aspect of finitude" (see V. Madhusudan Reddy, *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. II, p. 261).

Because this empirical world, the world of appearances (*saṁsāra*) is self-expression and self-manifestation of the Absolute it would be wrong to call it simply non-existent : the phenomenal world is not the imaginary (*asat*) but the illusory (*mithyā*), that which we at first sight take to be the real but, after having been enlightened by the Absolute, unmask as the non-real. *Mithyā* means something different the real (*sat, satyaṁ*), but it is, nevertheless, not irreal or *asat*.

In his paper on *Swamy Brahmabandhab Upadhyay's Concept of Māyā* (in *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. II, p. 266 ff., University of Madras 1968) Ignatius Hirudayam has expressively pointed out the very close connection between the concept of appearance in Advaita-Vedānta, the New Platonism of St. Augustine and the Scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas. St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas also describe the Being of the world and of the worldly beings — when compared to the perfection of the Absolute — as shadows, images, even nothing. But in this context he also points to the paradox that arises if one asks the question (unsolved by Śaṅkara and probably unsolvable in principle) why there is *māyā* and *avidyā* at all ; why there is a phenomenal world, a world of imperfections and error besides the real world of highest perfection and truth ; why the perfect and true reality represents and manifests itself to man in such an imperfect and misleading way.

Recalling, before proceeding to Kant, the question we have asked at the outset of our discourse on Śaṅkara, namely, whether the thesis

that Advaita-Vedānta implies an ontological dualism was not a contradiction in terms, I think we are permitted to state the following:

The idea of an ontological dualism is not identical with the idea of the existence of two separate and completely different worlds in the metaphysical sense. It does not mean that besides and apart from the eternal world of real entities which, in its ultimate structure, is inconceivable by the human understanding there exists a world of appearances, the realm of our human experience, our common world in space and time, or nature. Such a theory we would call "ontical or metaphysical dualism". The term "ontological dualism", on the contrary, means that there is only one single world existent which is considered under two different aspects: Due to the limitations of our minds (which in itself is due to the finitude of man himself) we are bound to restrict our scientific knowledge to what is given to us under the forms of sense-experience and rational discourse, i.e., things as they appear to us. This is the one aspect. The other one is that of the same world in its real ontical structure, apart from its being ontologically linked up with the human mind. Although we cannot prove this aspect of the world scientifically or by rational discourse, there can be no doubt that things exist apart from the human mind; for, how could we talk of appearances unless there is something to appear?

Taken in this sense, the philosophy of Plato as well as the Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṅkara are — although ontical or metaphysical Monisms— ontological dualisms. They leave no doubt that there is but the one and unique reality which, due to the structure of our minds, is represented to us as divided into different realms and modes of being.[1]

Being fully aware of this somewhat tragical limitations of the human mind, Plato and Śaṅkara nevertheless appeal to man, to do away with these limitations, to transcend the realm of appearances and to surrender completely to the realm of absolute reality. It is precisely this possibility which is rigorously denied by Kant and his critical or transcendental Idealism.

According to Kant, all human knowledge is restricted to what is given by the senses in space and (or) time by the a priori forms of intuition, and by means of the categories, the a priori forms of our understanding. The being, experienced under these conditions, he calls appearances, abolishing completely any speculation about things as they might be in themselves.

In this context of appearance and thing-in-itself Kant draws a distinction between empirical and transcendental reality: In saying

that appearances have empirical reality he means that they are objects of sense-experience. Ascribing, on the other hand, transcendental or absolute reality to things-in-themselves means that they cannot be experienced, that they are transcending all possible human experience. All knowledge is some kind of a subject-object relation. As to the real structure of the thing, independent of this subject-object-relation, no statement of any scientific relevance is possible. If we try to transcend the realm of appearances, our knowledge deteriorates to putative knowledge or illusion.

So we find that both Plato and Śaṅkara hold the position that the realm of appearances is a vanishing world of illusions and ignorance, whereas Kant declares that every thought which tries to transcend the phenomenal world will necessarily fall into uncritical and therefore unfruitful metaphysical speculation. Kant summarises the result of the Transcendental Analytic thus :

> "Transcendental Analytic has therefore yielded us this important result, that the understanding a priori can never do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience ; and as nothing can be an object of experience except the appearance, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are principles only for the exposition of appearances..." (*Critique of Pure Reason* A 246 f./B 303)

One has to realize that also Kant's Theory of the Scope and the Limits of all human knowledge as represented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can only be called an ontological not an ontical dualism since it is one and the same thing which is taken in a "twofold meaning", namely on the one hand (related to intuition and understanding) as appearance and on the other hand (considered as totally unrelated to either of these a priori forms of experience) as thing-in-itself.

Thus when Kant distinguishes appearance and thing-in-itself he does not at all make a metaphysical or real difference of two things but only an ontological distinction or — as he would prefer to call it — a distinction in transcendental or critical reasoning.

> "This was the result of the whole transcendental aesthetic, and it really follows quite naturally from the concept of an appearance in general, that something must correspond to it, which in itself is not an

> appearance, because an appearance cannot be anything by itself, apart from our mode of representation. Unless, therefore, we are to move in a constant circle, we must admit that the very word appearance indicates a relation to something the immediate representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is founded) must be something by itself that is a thing independent of our sensibility." (A 251 f.)

And in the *Transcendental Dialectic*, in those passages where Kant tries to explain once more the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves, we find that he, even in his use of forms and phrases, comes very close to Sankara, for instance, in the following passage:

> "......since no other objects can be given us but those of the senses, and nowhere but in the possible experience, nothing can be an object to us, if it does not presuppose that totality of all empirical reality, as the condition of its possibility. Owing to a natural illusion" — please note this sentence carefully— "we are led to consider a principle which applies only to the objects of our senses as a principle valid for all things; and thus we will take the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things as appearances, by omitting this limitation, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general." (A 582/B 610)

These few quotations already prove sufficiently that Kant, in restricting all possible human knowledge to the realm of appearances, does not at all deny the reality of things as such. They are, on the contrary, as we have seen, the only true reality since appearance is always appearance of something else, which, in itself is not appearance. What he denies is the possibility of knowing, of experiencing things in their Being as such, in their fundamental metaphysical structure.

This restriction does not only show the imperfection, the limitations, the finiteness of the human understanding but also the imperfections, limitations, the finiteness of man himself, his being a creature in comparison with the original creative po wer which is the regulative idea of moral action and religious belief but which by no means is an object of rational experience.

It would be very interesting to follow up the discussion of the concept "appearance" in the post-Kantian philosophy, for instance in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (1893) wherein he, on the whole, adheres to the line of Plato and New-Platonism, or in Heidegger's *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1929) where he — like Kant — difines appearance as the real being in its representation as an object of finite knowledge, or — again — in the Swiss philosopher Paul Häberlin who — also relying on Kant — states that appearance must neither be separated from something underlying, nor from the subject to which a thing appears as appearance. (Logik, 1947, p. 103.)

We must refrain from doing so in the course of this lecture, since, due to the time-limit we have just been able to give a brief sketeh of a subject which deserves to be discussed in much more detail.

This comparison between Plato, Śaṅkara and Kant, exemplified through the concept of "appearance", may probably be an insufficient one, but I hope that it will not be considered a "cheap comparison", since I had not the slightest intention to diminish the individual originality of these great thinkers. On the contrary, if we consider the history of philosophy not as a kaleidoscope of more or less contradicting thoughts and systems of thoughts but the ever anew tackling of the same basic problems, such as being and unity, unity and plurality, reality and appearance, by the various thinkers throughout the ages, then we think that such a comparison is not only useful but necessary in order to reach at the real meaning of philosophia perennis.

And it is exactly in this sense of philosophia perennis that I understood Prof. Bhattacharyya's addressing Prof. Mahadevan on the *ṣaṣṭiābdapūrti* celebrations last Saturday when he mentioned that Prof. Mahadevan was inclined to see an Advaitin in every philosopher, that means, seeing all the relevant thinkers as longing for the one and only principle of reason and reality, regardless of the various ways of approach.

[1] With regard to this distinction there are only very few philosophical systems which could be called ontologically as well as ontically monistic, as for example absolute materialism and absolute idealism. Needless to say that neither Plato nor Sankara fall into this classification.

A. G. Javadekar

SOME UNPARALLELED DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF ŚAṄKARĀCĀRYAS PHILOSOPHY

1. *The Significance of Comparative Philosophy*

Since the simultaneous studies of the Indian and the Western Philosophies there has been a natural tendency to seek comparisons between the two systems of thought; and there is no doubt that such a development of comparative Philosophy has yielded to some extent fruitful results. After all, the human mind is the same everywhere and there is no wonder if the efforts to seek truth find culmination in thoughts which have a good deal of parallelism among them.

The object of this paper, however, is to show that there are some distinctive features of the Advaita Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkara which have either no parallel or very little parallel in the Western philosophical thought. Even within Indian philosophy and in especially the other schools of Vedānta, though there are some general features which are held in common, there are certain aspects of the Śāṅkara school of Advaitism which are indeed very unique.

While whole-heartelly accepting the fact that a study of comparative philosophy does serve a useful purpose of mutual understanding, it is suggested that the spirit of over-enthusiasm should not blind us to the genuinely unique features of a philosophical system. The Nyāya concept of *vāda* or debate consists in arriving at agreements among the different parties. It consists in a sincere effort to see where they agree and where they disagree; and if possible to see whether the points of disagreement must inevitably remain so or that even there an acceptable reconciliation could be reached. Even after this spirit of reaching unanimity, certain features of any great system of philosophy would remain so distinctive and so unique, that they

would constitute a challenge to the others, either to be accepted or rejected.

It is to such unparalleled features of the Advaitic thought that this paper seeks to draw attention.

2. Śaṅkara's Brahman is devoid of internal differences

The kind of Non-dualistic Absolutism that has been advocated by Śaṅkara is uncompromising. It is no use to see parallelism with the Western Monistic thinkers, simply because they advocate Monism. Neither Parmenides' Being, nor Plato's Good, nor Aquinas' God, nor Spinoza's Substance, nor the Absolute of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet or others is comparable to Śaṅkara's Brahman.

On the essential side Brahman is regarded as Nitya, Śuddha, Buddha, and Mukta it is also described as at once Sat, Cit, and Ānanda.

Brahman is such absolute Being that it is devoid of a heteros in the form of a generic or specific difference or any internal differentiation (*sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda-śūnya*). In this respect even the other Vedāntic schools have no parallel, especially because their conception of the Absolute is agreeable to the internal differences. Thus Rāmānuja's Brahman is internally differentiated by the world of matter and the innumerable individual selves. Brahman becomes qualified by them (*viśiṣṭa*) similarly in Vallabha's system *Sat* is identified with matter in which both *cit* and *ānanda* are veiled (*tirohita*) and *cit* is identified with the countless individual selves in whom *ānanda* is veiled. Only in God all these aspects of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are found in full form. Nimbārka makes a mysterious compromise between identity and difference. Madhva's monism (if so recognised at all) is restricted only to God who alone is independent, while he advocates the reality of the five-fold differences. There are other varieties of Absolutism like *Śaktiviśiṣṭādvaita* or the internal distinction of Śiva and Śakti though they are inseparable principles. Most of these Absolutisms are personalistic in character while Śaṅkara's is impersonalistic.

3. Impersonalistic versus Personalistic Absolutism

Those of the Western thinkers who tend to be absolutistic have their affinities with the personalistic Vedāntic schools of absolutism, but they find it very difficult to swallow the impersonalistic Absolutism of Śaṅkara. Especially those among them whose thinking is conditioned by the Christian concept of theism fail to feel happy with Śaṅkara's apparently abstract and characterless Brahman. This explains why

Thibaut, for example, would favour Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Vedānta-sūtras as more faithful to the original philosophical position of Bādarāyaṇa than Śaṅkara's interpretation. While a mystic philosopher like R. D. Ranade would insist upon the unique Absolutism of Bādarāyaṇa.

4. *Jñāna and Ānanda not adjectival to Brahman*

Another unique feature of Śaṅkara's Absolute is that it is of the nature of consciousness or knowledge (*jñānasvarūpa*), and not either the knower or the known. The Upaniṣads clearly maintain this e.g. *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ Brahman*; or again, *prajñānaṁ Brahma*. Of course, there are passages where Ātman or Brahman is referred to as the knower (*vijñātā*), or the object of knowledge; but this description is not in the primary but secondary sense. As Ātman he is the ultimate subject (*viṣayin*) or witness consciousness (*sākṣi caitanya*). Ātman is again an object of our enquiry e.g. *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ* etc. Brahman, from that point of view, becomes a worthy object of our philosophical investigation. But neither its subjecthood nor objecthood is Brahman's essential nature. The tripartite division of the knower, the instrument of knowledge and the object of knowledge (*tripuṭi*) does not apply to Brahman. There is no parallel to such conception of the Absolute.

More than the above conceptions of Brahman, is the unique conception of Brahman as *ānandasvarūpa*. While the Vedāntic schools accept this following the Upaniṣadic tradition, the western types of Absolutism have no such parallel. Here, too again, Brahman is not to be regarded as blissful, but bliss itself (*raso vai saḥ*). Ānanda is not a modification (*vikāra*) of Brahman, nor a quality as the other Vedāntins would think it to be, but the very substantive stuff (*ānandaghana*) of Brahman.

Those of the Vedāntins who take the adjectival, or qualitative descriptions of Brahman as final are not able to account for the substantive use of the terms *jñāna* and *ānanda* as the descriptions of Brahman.

5. *Positive description of Brahman not final*

All this is well and good so far as the positive understanding of Brahman goes. Indeed it is the indeterminate (*nirviśeṣa*) nature of Brahman that for Śaṅkara is more important and hence the significance of *neti neti* or negative characterisations of Brahman.

In this respect it must be remembered that even though the essence of Brahman is *saccidānanda* or that Brahman is indeed *nitya-*

śūddha-buddha-muktasvabhāva, this positive account of the ultimate reality is the best that could be given from the phenomenal, or pragmatic, or conceptual point of view. But the *paramārtha* consists in transcending this positive description. These descriptions have their correlative opposites. Our understanding of the positive terms is determined by their negative counterparts, since for us only the dualistic logic is naturally and habitually meaningful. The ultimate reality transcends the dualism of being and non-being or nothing (*sadasatparam*). Compare also the Nāsadīya-sūkta: *nāsadāsīnnosadāsittadānīm*: Then there was neither being nor non-being.

Thus the Absolute transcends all human approaches and hence is described as supersensuous, supra-rational, supra-logical and supra-ethical. No categories or concepts are adequately applicable to it. The dialectical Advaita Vedānta is an elaboration of this destructive criticism of other categories.

6. *Brahman is neither Being nor Substance*

Just as Brahman transcends the concept of Being, it transcends the concept of Substance too. According to the Vaiśeṣika system there are seven categories: *Dravya guṇa* etc. Brahman does not fall under any of these, since all of these are intellectual ways of the classification of the knowable objects which constitute the universe. More or less similar is the position of Aristotle's predicables and Kant's categories. Padārtha according to Vaiśeṣika is that which is knowable and nameable (*jñeyam-abhidhevam*). Brahman is not an object of knowledge (*viṣaya* or *jñeya*) nor it has any name or form (*nāma-rūpa*). In so far as Brahman does not fall within the categorizable, knowable being, it follows that Brahman is not a *dravya* or substance. Brahman is a *padārtha* only, in the grammatical sense, and an object of enquiry (*jijñāsya*) in the ordinary sense.

7. *Śaṅkara versus Spinoza, Hegel and Bradley:*

The Cartesian conception of substance as that which is in itself and conceived through itself, is slightly different from the Vaiśeṣika concept. But whether for Descartes, or for Spinoza, or for Kaṇāda substance constitutes a substratum of qualities and actions. Spinoza's substance is indeterminate but only in virtue of its possessing infinite attributes. This view of Spinoza is more like that of Rāmānuja than that of Śaṅkara. Substance and attribute, subject and predicate, subject and object, are correlative pairs of terms and are meaningful within the knowable world of objects. Śaṅkara's concept of Brahman transcends all dualism, and hence the category of substance too is

transcended. Further, Spinoza's substance is conceivable through itself by definition, while Brahman is conceivable only from a lower standpoint. Brahman is not essentially an abstract intellectual concept but a transcendental experience or consciousness. These terms viz. experience or consciousness are not to be understood in the normal psychological sense, which has its inherent limitations. Hegel identifies the rational and the real, thus identifying logic and metaphysics and extending the laws of thought to those of reality. But Śaṅkara's Brahman surpasses the conceptual, categorial or logical knowledge. Thus in a way it is agnosticism. But this agnosticism only means that Brahman lies beyond the epistemological field of *pramāṇas*. Bradley does identify reality with experience, but this experience is essentially empirical or psychological, only carried on beyond the limits of the individual's finite experience. It is ordinary experience raised to infinity. Aparokṣānubhūti or direct intuitive experience of Brahman transcends the experiences of the waking, dreaming and the sound sleep states and admits of no quantitative degrees. It is the mystical *turīyāvasthā*.

8. Unity of self and Brahman

Unlike the western Absolutism Brahman is identified with Ātman, and as the foundational consciousness it is the source of the pramāṇas themselves. This is the import of the Upaniṣadic passage; expressing the difficulty of knowing the substratum of knowledge : *yenedaṁ sarvaṁ vijānāti taṁ kena vijānīyāt, vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāt.* That because of which everything becomes known how can that be known? That which is by nature the subject of knowledge, by what can it be made the object of knowledge? Thus epistemologically it is *aprameya.*

Not only there is absolute identity between Brahman and Ātman, but it is again, the Advaita Vedānta alone which emphatically asserts the theory of the unity of self (*ātmaikatvavāda*).[1] There are different varieties of idealism and humanism maintained by the eastern and the western thinkers, but none of them has ever advocated the oneness of self. The Upaniṣadic philosophy as interpreted by Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara upholds the fundamental sameness of the self in everything and in every individual. The absolutists who are very vociferous about the unity of existence are reluctant to grant this unity to the self. While they are prepared to accept the qualitative monism of the spirits they have insisted upon their quantitative plurality. It is understandable that the Christian background of the Absolutists in the west should result in upholding the pluralism of spirits, but it is astonishing that the great heritage of the Upaniṣadic philosophy in India has not been properly reflected in the non-Śaṅkarite Vedāntic

schools in so far as their advocacy of the spiritual pluralism is concerned.

9. *Ātmaikatvavāda alone adequate basis of Ethics*

It is this theory of the unity of self that provides a firm basis for the highest moral principles. The whole world is an alterego, whether in the human, animate or inanimate form. In all apparent self-sacrifice there is self-realization. The service of humanity is not a service done to others; it is indeed service unto oneself appearing as others. The Biblical principle, "Do unto others as you would be done by" is good so far as it goes. But it suffers from the natural limitations of dualism. Morality founded on this principle is bilateral and reciprocal. It is based on the expectation of response, and hence smells of commercial relationship of give and take. It tends to be pragmatic and utilitarian. But the worse defect of this principle is that it confines moral behaviour to the narrow field of humanity. The ethics of Advaitism is not merely humanitarian, but the entire animate and the inanimate existence too constitute the field of moral action. Thus a man has duties to perform towards the animal, the vegetable and the physical existenee without any reciprocal obligations on their part. This Vedāntic conception is not what is fashionable today as *mānavatāvāda*, but *bhūtadaya* or *sarvabhūtahitaratiḥ* which constitutes the essence of *dharma*. A man's duties are unilateral and are unexpectant of any gains in return. Virtue is its own reward, for, all life of duty is a life of self-fulfilment. It is not only the human beings, but the whole world, the kingdom of ends, because it is nothing other than one's self, constituting one family (*vasudhaiva-kuṭumbakam*).

The charge usually made against Advaitism that it has no scope for ethics and religion is thus based upon a misunderstanding both of Advaita Vedānta on the one side, and of the nature of ethics and religion on the other. As shown above the ethical life itself shades into religon.

10. *Śaṅkara's Dharmavāda*

There is no example of Western philosophical absolutism which has become a foundation of a world-religion. But Śaṅkara's Advaita is at once a philosophy and religion of the highest order. On this count Śaṅkara's contribution is perhaps the greatest. It is not possible to elaborate this aspect within the short space of this paper. But only a suggestion should be enough.

There are four main motives in the various systems of Indian philosophy, viz., Bhogavāda, Apavargavāda, Bhogāpavargavāda, and

Dharmavāda.[2] The world is looked upon either as the field of enjoyment, or as something that desrves to be renounced. (*bhogāpavargārthaṁ dṛśyaṁ — Yoga-sūtra*, II, 18). While Cārvāka looks upon the world as only a means of enjoyment, Buddhism as something to be renounced only, and the rest of the systems, heterodox or orthodox, including the Vaiṣṇava schools of Vedānta, consider it as a hindrance on the path of liberation and hence deserves in one way or the other to be renounced ultimately. The original Vedic tradition, however, is not disjunctive in this regard. It teaches to enjoy through renunciation (*tena tyaktena bhuñjīthāḥ — Īśopaniṣad*). This tradition is kept up by Śaṅkara in his two-fold concept of *dharma.*[3] There is no either or between renunciation and action, between *sāṅkhya* and *yoga*, between *sannyāsa* and *karma*. Both these are simultaneous, and are in fact one. Thus the world is not to be renounced, but preserved as a fieled of ethico-religious action (*dharmakṣetra*) in a spirit of detachment. The *dharmavāda* of Advaita Vedānta requires that one's duty is done without attachment to egoism of agency of action or to the fruit thereof. Dharmavāda is thus far from escapism. It is indeed a free yoking of onself into an inevitable duty. Śaṅkara's own life is the best example of this *dharmavāda* of a *jīvanmukta*.

1. cf. *ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante, Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I, 1.

2. cf. Śaṅkara's refutation of Sāṅkhya in the *Tarkapāda* of *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*: *pradhānapravṛtteḥ prayojanaṁ vivektavyaṁ bhogo vā syādaparyo vobhayaṁ veti*, II, 2, 6.

3. *dvividho hi vedokto dharmaḥ pravṛttilakṣaṇo nivṛttilakṣaṇaśca, Gītābhāṣya*, I, 1.

R. K. Tripathi

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND WESTERN THOUGHT

Quite a variety of absolutisms are found in the west and it is always possible to compare Advaitism with one or the other type. But we feel that comparisons are too easily drawn and due attention is not paid to the distinction. If only to appreciate the peculiarities of different systems, it is more important to draw distinctions. We therefore propose to draw attention to certain peculiarities of Advaitism which distinguish it from western types of absolutism. In our analysis of these peculiarities, their justification too will be discernible as these are the cardinal features of Advaitism.

I

Advaitism is very often described as a kind of monism. But it would be well to remember that Advaitism or non-dualism is not mere monism. The emphasis here is on non or negation, the negation of all kinds of duality or difference. As is well known, difference or *bheda* is of three kinds — *svagata* (internal), *svajātīya* (that between individuals of the same class) and *vijātīya* (that between different species). A mere monism may not allow the second and the third kinds of difference, but it is compatible with the reality of the first kind of *bheda*. *Brahma-pariṇāmavāda* for example is monistic but not advaitic. All the there kinds of difference are rejected by Advaitism. For the same reason, Advaitism cannot accept a view of ultimate reality as a person as is advocated by theism. The ultimate for Vedānta must be free from all difference, but the penultimate or Īśvara can be conceded to be the highest person. The distinction between Brahman and Īśvara is only logical or epistemological and not ontological.

Western thought generally speaking seems to shudder to think of the falsity of all difference. Even those who are inclined to deny the

reality of difference go only as far as the doctrine of identity-in-difference. It is felt that identity without difference would be pure blank and mere nothing, at least the difference between the self and not-self must be admitted. It is not realized that the absolute ceases to be the absolute and infinite to the extent it depends on duality and difference. Nor only that, it will be impossible to know or realize the absolute if it has anything different from the self. The Advaitic absolute excludes nothing as it is the self of everything (*ātmā sarvasya ātmā*). Advaitism believes in the doctrine of pure identity and holds that all difference presupposes it. That identity cannot be known without difference does not prove that identity cannot be without difference. The absolute as the universal self shines in its own light (*svayaṁjyoti*). In sleep there is consciousness without consciousness of objects.

Some western thinkers — Plotinus, Spinoza and in contemporary times Heidegger — are found to be talking of Being, Pure Being, the ground of Being. But they cannot be called Advaitic. It is one thing to speculate about the unity of existence and it is quite another to provide a systematically and critically worked out theory of falsity or of the relation between reality and appearance. It is not enough for philosophy to intuit mystically the oneness of all existence. A critical refutation of the claim of plurality to be real is necessary; philosophy should be able to show how plurality is able to put forth a claim for reality. Hegel and Bradley no doubt make a dialectical approach but they do not find plurality as absolutely false. Advaitism is neither an intuitive assertion of identity nor a rational synthesis of plurality. It is rather a critical awareness of the falsity of differenre; identity is arrived at by negation (*neti neti.*)

Being false, difference can be only due to ignorance, ignorance which forges or fabricates it, superimposes it on the real and makes it appear as real. The fact of super-imposition explains two things — the reason why difference appears to be real and also the reason why it must be rejected in order to arrive at identity. The doctrine of *adhyāsa* or super-imposition is thus one of the most distinguishing features of Advaitism. On this crucial point, not only western thinkers, but even the Mādhyamika, one of the most critical systems of India, seem to fumble. The point is that if the appearance or the natural view of things is true, then there is no need for the search of reality i.e., philosophy. And if the appearance is false, then it must be grounded in something or else it will be independent and absolute. The absolute having no particularity cannot be aggressive or hostile to anything and so even the false can sit on it and claim reality. The Vedānta therefore is keen about clearing or negating our first view of things which

covers reality; it is essentially critical. The peculiarity of Vedānta is to start with the problem of *adhyāsa* and *avridyā* and to reach reality by negation.

II

It may appear from what has been said about the dialectical demonstration of the falsity of difference that Advaita Vedānta can be purely a rationalistic system or that the truth of Vedānta can be reached exclusively on the basis of reason. Is a purely rationalistic absolutism such as that of Hegel or Bradley not possible? Probably in their anxiety to make Advaita independent of *śruti*, some exponents of Advaita would take this view. Śaṅkara's introduction to his commentary on the Advaita Prakaraṇa of the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* lends an apparent support to the view that the Advaita can be established purely on the basis of reason. Śaṅkara says, *śakyate tarkeṇa api jñātum* (the Advaitic truth can be known by reason also). But we ask: is it a matter of choice for us to know Brahman either by reason alone or with the help of *śruti*? This is an important issue and we mnst be clear about the Vedāntic position. If Brahman could be known by reason alone, *śruti* would be no more indispensable, and it would be difficult to understand those statements in the Upaniṣads as well as in Śāṅkara Bhāṣya where unaided reason has been clearly declared as incompetent to know Brahman.

Here we may first of all point out that in the above statement Śaṅkara does not say *tarka mātreṇa api* (by reason alone); he says *tarkeṇa api* (by reason also). Secondly, it should also be noted that this statement occurs after the Āgama Prakaraṇa where Advaita has already been demonstrated on the basis of *śruti*. Finally we should remember that the Advaita has two aspects — the positive and the negative, the reality of Brahman and the falsity of the world. Reason can at best succeed, by pointing out relativity and contradition, only in proving the falsity of appearance. But that is not the whole truth; merely by proving the falsity of duality one cannot have the positive knowledge of Brahman either as *saccidānanda* or as one with our innermost self. Purely on the basis of reason, Kant was able to show that what we know is only appearance, but he could not give us any positive knowledge of the unconditioned. And even the Mādhyamika has to depend on tradition, mere dialectic is directionless.

Our contention therefore is that for Advita as a philosophy, *śruti* and reason are both necessary but neither is sufficient. *Śriut* is not sufficient because there is the need to interpret and understand it in a consistent manner. Śruti is not a treatise, but a record of revelation.

Also the language of *śruti* being concerned with the transcendent cannot be literal. So reason is necessary to interpret the *śruti* in a consistent and intelligible manner. Reason is necessary also to answer possible objections against the teaching of the *śruti*. The content is supplied by the *śruti* and the form is given by reason.

But although reason is necessary, it is not sufficient. This is because reason by itself is only formal and empty; it is only critical and not cognitive of any reality. Apriorism or the belief that reason can know reality a priori is one of the basic fallacies of western thought. The only alternative to apriorism in the west is empiricism; the remedy is worse than the disease. But in India apriorism and empiricism are both rejected and philosophy turns to listen to *śruti*. What cannot be seen must be heard about. Reason whether in science or in philosophy stands in need of some data which for science comes from sense experience and for philosophy from revelation or the experience of the transcendent. Reason alone can never give us existence or reality. Even in the empirical sphere, we cannot be sure of the existence of anything on the basis of inference alone; on the basis of smoke we can only say that fire should be there and not that it is there. It is more so in the sphere of philosophy. Reason can at best indicate some possibility, it cannot give us categorical assurance. For Vedānta the existence of Brahman as the cause of the world is not proved by reason, it is revealed by *śruti*. The Kantian criticisms do not apply to Vedānta. The world would be absolute unless it is grounded in something and *śruti* tells us that the ground of the world is Brahman.

The west does occasionally recognise the limits of reason, but it does not appreciate the importance of *śruti*. If all the natural sources of knowledge are necessarily dependent upon and confined to perception, then either no knowledge of the transcendent is possible or we must accept some source giving us that knowledge. If the absolute were not known it could not be our self and if it were not our self it could not be known. Moreover, in view of the experiences of saints and seers, it cannot be held that the absolute is not known or knowable. Therefore there must be a means of knowing the absolute and that is *śruti*. The function of *śruti* is to set at rest all speculation about the unconditioned by giving us categorical knowledge; it removes also doubts regarding the possibility of knowing or realising the absolute. Mere reason can only grope or speculate. A purely rationalistic absolutism such as that of Hegel or Bradley can never be sure of the nature and existence of the absolute, much less can they show us the way to realize it. The Vedāntic absolute is revealed by *śruti* and confirmed by immediate experience.

However, *śruti* and *anubhava* should not be separated; they form a continuous process.

It is sometimes objected that the acceptance of *śruti* is faith and not knowledge. It is also pointed out that if *śruti* is the source of the knowledge of the absolute, where is the need for philosophy? We may answer that the acceptance of *śruti* is not blind faith but knowledge. For one thing, the teaching of *śruti* is open to analysis and criticism. Secondly *śruti* can give us even direct knowledge and can open up immediate experience. All the same, we do not hold that *śruti* is enough; reason is necessary for presenting the teaching of the *śruti* in a consistent and coherent manner and this is what we call philosophy. If unaided reason is empty, unaided *śruti* is unintelligible. Listening has to be intelligent.

III

Like the ordinary uninstructed individual, the west believes that for the attainment of the goal of life, knowledge is not enough; it must be supplemented by action. This is true universally so far as our natural attitude is concerned. Faith in the efficacy of action is what may be called animal faith. But philosophy is not animal faith. All the systems of Indian philosophy, specially Advaita, uphold the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of knowledge. Whatever is achieved by action must have a beginning and therefore also an end; it must be temporal. The eternal which is already there has only to be discovered by knowledge and not achieved by any action. If the goal of life is something eternal and infinite, it cannot be achieved by action, and the goal cannot be anything less.

In other words, the west has not yet reached the conclusion that the basic problem of our life is ignorance or rather the ignorance of the true nature of self. That all the problems of life may well be due to some basic ignorance is not considered by the west even as a possibility. But the Vedānta like other systems of Indian philosophy takes it as the fundamental presupposition of all philosophy. If the ills and imperfections of life are real and intrinsic to the self, they can by no means be removed either by knowledge or by action. If however they are unreal, only knowledge can help us. In any case, the true nature of the self has to be found out unless we feel that we know it already.

It is because of the failure to appreciate the importance of the ignorance of the self, that western thought generally fails to be directly relevant to life. At most it gives us either some a priori world view or some kind of ideology. It does not directly solve the problem of self.

To be relevant to life, it is necessary to formulate the problem of philosophy in terms of the ignorance of self. In this regard Vedānta succeeds more than any other system of philosophy. The supreme importance of philosophy for Vedānta is that it solves the problem of life by giving us a knowledge of the self; philosophy is *ātma-vidyā*. It is this feature which distinguishes philosophy at once from science and religion or the path of devotion. Science gives knowledge but does not solve the problem of the self and religion or love of God seeks to solve the problem of self but not by knowledge. Both the nature and the indispensability of philosophy can be seen by looking upon it as giving us saving knowledge. Knowledge is not merely power or virtue; it is the very saviour.

IV

It appears to us that in the west philosophy is generally equated with other disciplines which require only an intellectual competance. Even for Plato knowledge of mathematics is sufficient qualification for philosophy. This is not so for Vedānta. Not merely moral purity but also a kind of spiritual awakening is necessary for understanding and appreciating philosophy. Nothing clouds our vision so much as moral impurity because nothing binds us to matter as immoral life does. And there can be no earnest search for the eternal unless there is a deep disillusionment regarding the temporal life and its values. The seeker of truth must be capable of loving truth more than anything else, and that is possible only when one has come to realise that only truth matters and nothing else, so that no sacrifice is too much for the sake of truth.

There is, in other words, such a thing as fitness for philosophy or else philosophy will fail to deliver the goods and we will quickly jump to the conclusion that philosophy is useless. It is curious that if some one does not appreciate music, we do not blame music, but if some one fails to appreciate Vedānta, we do not blame the individual but Vedānta itself. It hurts our ego to think that we are not fit for Vedānta which only proves that we are really not fit. It is a false kind of democracy to open the doors of philosophy to everyone. It is nothing short of degrading philosophy to the level of the common man. As Plato put it, philosophy is meant only for her genuine sons.

V

At the end, we may point out a feature of Vedānta which distinguishes it not only from western thought but also from other Indian

systems. In the west it is argued that man has a finite intellect and so it is impossible for him to know the absolute and the infinite. The fallacy in this argument is twofold. Firstly it is wrong to compare the human mind and the absolute in size or quantitatively. Bradley would even say that the human mind is a part of the absolute. Really speaking all the phenomenal things including the human mind differ from the absolute qualitatively as belonging to two different levels or orders. There is no question of the human mind being a part of the absolute unless the absolute is taken to be a mere totality or even a harmonious whole. For Vedānta the absolute is the inner essence or reality of everything and as such it is at once immanent and transcendent. The absolute is neither one more reality beside others nor a mere synthesis of empirical appearances nor is it an empty nothing, it is the real self of everything.

The other fallacy in the above argument is to think that the absolute is something different from us, at least partly. It is forgotten that if the absolute were anything different, even though partly, it would not be absolute as it would exclude something, ourself. The absolute must be all comprehensive but not literally or else it will be dependent on the constituents. It is all comprehensive only in the sense that it sustains everything, is the ground of everything. The Vedānta therefore rightly asserts the identity between the self and the absolute. The absolute can be known precisely because it is our very self, not the self which is empirically known but the inner self which illumines everything. Just as there is no distinction of the knower and the known in the case of the self, even so there is no such distinction in the case of the absolute. The self or rather the absolute can be known and known immediately. Reality or self is self-luminous; it does not need a separate knower.

In some Indian systems, it is suggested that so long as man is embodied, he cannot realise his true self. In other words, the true self can be realised only when it stands apart from the body after death. In this way, the posibility of realizing the self remains for ever a matter of faith only. There is a fallacy here too. What stands in the way of realizing the self is not the body but the identification with body or *adhyāsa*, and *adhyāsa* is due to ignorance. So if and when ignorance is removed, the self is realised and it does not matter whether the body is there or not — since ignorance can be removed here and now, it is possible to realise the self here and now. The Vedāntic absolute is therefore neither impossible to realise nor is the realisation merely a thing of the future or faith. There can be a confirmation of the Vedāntic truth even in this life. This is one of the most important features of Advaita Vedānta.

In short, we may say that the special features of Advaita as distinguishing it from Western thought are: its doctrine of *adhyāsa* and *avidyā*, its emphasis on the indispensability of *śruti*, its view of the self-sufficiency of knowledge, its view of philosophy as a spiritual quest and finally its doctrine of *jīvanmukti*. Philosophy cannot justify itself except as a spiritual endeavour and cannot survive scepticism unless its goal is realisable here and now.

K. Seshadri

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND WESTERN THOUGHT

The purpose of my paper is to draw attention to the difference in the levels, at which comparison between the two usually proceeds, and to reiterate the need for keeping to the same level in both. Two main levels are distinguishable in the present context — that of systematic thought and that of mystical intuition or experience. But these get sometimes confused, resulting in the comparison gliding over imperceptibly from one to the other and depriving it of a common basis or standard. This shift occurs all too surreptitiously and often unconsciously, vitiating the comparison or rendering it futile. A comparative treatment of Advaita on the one hand and Western thought on the other, runs the risk of such a shift, in a special sense, for Advaita (as Dr Mahadevan pointed out the other day) is both a plenary experience and a philosophical system. Advaita as experience belongs to the realm of mysticism, while it is Advaita as a system, which figures in polemics. Similarly, we have a formidable body of mystical literature in the West echoing Advaitic ideas, alongside of an equally formidable output of systematic, specialised thought carrying features closely similar to the substance and approach of Ādvaita. It is, therefore, necessary to make sure that we stand on the same ground on both sides. To compare or criticise mystical expressions of the East from the point of view of what may, for convenience, be called 'systematic ideas' of the West, would reflect an unwholesome shift in standards. This is no empty or imaginary apprehension. The zest for drawing parallels, blinding one's vision against significant and substantial contrasts, has persisted through the years. The over-zealous have, time and again, confused the levels, and the parallels get repeated with apparent and added plausibility. I have chosen just two cases for illustration in the present paper, viz., Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman. These would show that in spite of a

real affinity with Advaita, neither of them could with any justification be regarded as Advaitins in the academic or systematic sense.

Dr Javadekar and Dr Tripathi have shown in their papers how futile it would be to look for precise parallels in Western thought-systems for some of the major features of Advaita Vedānta, particularly in its purer forms, such as that of Nirguṇa Brahman and *māyā*. This futility is not because of any necessary confusion of levels or shift in standards, but because of an actual lack of parallelism or paucity of parallel features, revealing a one-to-one correspondence. We may have approximations, deceptive and superficial similarities, pretentious echos in concept and expression, but these fail to suffice. These echos are most in evidence in the realm of mysticism. But even there it is hard to find a single instance to echo the full sense of *māyā* as taught in Advaita in all its uniqueness of the *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*. The *mithyātva* admitted in Advaita Vedānta is, indeed, unparalleled. The concept of the Self as *nirguṇa* is also equally unique. We have, of course, parallels to the Self as identical with the Real, and we have parallels to the idea of the Real as Being; but none of these would amount exactly to that Absolutism, which is distinctive to Advaita Vedānta.

There is a peculiar difficulty in regard to mystical intuition or experience. Comparisons in this sphere, as in any other, must proceed with the aid of appropriate expressions. If these comparisons should reach down to the real core, and not stop short at any intermediate level, if they should be more than mere verbal or conceptual comparisons, one must somehow get at the experience behind the expression. Even where parallels are precise, it is difficult to claim that they are valid in reference to the content and not merely the form of mystical expression. To grasp the content of a mystical expression which does not arise in or belong to one's own climate is well-nigh impossible. The obvious way of securing access to the content is to have the experience oneself. Hence the mystic's familiar exclamation. — "Oh, taste and see!" Mystical expression may serve as a source of inspiration more than as a source of illumination. If expression in original is itself removed or isolated from experience, translated expression is twice removed from it. Translation of poetry, it has been said, is not possible in the real sense. This is so, because poetry is mystical in essence. All expression is in a certain sense translation.

When mystical expression is respected as authority, it is viewed as 'revelation' in the larger and more liberal sense of the term. It may not be correct to identify or equate precisely 'revelation' and *śruti*. Parallels, not only between one mystical expression and another, but

also between the scriptures of the world resting on 'authority', are not always precise, and therefore may not serve as bases of comparison.

In all attempts at expression, and particularly in regard to expression of mystical experience, there is an inevitable step-down, a descent of the subtle into the gross or the less subtle. Expression is formal and disciplined in comparison with experience, which is spontaneous. The discipline, to which expression subjects experience, results in a loss to it. And, therefore, no expression is ever adequate to bring out the authentic intimacy of the experience, and none can truly and fully reveal it. But as it can kindle and inspire identical experience in one who receives the expression and responds to its impact, it may for this reason and from this point of view serve as a valid basis for comparison.

Parallels revealed at one level are far from adequate, and sometimes cease to have all relevance, at another. The contingency of this inadequacy turns out to be of singular significance in the context of Advaita Vedānta, for here the Ātman or the Self is not merely experienced mystically or spiritually, but experienced as *jñāna*, through and through *jñāna*. The Self is experience substantially transcending the duality of subject-object. It is difficult to find a parallel to such a conception anywhere except in Vedānta.

The sources of 'Philosophia Perennis' lie in profound, original intution and experience rather than in any level of expression. It is in those fathomless depths that philosophies meet. Even where we see a semblance of some parallel at the superficial levels, they have to be substantiated by being traced to deeper sources in their common ground, to the extent to which this may be possible. It is the distinctive excellence of Indian thought that in the rich and variegated range of its philosophies there is an underlying core rooted in its self-awarness as eternal and immutable spirit. Appeal to source-experience is not an appeal to anything purely subjective. And that is the hope and justification for any attempt at comparison. But comparisons are bound to be misleading where the levels are different.

Let us consider two instances, where the claim to parallelism seems pronounced. R. W. Emerson is non-denominational and universalist in his approach. He belongs to the transcendentalist tradition. Referring to what he describes as 'the Bibles of the World' and the identity of their essence he asks, 'is there any geography in these things?' Established in a fundamental discrimination between the substantial and the superficial, the eternal and the ephemeral, he recognises the paramount supremacy of the spirit in every dimension of

life and existence. With the utter simplicity of a man of illumined faith he urges, 'let a man believe in God, and not in *names* and *persons*.' He contrasts 'the love of repose', expressing tāmasic nature, with 'love of truth' expressing the sāttvic, reminding the student of Vedānta strongly of the Upaniṣadic contrast of *preyas* and *śreyas*, as he develops it, and when he says that the one in whom *sattva* dominates is 'a candidate for truth', — a candidate for *truth to choose him*, he does remind us of the familiar lines, *yam-eva-eṣa-vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ*. He argues that the soul is perceiver and revealer of truth, and that the 'soul's communication of truth is the highest event in nature', for 'the soul', in his own words, 'is the great end of all'. It is both *tattva* and *puruṣārtha*. Again, he says, 'men contemplate distinctions, because they are stupefied with ignorance', and more explicitly he adds, 'the words *I* and *mine* constitute ignorance'. He does say many such things, which would bring him closer and closer to Vedānta in general, and even Advaita in particular, as we read through some of his essays. But I would ask, does all this make Emerson an Advaitin? No; no more than his utterances like 'the Universe is warm with the latency of the same fire', paralleled in the Aḻvār's would make him a Viśiṣtādvaitin.

Walt Whitman is another, who has been credited with a similar place among Advaitins, because of his absorption with 'self' and the originality of his projection of the 'self' in his *Leaves of Grass*. The moods, with which Walt Whitman invests his 'self' are certainly clearer and better comprehended in the light of Vedāntic concepts,— like Brahman, Ātman, *karma* and *saṁsāra*,—than in the light of any other concept. But it is necessary to remember that these concepts are *our* 'tools', and we use them because we are familiar with them. Others with *other tools* may comprehend Whitman in quite a different manner, and may even prefer to recast Whitman's 'Advaita' in a fresh mould including more of what he thought and said.

Walt Whitman is not an Indian. He is not a 'philosopher'. It is his mysticism that takes him beyond all boundaries of time and geography; and it is as a mystic that he touches the Vedantic ground, and his ideas lend themselves for manipulation by our tools. He does breathe the Vedāntic air, wherever he may be or belong. In a sense, all mystics, whose inwardness has provided them with an experience of the Real as the Spiritual breathe the same air of Vedānta. From one point of view, the spontaneity of Whitman is more significant to Vedānta and to Advaita than the 'studied' approach of Emerson, who had garnered the honey of Vedānta directly from the available scriptures.

Walt Whitman's awareness of the Self and his encounter with it in different dimensions — 'I believe in you my soul, the other *I am* must

not abase itself to you' — is not only original, but has a direct relevance to contemporary man in society. He was, as Middleton Murray points out, the poet-prophet of a society to be actually realised, and the purpose of democracy, according to him, was that 'man must *become* a law, a series of laws, unto himself'.

Whitman's conception of the Self is a highly complex combination or fusion of the mystical and the metaphysical elements. But studies of Whitman — both pedestrian and specialist — have imperfectly concentrated on one or other of these to the neglect of the rest, and hastened to draw facile comparisons. One could discern three distinct strands in Whitman's notion of the Self as reflected in his poems. It is in *Passage to India* that Whitman emerges as a metaphysician, probing the depths of the self and exploring the relation of soul and God. His inward voyages are here on a metaphysical raft, and if we could read between the lines, he does have to weather many a severe storm. While the "I" of *Song of Myself* is mystical and dramtic, the "I" of *Passage to India* is metaphysical.

There are striking parallels in posture between Walt Whitman's idea of the Self and the Vedāntic Brahman, — indeed, there are not many among the Western poets, who have shown such absorption with ṣelf as their theme — but it is not as a philosopher, but as an artist that Whitman (to borrow an expression) 'pours his Vedāntic intuitions', into a variety of moulds. As forms of intuition or intuitive expression, they are vivid, but fleeting, and being shaped by inconstant moods, they lack consistency. Hence they do not lend themselves to categorisation or any kind of systematic treatment; and to judge Whitman strictly as philosopher or to attempt to assess him within the framework of any system of thought would be in vain.

It is in 'a noiseless patient spider' that one witnesses a perfect combination, a delicate inter-turning of 'the cosmic and the solitary'. We have here two images, — that of the solitary spider on a promontory confronting 'the vacant vast', and that of the soul centred in 'measureless oceans of space'. Here are presented the 'existential' and the 'cosmic' not only in a striking contrast of each other, but in a magnificent, mystic perception, of their inter-penetration. This is a bid for that unity, which is characteristically Vedāntic in its comprehensiveness. Yet, to say that Walt Whitman was a Vedāntin or an Advaitin would be fair neither to Advaita nor to Whitman.

There is, if I may describe it so, something *raw* in Whitman, which while revealing his self in perfect rapport with all things, has not yet shed its grossness, and therefore finds itself incapable of rising to

heights of pure renunciation (*vairāgya*), which in Advaita Vedānta is a preliminary to *jñāna* as plenary experience. Whitman seems to aim at an Advaita, which would affirm and assimilate the world, rather than deny and exclude it. That is the crux of the difference. He sees God in men and women, and in the reflection of his own face in the mirror, but the men and women and the mirror and the reflection are all real for him. He has, indeed, his rarer moments of illumination, in which he does see the Self 'at the point of its unity with the All' (as Murray reminds us); and he keeps reiterating, 'I believe a leaf of grass is no less than the journey-work of the stars'.

All this would take one to the very precincts of Advaita. But would it satisfy the requirements of a systematic philosophy? On the mystic level, Whitman does reveal affiliations with Vedānta, but he has other affiliations, too — though these may not amount to commitments, — and it would be wrong to over-state any of these, even at that level.

K. B. Ramakrishna Rao

RELATIVITY AND SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE

(An examination of the Theory of Relativity in Modern Science and Hegelian Phenomenology of Spirit against Advaitic perspective.)

A recent writer characterising what a 'substance' is mentions four 'moments' of it: "to be substance means to be subject but never predicate, to be independent, to be causally efficient, and to be conserved through change."[1] With a little qualification these four 'moments' could be applied to what is called 'Self' or 'spirit'. In a spiritualistic or idealistic philosophy such as Advaita, the first two of the above 'moments' have clear reference to the conception of the Self (*ātman*), the fourth as meaning 'indestructible' or 'immutable' (*avyaya* or *akṣara*), and the third as meaning the 'ground of all that is possible' i.e. as potential cause of all possibility not only cosmologically, but also as constituting the source of all experience and value. In other words, if we could make use of these four 'moments' of the substance to indicate the Self (which, in a primary sense, is the Substance of all substances), we have a fair idea of not only of what the *Self* is in itself, but also of what it gives rise to without its *Self*-hood being affected.

In this paper we understand 'spiritual experience' to be *being* the Self as qualified above. Such Self can only be One or more strictly, Non-dual i.e. Absolute. Its Self-hood then is its Full-ness in terms of the 'moments'. And with reference to the third 'moment' it is understood here that while in its Full-ness the Self is commensurate with everything that *is*, whatever we perceptibly understand as being in time and space is not commensurate with the Self. To get to that state of the incommensurate (which by itself *never is not*) is to experience its Infinitude — i.e. the *being* of the Self as the Infinite, and it is this we understand to be the 'Occasion' of the Self or the Spirit.

What is aimed at in this paper is just to unravel the dialectics of Infinite or the 'occasion' called the 'Spirit' for mundane thought and contemplation. Against the background of this it is proposed to examine briefly:

a. the concept of relativity as adumbrated in modern science, and what comparison it makes with that understood in Advaita as '*māyā*', and

b. to find out if relativity or *māyā* (and all that it stands for viz. the mundane, the material, the physical, the many, etc.) stands opposed to the fullness of the spiritual experience, a contention implied in the hypothesis of Concrete Universalism of Hegel as worked out in his Phenomenology of Spirit.

I

In the field of modern science it is an accepted truth that all truth is relative i.e. relative to space and time or space-time continuum. All decisions about facts or formulations of laws are made with reference to fields of observation, and it is the frame of reference that ultimately estimates the correctness or incorrectness of judgements. The Copernican revolution which Albert Einstein brought about was the rejection of the absolute concepts of time and space of Newtonian Physics, and the introduction of relativity. It is also the vindication of the truth that scientific truth is limited to the physical or empirical and that matters not touching the physical or empirical are not topics properly to be investigated by 'sciences'. This makes all the difference between physics and metaphysics. For the relativity of science is practical, while that of metaphysics or Vedānta is validational and metaphysical.

In the field of philosophy, it is the Advaita of Śrī Śaṅkara which speaks of relativity, and yet goes beyond it. With reference to the first, there is concurrence of estimation with science as far as the practical side of it is concerned. It says that all our 'experience' here and now is relative, that the 'objects' of our experience are relative, or that we are face to face with the principle of relativity. It is to this principle that Advaita gives the name '*māyā*'. '*Māyā*' literally means that which measures: '*mīyate anena iti māyā*'. That is, it is the principle of validation. What is it which it 'measures' or 'validates'? It measures or validates all that we call 'relative' i.e. the extent of the relative in its various forms viz. the many, the different in the field of experience, the relativity of our knowledge too. That is to say, whatever is 'measurable' is commensurate with *māyā*, and yet *māyā* philoso-

phically goes beyond itself. It follows then, that what is non-commensurate in this sense is the non-relative, which philosophy calls the 'Absolute'.

If modern science says such a non-relative (or the Absolute) is unintelligible within its field, *māyā* says that the non-relative cannot be 'measured' as if it is an 'event' or a 'thing' in the relative realm, but that its existence is logically basic, necessarily true and essential for the being (or even for its comprehension) of the very relative. That is, while the principle of relativity in modern science restricts itself to itself (as it is just a technique of understanding the mutual relations of 'events' and 'things' entering into and within the empirical experience), *māyā*, the principle of relativity in Advaita assumes something of which it is itself an extension. In other words, it would not claim to be 'relative' had it not been for something which is 'absolute'. Or while science accepts nothing but the *absoluteness* of relative existence,[2] *māyā* rejects it as absolute, and points towards an Absolute *not involved in any relativity*.

Thus *māyā* functions by 1. 'measuring' or 'covering' whatever is the content of empirical experience, and by 2. pointing to a necessary something unmeasured by any known or empirically determined means as the ground of all experience.

What is important to note here is that *māyā* or the principle of relativity in Advaita, while it points to something beyond itself, does not reject the world, nor its relative reality or truth, but rejects its absoluteness either of its existence or non-existence. That is, the world, the experience and the 'experiencer' (*jīva*), are all assimilated or comprehended within the 'commensurable' and never *as such* denied.

II

It is sometimes argued that in an experience called 'spiritual', which constitutes the real, and in so far as it should become 'wholesome' (or 'perfect') and 'integral' there should be no rejection of any object or orders of being even if they are relative.[3] In other words, the world and all that is 'relative' must form a necessary element of the 'spiritual', which constitutes the most exhaustive expression for Reality. The argument is found reflected in very clear terms in the philosophy of Hegel, who advocates the theory of 'Concrete Universalism'. This theory is at pains to explain the necessity for the Spirit to pass through a 'process' of evolution from the most abstract to the most concrete 'Absolute Idea' working itself through Nature and Spirit. That is, the Absolute Spirit for its fulfilment, as it

were, 'gathers up' (*aufgehoben*) into its being all that it passes through: the object and the subject. It is a scheme of 'Self-realisation', which implies the return of the Self to itself as 'Self-consciousness'. It is Existence becoming aware of itself. But this 'transformation' is effected only through the episodes of its development into Nature, to a human Mind, and from there to a higher universal Absolute Idea. The significance of Hegel's naming his philosophy as the 'Phenomenology of the Spirit' is to be seen thus in the Spirit's growth through the phenomena.

This perspective is so well known, and has been recurring in the history of philosophy in some form or the other (for example, '*Brahma-pariṇāma vāda*' of Bhartṛprapañca), that we need only to know how it is taken by Advaita and estimated.[4] What Advaita says or means to say is very significant. It is not inclusion of 'relativity' or 'objectivity' as a necessary and persistent co-ordinate that gives any 'spirituality' or 'wholesomeness to an experience, but that in a 'spiritual' experience we get to the very core of 'substantiality' or 'potentiality' of all being which makes all 'relativity' and 'objectivity' a *possibility*. It is this 'Substance' which gives what is termed a 'spiritual' experience its uniqueness, and forms the end of all endeavour. In this endeavour, it is the world of experience that gets restored or illumined on this 'canvas' without which the world is not in/on focus at all! And any meaningful part that the world or objectivity can play as 'entering into' 'spiritual' experience, will have to be evaluated only against the background of this non-commensurable non-relative principle, the Absolute. Thus if we may say, that it is the 'occasion' of the 'Spirit' or 'spiritual experience 'which gives meaning to relativity and objectivity not by an all-excluding and nullifying transcendence as is ordinarily believed, but by an unexcepting 'assimilation' into the Being of all that exists and forms a part of experience at whatever level it may be. The real meaning of 'acosmism' is its revelation of the 'infinitude' (*bhūmatva*) of Being or Self, the dialectics of which is scarcely understood: the boundlessness of its Infinitiy excludes all limitation, and so it is acosmic; and the boundlessness is so inclusive that nothing is besides it, and so it is cosmic. This is virtually the exclusion of exlusion, or the denial of the denial, and points unfailingly to a positive assessment of all that is relative and of the value of the Spirit making it possible.

But what is metaphysically more charming about it is that acosmism extends the range of the relative i.e. the 'actualities' that we may encounter, besides taking beyond to the extreme lengths of unknown possibilities. Where Concrete Universalism of Hegel (and incidentally the Integralism of Sri Aurobindo) cannot free the Absolute

from the 'actualities' and make them necessary elements or episodes in the 'Logical life' of the Absolute, as Hegel holds, Advaita's concept of acosmism makes the Absolute the ground of all 'actualities' but not necessarily tie up the Absolute with the process of its development through the 'actualities'. The infinite possibilities of Acosmism are such that it can make the 'concrete actualities' of objective world equally a 'logical possibility' even so as Hegel recognises the world process not as temporal but as *logical*. But this much of potency granted to the Absolute, Hegel fails to pursue it further, and his confidence in the infinite potency of the Absolute is surrendered to the gnawing 'actualities' of an all too temporal world! And so the Absolute is made to involve in the temporal process. We shall see more of this immediately.

Further, with regard to the unknown possibilities beyond the encounterable 'actualities' the infinitude of the Absolute is unmeasurable, and with what confidence can we categorise them exhaustively? The categories of spirit and nature may not be all, and there may still be a residue that is uncovered. And so we will have to be cautious of our capacities — rational and imaginative — to measure the unmeasurable. How are we sure that our estimates of Reality are identical with Reality's estimate of us? Our loftiest observations and reasonings see only the 'concrete' truths that go by us, viz. the 'processes', the 'development', the 'evolution' and etc., and from this if we are to conclude that the Spirit also undergoes these, it may just be a conclusion of a finite perspective trying to estimate something that transcends it. When Hegel estimates the 'growth' of the Absolute from the 'abstract nothing' to a 'concrete whole' passing through Nature and Spirit to attain a fulfilment in its 'self-conscious' state, his technique of evaluation is clearly inferred from what he sees in Nature and mind. For him Reality is to be judged in terms of thought, and when it is clearly evident that thought evolves through concepts to an Absolute Idea, objective reality is taken to evolve thus and taken objectively, it is the Absolute Idea which operates the process of objective reality or Nature as of itself to its own ultimate condition of 'Self-conscious Being'. This is an estimate which draws from, is built on, an observation of the relative and finite events, but made applicable to the Absolute, and it may not be the way how Reality itself makes provision for the events of the finite experience. The Advaitic perspective regarding this seems to be very cautious and draws our attention to the Fullness of the Infinite and of its potencies, and says may be the Infinite never 'thinks' or 'imagines' that it has or is passing through a process to *be* the 'finite' things, and through them is rising up to the status of the Infinite! The truth is, the Infinite is always what it is eternally, and the 'becoming' character of it is our i.e. the finite's estimation of it !'.

And if the finite's comprehension of the Infinite is 'complete', then by a logic that is elementary, the Infinite ceases to be the 'Infinite'.

The intuitions of Advaita set before us the task that the Infinite is to be seen through the Infinite as an unalterable unity of existence. This basic truth bars all our attempts at separation, however much we may try. We are within it whether we like it or not. The unity that is unalterable is its perfection, that attaining a further perfection or completion by a finite process of evolution, which necessarily is through time would be to treat the Absolute or the Infinite as finite and relative. Hegel perceives this difficulty, and submits that the evolution is only *logical* but *not temporal*! But the whole treatment of the Phenomenology of Spirit is contrary to its best intentions. A process not in time is not the process that we see in time, and so we must get out of time to see that process which is not familiar to us! It is evident from Hegel's work that his intuitions take him nearer the truth than his reasoning, when he accepts with a certain sense of defeat that the 'process is not in time', and that 'the Absolute is always what it is!' When his reason makes him assess things as passing through 'objective time', his intuition says the Absolute 'does not pass through time.' He says 'here is a process not in time but in *being*.' What is this 'process in *being*', if it is not associated with 'process in time'? Hegel has no answer to the question in his system of the Concrete Universal. It is the vision of Advaita which points out that the 'process' itself is relative — and applies only to the relative things — *and the Absolute can be anything without undergoing a 'process' either of being or of time.* Can we understand *this* dialectics, which is not Hegel's dialectics? And so Advaita categorises Reality into '*pāramārthika*' and '*vyāvahārika*' and does not mix both and does not pretend to give a 'scientific' account of a development or evolution and says that all 'change', 'process' or 'evolution' are to be strictly confined to the realm of the latter, and any extention of this into the former is misapplied. We see here a more honest declaration in Advaita that all these episodes in the context of time are only logical possibilities (they are logical as Hegel would say) but do not form aspects of logical necessity (as Hegel fails to say). There is no 'descent' here (as in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo) as there is no necessity of it, and the infinite possibilities in the realm of Absolute can make all our 'actualities' and 'concrete stuffs' without making the Absolute undergo the processes of 'delimitation.' The dimensions or the dialectics of the Infinite are so rarely understood that we underestimate its potentialities of being everything without a becoming.

Does the above account of the relative world being estimated as not in time, but as a logical possibility only, reduce it to a bare

nothing? In what way should we assess the value of the empirical world and experience in the scheme of possibilities, even if it is logical only?

The effort of Hegel in elevating the object or the universe of our empirical experience to any distinguished position only by making it a factor in the being of the Spirit is clearly transparent in its intentions: i.e. unless related to the Self the universe loses all its value. It is exactly the same in Advaita: the meaning that the world and life may get cannot be meaning outside and besides the sphere of the Self or the Spirit or as unconducive to sipiritual experience. But unlike the Hegelian phenomenological process through which Spirit is conceived as passing, Advaita draws into experience of the Self all that exists by an 'assimilation' that is native to the infinitude of the Self, wherein not only the material objective universe but also all 'centres of consciousness', the selves, fuse in that situation of 'pure existence' the Self — which is not simply the principle of being (as Hegel may think) but is that of Consciousness also. This is the meaning of saying that in the unique situation or 'occasion' called the Self, the material or the non-spirit and the selves are all assimilated as *non-different*. Whether they exist at all either within or without the Spirit seems to originate from a non-comprehension of the dimensions or the dialectics of the Infinity of the Spirit, or of the non-commensurate over and above the gross relativity.

The problem of Advaita then is to discover the Spirit in the brilliance of whose unity, what we esteem ordinarily as 'reality' and 'grossness' of things becôme so transparent that they cease to throw any shadow as a second object may be conceived to throw, whieh means the polarity af it is assimilated! This is 'spiritualisation' of all existence, which the Upanishads imply by the statement 'All this is Brahman' or 'there exists nothing different from it.' The 'dissolution' or 'depolarisation' ('*prapañcopaśaman*') of the relative or the 'assimilation' of it is *existential* at the 'occasion' of the Spirit, and *evaluational* for practical purposes.

1. It is existential in the sense that within the infinite sweep of the Spirit there is nothing left as recalcitrant hindering the potency of the Infinite to be anything existentially without running the temporal course (which Hegel could not understand). This is the existential import of '*prapañcopaśamam*', and to take this literally as 'physical disappearance' of the relative and the material implies a poor estimation of the meaning of the Infinite.

2. It is evalautional in the sense that it is the cue for any estimation of all values relative or empirical, because the babble of the relative

cannot determine the value of the relative. Thus relativity considered as relative truth gets faded in its validity, and at this 'occasion' of the Spirit all experience gets 'wholesome' and 'pure' without being involved in any valuation. Any postulation of an ontological existence for the relative will eventually contradict a spiritual experience being full.

Now with regard to Hegel's attempt to make the Absolute a *real* Absolute. For him the Absolute is spiritual and is to be a 'self-conscious' one, for without this he fears it would be just matter. The evolution of the pure Being finds its perfection only by transcending the state of matter to that of a logically higher state of mind i.e. in being rational. And so the Absolute to be real is to be rational, and if we are to pursue the line of argument of Hegel, Absolute rationality is not qualitatively different from what we find at the level of the human mind, for the human mind itself is an episode in the realisation of the Absolute Mind.

Now the question is, should the highest Reality be a 'Self-conscious' one as Hegel naturally expects? And is there a limit to the evolving Absolute towards 'Self-consciousnes'?

Naturally for a philosophy which links up the shaping of the Absolute (?) with the shaping of the universe including minds, the Absolute cannot be other than 'evolving'. And this 'evolution' is rendered possible by a 'self-conscious' impulse in the being of the Absolute. In thinking of itself, the Absolute Spirit is giving a direction to the movement of Nature. That is the evolution in Nature is the record of the flow of the Spirit *while it thinks*, and vice versa. The link is inescapable and the 'concreteness' of the evolving Absolute is so palpable, that the logic of it is also inescapable : at the faultering of the Absolute Nature faulters and at the faultering of Nature the Absolute faulters! The mind that errs, the evil that destroys are clearly those of the Absolute, that if one is looking for a perfect principle who makes it possible for all 'evolution' but never involved in it, hardly finds it here. Here is an erring Absolute which goes on correcting as it goes on erring.

From the point of view of Advaita such an Absolute is riddled with its own limitations and relativity, and so is only a 'Relative Absolute'.

Now with regard to 'Self-consciousness' as the fulfilment of 'self-realisation' Advaita has this to say. The Absolute can be 'self-conscious' only at the occasion of 'self-objectivation' wherein the unity of being is not yet attained. But Advaita speaks of the Self as that of Being, Consciousness and Bliss, where the element of Consciousness

is in unity with itself as Being or Bliss (*ekībhūtaḥ*). Hegel's conception of the Absolute as the principle of Consciousness being conscious of itself in order to be *real*, is a sad equation of it with an ordinary creature trying to be conscious of itself lest it be mistaken for dead matter, or be derecognised as real! When the whole of being has come of the Absolute, or is rooted in it to ask for being 'self-conscious' in order to be real, is to question the 'silence' of Consciousness which has made all consciousness possible. To forget there is a 'stillness' in Infinitude is to misjudge its most vital potency, for this 'stillness' pervades the range of all being but makes for all that is dynamic at all levels of existence and experience — mental and material. The 'stillness' or 'silence' of Consciousness ('*prajñānaghana*') is not in need of the *act* of self-consciousness to attain a reality!

Now with regard to consciousness as 'experience' of the Absolute, one may have doubts. It is a naive doubt, and with it we are in the grip of dichotomising relativity, where one experiences the 'other' as the 'object'. Needless to say that the spiritual experience we are trying to comprehend is no 'experience' at all in the usual sense of the term, i.e. in terms of 'subject-object' relationship. 'Experience' is a deluding word which brings within its train all the extent of the field of relativity, and the Absolute is a *state of no experience*. Like the ancient Rishis, one who had that beatific felicity recently remarked 'It is a state of not knowing! It is not experience!' We are baffled, and may say it is incomprehensible. Spiritual experience is exactly that! The Upaniṣad says: It is *agrāhyam*, *avyapadeśyam*, *avyavahāryam*, *achintyam* etc. etc. (Māṇḍūkya, 7). It is incomprehensible as long as we speak of it in terms of our knowing. The second meaning of '*māyā*' becomes evident here that it is the measure of our ignorance of the Incomprehensible, the Incommensurate.

III

To conclude. We see that the concept of *māyā* or relativity renders two useful functions: (a) It assesses the world as having meaningful existence only as 'relativity' and as part of 'spiritual' experience the world of empiricism is assessed as depending on something not involved in experience, and as not real polarity to block the light or felicity of the Spirit. (b) It assesses that while we are here with our ratiocinations, rationalisations and logic, we are struggling with the commensurate only and standing here to try to measure or interpret the Incommensurate is the measure of our ignorance.

The Advaitic Absolute is not the commensurate 'absolute' which modern Science says it has rejected, nor is the one which is discussed as

an object of inquiry. What is measured and discussed as forming the object or subject of all philosophies and sciences is *māyā*, the principle of relativity or objectivity and its various manifestations, viz. the 'things' the 'events' not excluding a 'personal god'. In a bid to include a polar relativity as such within the Absolute as to have an 'integral' or 'concrete' experience of the type spoken of, is to miss the pure 'occasion' called the Absolute, and its spiritual dialectics of Infinity, for no one can expel the Infinite from any point of existence, and no one can force it from being the 'finite' at the same time. This is the real meaning of the 'logic of the Infinite', embeded in the dialectics of the Infinite of being its opposite without a 'process' or 'change'.

1. D. H. Parker, Experience and Substance, Greenwood, New York, 1968, p. 49.

2. It is strange that while modern science rejects the absoluteness of everything, it accepts the absoluteness of the speed of light, which ultimately 'measures' the acceleration of things micro as well as macro. When the full implications of the Unified Field theory of Einstein are worked out, it may not be a wonder if it is revealed that both the gravitational and electro-magnetic fields are reduced to the variations of this 'dimension' of light, which measures all, but is measured in its own terms. It is itself the 'Absolute'.

3. The general leaning of all theistic systems is towards such a position.

4. Not very differently the theme is found enunciated by Sri Aurobindo in his philosophy of 'Integral Advaita'.

N. S. S. Raman

THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSLATION

(with special reference to the idealist texts of Indian and Western philosophy)

One can hardly expect to know, much less to master all the languages in which philosophical texts have been written ; we have to depend for the most part on translations — sometimes forced to accept anything available, even if the version is not authentic. If translations are unfortunately not available readily, one is even forced to manage with second-hand interpretations, as Kant is supposed to have depended on Battie's account of Hume. In the sciences textual references are not so important as in philosophy. Moreover, a scientific work does not present so many obstacles in the way of an easy translation as a philosophical work. This is so because of the development of a precise scientific terminology, which sometimes may be common to many languages, as for instance, the Latin names of fauna and flora. Unlike science and more like art, philosophical endeavour is more an individual matter, not only as regards the peculiar literary style of each and every thinker, but also in regard to his conceptual framework. Sometimes of course, there are common philosophical terms in a philosophical system as a whole, as for example in the Vedanta and in post-Kantian idealism. This makes it a little easier, than when one has to deal with a unique thinker like Heidegger. In general, philosophical translation presents a formidable barrier to communication. The logical positivists have been trying, for the last fifty years or more, to impress upon us the need for evolving a precise and clear vocabulary, but little constructive has been done towards that end. There have however been numerous attempts to throw out some traditional philosophical terms as 'senseless', non-sensical 'systematically misleading' etc.

Sometimes it is asserted that ' translation is better than original '; but the truth of this statement depends upon how well the translator is

equipped, in terms of knowledge of philosophical ideas or of the languages in which such ideas are expressed. There would be a vast difference between the translation of a Sanskrit text done by a Sanskritist with a purely literary background, and a Sanskrit-knowing philosopher. Perhaps one who is oriented more in theology than in philosophy, may also be somewhat dogmatic, and more often than not, carried away by his own convictions. An excellent illustration for this kind of bias is the translation of various Sanskrit texts by missionaries. But it has also to be recognised that missionaries have done commendable work in the field of translation. Above all, the translations of the Bible into various languages of the world have given us some guiding principles regarding translation.

In short, the translator has to be as objective as he can, but this objectivity cannot be described as scientific objectivity, because he has only to find precise equivalents of terms, as the original in accodance with what he expects are the intentions of the author. Intersubjectivity of meanings, in the sense of a conceptual framework acceptable to all in general is *not* involved. The translator has to be equipped with a sympathetic frame a mind. A Buddhist philosopher can hardly be expected to translate the Vedantic texts authentically, though as a critic, his opinions may be invaluable. He may in fact fall into the same error as some Marxists, who have tried to re-interpret ancient Indian thought according to the their own pre-conceived categories. The Hegelians have also been responsible for a distorted account of the history of philosophy, To look for certain 'absolute presuppositions' in the history of philosophy, and managing to discover them somehow in the metaphysics of certain periods of history of philosophy, may not be so objectionable as a philosophical method ; but for a philosophical translator, such metaphysical presuppositions might dangerously affect the quality of the translations. Even as interpretations of individual thinkers, it may result in lack of accuracy and objectivity. The type of historicism that many writers advocate, particularly the idealists, cannot certainly provide any guidelines to the translators of philosophical texts. It is well-known that Edward Caird's book on Kant published in the last century as one of the first interpretations of that German philosopher in a language other than German, suffered from certain Hegelian presuppositions. Among the more recent biased accounts of philosophers by other writers may be mentioned Heidegger's *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Jasper's work on the great philosophers (*Die grossen Philosophen*) including Buddha and Nāgārjuna, Wellheim's book on F. H. Bradley and many treatises by Marxists. Vijñānabhikṣu's Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and even the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* are examples of such biassed writing on other philosophies than one's own. However, these are fortunately only

interpretations, or rather, critical reappraisals of other thinkers by some thinkers. One might say, translations belong to another category. Greater self-control and discipline is called for in a translator than in a mere interpreter. But broadly speaking, translations are interpretations and interpretations are translations.

Then there are problems with a special or peculiar connotation, which whatever the mastery over a language, may not be intelligible to some. Conversely, whatever the extent of one's philosophical scholarship, certain ideas would still be unintelligible, owing to some special flourishes of writing, employment of certain unique idioms, ihe peculiar logical constructions of sentences, employment of certain similes, metaphors, allusions and other forms of rhetoric. The 'luminosity' of Brahman, Hegel's owl of Minerva and the dark night in which all cows are black are examples of such metaphors. Thinking is inevitably bound up with a special style. One is here reminded of Richard Hönigswald's picturesque phrase, 'die Worthaftigkeit des Denkens' — thought being bound to words. Hence it is a mistake to suppose that given mastery of two languages, one could effortlessly translate from one language to the other, even supposing at the same time, that the translator has a sound philosophical knowledge. It is too much to say that any idea expressed in any language would be adequately intelligible if translated. Zen Buddhist texts, for instance, pose some problems even for a Buddhist scholar. Heidegger's German is so unique, that it is said that even Germans find it sometimes difficult to understand him. It is well-known how his pre-occupation with 'Being' drew caustic comments from Rudolf Carnap.[1] It was said of Hutcheson Stirling who wrote the first treatise in English language on Hegel under the queer title *Secret of Hegel* — that no one could understand the 'secret', except Dr. Stirling himself, perhaps because the language was highly Carlylese and unintelligible, even according to Victorian standards. The language of Hegel himself is unfortunately quite obscure and his translators (e.g. J. B. Baillie) could be said to have been in quite an unenviable position. The Sūtra literature by and large — in particular the *Brahma-Sūtras* — would be unintelligible without a suitable commentary. And even the commentaries are only *possible* explanations without any claim to finality. And no one *sūtra* of any text could be isolated from others. Even a comparatively simple text like the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has occasioned many differences of opinion.

In view of the many attempts being made in this country to draw up a scheme or schemes for the quick translation of classics in other languages, one is constrained to note the clumsiness with which the programme is being pushed through. In a craze for quantitative

results, the quality of the work has very much suffered. One also forgets that with the exception of the empiricist philosophers, most other philosophers of the West wrote in languages other than English. One might say that Hegelianism in Britain was a temporary phase. The great idealist texts of the West — from Plato onwards till Hegel are in languages other than English. It would therefore be fitting to translate Plato. Kant and Hegel into our languages only if the translator has sufficient mastery over Greek or German as the case may be. One could study the literature of one's own country without knowing about the literary acievements of others. But in philosophy this isolation is not possible. The philosopher, to whatever country or culture he belongs, must enter into a dialogue with philosophers of other cultures, if philosophical knowledge is to progress at all. Knowledge of other languages therefore is necessary. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nāgārjuna, Madhva and many others who wrote in Sanskrit, which was not their mother-tongue. A classical language like Sanskrit was pre-eminently suited for philosophical communication, perhaps because the scriptural texts were in that language. Similarly, many medieval scholars wrote in Latin. Leibniz, whose country of birth was Germany, also wrote his major philosophical works in French — which is surprising to-day as most of the great idealist classics of modern philosophy and many other great works of contemporary philosophy are in German. European philosophical tradition, in which may be included not only idealism, but also other great modern trends like Marxism and Positivism, owes so much to German language, that it must indeed be strange that we are still studying these systems through English. Moreover, the capacity for conceptual expression may justifiably be one of the yardsticks by which one may judge a language's suitability for translation. If a translation is to be done at all, it should directly be from the language in which the original work is written, and not from a second-hand source. It may therefore be more profitable for example, to translate from Plato's original Greek text than from Jowett's English version.

With the neglect of education in classical languages, at least in the sphere of Humanities, the students are gradually losing hold of their conceptual base. Sanskrit has fallen into disuse in most of the states of India owing to political reasons, and is not being replaced by any substitute. Thus the students of philosophy show their ignorance of a proper philosophical vocabulary, which is better passed through tradition, than invented.

It should be realised that what is important in a language is the thinker's capacity to mould it to his needs, and at the same time to make it intelligible. How we manage to think more effectively in a

language other than our own mother-tongue (as most Indians to-day do in English), is of course beyond the scope of this paper. I propose to discuss here only the problems involved in philosophical translation. For, a proper cultural understanding — if not what E. A. Burtt calls[2] picturesquely as an 'orchestral balance' between East and West is possible only if ideas as articulated through written words could be made more and more intelligible, when rendered in another language. Good translations facilitate the communication and growth of ideas.

This means that proper criteria and techniques should be evolved for the proper translation of ideas of one language into another. Many ideas are misunderstood to-day because of the inadequacy of translations and interpretations. The concept of '*māyā*' in Advaita philosophy, the idea of the 'transcendental' in Kant, the Absolute of Hegel are all cases in point. There are other philosophical terms used in ancient Indian texts — viz. 'dharma', 'karma', 'vijñāna', 'mahat' etc. an adequate translation of which has defied any laborious researcher. Sometimes whole passages have been translated somewhat inadequately. The rendering of Plato's *Dialogues* into English has shown weaknesses leading to misunderstanding. And translations from German texts have pointed to the insurmountable obstacles that some German terms present: e. g. 'Geist' (which has always been misunderstood), 'Seele', 'Erfahrung', 'Erlebnis', 'Wirklichkeit', 'Realitöt', 'Geschichte', 'Kultur' etc.[3] to quote only a few of these terms. Each of these terms has a special connotation which is untranslateable, and has to be interpreted in the context of the original text as a whole. Even then, the translator cannot be sure whether he has grasped the meaning accurately. The translators of Heidegger (more than those of Hegel) grope in the dark, doubting whether they have rendered him correctly. This German philosopher indeed plays upon words. Perhaps his significance partly consists in the literary fineness in which he uses the German language. After all did not Heidegger himself say, "Language is the house of being" (*Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins*)? And Heidegger's own analysis[4] of Nietzsche's words, 'God is dead' reveals the otherwise unknown analytical side of this great thinker.

The translators of Plato and Aristotle are aware of the terminological difficulties that these philosophers present. The translator tries to be a faithful interpreter of another man's thoughts, without ever falling into the temptation, like a normal critic, of paraphrasing the passages with his own ideas. In fact a good translator avoids giving us the slightest hint of his own views. A commentator is allowed this privilege, but not the translator. For instance, the various writers on Advaita after Sankara have with some justification amplified and even

amended some of the ideas of the great master. But a translator should proceed to do his work with care and precision, in spite of a great amount of difficulties, some of which may be considered in the following pages.

II

It is not suggested here, as Croce does, that a genuine work of literary art or philosophical merit is untranslatable. It may be that it may never be translated *adequately*, but some kind approximation in various degrees is possible. One agrees with Croce when he says that there can be no intuition without expression. Communication is possible only through a language and form one understands. To a mathematician, the language of mathematics may come with great facility, whereas to a non-mathematician, it may merely be a meaningless jumble of symbols. This, in spite of the fact that mathematics is acknowledged to be the most universal of all languages, and certainly the most exact.

The idea of mechanical translation mooted by Norbert Wiener, Booth, Bar-Hillel and others[5] is a distinct, though remote possibility in the sphere of scientific and technical translation, though a good deal of it, to quote Bar-Hillel himself, is at the level of the 'utopian'.[6] But philosophical literature lacks the same degree of precision and objectivity as scientific works. The individual senses in which words and phrases are used lends a unique colouring to each philosophical text. Besides this, one may observe that not all philosophical texts have been written in the same form, unlike the scientific texts. For instance, we have poetry, the full impact of which can never be felt except in the original. The Vedas, Upaniṣads, the Gītā and many other Indian philosophical texts have been written in the poetic form. Even Kauṭilya wrote through verse! All this compares very well with pre-Socratic philosophy, most of the texts of which are in poetic form. The dramatic or the dialogue form (Plato, *Questions of Milinda*, for instance) may not represent so formidable an obstacle, but their medium is certainly not pure scientific prose. The Sūtra literature, the contents of which are ambiguous, is unintelligible even in the original. Then there are myths, which many ancient philosophical texts both in the East as well as the West, including the Upaniṣads are full of. What Jowett says about Plato is perhaps partly true of other philosophical texts as well: "When Plato adopts a mythical representation, he indirectly confesses that his ordinary style would be impossible to him. His myths are consequently not only a proof of his artistic ability, and an effect of the intimate relation still subsisting between his philosophy and his poetry, but they also betray the boundaries of his methodical

thought. However admirable in themselves, therefore, they are, in a scientific point of view, rather a sign of weakness than of strength: they indicate the points at which it becomes evident that as yet he cannot be wholly a philosopher, because he is still too much of a poet".[7] After all, language is the only vehicle of civilized communication and there are limits to it. Hence the creative writer has to employ as many methods, as many ways to express his thoughts as are available to him, however 'unscientific' such methods might be. It may not altogether be a sign of weakness. Who would say for instance, that the story of Naciketas is a sign of weakness in the Upaniṣads? Even in Plato, some of the myths like the myth of the cave have profoundly influenced philosophical understanding by their poetic imagery.

To some critics however, the philosopher has to be scientifically prosaic. To the neo-positivist — more particularly to the English-speaking neo-positivist, it would appear as though all philosophical writing not conforming to his own prosaic outlook, is either emotive or nonsensical. But in volume alone, a majority of works in philosophy throughout the many centuries of its history, have been written in forms other than the merely prosaic. (The English philosopher can hardly look beyond his own narrow world of the empiricist, utilitarian and analytical philosophy; even the short-lived reign of the Hegelians in Great Britain has little more than the prosaic to offer us). Aristotle, who appeals to the English-speaking mind of two-day, is one of the few thinkers of the ancient world who cultivated a typical prose style of his own. The attempt to convert philosophy into a *mathesis universalis* is perhaps traceable to him. But one is surprised to find that the volume of prose writings in the ancient world are more numerous in ancient Indian philosophy than in the West! But perhaps the neo-positivist would like perhaps to wipe out the entire philosophical tradition as meaningless. Fortunately, no one but a handful listen to this advice, as the history of philosophy seems to be studied with as great a keenness as before. The interest in Kant (though he has been branded by a well-known English philosopher as a mere 'misfortune') in the West and Sankara in India is very abiding. Even Wittgenstein wrote in forms other than the merely prosaic — in fact, in a form somewhat difficult for the translator. Is this one of the reasons why almost all the works of Wittgenstein in their English version are invariably presented side by side with their original German version?

Poetic statements are certainly not logical propositions with any definite logical form. The enormous role which the arrangemeat of words plays in a poem besides conveying an emotional meaning is indicative of the special character of poetry, as distinct from prose.[9]

Although Coleridge called poetry 'covert metaphysic', yet strictly speaking, poetic statements are not usually considered as philosophical statements. Thus philosophical statements are to be distinguished from poetic statements on the one hand, and from scientific statements on the other. Then there is a great deal of rhetoric[9] — notably metaphor — in poetry, though philosophers are also fond of using analogy and metaphor. Two interesting studies have appeared on the philosopher's use of analogy of metaphor, in English — one by Margaret Macdonald and the other by Max Black[10] — but no comprehensive studies have been made on the use of metaphor by the Vedāntins. Much less have there been studies on the philosophical style of Indian philosophers.

Further, idioms and phrases which are so spontaneous in poetry are not to be found in philosophy. In any case, it differs from language to language. The ancient man found poetry a powerful instrument to convey his ideas forcefully; and in an age where knowledge could not be preserved through printed books, memorising was the only way of keeping wisdom intact.[11] Hence poetry might have become a handy instrument. But the words chosen in ancient poetry demand of each thinker that natural sensibility, which is simply absent in one who is not used to the language from his childhood as a part and parcel of his upbringing and education.[12]

Wittgenstein once wrote that 'metaphysics begins when language takes a holiday', and one wishes that the language of philosophy is precise and ambiguous. Then there would be no difficulty either of interpretation or translation. The ideal of science, in short, has always been to evolve a universal and exact linguistic framework. Can philosophy adopt this ideal? The answer to this question would take us into a now-familiar controversy, but considering the various forms in which traditional philosophy — more particularly idealism — has expressed itself, we are simply attempting to demonstrate that in the history of philosophy this ideal has not been fulfilled, and that just for this reason, we cannot do away with it. The language of idealist philosophy — Hegel and Sankara for example — presents formidable obstacles, particularly to the translator who belongs to a totally different culture and age. Besides the difficulties of vocabulary, style, and form, there is metaphor, allegory, myth and other forms of rhetoric, anecdotes, parables, scholastic commentaries, autobiographies etc., and it is almost impossible to evolve a common criteria for interpretation, much less of translation. An immense responsibility is therefore thrust on the translator and the interpreter.

III

A few words must here be said about the syntactical structure of languages. The familiar grammatical form — Subject-Predicate-Object — cannot be applied to all the languages. We are used to this form in English, but the same form cannot be found in some languages — in fact, even in some of the European languages. J. S. Mill declared more than 100 years ago: "Grammar is the most elementary part of logic ... The Structure of every sentence is a lesson in logic."[13] Mill of course, was no linguist and did not know the problems faced by the translator in dealing with the syntactical structure of languages, even if we ignore the confusion implicit in the statement, between logic and grammar. There are grammatical peculiarities in almost every language of the world; many of these peculiarities are merely conventional and therefore inexplicable. Gender, cases, uses of prepositions, forms of verbs, conjugation etc. show some remarkable peculiarties in every language. One can perhaps explain why 'Brahman' is neuter gender, but it is impossible to say why 'Realität' and 'Wirklichkeit' are feminine. There may be some truth in the view that some of our metaphysical beliefs are due to the peculiarities of grammatical structure and conventions.

For example, in most languages the subject has a place of importance. This may be one of the reasons which prompted Russell (following on Hume earlier) to remark that the 'I' is introduced "not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar."[14] This view has also been echoed by other English philosophers — notably by A. J. Ayer. Such relationships between grammar and metaphysical concepts cannot be easily ignored, even if the importance and relevance of such relationship might be exaggerated. For, what would happen if the translator accepted such views and translated idealist texts? We would surely concede to the translator a right of interpretation, but not the right to mould his translation in accordance with his views. In reality, the unbiassed translator comes across a jumble of metaphysical terms, which are all different and yet somehow related to one another: the 'I', the 'self', the 'subject', 'consciousness' (note the absence of the definite article!), 'mind', the 'ego' etc., or the Sanskrit terms: 'ātman', 'buddhi', 'jīva', 'ahaṁkāra', 'manas', 'vijñāna', 'mahat' etc. and the German terms, 'Ich', 'Seele', 'Geist', 'Bewusstsein', 'Subjekt' etc. Would any one be able to relate that queer German term 'Geist' always to its proper context? Dictionaries would not help, and sense would depend on the total context in which each of these terms above is used. I am yet to come across a comprehensive dictionary of philosophical terms in English or in Sanskrit, which can deal with all

such terms in all the contexts in which they are used, though there are a few dictionaries in German which certainly cannot be said to be comprehensive.

The attempt to explain etymologically the philosophical terms by referring them to their origins is an accepted method with some Sanskritists, and particularly with some Naiyāyikas, but it can hardly be said to be successful. The various vicissitudes which the terms have undergone during centuries of their usage can hardly be explained satisfactorily. This is because the usage of terms is partly conventional, and the rigidity of meaning attached to scientific terms cannot be applied to philosophy. Further taking sentences as a whole, the translator knows that the Sanskrit or the German paragraph apart from being incapable of being compared to each other, are very much unlike an English paragraph; even the sentences are quite different, though some writers like Śankara do write simple Sanskrit. Hegel's German is an apt example of a complicated heavy style, though German language itself exhibits a somewhat systematic construction as far as its sentences are concerned. A well-known translator from German[15] has remarked that the difficulty lies in trying "to turn classical German into sound democratic English". Such statements by translators are highly misleading. Many Indians are fond of seeing in the Sanskrit language the nobility of Indian culture. One wonders if the character of a culture is reflected at all in the language of that culture. If so, one should discover imperial qualities in English language, and egalitarian ideals in French. The syntactical structure of both German and Sanskrit (as it has indeed been pointed out by some) should exhibit a love for system-building. To carry such analogies further would not only be futile but fantastic as well.[16] But if what is said about the character of a culture and its reflection in a language is correct, then Hegel's German can never be adequately translated. But how is it that Goethe has been translated? And how is it that Wittgenstein could write simple 'democratic' German?

One realises however, how easy it is to translate a simple narrative form than it is to translate a thought or a series of thoughts cloaked by complex syntactical structures and idioms. B.L. Whorf's Mr. Everyman, the natural logician would also find it puzzling to interpret the Upaniṣadic passages or Zen Buddhist texts. Moreover the diction of the original passage has to give place to a new diction in the translated passage, conveying as far as possible the same effect.[17] Or is it possible that the choice of words is indicative of the author's design?

One may point out in this context that the problem of philosophical translation is not adequately covered by any general analysis of

translation—not in any case by Quine's essay,[18] for example. It may at best deal with the general structure of English language in comparison with other European languages. It does not even distinguish between translations of poetry and prose. It is impossible to develop a logic of philosophical translation, because the difficulties of philosophical translation can never adequately be overcome by any general theory of translation. For, unlike other sciences, philosophy carries the huge burden of a historical tradition on its back.

IV

The translator is not directly concerned with the various theories of grammar including a recent one by Chomsky.[19] But a philosopher in general is affected by such theories. The older methods of analysis have been challenged by the new developments in the methods of determining the structure of language, by enquiry into its syntax and its semantics. Gilbert Ryle in one of his recent articles[20] has tried to avoid this problem of confrontation between philosophy and structural linguistics by pointing out that the philosopher is interested in 'use' (-speech) and the linguist in 'usage' (-language). This is how distinction is sought to be made out between philosophy and philology. The translator asks questions about the conditions and circumstances under which a word is properly used and tries to develop methods by which such questions might be determined. If the translator is indeed a philosopher at the same time, the relationship between the two fields is very significant. For it is our contention that a proper philosophical translator can only be a philosopher himself. He should be one who is interested both in 'use' as well as 'usage'. In one of the important articles on the subject, W. P. Alston remarks[21] that philosophical analysis of the Rylean type might indeed have a common enterprise with the analysis of language undertaken by a structural linguist, in spite of the obvious differences in approach. "Even though the analysis of language in purely formal terms does not itself give the philosopher the results he needs for his purposes, it might well separate out classes that the philosopher would find it profitable to examine in his own way ...... In this way, structural linguistics might be of real importance to philosophy. And, of course, if and when semantics is developed and integrated into structural linguistics along with grammar, the differences between the two sorts of linquiry in methods and status of conclusions, though not in ultimate aim, may well be reduced to the vanishing point."

An understanding of structural linguistics would help us to overcome the scepticism that ideas could never be adequately translated in a language other than the one in which they are originally conceived.

(Such a scepticism should be distinguished from the scepticism that words are inadequate to express philosophical ideas, and also from the scepticism inherent in the old idealist view that language is insufficient to express the nature of ultimate reality ; in this article we are trying to avoid any kind of metaphysical commitment. Hence it is enough if we consider the first kind of scepticism). This question has an important bearing on our problem. It would not be enough if we reject some of the age-old concepts — e. g. of idealism, of the Vedānta etc. — by means of a Rylean analysis of the use of terms. What would one say to the fact that the word 'mind' or its right equivalent is absent is Sanskrit and German languages ? Would not one better understand the structure of these languages, with reference to their syntax and semantics, in order to understand fully what philosophical statements in these languages ? Perhaps the knowledge of structural linguistics and its methods would enable a translator to provide us with better translations. The present position is that many translations have appeared of some philosophical texts — particularly of idealism — but no one translation can claim superiority over the others. In the case of the translation of the philosophical classics like those of Plato, Kant and Hegel accuracy is a matter of approximation only. New linguistic researches into the structure, into the syntax and semantics of the so-called 'natural' languages might contribute a great deal towards accuracy in future. Formalisation techiniques of positivism, above all machine-translation have not helped at all. They have proved fantastic.

V

New methods and new innovations have to be tried including research into the lives of the philosophers and their contemporaries or friends or rivals which may throw some new light on their ideas and open new avenues for translators. The translator has to re-create the same atmosphere, and attempt to live through the same experience, though it may not be so easy. But this is what a sympathetic translator would do, even if he does not necessarily agree with the ideas of the original work. Fortunately many philosophers have written their autobiographies, and many biographical works do exist. P. A. Schilpp's admirable series on the philosophers of twentieth century, invariably contain a philosopher's autobiography at the beginning of each volume which certainly helps in understanding the mind of the writer, and his philosophical development.

In this connection, it may be observed that the important contributions of Wilhelm Dilthey[22] have provided us with some important guidelines. Although meant for the philosophical inter-

preter, the hermeneutical principles laid down by Dilthey, and his predecessor Schleiermacher, are certainly helpful to the translator. The Mīmāṁsā laid down certain principles for interpretation of Vedic passages, and hermeneutics in the West also had its origins in the interpretation of religious texts. But Schleiermacher used the same principles while editing the *Dialogues of Plato.* The concept of *Verstehen* in Wilhelm Dilthey implies broadly grasping the meaning and inner coherence of the subject-matter.

The task of the translator or the interpreter is two-fold: 1) literary 2) psychological. The literary aspects of translation (or interpretation) consist in grasping and appreciating the stylistic peculiarities, which may provide a clue to his thoughts — perhaps accurately. The length of paragraphs, of sentences, direction, use of imagery and metaphor, the illustrations employed, might also reveal the mind of the writer. Each part of the text has to be examined minutely in the context of a totality of meanings (what Dilthey would call, "Sinnestotalitaet"). Philosophical translation therefore certainly involves a great deal of intellectual effort that should not be underestimated.

The psychological aspects are a little more difficult to grasp. One can only intuit the author's mind. Perhaps the best translations or interpretations are by those, who have in their personal life, moved closely with the writer, perhaps as friends or disciples or students. Even if this were impossible in all cases, it may not be so difficult after all, to get into the proper intellectual context. The continuity in the Vedānta tradition in India is mainly due to the intellectual relationships between philosophers (e. g. Gauḍapāda-Govinda-Śaṅkara or Sureśvara-Śrīharṣa). Such examples of close relationships between thinkers are not difficult to find. But all the same, philosophical endeavour is by no means a team-work like a scientific work. Secondly, it does not involve any *a priori* objective procedures for description and evalution. Philosophical knowledge is an individual endeavour, in which the whole personality of the thinker is involved. It is a communication from *one* person to others who are willing to respond. Snch response would of course have to be sincere and serious, and connected to the whole perspective of the thinker. Perhaps the philosopher's inner life is also relevant, as in the case of the interpretation of the works of art, and literature. This would enable us to understand the formation of his ideas. Inadequate comprehension of all these aspects would lead to biased judgements, such as that of Santayana, who called the whole of German idealism, 'German moonshine'.

As was pointed out earlier, the great intellectual effort that a good translation requires should not be underestimated. The poor translator seldom gets the credit for what he does so painstakingly to bring obscure writers into limelight, by introducing their works to a much larger reading public, and in the process spending as much energy as the original writer himself. For who remembers Jowett or Thibaut and their life-term work, while Plato and Sankara after they were translated have achieved far greater glories beyond the frontiers of their own intellectual world?

1. *Philosophy of Science* Vol. III, p. 420f. Also quoted by P. Marhenke in his Presidential Address to the 23rd Session of the American Philosophical Associaiion at Oakland, California (Dec. 1950). The address on the 'Criterion of Significance' is also reproduced in *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language* (Edited by L. Linsky), Urbana, Ill. 1952, pp. 157-159. Carnap, like Russell before him, uses translateability as the criterion of signifiicance, and shows that Heidegger 's use of the various forms of the verb 'to be' in an ambiguous manner is nonsensical.

2. E. A. Burtt: 'Problems in harmonizing East and West' in *Essays in East-West Philosophy*, edited by C. A. Moore, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1951, p. 122. Burtt has touched upon the problem of translation in this essay, but has not explained the difficulties invloved in the translation of classics from one language to another, when they belong to two different cultures. See also P. T. Raju: *Idealistic Thought of India*, Introduction, London, 1953.

3. Norman Kemp Smith in his *Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason* (London, 1918), has drawn our attention to the difficulties one encounters in translating the word 'Anschauung' used by Kant (A 42-B 59). Previous translators and interpreters (Meiklejohn, Max Mueller, Watson, Prichard) had translated this term as 'perception', which Kemp Smith finds unsuitable in the context of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Smith's own rendering of it is 'intuition'. Similarly, Kant's reference to the Copernican revolution in his Preface to his first Critique (B xxiin) has been misinterpreted according to Smith by the previous commentators (Adickes, Alexander, Caird, Green).

4. In *Holzwege*, Frankfurt/Main, 1950.

5. On this subject, please see Yehoshua Bar-Hillel: 'Present State of Automatic translation of languages' in the volume, *Advance in Computers*, edited by F. L. Alt, New York, 1960 pp. 91-163. See also Bar-Hillel: *Language and Information*, Reading, Mass. 1964. See especially p. 183f, where he attempts to demonstrate the limitations of mechanical translation. He advocates using 'machine aids' rather than complicated computers, which he regards as an utopian goal.

6. Y. Bar-Hillel: Language and Information, p. 183.

7. B. Jowett: Iutroduction to the *Dialogues of Plato* (Tudor Publishing House edition, no date), Vol. I, pp. lviii-lix.

8. Cf. A. C. Bradley: "Poetry is a spirit. It comes we know not whence. It will not speak at our bidding nor answer in our language. It is not our servant; it is our master". *Oxford lectures on Poetry*, p. 22.

Cf. also R. G. Collingwood, *An Eassay on Philosophical Method*, Oxford 1933, pp. 212ff. " ...... philosophy resembles poetry; for in poetry also the writer confesses himself to the reader, and admits him to the extremest intimacy" (— p. 212) "Quite otherwise than the scientist, and far more than the historian, the philosopher must go to school with the poets in order to learn the use of language, and must use it in their way: as a means of exploring one's mind, and bringing to light what is obscure and doubtful in it. This, as the poets know implies skill in metaphor and simile, readiness to find meanings in old words, ability in case of need to invent new words and phrases which shall be understood as soon as they are heard, and briefly a disposition to improvise and create, to treat language as something not fixed and rigid but infinitely flexible and full of life." (— pp. 213-214).

9. Cf. Max Mueller: "Man was compelled to speak metaphorically, not because he could not control his poetic fantasy, but rather more because he was compelled to strive to the utmost to find expression for the ever.growing needs of his soul. It was completely impossible to grasp and hold the outer world, to know and to understand, to conceive and to name, without this fundamental metaphor, this universal mythology, if you will. Metaphor in this sense was much less the carrying over of a word from one concept to another as the creation or nearer determination of a new concept by means of an old name". Quoted by E. Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* Vol. II, p. 61.

10. Margaret Macdonald: "The Philosopher's use of Analogy" in *Logic and Language* (First Series) Edited by Anthony Flew, Oxford, 1951, p. 80f. Max Black: *Models and Metaphors*.

11. A case in point is early Buddhist literature, which is not in poetic form, but memorised as recited by the disciples of Buddha after the latter's death. The *Piṭakas* were not compiled before 300 years after the death of Buddha.

12. George Santayana in the Preface to his *Poems* (1922) confesses: "Even if my temperament had been naturally warmer, the fact that the English language (and I can write no other with assurance) was not my mother-tongue would of itself preclude any inspired use of it on my part; its roots do not quite reach to my centre. I never drank in childhood the homely cadences and ditties, which in pure spontaneous poetry set the key."

13. *St. Andrews Address* (1867). Quoted by Urban: *Language and Reality*, London and New York, 1939, p. 283.

14. *Analysis of Mind*, London, 1921, p. 141.

15. Willa Muir: "Translating from German" in the volume *On Translation*, Edited by Reuben A. Brower, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 96.

16. Cf. Willa Muir, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

17. Cf. D. J. Furley: "Translations from Greek Philosophy" in *Aspects of Translation* (Studies in Communication No. 2) by Booth *et al*. London, 1958, p. 59: "The existence of a certain syntactical idiom in Greek is probably never a sufficient cause in itself for the holding of certain wiews by Greek philosophers; but it is certainly a contributory cause. If this is true, and if these syntactical idioms have no counterpart in English, then translation from Greek to English must necessarily obscure this contribution".

18. 'Meaning and Translation' in the volume *On Translation* edited by Reuben A. Brower, pp. 148-172.

19. It is Noam Chomsky's significant contribution to have shown the difference between a superficial grammatical structure and the more fundamental structure of an utterance. Every utterance has two grammatical structures: one, its 'surface grammar' and the other, its 'deep' grammar. What Chomsky calls 'transformational grammar' is a grammar that will permit transformation of utterances in order to show their 'real' structure. Such new developments in structural linguistics, does have an influence on the commonly-known 'linguistic analysis'. Philosophers however claim that the semantic problem (i.e. the problem of meaning) is not affected by any such new developments, in syntactical linguistics. On this point, please see Colin Lyas: *Philosophy and Linguistics*, London, 1971, and also Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz: *The Structure of Language*: *Readings in the Philosophy of Language*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964, Chomsky's essays on p. 50f ('Current issues in linguistic theory'), 119f ("On the notion 'Rule of Grammar') and pp. 211f ("Transformational Approach to Syntax").

20. G. Ryle: "Use, Usage and Meaning" Proceedings of the Arist. Society, 1961, Vol. XXXV, Supplement. Also reproduced in Colin Lyas, Op. Cit. pp 54ff.

21. W. P. Alston: "Philosophical Analysis and Structural Linguistics" in Colin Lyas (Ed.) op. cit, pp, 284-296. The quotation is from p. 295f. See also *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol, LXI (1964), where this essay first appeared.

22. The works of Wilhelm Dilthey; on Hermeneutics: *Die Hermeneutik Schleiermachers*, 1860, *Die Typen der Weltanschauung*, 1911, *Entstehung der Hermeneutik*, 1900, *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*, 1919, and *Kritik der historischen Vernunft*, 1924.

G. Srinivasan

HEIDEGGER AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

In philosophy, clarity of expression at the expense of thought is not a virtue, while obscurity of expression in the interests of the profoundity of thought, in so far as it is unavoidable, is not altogether undesirable. The latter is especially true of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger who is known for his obscure expression and enigmatic statements. The new mode of structural analysis of human existence and the analysis of Being in relation to the world of beings have both necessitated a kind of expression which is not altogether lucid in Heidegger's philosophy. But it is not unlikely that an Indian reader who is familiar with the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta may find Heidegger's philosophy less obscure and more intelligible than it is believed to be, and it is still less unlikely that a Western reader who ventures to probe into Heidegger's philosophy may find in it a 'suspension bridge' to Advaita Vedānta.[1]

This is obviously because of the close affinity of thought between Heidegger's philosophy and Advaita Vedānta. But this similarity escapes our notice if we exclusively concentrate on Heidegger's structural analysis of human existence to the neglect of its ontological orientation. Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence is oriented towards a science of Being or ontology and this is a fact which draws him close to Advaita Vedānta. Heidegger, in fact, covers the same philosophical ground as Advaita Vedānta does and uses almost the similar concepts in his enquiry into the meaning of Being.

This, however, does not mean that there are no differences between Heidegger's philosophy and Śrī Śaṅkara's Vedānta. There are bound to be differences between any two thinkers who belong to different traditions of thought, but these differences may yet leave room

for certain profound similarities between them which are worthy of note. The purpose of this paper is to indicate some of these similarities without overlooking at the same time their differences.

At the very outset of his treatise, *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that the main purpose of his enquiry is to "raise anew the question of the meaning of Being", and to "reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question."[2] The question he wants to enquire into is "What is Being? What is What-is?" This reminds us of the beginning of Śrī Śaṅkara's *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* which is commenced with the commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's first sūtra, "Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman."[3] Enquiry into the nature of Being or Brahman is thus the goal of enquiry for both Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta and this implies an identity of purpose between them.

To this it may be objected that the purpose of enquiry according to Advaita Vedānta is not only intellectual but practical or spiritual whereas Heidegger's purpose is purely intellectual, in so far as his enquiry merely aims at the 'understanding' of Being. But on closer examination it can be shown that Heidegger's purpose is no less practical than intellectual. For throughout his philosophy, Heidegger makes a distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, and one of the definitions of authentic existence in his philosphy is that it consists in the cultivation of the awareness of Being as distinguished from the 'nothingness' which seems to pervade the world of objects, and the consequent realization of freedom from 'erring' and misery in life. We may deal with this point in somewhat greater detail sometime later in the course of this paper.

However, the methods of philosophical exposition of Heidegger and Śrī Śaṅkara seems to be different from each other. Heidegger's method is phenomenological inasmuch as he seeks to analyse the structure of human existence as disclosed in the concrete lived experience of the individual; but this analysis is only preliminary or preparatory to the 'understanding' of Being in his philosophy, since he 'reaches out' to his conception of Being through an analysis of the emotive concepts of dread and nothingness as disclosed in the structural analysis of human existence. Heidegger justifies his approach to Being through an analysis of human existence by pointing out that human existence unlike the other entities in the world is a unique kind of being inasmuch as it includes knowing as a part of its being, and can also comport itself towards its own being so as to put the nature of its own being into question. Human existence thus provides us with a mode of being which we can understand from 'within' in a manner in which we can understand no other entity, and hence serves as the best

medium through which the meaning of Being can be grasped. Śri Śaṅkara, on the other hand, develops his philosophy by way of commenting on the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras and the other scriptures ; his philosophy emerges out of a definite presupposition of Being or Brahman which may be taken to be either *a priori* or a matter of inner experiential truth, and from this presupposition, he deduces the nature and significance of human existence and the world. Thus it may be broadly said that Heidegger's method is phenomenological, while Śrī Śaṅkara's method is scriptural and deductive.

But this methodological difference has no significance beyond the technique of their philosophical exposition, for the truths conveyed remain the same while the methods vary. Both Heidegger and Śrī Śaṅkara cover the same area of ontological enquiry irrespective of their different starting-points, and their difference in starting-points loses much of its significance, if we take into consideration the identity of truths conveyed by them and the mode of realizing these truths. For both Heidegger and Śrī Śaṅkara lay stress on the 'fallenness' of human existence and plead for the necessity of 'freedom' from thereof; this 'freedom' consists in an act of self-transcendence towards Being for both Heidegger and Śrī Śaṅkara and both regard this transcendence as an experimental act. While Heidegger works out in detail the psychological process of transcendence through the analysis of structural moods such as care, dread, nothingness and Being, Śrī Śaṅkara unhesitatingly points out the inadequacy of all verbal or theoretical knowledge in the matter of realizing Brahman and stresses the need for experiential realization.

There is also a close similarity between Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta in their analysis of the structure of the empirical self. Heidegger points out that we always 'discover' man as being-in-the world, but his, 'inness' is not mere spatial 'inness'; he is 'in' the world not as 'things' are spatially in the world but as concernfully dealing with the world. Man can thus be defined as concern and his concern is always with the world and with himself as being in it. The Advaitic equivalent to Heidegger's concern is *vyavahāra,* in which the empirical self is said to be involved until it is liberated.

Heidegger also points out that the empirical self is not 'looked up' in a body but always 'stands out' so as to disclose the world within it. The self in this sense is 'being-there' (*dasein*) in the world and its 'thereness' implies its 'openness' of being in which the world comes to be disclosed. The relation between the self and the world is thus structural since the world is what is disclosed in the self and the self is the 'disclosedness' of the world.[4] From this it

follows that there can be no self without the world and no world without the self.[5] The structural unity between them is what is expressed in the phrase being-in-the-world, and this structural unity is *a priori* in the sense that it is "primordially and constantly a whole" as disclosed in the phenomenological analysis of concrete experience and "not pieced together" by means of conceptual analysis.[6]

Similarly, in Advaita Vedānta the empirical self in relation to the world is regarded as a unitary phenomenon inasmuch as it is 'constituted' by its relation to the objects of the world in terms of action, impressions, knowledge and experience. In fact, the Advaitic explanation of *pratyakṣa jñāna* or perceptual knowledge is a clear affirmation of the unitary character of man's being-in-the-world. The Advaitic thinkers believe that human consciousness or *pramāṇa caitanya* is not 'locked up' in a body though seated in it, but is capable of moving out through the sense organ, so as to assume the *vṛtti* of the object and become identified with the *viṣaya caitanya* in the object by destroying the *bhāvarūpajñāna* in it. From this identity between the *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viṣaya caitanya* follows the subsequent identity between the *pramātṛ caitanya* and *viṣaya caitanya*, which is perceptual knowledge. All the details of this analysis of perceptual analysis may not be found in Heidegger's philosophy, but he also explains perceptual knowledge as an act of 'deseverance' of the object on the part of human consciousness whereby it comes to 'constitute' himself out of the object in terms of knowledge or experience. Both Advaita Vedānta and Heidegger thus conceive of human consciousness as capable of 'moving' or 'standing out' so as to 'desevere' objects and be 'constituted' out of relations with them, and the significance of the act of 'deseverance' for both Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta is that it results in the 'unitary' structure of human empirical existence which has in it only 'distinctions' but no 'divisions'.

There is a common emphasis which both Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta lay on the transiency of human existence and the consequent worthlessness of all worldly possessions. Heidegger works out in great detail the theme of human existence as temporality and lays stress on the structural mode of human existence as being-ahead-of-itself-towards-death. Man is never a static being but is constantly 'drifting' and he is 'drifting' towards death. Death is not an 'accident' which cuts short human life at a point in time, but is the structural potentiality of human existence. Man is cast into death since his birth and is capable of anticipating it as the most personal, unshareable, inevitable termination of his present life. Death turns a man's existence into the mode of no-longer-being-in-the-world and 'disrelates'

him from all that is in the world.[7] The anticipatory conception of this 'disrelationship' to the world introduces into life, according to Heidegger, a sense of vacuity, nothingness or worthlessness of human worldly pursuits and possessions, even while they still exist as options and actualities. Heidegger thus emphasises the need for a revaluation or devaluation of all that is, on the part of man, from the standpoint of his own temporality and death.

The mood which discloses the nothingness or worthlessness of all that is, is called dread in Heidegger's philosophy.[8] Dread is not mere fear which has an external cause and can be overcome with the removal of that cause, but is a primordial mood which pertains to man's being-in-the-world as such and discloses the 'void' which is present all through it;[9] what matters in dread is not the presence or absence of things or possessions but their utter lack of value; it is the oppressive feeling in which the whole world seems to 'slide away' from one's own being[10] leaving behind a sense of 'void'. But dread usually announces itself not as that which we face but as that from which we flee. Man's constant flight from the dread of his own being-in-the-world results in his 'fallenness' or inauthentic existence whereas facing it marks the beginning of his authentic existence.

Like Heidegger, Advaita Vedānta also emphasises the need to take into consideration the inevitability of death in forming the right attitude to life. Since death is inevitable, all the egoistic attachments and material possessions which seem to disappear at death, become unworthy of pursuit. It is their worthlessness which comes to be disclosed in the mood of *duḥkha*. *Duḥkha* thus seems to be the Advaitic counterpart of Heidegger's dread; for *duḥkha* is not mere sorrow or pain as opposed to pleasure but the feeling of oppressive vacuity which characterises the worldly pains and pleasures alike. And it is also true that in Advaita Vedānta, no one who fails to see and face *duḥkha* in empirical existence is qualified for what may be described as authentic or spiritual existence in the Advaitic context.

Both Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta equally insist that man should not be misled by the apparent permanence of worldly possessions or succumb to their temptations, but should be aware of their basic transitoriness and act or live in the world with that awareness. This is authentic existence, in the sense that it expresses man's freedom from the deceptiveness of the world, and an act performed at this level of existence can only be 'disinterested' or unselfish, since selfishness or attachment always springs from mistaking the transitory for the enduring.

At this stage, a certain important difference between Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta has to be mentioned. For Heidegger, human existence begins in birth and ends in death; man's existence in this sense is finite and there is nothing for him beyond death. There is no pre-determined essence in him which either precedes his birth or survives his death; he is pure existence or act whereby he relates himself to the world, and any value or essence he acquires for himself in the world disappears for him in death. This confinement of human existence to temporal finiteness is obviously due to Heidegger's non-commitment to any theological dogma or faith. His phenomenological analysis of human existence excludes from its scope the postulates of soul and rebirth, and he finds no need for them either in explaining the structure of man's empirical existence or in emphasising the need for his authentic existence.

But the case with Advaita Vedānta is altogether different. Being rooted in Hindu tradition and being true to the Hindu scriptures, Advaita Vedānta admits the validity of the postulates of the soul, rebirth, and the doctrine of *karma*, and these postulates make a difference to its view of man's empirical existence. For in this case, man's existence does not begin in birth nor end in death, but has a past before birth and a future beyond death. What we call present life is only an intermediary link in a chain of births and deaths, and has a significance beyond the limits of present birth and death. Death is not the final end of man's existence, but the beginning of a next life for him inasmuch as it ends the present one. Accordingly, the concept of *duḥkha* will have no exclusive origin in the anticipation of death as the termination of existence, but spreads itself over the series of lives to which man is subject; it is the fact that man is subject to a series of births and deaths (*saṁsāra*) each of which is transient and 'vacuous' that causes *duḥkha* for the individual. Moreover the belief in rebirth and the doctrine of *karma* enhances man's sense of ethical responsibility and endows his moral life with a prospect beyond death.

These doctrinal presuppositions in Advaita Vedānta do not, however, lessen its emphasis on the inevitability of death, pervasiveness of *duḥkha* and the need to overcome it, and on all these points, Advaita Vedānta has a profound similarity to Heidegger's philosophy in the West. Moreover, though Heidegger, unlike Advaita Vedānta, believes in one life and not in a series of lives, his main purpose is to enquire into the nature of Being, and there seems to be a close similarity between Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta in their analysis of the meaning of Being.

Like Advaita Vedānta, Heidegger believes in the oneness of Being as distinguished from the distinct entities disclosed in our concernful

dealings with the world. Being, he affirms, is not a bare general concept which we intellectually derive from our distinct perceptions of the particular entities, nor is it a mere totality of such entities; but it is the 'indeterminate immediate', the reality of which we are certain, and which is the ground of all that is and determines all that is to be what it is.[11] Heidegger's emphasis on the immediate presence of the one indeterminate being as the real ground of all that is unfailingly reminds us of the Advaitic description of Brahman as self-evident (*svayaṁ prakāśa*), one (*ekaṁ*), undivided (*akhaṇḍaṁ*) and indeterminate (*nirguṇa*).

Human knowledge reveals the particulars of what-is, but in the act of revealing the distinct particulars of what-is, Heidegger affirms, that it conceals the Being or ground of the particulars of what-is. This concealment of Being is the error which basically characterises all human knowledge of the world. This error is not merely 'occasional' in the sense that it arises only under certain extraneous conditions and disappears with their removal; nor is it merely logical in the sense that it derives its meaning or definition as distinguished from logical truth *within* human knowledge. For logical truth and logical error have both reference only to the particulars of what-is, but the error of which Heidegger is speaking has reference to Being inasmuch as it conceals Being in the act of revealing the particulars of what-is.[12] In fact, it can be said that the distinction between logical truth and logical error is itself a distinction within human knowledge which is all through erroneous inasmuch as it conceals Being. This basic error which consists in the concealment of Being is structurally constitutive of man's being-in-the-world and basically underlies his knowledge of the world. Man errs and he errs constantly by concealing Being in the act of disclosing for himself the world of objects, and even the logical or intellectual truth which consists in disclosing a particular of what-is as what it is, and which, in fact, is v ery essential for him in his practical concernful relationship with the world, is itself the result of his basic ontological error of concealing Being, the ground of what-is. All logical or intellectual truth is thus rooted in a basic ontological error and contains, in this sense, a certain 'dis-essence' in itself.

Heidegger's interpretation of error is suggestive of its own similarity to the Advaitic concept of *avidyā*. The Advaitic thinkers hold the view that *avidyā* or error basically characterises all dicotomous modes of human knowledge, inasmuch as it conceais the 'unitary' nature of Brahman in the act of disclosing the differentiated partculars. Just as Heidegger believes that the logical truth contains an element of 'dis-essence' in itself inasmuch as it conceals Being, the Advaita Vedānta holds the view that the *vyāvahārika* truth is only erroneous from the standpoint of the *pāramārthika* which it conceals.

Heidegger's description of the 'relation' of Being to the world is also similar to that of Advaita Vedānta. He holds the view that the relation of Being to the world is one of 'dissimulation', and 'mystery' underlies the 'dissimulation' of Being into the particulars of what-is. 'Mystery' consists not only in the concealment of Being but also in the projection of the particulars of what-is out of Being. Man is subject to the rule of 'mystery' in erring about Being,[13] which, in other words, means that the 'dissimulation' of Being invariably takes place in his knowledge of the world of objects. Man in this sense is being-there (Da-Sein) for Being to 'dissimulate' or appear as the distinct particulars of what-is which he discloses for himself in his knowledge of the world. In the sense of being-there for the 'dissimulation' of Being to take place, man is said to 'stand out' of Being and this is what Heidegger calls ex-sistence; the ex-sistent man is also in-sistent[14] inasmuch as he not only provides the field or area for the appearance of the particulars of what-is, but also takes special interest in some of the particulars to the exclusion of others. This in-sistence leads man to misery according to Heidegger,[15] and misery in Heidegger's philosophy is thus rooted in the human error of not being aware of the 'dissimulation' of Being constantly taking place in his knowledge of the world.

Like Heidegger, Advaita Vedānta also believes that Brahman appears as the world and this appearance is due to *māyā* which in Advaita Vedānta, is the corresponding concept to Heidegger's 'mystery'. Like Heidegger's 'mystery', *māyā* is said to conceal Brahman (*āvaraṇa*) as well as project the particulars out of Brahman (*vikṣepa*); it is in other words, "the cause of obstruction to the presentation of the true and of the presentation of the erroneous".[16] As long as man is subject to the rule of *māyā*, he remains unaware of the fact that the world is only an appearance of Brahman. As a result of this basic error, there arises in him an egoistic involvement or identification with some particulars to the exclusion of others and this identification or attachment (or in-sistence in Heidegger's terminology) leads him into misery. Thus human misery is ultimately traceable to man's ontological error or *avidyā* in both Advaita and Heidegger's philosophy.

Heidegger points out that it is not necessary that man should rest contented with his state of ontological error or misery, but he can rise above it or become 'free' from it. This implies Heidegger's conception of authentic existence or transcendence, which man can achieve in his own life. This transcendence, Heidegger believes, cannot come to man as a result of his intellectual activity which according to him his all-through erroneous inasmuch as it conceals Being; it can come to him only 'moodwise' as a matter of his subjective encounter with Being. What is essential for this encounter is that man should fully

face the mood of dread and psychologically accept the 'nothingness' of the particulars of what-is in relation to himself as disclosed in the mood of dread. The cultivation of the awareness of the pervasive 'nothingness', in other words, implies the growing awareness of 'mystery' which underlies the 'dissimulation' of being into the discrete objects of the world. When man becomes aware of 'mystery', he becomes 'free' from it, and through the 'nothingness' which pervades him, he 'touches' Being or 'catches a glimpse' of it. For, as Heidegger believes, "only in the clear night of dread's nothingness is what is as such revealed in all its original overtness (*offenheit*): "that it is and is not Nothing".[17] This encounter with Being, Heidegger says, is expressed in the form of a question, "why is there any Being af all and not rather nothing?"; but this is a question which is not really a question but an exclamation or expression of wonder at the presence of Being. Moreover, for Heidegger, there is no contradiction in affirming that 'nothingness' is the medium through which Being can be encountered. For what we call the pervasive 'nothingness' of the world of objects is Being under 'dissimulation', and when 'pierced through', it certainly reveals Being at the back of it. Nothingness and Being are thus integral to each other, and in order to emphasise the integral relation between them, Heidegger goes to the extent of saying that Being and 'nothingness' are the same. This identity should not however be taken to mean the denial of Being but the "nihilation of nothingness in Being"[18] which according to Heidegger occurs when man reaches out to Being through 'nothingness'.

Like Heidegger, Advaita Vedānta emphasises the need for man's transcendence of the state of error and misery. Transcendence means the realization of the one, undivided, all-comprehensive Being or Brahman, and one's own non-difference from it. Transcendence cannot be the result of a mere cognitive act which presupposes and sustains the distinctions, but does not overcome them; it can only be the result of an experiential or meditative act which fulfils itself in the oneness of the seeker with the sought. The inner core of meditation is the cultivation of the 'feeling' of the all-pervasiveness of Being and one's own non-difference from it. Thus we find in Advaita Vedānta, as in Heidegger's philosophy, a stress being placed on the cultivation of the metaphysical mood in preference to the dichotomous modes of cognitive understanding as the means of transcendence. Realization of the one undivided Being, however, presupposes the realization of the 'nothingness' or the illusory status of the distinct particulars of the world and one's own egoistic involvement with them. Thus we find that the experience of 'nothingness' or the illusory status of one's own egoistic relations with the world of objects forms the precondition for the encounter with Being both in

Advaita Vedānta and Heidegger's philosophy. Awareness of 'nothingness', in other words, implies the awareness of 'mystery' in both these philosophies, and in becoming aware of operation of *māyā* or 'mystery' one becomes 'free' from it. Moreover, it is affirmed in both these philosophies that Being cannot be sought by means of exteriosed thinking but can only be realized through a subjective encounter which results from a transcendence of the state of *avidyā* or error inherent in each man.

In conclusion it may be said that the similarities described above will justify a more detailed comparative study between Heidegger and Advaita Vedānta so as to throw more light on their basic and common commitments.

1. Margaret Wiley Marshall, "Existentialism : Suspension Bridge To Indian Thought", *Visvabharati Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1 and 2.

2. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, 1962), p. 19.

3. *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*, trans. George Thibaut, Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXXIV, (Varanasi : Motilal - Banarsidass, 1968), p. 9.

4. Heidegger, *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 92 : "The 'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not ; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself".

6. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

8. Heidegger, *Existence and Being* (London, 1949), p. 366.

9. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 231 : "the 'world' as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety".

10. Heidegger, *Existence and Being* p. 366 : "This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, which then crowds us in dread, this is what oppresses us".

11. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 22-26.

12. Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, p. 346 : Error "is essentially one with the manifest character of what-is".

13. *Ibid.*, p. 344: "Man's drifting from the mystery to the practicable and from one practicability to the next, always missing the mystery is *erring* (*das Irren*) ".

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, p. 346 : "The total essence of truth, which contains in its own self its 'dis-essence', keeps Da-sein ever turning this way and that but always into misery".

16. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, Madras, 1957, p. 230.

17. Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, p. 369.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 370 : "It is in the Being (*Sein*) of what-is that the nihilation of Nothing (*das Nichten das Nichts*) occurs".

Pabitra Kumar Roy

VEDĀNTA AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

(from the ethical point of view)

In the context of this paper, by *Vedanta*, I shall mean a set of sacerdotal statements, *mahāvākyas*, which entails the following propositions :—

1. Man is essentially a spiritual being.
2. The *real* self of man is cognitively unseizable.
3. The real and the *apparent* man form a complex.
4. The apparent man is an embodied mind.
5. The real man uses both the body and the mind and yet is neither.
6. The activities of the human spirit are interrelated.
7. Man's quest for perfection consists in organising the things of body, mind and the spirit into a whole.

To comment on the propositions listed above :—

1. The copula 'is' may be interpreted either as (a) complete identity of the meanings of subject and predicate of the proposition 'Man is spirit' or (b) partial identity, the connotation of the predicate being *a part* of the subject; or (c) the mere inferability of the presence of the predicate from the presence of the subject.

1.2 By 'spirit' or its adjective 'spiritual' I mean a self about which no set of descriptive statements is exhaustively true. Or, in short, the spiritual man is an over-natural self.

2.1 It is a philosophical commonplace. (2) follows from the meaning of the 'spiritual' in (1.2).

3.1 The *apparent* man is the self about which any finite set of descriptive statements is claimed to be true at a given time. The *real* man may be metaphysically, *as if*, referred to, by the set of *mahāvākyas* alone.

5.1 It is a proposition of introspective psychology.

5.2 The concept of the body is not presupposed for the assertion of the first person pronoun 'I'.

5.3 'I' entails the possibility of the true assertion of the second and the third person pronouns, *you*, *he*, *they* etc. The world is a non-solipsistic one.

7.1 It is the admission of the primacy of ethics, pointing to an *ought*. *Ethics* has for its domain a non-solipsistic world (5.3) and is directed towards realising (1) without denying the truth of (4) and (6).

By 'Western philosophy' I shall understand (a) the methodology of ethical analysis, developed by the socalled Oxford school since Moore; and (b) such theories of ethics that are called teleological and deontological. The word ethics will be employed in the sense of 'moral philosophy', or at the second order level of usage. The first order usage will be qualified as 'normative ethics'. In this paper *ethics* in general, shall then mean meta-ethics.

My object, in this paper, is to consider the nature of moral obligations, moral judgments and value, etc., according to Vedānta, in the light of Western meta-ethics.

II

Let us begin by considering the nature of moral obligation. It is an act which is regarded as morally obligatory and called a duty. The word duty may stand for an act which is obligatory on man either as man or as a member of a community or social class or as being at a particular stage or period of life. If an act is obligatory on man as man, it is a duty having reference to the attainment of the individual's perfection, man's real self. If it is obligatory on man as a member of a social class or as being at a particulær stage of life, then it has reference to the apparent man, because one's being a member of a social class or being at a particular stage of life are descriptively true

of the apparent man. Since the real man is a spiritual self, no statement of the kind can be said to be true of it as it may be in the case of man's social membership, etc. The Vedānta philosopher and his Western counterpart might agree on this classification. They may hold that all duties are duties of the self, whatever be their respective conceptions of the self of man. But the Vedāntin's term *dharma* is wider enough than *duty*. Besides the clasification of duties into generic and specific, it may be done on a new principle. Duties may be of empirical import and also those of non-empirical import. Duties of empirical import have their sanction in human nature, and by virtue of having empirical import, their evidential value or validity may be less than the duties of non-empirical import. One might hold that the duties of non-empirical import alone have unquestionable moral authority. Now since the real nature of man cannot be objectively apprehended, because no set or sets of statements can ever be entirely true of it, hence the sanction of duties relating to the real self of man must be different from the sanction of the duties of empirical import. Again, even the duties concerning the apparent self of man may also be of non-empirical import. One might believe in a metaphysical account of the apparent self of man, namely that the apparent state of the self is in consequence of actions performed in its pre-existence, in that case there may be duties conditioning its future existence as well. And hence, one can say that besides duties realating to the realisation of the real self of man, the overnatural self, duties concerning the future or post-mortem survival of the apparent self of man must be of non-empirical import, because the future is not a datum of experience. The Vedāntin holds that the duties of the self in general are of non-empirical import. Because since he does not deny (6), he would say also that the actions of the apparent self of man have relevance for realising the real self of man. The name for such duties of the self according to the sources of sanction, is *śāstrika*, or *pāramārthika*. Scriptural duties of non-empirical import and duties of empirical import — both comprise the domain of *dharma*.

The spiritual duties are either negative or of positive significance, i.e. are either *vidhis*, positive injunctions, or *niṣedhas*, mere prohibitions. The theory of moral language implied in the doctrine that the system of *dharma* comprising of *vidhivākyas* or injunctions is that moral (or dharma-) language is imperatival, or a sub-class of prescriptive language. The language of *dharma* is imperatival with non-empirical import. The Vedāntin holds the prescriptive theory of ethics in common with such prescriptivist thinkers like Kant and Hare. But there is a great difference, which must not be overlooked, namely, in the West it is the socio-ethical classification of duties that is usual, while in the Vedāntin's classification, the principle involved is the presence or

non-presence of a scriptural sanction. The Vedāntin insists on a non-natural sanction of the duties and there is a consequent separation of the moral life proper from the merely natural life, understood in the Western sense of the term. We may say that the Vedantin's clasification is ethico-theological both because of presence of scriptural sanction, and the teacher of morality is always the Lord, *Prajāpati*, the creator of the world. Socio-ethico classification of duties in the Western style may be had in the classification of dharmas, to some extent, I believe, in Manu and Praśastapāda.

An ethical theory provides an analysis of the basic concepts and methods of a morality, a descriptive account of the types of phenomena involved, an explanation of the relations of the morality to the fuller context of human life, and procedures for using the morality in deciding and evaluating. In this sense, there are the Vedāntin and the Kantian ethical theories. But the structure of the ethical theories are different. The difference lies in the kinds of problem each of the ethical theories addresses itself in its attempt to understand and guide the morality with which it is associated. Again ethical theories may be of diverse types. There is a typal difference between the Kantian prescriptivism and that of the Vedantin. Every ethical theory has an existential perspective, i.e. assumptions about the world and human nature, images of man etc, operative in it. We may say that the Vedantin and the Kantian theories of ethics, notwithstanding their prescriptivism, differ in their respective existential perspectives. The existential perspective of the Vedāntic theory of ethics has been laid down in the propositions (1) to (7).

III

The moral code of the Vedāntin primarily signifies the code of scriptural commands. Hence the anlaysis of consciousness of duty, for him, involves the analysis of the *śāstrika* imperatives as embodied in the code of Scriptural duties.

Conscience implies not only an act to be accomplished and the consciousness of it as duty or morally imperative but also righteousness, *dharma* or merit as accruing from the proper accomplishment of the duty. Nothing is duty which does not conduce to *dharma* or righteousness. Is righteousness a subjective category? Moral merit, it may be held, has only subjective significance, there being no merit in the act itself. Intention is necessary to constitute merit or demerit. The intention is pure in the case of merit. This I think, is the position of the Nyāya emotivism or subjectivism. The Vedāntin would endorse the Mīmāṁsaka's view that *dharma* is objective, is essentially of the nature of

good, i.e. a thing worthy of being aimed at or desired rather than a subjective quality or disposition to be acquired or cultivated. Further, the Vedāntin, in consequence of his endorsing the Mīmāṁsā prescriptivism, would hold also that *dharma* is not a mere *artha*, but an *artha* which is sanctioned by *vidhivākya*.

The constitutive principle of the good, that which makes it an object of desire, is whatever does not produce pain in excess of pleasure. We have *artha* not merely where there is an excess of pleasure over pain but also where the pain does not exceed the pleasure that may be desired. This is what constitutes the nature of *artha* or good in general and *dharma* or moral good is a specific form of this generic good, i.e., the good or *artha*, which is sanctioned by scriptural prescription or *vidhivākya*.

Thus far the Vedāntin is a teleologist and adopts the ethico-psychological principle of classification. He is a teleologist in saying that the basic or ultimate criterion of what is right or morally obligatory, etc., is the non-moral value i.e., pleasure that is brought into being, at least for the *laukika arthas*. His making *dharma* a specific kind of *artha*, of non-empirical import and being scripturally enjoined, he can be said to be trying to free himself from the charge of defining the moral in terms of the non-moral. Production of the non-moral value, i.e., pleasure in excess of pain is a necessary condition of an *artha*, but it need not be sufficient for its being moral. When the Vedāntin says with the Mīmāṁsaka that *dharma* (a) must be an *artha*, i.e., must not produce pain in excess of pleasure, but also that (b) it must be sanctioned by *codana*, or *śāstrik* prescription — he can be taken to mention both the necessary and the sufficient conditions of the applications of the concept of *dharma*. Is then, the proposition '*dharma* is the *artha* which is of positive *śāstrik* import' analytic? If so, then moral judgments become trivial assertions. 'X is *dharma*' would then mean 'X is an *artha* and has positive *śāstrik* import and X is *dharma*' or 'X is an *artha* and has positive *śāstrik* import' *and* 'X is an *artha* and has positive *śāstrik* import'. Then it is a tautology. Surely, the Mīmāmsaka, does not intend a tautologous assertion. If 'dharma' is a value word then to say, 'X is *dharma*' is to commend, or to assert an imperative, by way of guiding one's choices. A trivial assertion cannot do it. What then is the logical status of the statement *codanālakṣaṇah artha dharmaḥ*? If it is a definition, which I think it is, then *dharma* cannot be used as a predicate. But none the less it is a value word, it has a built-in commendatory force as in the statement 'X is *dharma*'. The only way out that seems to me possible is to say "'X is *dharma*' is *dharma*". If *dharma* by virtue of its having *codanālakṣaṇaḥ* is meant to be something unique or *sui generis*, then it must be undefinable.

The difficulty might be resolved by considering the proposition *codanālakşaṇa arthaḥ dharmaḥ* as synthetic as imparting an information about the word *dharma*, and analytic when stating the *meaning* of '*dharma*'. If the proposition is synthetic in import, then such statements 'X is *dharma*' become significant. We shall then understand that in the proposition 'X is an *artha* having positive *śāstrik* import', i.e., we are given a criterion of applicability. Is this descriptive meaning secondary to X's being *dharma*? If *dharma* is a value word, its evaluative meaning must be primary. But I do not know whether the Mimāṁsaka would admit the primacy of the evaluative meaning of *dharma* at the cost of its descriptive meaning. Because if the descriptive meaning is secondary, one can always refuse to accept it, and go to give the evaluative meaning a new descriptive content. This is what is known as persuasively defining the value terms. In my opinion the statement *codanālakşaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmaḥ* persuasively defines the word *dharma*. Its acceptability depends on the admitting the authority of the scriptures.

IV

The Vedāntin does not go a long way with the Mīmāṁsakas. It may be asked, what in particular constitutes the non-empirical good, *adṛsṭārtha*? Is it the act enjoined by scripture, or is it some effect? The Mimāṁsaka has to accept either of the exclusive disjuncts. If the first disjunct is denied, then we get the position of one Mīmāṁsā school, which holds that *dharma* is a new category revealed by *niyoga*, i.e., the imperative involved. Or, we may say that *dharma* is revealed by *preraṇā*, i.e. by the authoritative suggestion to the will implied in such a command. This *preraṇā* is a kind of *ātmakuta*, i.e. excitement or impulsion in the self, an excitement that becomes the cause of certain physical processes — *bhautikavyāpārahetu*. This position corresponds to the prescriptivism of R. M. Hare, who proposes the analysis of an imperative sentence into its *phrastic* and *neustic* parts. The *preraṇa* is the neustic part of the *vidhivākya*, 'X is *dharma*' can be translated into the following statement.

"Your doing X in the relevant circumstances, *please*." The word 'please' is the sign of assertion by the hearer to whom the imperative is addressed. I think the concept of *preraṇa* bears some such significance. The Vedāntin would join issue with this view.

If the second disjunct is denied, we get another Mīmāṁsā view, i.e., the acts enjoined, constitute *dharma*. In *vidhicodana*, the *dharma* is a positive good, viz., the good involved in the act enjoined. *If* no reference is made beside the acts enjoined, the position is one of act-deontology, i.e., there are considerations which can make an action

right or obligatory besides the goodness or badness of its consequences — certain features of the act itself other than the *value* it brings into existence. But *Dharma* is *sreyaskara*, conducive to good, i.e. works for the agents' *niḥśreyasaḥ* or highest good. This view does not distinguish between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, between duties obligatory on man as man or as a member of a social group or at being at a particular station of life. Some Mīmāṁsakas may be rule-deontologists as well if they hold that *any* act of non-empirical positive *śāstric* import is *dharma*.

Is it possible for the Vedāntin to endorse the act or rule deontology of the second view? One might say like the Naiyāyika that *sādhāraṇa dharmas* constitute his properly ethical duties, and since *dharma* is of subjective significance, *varṇāśrama dharmas*, when properly discharged would contribute towards acquiring merit. Vidhivākyas concerning ceremonials are not obligationary *per se*, but according to one's station in life for the moral perfections of the agent. This view is a half way house between the open question argument and naturalism. Moral perfection is a value, and as such, cannot be entailed by any set of factual premises. We can always ask whether any set of performances really entail moral perfection. This is the open question argument. Naturalism requires the entailment relation to hold. The Mīmāṁsāka bears within his deontology a strong naturalistic disposition. The Naiyāyika is not a naturalist, he is a subjectivist in so far as his concept of *dharma* refers to the psychical state of the moral agent. He is a non-naturalist in holding that the performance of rituals imply moral perfection, though not entail. But he believes in the authority of the scriptures and endorses the view that the *śāstrik* imperatives *qua śāstrik*, must be conducive to real good. As regards the *sādhārana dharmas*, he is a rule deontologist of the Kantian kind.

V

The Nyāya consideration of *dharma* is valuable in as much as it provides us a passage to the Vedanta ethics. The Vedāntin admits with the Mīmāṁsaka that *dharma is śreyaskara*. In that sense *dharma* transcends the life of pleasures. The *preyas* and the *śreyas*, the 'more pleasant' and the 'more ethically satisfying' are confronted as the two aims of man's worldly aspirations. The ethically better is recommended instead of the more pleasant. But the Vedāntin holds that these two different longings of mankind still refer to the empirical ends of relative values. When it comes to the final goal, it is not the better, nor even the *śreṣṭha* 'the superlative best', which stands for the *summum bonum*. The 'final' goal (7) is expressed not as *śreṣṭha* but as *niḥśreyasa*, or the breaking up, and breaking away from (*nis*), all notions

of comparison. The term *śreṣṭha*, 'the best' is reserved for the social scale of the community. *Śreṣṭha* never amounts *niḥśreyas*, the final goal. The comparative refers only to empirical factors, the domain of the apparent man. The statement that *dharma* is *śreyaskara*, conducive to the ethically better, or simply good, holds true for the ethics of relations, and the comparative can be applied only if the relations are non-reflexive. Because only between two separate things can a comparison be made. Ethical operations, i.e. performance of duties can be had only in a non-solipsistic world.

But again, the moral agent is an individual, and his self, though gets socially individuated in society, is not exhausted with in it, since as spirit (1) he transcends every determination, or no set of descriptive statements can exhaust his identity. The real man then is unique and stands outside any comparison. *Nihśreyas* then can refer only to the real man. The real man is an axiological value. It is the *regulative* image of the real man which saves morality from stagnation. Highest morality has to do with values, not merely with duties alone, of which no other value is higher than Freedom.

What then is the status of the life of duties? Does it have a moral significance, in the higher non-comparative sense of the word? Or how is the life of duties related to the life of the spirit? The Vedāntin would answer the questions variously. He might say that either the two lives are disjoined, or one is a precondition of the higher life. The second answer has a built-in theory of moral psychology. Disinterested performance of duties leads to *nivṛtti*. But unaided by this proposition of moral psychology, it cannot be logically said that the life of duties is a pre-condition of the life of the spirit. Unless, of course, one pressupposes that a disinterested attitude is possible. Again, if X is a precondition of Y, then it cannot be the case that X is there but does not follow. To say 'Y is preconditioned' is to assert that Y would, of necessity, follow. If the 'cannot' is interpreted modally, then to say 'X preconditions Y' amounts to saying 'X entails Y', and this is pure and simple naturalism. But the Vedāntin is a professed non-naturalist. Then either he makes compromises with the traditional authority or he ignores logic. Maitreyi's question, "Should I through these possessions attain immotality?" is an open question and can always be asked by the Vedāntin, when he is at his best. Or else he has to admit that Freedom can be preconditioned, which certainly he would not like to do.

The difficulty is not unknown to the Vedāntin. The Mīmāṁsaka deontologist holds that *dharma* should be regarded as an instrinsic value worthy of being pursued for its own sake. *Dharma* becomes, for him,

an ultimate value. This view is the total rejection of the hedonist or utilitarian standpoint of conceiving *dharma* a means to the attainment of certain ends, and thereby putting *abhyudaya* on a par with *śreyas*. Mīmāṁsā deontologism is a higher view of *dharma* no doubt, it shows that an instrumental value may, if one wills, be so pursued to transform it into an instrinsic one. But this view does not satisfy the Vedāntin. In commending disinterested activity in the literal sense of the expression, it is indulging, he would say, in a pure abstraction, for action entirely divorced from purpose is a psychological impossibility. To insist upon such activity in the name of *dharma* is, the Vedāntin might observe, to reduce life to a form or meaningless drudgery. His revaluation of *dharma* makes it subserve *mokṣa*. *Dharma*, for the Vedāntin, assumes the role of an instrumental value. It becomes instrumental not to the realisation of any secular ends (*abhyudaya*) or quasi-spiritual ones (*śreyas*) but for achieving what is regarded as the supreme spiritual ideal. The Vedāntin seeks to synthesise both the teleological and the deontological of the Mīmāṁsā ethics on a new foundation, the paradigm of which is found in the *Gītā*.

The ethical significance of duties performed in accordance with the *vidhivākyas* is understandable on the Mīmāṁsaka's terms. Freedom may be said to be not a cessation from activity but the realisation of eternal happiness with active participation in the duties. But the Mīmāṁsaka teleologist perfers the spiritual ideal as dissolution of the individual's connection with an empirical world — *prapañcasambandha-vilaya*, though not *prapañcavilaya*. The Mīmāṁsā teleologist does not say that the domain of moral action is dissolved, but only the bonds that attach the individual to a world and thereby cause experiences of pleasure and pain. The Mimāṁsā rigorist would define the spiritual ideal as *niyogasiddhi* or realisation of the moral imperative as duty. *Mokṣa* is the accomplishment of duty for duty' sake, i.e. the discharge of the unconditional duties as moral verities. Moral experience is not annulled, as it is for the teleologist.

The Vedāntin sets himself to the task of redefining the Mīmāṁsā teleology and subordinating its rigorism to the supreme spiritual ideal. Not only does he subordinate *dharma* to *mokṣa*, but exhorts the *sādhaka* to become a *siddha*. The Vedāntic imperative tells us to pass from a state of striving morality to that of a spontaneous one. The moral activity must become the natural manifestation of the real man, and be consequently charactersised not only by constraint or strife but by supreme joy. The apparent man is self-forgetful, since, in course of his leading a life of conventional morality, he allows himself to be exhaustively described or judged by sets of descriptive statements. He identifies himself with the role of his agency of social or relative duties. This identification obscures his real self, which can be realised by

another set of virtues, the noetic ones. When a person realizes his real self, he acts, not as a member of a social group or being at a particular stage of life, but as what he really is.

This ideal of the Vedāntin seeks to resolve the conflict between duty and interest, escaping the shortcomings both of pure formalism and concrete teleology. The Vedāntin's position in relation to the deontologist Mīmāmsaka's is similar to that of Hegel's ethics in relation to Kant's. The moral point of view is an attitude to life, said Hegel, rather than a formal philosophy. Just as Kant anticipated Hegel's ethical reconstruction, similiarly, the later Mimaṁsaka spoke much in the vein of the Vedāntin. This fact is testified by the Vedāntin's incorporating much of the Mīmāṁsaka *trivarga* only to subserve the fourth — the spiritual ideal of freedom or *mokṣa*.

The Vedāntin seeks to give an integrated view of life and a completer picture of man. The activistic ethics of the Mīmāṁsaka does not account for the whole of man. The contemplative man is, perhaps, left out of the Mīmāṁsā account. The ritualist man is as much an abstraction as the ascetic thinker. Man is not only both but he must evaluate his moral commitments in the light of his ultimate concern, his discovery of his real self, as the self-transcending subject. The Vedāntin holds that man's real and the apparent selves, though distinguishable are not unrelated, and he holds, accordingly that self-realization is not merely a concept or ideal beyond the empirical pale, but rather and more exactly an actual experience which the individual undergoes. It is a practical ideal, though the exegesis of the Vedāntin's metaphysics make it appear negatively.

We may explain in what sense does the Vedāntin hold that a life of duties is preparatory to or a precondition of the life of the spirit. From the nature of Vedāntin's ideal it is evident that the life of the spirit does not consist in moving towards a goal, as some of the Mīmāṁsakas would hold, but in a mere change of outlook. It would be mistaken to think that a life of duties *temporally* leads the life of the spirit. The quest after perfection does not start in *vaccuo*, one begins with given sets of imperatives. The discipline is merely an indirect aid, for gathering the spiritual momentum. The realization of the real self of man is a *puruṣārtha*, that is a human value, and hence it cannot be said to deny what is sought by men rather this satisfies it most. Again, it is a *kṛti-sādhya* or rationally willed. It is not that a sort of a value which gives rise to ineffectual longings, in that case *mokṣa* as a *purusārtha* would be a misnomer.

The Vedāntin would like to hold that the life of duties and the life of the spirit are not unrelated, though obligations of duty remain,

yet since the good life is a spiritual one, morality can neither have a fixed station, nor any predetermined code of ethics. The moral life is a perpetual unrest — an unceasing progression from one dissatisfaction to another. To be moral is to be dissatisfied, to be in unceasing conflict with the actual, to be always stretching forward to an ideal that never is, but always to be. To find morality in one's fixed station and its duties is to mistake both one's moral station and the duties it entails. This account of the Vedāntin's moral theory follows from his image of man as a self-transcending subject. The Vedāntin frees himself from the objectivistic obsession of the Mīmāṁsaka deontology. But this does not mean the abnegation of the social domain. The Vedāntin's negative attitude to empirical life need not be taken literally. The real self is the *transcendental* self, not a transcendent self. On the basis of a transcendent self morality would be impossible. The real self is the consummation and completion of the values of the apparent self, the social self of man. In practising the dianoetic virtues the social *aim* is given up, not the social *view*. That is, the welfare of society as such ceases to motivate action, it is not excluded from the agent's mind. The Vedāntin aims at transcending the conflict between duty and interest. It is the social significance of the actions performed that alone matters for the Vedāntin. The ethical man is an incomplete image of the real man. The moral attitude is mainly aspirational springing from strife, but the Vedāntin's regulative image of the real man reconciles aspiration with achievement. What the Vedāntin seeks to effect is the elimination of strife, and not that of activity. He cannot grow oblivious of the enviornment, since he is ontologically committed to a conception of Being as bliss, which implies the oneness of the whole of existence. This ideal necessitates the cultivation of universal love, not in the sense of love for others *as othres* but as *oneself*. The question whether the highest value is attainable is not of much consequence. We may grant that it is not finally attained and that man's reach will always exceed his grasp. What matters is the deliberate choosing of it as the ideal to be pursued — this is what the Vedāntin calls *mumukṣutva* and thereafter making a persistent and continual advance towards it. This of course is a personal opinion, and some of the Vedāntins would not disagree, since all them do not admit *jīvanmukti*. The Vedāntin's moral endeavour consists of two stages, one of striving to realise the *iṣṭa*, the real self of man, and the other of achievment. The former is called *vividiṣā-sannyāsa* and the latter *vidvat-sannyāsa*. Noetic duties comprise the domain of the stage called *vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa*. Since the Vedāntin's is not a deontological theory of ethics, the stage of *vidvat-saṁnyāsa* is a logical requirement, though not a moral one, but its value lies in its *regulative* function. The vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa is *constitutive* of the Vedāntin's moral code.

Richard V. De Smet

QUESTIONING VEDĀNTA

In this contribution to the Seminar on "Advaita Vedānta and Western Thought", I intend to apply to Vedānta a critical consideration made by Saint Thomas Aquinas about early Greek philosophy and thereby to question Śaṅkara's treatment of supreme intuition and, more radically, at least one position of a whole group of his modern interpreters.

St. Thomas Aquinas once gave a bird's eye view of early Greek philosophy as a development governed by the postulate, "the like is known by the like," till the overthrow of the latter by Aristotle. This postulate may, correctly enough, be understood as expressing the rule of intellectual discovery when it infers the nature of a new object from its similarities with another object previously known, (as in *upamāna*.) But, according to him, it was understood in a different way by the Presocratics. The likeness which they took for granted was between the known and the knower. For them, knowledge implied an essential similarity or basic identity between the objects and the subject and *vice-versa*. Now, it was obvious to them that objects were material, made as they were of the elements, earth, water, air and fire; hence, for the first of those philosophers, the subject too was to be considered as material. Even when Heraclitus noticed the *logos* as the power in the knower which relates and binds the fleeting moments of knowledge, he understood it as being of the same nature as the fire which brings about the moving consistency of the flux of the objective world. And when Parmenides noticed the indeterminacy, oneness and infinity of pure thought, he projected them upon the object of thought which he conceived as strictly monistic being. Indeed, if mind coincides with being, the modes of the mind must be the modes of being and *vice-versa*. Thus also the first Atomists attributed to their atoms love and

hatred, the force of attraction and repulsion which they had experienced on the mental plane.

For Socrates, on the other hand, and soon for Plato, it became evident that knowledge was radically intellectual, spritual, and consequently they declared its objects to be essentially *eidos* or *eideaidea*, idea (from the root *oid-* or *vid-*), matter being only a degradation or shadow of idea and corresponding to *doxa*. Thus they continued to adhere to the old postulate. Aristotle was the first to see that "whatever is received takes in its receiver the mode of that receiver." For instance, objects as received (actively) by the intellect of a man take on the mode of being of that intellect and are thus found there in the form of ideas. But the ideas of things are, as received by matter, materialized so that they constitute physical existents. Thus it is no longer true for Aristotle that the modes of thinking are the modes of being, or *vice-versa*. Physical objects are not composed of genus and difference which are but modes of our mental representations of them, but of prime matter and substantial form which are the inner co-principles of their real essence. Accordingly, Aquinas will say that the whole universe may be considered either in its actual reality, and then it is complex, material, changing, etc., or in its potentiality as possible in the divine All-power, or also as divinely known by its Creator, and in these two cases it must be said to be identical with the divine Essence or Esse. This, by the way, is the *satkāryavāda* of Aquinas as stated in his *De Potentia*, 3, 16, 24.

Taking our cue from Aristotle and St. Thomas we may now wonder whether Indian philosophy, including Vedānta, has not been governed unknowingly by the wrong postulation of a one-one relation between thinking and being. This would not be astonishing since knowledge is often conceived as the result of a process of *bimba-pratibimba* in the mirror-like *buddhi*. Indications are not lacking that this is perhaps what did indeed happen. To take first a rather gross instance, Vaiśeṣika did range *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* among its scheme of ontological *padārthas*. Though it did say that they are *buddhy-apekṣa*, it gave them a realistic interpretation in the manner of all Realists faced with the problem of the status of universals. Similarly many Mīmāṃsakas imagined a realm of subsistent *sphoṭas* not unlike Plato's realm of ideas. Others ontologised the *ākṛtis*. Even the term *nāma-rūpa* which refers directly to speech and preception was very early given a realistic interpretation.

Our questioning becomes more central when we examine the influence of meditational introversion and *yoga* upon philosophical doctrines. These methods are essentially ascensional and abstractive.

They draw man away from the concreteness of sense-objects and *mano-vṛttis* towards the upper indeterminacy of pure consciousness. Or they ascend from the concrete *nāma-rūpas* of the universe towards their more and more internal causes. Internal causes form a ladder of *upādānas* or *ātmans* whose highest rung is the *Parabrahman* or *Paramātman.* Every step, says Śaṅkara, is marked by higher subtleness, greatness, interiority and transcendence. Whether the ascension goes from objects to pure conscionsness or from effects to supreme inner cause, its end and goal is a point of supreme abstraction. Infinite and indeterminate, it is figuratively spoken of as *ākāśa.* Trancending the agitation of desires and passions, it is called peace or also isolation, *kaivalya*, and beyond the *guṇas* (*nirguṇa*). Undifferentiated, void of forms (*nirākāra*) and qualities (*nirguṇa*), ineffable, uncompounded, (*asaṁskṛta*), it is interpreted by the Buddhists, especially of Māhāyāna, as Void, *Śūnya.* However, apprehended differently as most subtle inner cause, highest concentration of energy and consciousness, it is interpreted by Brahmavādins as Fulness (*Pūrṇa*), Reality-Knowledge-Infinite (*Satyam-jñānam-anantam*), Bliss (*Ānanda*).

The diversity of these interpretations, from Buddhistic *śūnya* to Sāṅkhya *puruṣa* to Vedāntic *Pūrṇa*, may make us wonder about the exact nature of the experience (*annbhava*) which they claim to express. The question may be put in this way, is it ontological or gnoseological, is it the experience of Reality or the experience of the highest state of consciousness? Is it a synthetic experience of Reality and Consciousness at their highest level, or does it imply a projection from mode of consciousness unto degree of reality? In other terms, are not the ontologizing interpretations unknowingly governed by the pseudo-principle that the like is known by the like, and the modes of knowing are the modes of being?

Indeed, the very process of yogic meditations suggests that it might be so for it consists in a gradual isolation of consciousness from its concrete and finite forms. In its Buddhistic form, we are told that the meditating man can reach gradual stages of deliverance (*vimokkha*) among which the following are of interest: First, by passing beyond any conception of matter, sensation and multiformity, he attains the state of mind in which the only idea present is the infinity of space (*ākāsānañca*). On this follows a stage in which the infinity of intellect (*viññānānañca*) is alone present. The next stage is reached when there is nothing at all present to the mtnd (*akiñcaññāyatana*). Then is achieved the stage when neither the presence nor the absence of ideas is specifically present (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*). Finally is attained the state where there is suppression of both sensation and idea (*saññāvedayitanirodha*). In Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, 1, 51,

we find a similar teaching concerning *nirbīja samādhi*, the seedless state of consciousness in which all objects and modifications of the mind are suppressed (*nirodha*).

For Śaṅkara, meditation (*nididhyāsana*) consists in "grasping the teaching relating to Knowledge (*vidyā-śravaṇa-grahana*), holding it (*dhāraṇa*) and repeating it mentally (*abhyāsa*)" (*Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya*, 2,1.) With its culmination, *samādhi*, it constitutes *dhyānayoga* "which is the most immediate means to *Vidyā*" (*Gītā Bh.*, 5, 27), "the highest form of *yoga*; it consists in abiding constantly in the Ātman, bearing in mind that the Ātman is all and nothing else is absolutely existent" (*Ibid.*, 6, 25.) This *dhyāna* surely resembles that of Patañjali and the Buddhists. It culminates in the same *nirodha* of objects, sensations, ideas and all reflections of consciousness and in the same purity of consciousness. However, this consciousness is not a *śūnyam* but a *pūrṇam*. It is *paramārthataḥ sat*. This is an interpretation of the supreme *dhyāna*-experience about which we may wonder whether the above mentioned pseudo-principle is not at work in it. Indeed, the latter can work in two ways. If the modes of being are the exact counterparts of the modes of knowledge, then, the extreme purity of consciousness in the state of complete *nirodha* may be interpreted, either as implying a radical emptiness of being—this is the śūnyavādin's position — or as implying that being is supremely pure and transcendent and, in that case, pure being and pure consciousness can be identified as the one Ātman or Branman — this is Śaṅkara's interpretation which recovers the truth of *Taitt. Up.*, 2, 1, 1 : *Satyaṁ-jñānam-anantam-Brahm'eti*.

But this is an interpretation which seems to go beyond the experience itself. It seems to read into the experience something imported from outside it, namely, from the Śruti-assertion of the ontological nature of the *sākṣin* as Fulness. The experience of pure consciousness in the state of *nirodha*, even if it proceeds from the śruti, '*Neti, Neti*', does not suffice to justify that interpretation. Śaṅkara himself says it in *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, XVIII, 125 :

> "If in this context you maintain that [there is] a negation [of all else other than the Ātman, which] proceeds through the sole authority of the śruti, [*neti neti*,] we reply that in that case a mere void would result, as there would be no [previous] ascertaining (*prasiddhi*) of the witness."

Sarvajñātma Muni confirms this in *Saṁkṣepa Śārīraka*, I, 255 : "The false appearance of a snake arising from ignorance of a rope cannot be cancelled by mere negation not preceded by a positive

cognition of the rope. And similarly, the pain of transmigration proceeding from ignorance of the inmost Ātman cannot be cancelled by the mere notion 'it is not so' (*neti*) arising from the śruti [*neti neti*] without previous positive apprehension of Brahman."

Śaṅkara appears to reject in the above quotation the doctrine of Maṇḍana Miśra in *Brahma Siddhi*, p. 157 : "What then is taught by the Śruti ? [Merely] the non-existence of the universe." Śaṅkara continues :

> "If you answer [that one could infer the ātman-nature of pure consciousness] by saying, 'thou art conscious : how couldst thou be the [non-conscious] body ?' we reply, 'No, for [the Ātman as pure consciousness] is not established [thereby, or previously].' This argument [also] proceeds through negation of what is contradictory [to the Ātman as pure consciousness.] It would be valid only if pure consciousness were already established through some other proof." (127)

> "[Further,] if someone were to say, 'the witness affirms its own self-existence because consciousness is immediately evident (*aparokṣa*),' we reply that in that case the witness ought to affirm itself even in the case of the Śūnyavādin." (127)

It appears, therefore, that for Śaṅkara the mere experience of pure consciousness, unprepared by *śravaṇa* and *manana* upon the śruti positive characterisations (*lakṣaṇa*) of the Ātman, could lead no further than the apprehension of *śūnya*. Its positive interpretation as experience of the Ātman required to be supported by another *pramāṇa*, namely, the *śabda* of Śruti, or, more precisely, such *mahāvākyas* as *Tattvamasi* and the definitions of Brahman. What is the reason for this insufficiency of the experience of pure consciousness so long as it is not prepared, informed and supported by *śabda* ?

My suggestion is that Śaṅkara, without formulating the postulate 'like is known by like,' views knowledge within its perspective and remains influenced by the simile of *buddhi* as mirror. If the modes of knowledge and reality coincide, then when the mode of knowledge is purity it mirrors nothing and the mode of reality can only be *śūnya*.

In opposition to this theory of coincidence, its reversal which I have traced to Aristotle conceives that kdowledge is in every state polarised on being. Being, in all its instances, is always independent

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of knowledge; its modes are simply its own. Knowledge, on the other hand, does in its dynamic search for being pass through many modes which are the forms of its approaches of being. The link of knowledge with being is the very orientation of its dynamism ever focusing upon being and thus ever affirming it, if not explicitly, at least through the constant aiming of its very *élan* towards it. This link is not representational as in the static mirror-theory of knowledge. The dynamism of knowledge goes beyond any representation just as it goes beyond the empirical, the changing, the finite, the limited, the imperfect. Thus from its very inception it obscurely affirms Being in its fulness, infinite, permanent, absolute. An implicit assertion of the Absolute is exercised in all the explicit assertions performed by a human knower and pervades the whole dynamism of his knowledge. In short, human knowledge is oriented by nature towards being or reality. The nature of its highest aim is measured by the scope of its pursuit. The range of this scope is unlimited since our quest goes ever beyond, and is unsatiated by, any reality marked by finiteness or limitation of any kind. Hence, the only goal that can satiate our appetite for knowledge is the Absolute grasped as Fulness. This is the theory of Aquinas, developed on the basis of Aristotle. and exposed anew in the light of Kant by the greatest (to my mind) of contemporary Thomists, Joseph Maréchal.

Śaṅkara himself tried to overcome the defects of the theory of knowing, which he had inherited, in several ways. First of all, in his Commentary on *Bhagavad-gītā*, 2, 16, "*Nāsato vidyate bhāvaḥ*," he instituted a transcendental analysis of judgement. First, he defined being (*sat*) as "that object whose knowledge never fails" and non-being (*asat*) as "that object whose knowledge fails"; thus, he writes, "their division stands in dependence of knowledge." He, then, therefore, analyzed knowledge, i. e., more precisely, judgement, the assertion of an existent object, such as, 'this is a jar,' 'this is a cloth,' 'this is an elephant,' (*san-ghaṭaḥ, san-paṭaḥ, san-hasti*) and as opposed to 'blue lotus' (*nīl'otpalavat.*) "Now, in every judgement," he says, "all men are aware of a double knowledge (*buddhi*) with reference to the same substratum, namely, *sat* and such subjects as *ghaṭaḥ*, *paṭaḥ*, etc. Of these two *buddhis*, the second happens eventually to fail since jars, etc., pass away, but the first, the *sad-buddhi* does never fail. It is present even when the judgement deals with illusory objects like the water of a mirage." From this he concludes that the various subjects of judgements which are effects and mutable and whose knowledge fails, are *asat*; but "of being (*sat*) there is no inexistence or absence, because, as we have said, it never fails anywhere...Being designates Brahman...and non-being designates whatever changes and has a cause."

In this analysis, we can find at least the first point of the Thomistic analysis, namely, that the immutable Being is somewhat affirmed in every judgement, even in false judgements, as the radical object of the existential copula. That judgement is anchored in the Absolute as in its one Pole and Goal, is discovered by Śaṅkara as well as by St. Thomas. But he does not explain this by a theory of knowledge-dynamism. Rather, he conceives it through the Śruti assertion of the Ātman as *Sākṣin*. The Ātman is the immutable Being ever present to the judging intellect, as he says in the same commentary. St. Thomas equally holds that God, the divine Absolute, is the ever-present Illuminer of our intellects but this might not suffice to explain the intentionality of our intellects apart from a clear awareness of their dynamism.

In another important passage, namely, in his commentary on *Kaṭha Up.*, 2, 3, 12, Śaṅkara comes back upon that permanent anchoring of *buddhi* in *sat*:

> "Although [Brahman] is devoid of all differences, yet, since it is arrived at as the root of the world, it indeed exists, because the elimination of effect terminates in existence or 'Is-ness' (*astitva*). Indeed, this effect [the world] when thus followed along the ascending series of its more and more subtle [inner causes] leads ultimately to the simple awareness of *sat*. Even when through the elimination of objects, the buddhi itself becomes eliminated, it is at that moment big as it were with the embryo *sat*. For buddhi is our instrument in ascertaining the truth of both *sat* and *asat*. If the world had no cause, this effect being transfused with *asat* only would at every step be grasped as non-being only. But in fact it is not so ; it is, on the contrary, grasped at every step as being only, just as jars, etc., which are the products of clay, etc., are perceived as permeated with clay, etc."

We see here again how *buddhi* is related to being (*sat*) by its very nature. When it is in connection with *asat*, it asserts being in it and through it. When it regresses from that *asat*, which is effect, "along the ascending series of its more and more subtle" inner causes or ātmans, it is all the time pregnant with being. And when, in the state of complete *nirodha*, it eliminates even itself, being is as it were born, manifested in its fulness. However, the link of buddhi with *sat* is static, not dynamic, even though it is affirmed on the side of objects, as pervading effects and their inferior inner causes.

For Aquinas, it is dynamic on the side of objects though static on the side of the subject where God stands as absolute Illuminer. In any

case, absolute being is for him also found through a regression from effects to Cause and through finally going beyond the intellective soul itself:

> "To That which transcends everything we ascend, as much as we can, by a threefold way and relation, namely, through an elimination of all things, through an elevation above all things, and through attaining the Cause of all things. This is why God is known in all things and yet beyond and without all things. Thus He is known through knowledge and through ignorance, inasmuch indeed as [for us, men, in this life] this is to know God, namely, to be clearly aware that we do not yet know what He is. And this 'knowledge through ignorance' is most divine because it is attained by a supra-mental union which takes place when our mind [*mens*: intellective soul] leaves all things and then dismisses itself also. Then it is united with the light that is above all lights and illumined by the inscrutable abyss of Wisdom" (*Commentary on Dionysius's 'Concerning the Divine Names'*, 7, 3, n. 731-732.)

Thus in Aquinas too the ascent to the absolute Being requires a complete *nirodha* but here also it has been preceded by a *pramāṇa* which has established a supreme Positivity above the whole series of effects and causes which It sustains. This *pramāṇa* is a whole metaphysical enquiry. In Śaṅkara it is the whole exegetical enquiry upon the *śabda* of Śruti. It includes, of course, *manana* and, in that sense, a metaphysical enquiry. Yet, it is essentially testimonial.

The status of Śruti as *śabda* requires a justification since it is said to be *apauruṣeya* and eternal and thus independent and self-standing in contradistinction from the other *pramāṇas* though not in contradiction with them. The Mīmāṃsakas had their own justification for it and Śaṅkara refined it. But contemporary Vedāntins rarely accept it and rather hold that the authority of śruti is validated by the ultimate experience (*anubhava*) to which it conduces. But if it is so and if at the same time we hold with Śaṅkara that this *anubhava* is bound to be merely 'śūnyavādic' unless it is preceded by another and independent *pramāṇa*, we are in a quandary. Indeed, *śruti* would be justified by that *anubhva* and the latter in turn would for its positive content be justified by *śruti*. This is an antinomy which is incident to the stand of modern Vedāntins though not of Śaṅkara. It deserves, I think, to be grasped, discussed and, hopefully, solved.

To sum up: This paper recalled, first, the influence of the postulate 'like is known by like' upon the Greek philosophers up to

Plato ; then, its overthrow by Aristotle who established that known and knowledge have each their own mode though knowledge endows the known with its own mode. The said principle was, then, found to have played a similarly governing role in Indian philosophy. This was examined further with regard to the interpretation of the supreme experience of *dhyāna*, which is śūnyavādic in Buddhism but brahmavādic in Vedānta. Śaṅkara was shown to have perceived the difficully of establishing the brahmavādic interpretation on the sole basis of the *dhyāna*-experience, and to have demanded a previous *prasiddhi* by Śruti. This indicates that he was himself unknowingly accepting the consequences of the above postulate. Thomas Aquinas, on the contrary, had developed a theory of the dynamism of knowledge which preserved him from that difficulty. Through this theory he could pass by a continuous movement and without recourse to the authority of a testimony from ordinary knowledge to his equivalent of the *dhyāna*-experience. Śaṅkara overcame for the essentials the consequences of the similarity postulate, mainly through his transcendental analysis of judgment. Modern Vedāntins, on the other hand, have to face the antinomy which arises if *Śruti* is validated by the supreme *anubhava* and the latter by *Śruti*.

P. Nagaraja Rao

THE REALIST ENCOUNTER WITH ADVAITA

The Vedānta philosophy in India has taken on *two* patterns — the Advaita of Śaṅkara, with its distinct doctrines and theistic schools of Vedānta which have grown in opposition to Advaita as alternate and differing interpretations of the triple text. Both the types of Vedānta have alike sworn by the *triple texts*. Hence we have had centuries of controversy and the enormous output of polemical treatises. The polemical literature between the different schools of Vedānta almost equals and on occasion outweighs the polemics against other *darśanas*. The Realistic pattern of Indian thought and western epistemology concentrate their attack on the central concept of Śaṅkara's Advaita i.e., Absolute, or Brahman.

The Absolute of Śaṅkara is hypostatised on the authority of the *śruti*, revelation, sought to be established with help of reason, and affirmed by plenary spiritual experience. Thus *śruti*, *yukti* and *anubhava* are pressed into service. The realistic theist eually claims that his *anubhava* affirms the existence of a supreme personalistic God full of infinite auspicious qualities and absolute difference between soul and God. Leaving experience, and *śruti* which also can be twisted to yield any meaning we want to, let us concentrate on the common ground of reasoning and examine the arguments with which the Realists confront Advaita.

The Advaita concept of consciousness *qua* consciousness is unique. It does not imply a subject or an object or has any attributes. It is a homogeneous, non-composite consciousness. It is not dead matter or *jaḍa*, non-sentient.

The Realist does not *admit* the existence of such a consciousness. For him consciousness is always intentional. It has a subject and an

object and has attributes. It is almost a postulate with them that consciousness is of a thing and belongs to some subject.

The nature of Brahman, if such a term is permissible, is of the nature of such a consciousness — it is negatively defined as not ignorance, sorrow or insentience. The realist feels that there is no objectless knowledge (*nirviśeṣa jñāna*) and attributeless object is tantamount to non-existence. Existence of an object and its cognizability is always asserted as possible only if it has attributes. A pure Being is no Being as Hegel put it. In the Chāndogya bhāṣya Śrī Śaṅkara anticipates his critics and in advance characterises their attitude as one of dull intellect. This remark has provoked a more severe retort at the hands of the Indian theist. The pure consciousness or Brahman of Śaṅkara is equated to the *Śūnya* of the Buddhist and is also described as real as the horns of a hare (*śaśa viṣāṇa.*)

The Advaitin's attempt to logically demonstrate the possibility of the existence of Brahman apart from Sruti is systematically criticised. The first attempt is to resort to secondary meaning, *lakṣaṇa.* Whenever we are up against defining a term in terms of its word-sense, *vācyārtha*, we resort to the *lakśaṇa*, secondary meaning. The oft-quoted example is "the village is on Ganges". It is not possible for a village to be on Ganges, for it will be washed away. Hence we interpret the word "on Ganges" to mean, "the blanks". Here it is must be noticed that the term, "on Ganges" has meaning, and we find its word-sense makes no sense, so we resort to secondary interpretation. The possibility of secondary interpretation pre-supposes that the word must have initially a primary word-sense. It must have *śakti*, before we resort to *lakṣaṇa.* For of a word which is devoid of all *śakti* and word-sense, and is *sarvathā-avācya*, it is not possible to give a secondary meaning. The term *Brahman* is *sarvathā avācya*; hence it is not possible to give it secondary reasoning.

It is contended that Brahman is self-luminous which term means *avedyatve sati aparokṣa vyavahāra yogyatvam.* This description is held as contradictory; against this concept a heavy criticism is levelled. The possibility of *ajñāna*, obscuration of a self-luminous substance, is ruled out. That affects the tenability of the Advaita doctrine of *vivarta.* Śrī Madhva asks, *nirviśeṣa svayam bhāte kiṁ ajñānāvṛttaṁ bhavet?* As for the textual interpretation Śrī Madhva the realist explains that the scriptural passages that are apparently contradictory can be systematised. That he holds the Vedānta sūtra has helped us. All the Upaniṣadic texts proclaim with one voice the majesty of the supreme as the store-house of numberless auspicious attributes and ftee from all imperfections. (1) Of these some represent the Lord as endowed

with positive attributes e.g., omniscience, Lordship of creatures, control of beings from within, and other excellences. (P) Some others describe him negatively as free from such blemishes as sin and suffering and liability to material embodiment. (3) Yet others speak of it as beyond the reach of mind and words in order to bring home to us, its comparative inaccessibility (not its complete unknowability). A fourth type of texts represent It as the *only one* that exists, to point out its importance, in relation to all else. It does not mean that the many do not exist. To make the devotee seek it, it is declared as the only one. (5) A fifth type of texts describes it as that which partakes of the nature of all, so that it may be realised, as being ultimately responsible for the existence, knowledge, activity, etc., of them all. Thus and in this spirit alone the scriptures depict Brahman in deverse ways and from different stand-points all converging towards the supreme one.

Discussing the nature of Reality, one of Śrī Madhva's ardent disciples argues the point in favour of the existence of only one independent Real and a plurality of dependent reals. The nerve of the argument is as follows:

Some philosophers hold that there is *only* one single Reality in the universe. This is not acceptable, because of the perceptual evidence of the many we see, feel, and live with, the existence of many reals is a fact of experience. As against the argument let all the reals be taken as equally independent, it is contended then that there should be eternal happiness for all of us. The fact of experience is different. Each one of us has some sorrow mixed with joys. If it is contended that all the reals are equally dependent with no independent being anywhere, in that case there would be no movement capable for any, as all of them are dependent. If it is contended as the Sāṅkhya does "that movement is possible by a cooperative effort of two real dependents like the cooperation of the lame and the blind, we have to point out that there must be some independent real to direct and bring them together. An interminable stream of dependents, lands us in infinite regress. Hence we have to concede the existence of one Independent Real and a plurality of dependent reals.

In asserting the existence of the one independent Real and a plurality of dependent reals, the theistic Vedānta teacher envisages a type of Advaita. Rāmānuja looks upon all the three categories, souls, matter and God as an inseperable complex whole *viśiṣta*, which can be never separated, for they are in *apṛathaksiddhi* relation, an inseparable relation. The relation between the universe and souls with Lord is intimate as that of the body and the soul. In fact, the body exists, is

sustained and to be used for the Lord. Śrī Madhva states his system is called "Svatantrādvaita". It means that there is no second independent Real. He also goes to the extent of saying that the souls, *karma*, substance, time, space exist by his grace. If He chooses to rule out their existence, they go out of existence. He quotes a Bhāgavata verse in support.

dravyam karmaṁ ca kālaśca svabhāvo jīva eva ca
yadanugrahataḥ santi na santi yadupekṣayā (II — 10 — 12).

All the schools of Vedānta seek an unified vision of some pattern or other. Years ago in a volume of essays, *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan sought to establish that most of the systems tend to a unified vision when divested of their religious prejudices. Though the philosophical absolutes of the different systems differ from Advaita, there is a marked tendency to look at the system as a whole.

PART TWO

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON THE CONCEPT OF GOD

N. D. Sundaravadivelu

INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS

Your Excellency, Dr. Mahadevan, ladies and gentlemen,

It is my pleasant duty as well as a privilege to welcome all the delegates and participants to the Eleventh All-India Seminar organized by the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, on "The Concept of God". I bid all of them warm welcome and hope that their stay with us would be pleasant; for our part, I am sure that we shall profit greatly by the knowledge and scholarship they would be sharing with us.

The Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy has built up a valuable tradition in organizing two All-India Seminars every year on some foundational theme or philosophical concept. Delegates from all the major Universities have attended these annual seminars, and their contributions are being published in the *Indian Philosophical Annual* which serves as the journal of the Centre. The Centre has so far conducted ten such seminars, and the present one would be the eleventh. I am sure that such seminars and conferences serve a useful purpose in the intellectual life, for they afford possibilities for the meeting of minds and an exchange of views in the give-and-take of personal encounters. Discussion is, perhaps, the very life of philosophy, and it is gratifying to note that during such seminars discussion has always been free, unfettered and far-ranging. And the themes chosen for such seminars have also been foundational themes, which deserve the closest analysis and the most careful attention. Such meetings foster a spirit of clear statement, close analysis and objective evaluation by the students and research scholars.

I must here mention that in December 1970 the Centre also conducted an International Seminar on "Philosophy: Theory and Practice" which was attended by about 20 foreign scholars and an equal number of scholars from our own country. The International Seminar

was, in many ways, a distinct success; the work of the seminar proceeded in an organized manner day after day for 10 days without the slightest inconvenience to any one and at a consistently high level. The discussions were extensive, illuminating and sharp ; the contributions of the participants were notable and the interest and concern of the audience was keen and unflagging. The Centre must be congratulated for this distinctive contribution to philosophical scholarship. The theme set for the present seminar, viz., 'The Concept of God' is as challenging as it is important. On any reckoning, religion, along with science and art, has been one of the great cultural and formative forces ; a distinguished contemporary philosopher, Ernest Cassirer, has called it 'a prime symbolic form'. It has been a formative influence upon saints, mystics, philosophers, theologians and humble pious folk alike ; it has shaped the vision and moulded the feelings of countless millions in all times and all places. It has demonstrated its power to create and destroy, to make and mar entire civilisations and epochs, and it has fascinated the artists, thinkers and intellectuals of every age just as it has possessed the lives of ordinary men and women. And the living centre of religious thought and feeling is the idea of God ; it is this 'great problematic' that gathers up into itself all the far-flung thoughts, images, feelings and attitudes of the religious temper and the religious way of life. The idea of God, therefore, is perhaps the most vital and central of all the concepts of religion, and it is fitting that such a centrally important concept should be taken up for careful philosophical statement, analysis and scrutiny. And, indeed, from the time of Plato onwards, in the West, serious philosophical concern with the idea of God has been a persistent feature of Western philosophy and today, the basic issue, the nature and existence of God, is again being seriously examined in terms of modern logic and philosophy of science. The concern of Indian philosophy with religious and spirituality is well known. Philosophers, sages and saints in our country have been profoundly concerned with the religious question and have given us the fruits and lights of their life-long meditation.

The natural involvement of philosophy with the question of the nature and existence of God is, therefore, a fact of history, and it is also proper that it should have been so. The very massiveness of the impact of religion upon the masses, and its very strength and power, make it necessary that we should devote the most careful thought to it, for otherwise, cheap rhetoric, vulgar fears and prejudices, crass strivings and passions would take possession of us and make of religion itself a blight and a mockery. We must ever be sensitive to the demands of philosophic reason in our examination of religious beliefs ; we must purify our faith in the crucible of our logic so that all that is dross and perverted may be removed and eliminated. We must therefore have

the widest possible scrutiny of our basic commitments and beliefs, and this analysis and examination is the privilege of philosophy. Philosophy, as Socrates said, is nothing less than an examination of life — of all that goes into human existence and constitutes human experience. It is in this sense, I believe, that philosophy of religion and philosophy of science are our most urgent conceptual needs today.

While in no sense wishing to limit the range of the seminar, I would like to set down a few themes which I hope would be touched upon and clarified during the deliberations of this conference. First and foremost is the meaning of the concept of God — the idea of God as the Supreme Being, as 'one greater than which is inconceivable', of unsurpassable perfection — what do these concepts signify? Too often the concept of God has been clothed with vulgar imagery and crass trappings of mere power and pomp; too often, men have worshipped mere might and farce, mistaking it for love and light. It is hence necessary first to clarify the sense and significance of the idea of God, to examine with philosophic lucidity and logic the meaning of our religious affirmations. And beyond the question of meaning lies the question of truth. Both in the East and the West several patterns of argument, several types of proof, have been advanced for the existence of God. It is time now, I think, to take stock of these proofs to examine affirmations as well as denials for their consistency and relevance. One should investigate these existential claims and denials and assess the question of proof for what it is worth. Last, but not the least, is the social and cultural dimension of the idea of God, of its role in the life of people in their day-to-day activities, its cultural impact and social force. Philosophers should examine the bearing and relevance of this concept for socio-cultural life in general and clarify the pattern of its functioning. Only such a philosophical examination of religion as a cultural force could provide us with a perspective and balance regarding the basic foundational theme of the idea of God.

Finally, I am also glad to note that distinguished representatives of the major faiths, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Jainism, are assembled here. There are, I am sure, also agnostics and atheists — and it is good that it is so, for whatever may be one's own personal stand and commitment upon this issue, the problem concerns all; and only a perfectly free and unfetteredexamination from every aspect would be of any help. Closure of minds, on this issue, is the greatest danger that we have to avoid, and hence I am particularly happy to note that there seems to be little possibility of such closure as far as this seminar is concerned.

Once more, I wish all the participants warm welcome and assure them that their discussions and deliberations would be of great value and help to the rest of us also.

K. K. Shah

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Friends,

May I thank the Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, for inviting me to inaugurate this Seminar on "The Concept of God"?

I congratulate the Centre on organizing two all-India Seminars every year in which participants from different Universities and institutions present important papers on different subjects. The publications of this Centre, I find, are very valuable and scholars are bound to welcome them and profit by them. We owe a debt of gratitude to the University Grants Commission for helping this Centre with financial assistance for promoting its activities.

The theme chosen for this Seminar has a wide import. The concept of God varies from religion to religion. There is a multiplicity of religions in this world; and though God is one, the approaches to God, worship of God, rituals, scriptures and dogmas are many. The concept of God, therefore, becomes complex by virtue of the complexity of the innumerable pathways to God. It is no wonder that according to Empedocles, "the nature of God is a circle whose centre is everywhere and its circumference nowhere".

Scientists are the best philosophers and provide convincing proof of the existence and entity of God. Of late, scientists in America have gone to the extent of saying that those who want scientific and demonstrative proof of the existence of God have only to ask a few questions: What will happen to the world if the distance between the sun and earth were less by 6 or 8 miles? If the angle at which the earth is rotating were to change by 1/10th of a degree, what will

happen? Many such questions are asked and the final question posed is — who controls the methodical accuracy with which the world is maintaining its balance and the universe is able to function? Out of millions of checks and counter-checks, if one were to go out of gear, the whole structure would collapse. This disposes of the question whether everything happens by chance or is the outcome of an order which is pervading the entire universe.

Once it is accepted that there is order in the universe, the next question that has to be decided is whether the order is automatic and whether imbalances are corrected. If it is accepted that there is order, it will have to be accepted that the order has in-built imbalances too, on account of wear and tear and these imbalances can only be set right by a super-power — call it Paramātmā or intelligent cause, if you like, in the philosophical terminology.

It is now established practically that out of the *pañca mahā bhūtas* (the five great elements), namely, earth, water, fire, air and sky (ether), the one that permeates all is ether and ether is represented by sound (voice). The modern world has accepted the concept of Śabda Brahman and Nāda Brahman by demonstrating that sound travels all over the universe and is one of the media by which you can continuously be in touch with the universe. This vehicle of voice is common to all though its identity may differ, but the ultimate basis is the same. When voice is loaded with emotions it becomes Nāda Brahman. If voice is immortal and all-prevading, it can be controlled only by a super power which is immortal, all-prevading and all-powerful. In the final analysis it leaves hardly any doubt about the super entity, call it God or Paramātman. Once this concept of God is established, then the most important thing that remains to be decided is what form this concept of God should take. The concept of God will have no meaning unless the method to reach Him or to know Him has been found out. This can happen only if you know how to be in tune with Him. Once you are in tune with him, you establish a line of communication and then you stumble upon ways and means of being in communion with Him. Therefore, the approach must depend upon whether a religion is in tune with God or not. To be in tune is to accept the order which he has established, and to accept the order which he has established is to accept the interplay of these five elements as a natural phenomenon and we should not therefore get worried about whether it is good or bad. That is what the *Bhagavad Gītā* teaches. The functions assigned should be performed without caring either for the results or without being afraid of the consequences or without being involved in the fruits of action : *sukhaduḥkhe same kṛtvā lābhālābhau jayājayau* (treating alike pleasure and pain, gain

and loss, victory and defeat). To put it scientifically, happiness and misery are both created by Gd and both should, therefore, be accepted. Neither should be unwelcome or feared.

Once this attitude is established, the next point that any religion has to teach is to conform to His creation. In other words, to make it convenient for His crsaiion to function. Do not do anything which will interfere with the smooth functioning of His creation. There also the Bhagavat Gita shows the way —

> *śreyān svadharmo viguṇah paradharmāt* svanuṣ*ṭhitāt*
> *svadharme nidhanam śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ.*

(Better is one's own law though imperfectly carried out than the law of another carried out perfectly. Better is death in the fulfilment of one's own law, for to follow another's law is perilous). It amounts to saying: Do they duty and do not interfere with others doing their duty.

If God is one, what is the need for a multiplicity of religions? This is the next question to be answered. This riddle is beautifully solved by Mahatma Gandhi and his observations clear the ground for us. I quote his words — "In nature, there is a fundamental unity running through all the diversity we see about us. Religions are no exception to the natural law. They are given to mankind so as to accelerate the process of realization of the fundamental unity. When you look at these religions as many leaves of a tree, they seem so different but at the trunk, they are one. The soul of religions is one, but it is encased in a multitude of forms. The latter will persist to the end of time. Wise men will ignore the outward crust and see the same soul living under a variety of crusts." We thus see that the basic concept of God is the same in all religions.

Religion should be looked upon as a mental physician to whom the mentally ill can go. The physician may be different but the object is the same. The analysis of the physician may be different and the cure may take more or less time but ultimately the object of the treatment is the same. Nobody should find fault with another religion or another approach so long as it is capable of serving the object. Sometimes people are obliged to change their doctors and similarly everyone should be free to change his doctor to suit his requirement and experience if he is satisfied that he needs additional assistance.

Vedānta philosophy gives us the basic concept of the oneness of God and it is from this angle one should look at religion. Divisions of

approaches into *karma yoga*, *jñāna yoga* and *bhakti yoga* are invariably concepts which will suit a particular temperament or a particular environment but all the three and many others which may be thought of are based upon the recognition that there is a super-power or intelligent cause which pervades the entire universe and that in spite of darkness, light persists; and in spite of untruth, truth persists, as Mahatmaji put it. Svami Vivekananda says that so long as the waters of the sea or the lake are disturbed, they are bound to be polluted by a number of elements which are at the bottom or on the surface, but once they settle down and become crystal clear, the real structure of the sea or the lake can be seen. In the same way, once the mind is settled and is not disturbed, the real structure of the mind will be visible, and once the real structure of the mind becomes visible, the structure of the universe will be visible. It must be realised that the location of mind or the location of *buddhi*, even though a moot point, will have to be accepted as something which is, in a sense, the real self or part of *Paramātman*. Just as voice is one of the means of being in communion with the universe, mind is a more powerful instrument for being in communion with the world, and is capable of giving ocular demonstration of the structure of the world. When the universe was seen in the mouth of Kṛṣṇa by his mother Yaśoda it demonstrated scientifically that the mind of a devotee, when settled with knowledge and faith, is able to have a demonstrative and ocular perception of the universe.

If there is still any lingering doubt about God, there is one more scientific proof available for study. Modern neurology has established that the number of basic nerve cells, called neurons, which control the entire nervous system of the human body remains the same that it was at the time of birth and that if one neuron is destroyed, it does not replace itself as in the case of the other cells. What greater proof we want about *pūrva janma* and its effects continuing in every succeeding birth! If the cycle of such influences continues and there is nothing else which can take us out of the cycle, how then are we to get out of the cycle? That itself proves that there is a super power or intelligent cause which provides an escape from the cycle and freedom from its influences if you know Him properly and approach Him properly. The theory of *Avatārs* (Incarnations) confirms this proposition.

I have already referred to the control of mind. There is one other aspect to which I must refer now. *Dhyāna* and *Samādhi* are intended to be the instruments for settling the mind. If anybody thinks that *dhyāna* and *samādhi* mean absence of consciousness, he is mistaken. In fact, consciousness in its undisturbed composition is *dhyāna* or *samādhi*. When the internal inter-play of actions and re-

actions ceases, the outward disturbances disappear and when the outward disturbances disappear, the real essence of our existence becomes inwardly visible. Whether by *yoga* one obtains mastery over the five *mahā bhūtas* and sees them in their perfect form or an observer has developed the ability to see the inter-play in their perfect from, makes very little difference. Rāvaṇa was a *mahā yogi* and *mahā jñānī* but did not develop that detached attitude which alone could make him a *siddha yogī*. Rāma developed that detached attitude and developed the capacity to understand the inter-play. In the ultimate analysis, perfect understanding alone can lead to ultimate realization.

The seers assert that no proper concept of God can be validly evolved without experience. Great souls did not become saints by merely reading text-books or scriptures. In every religion, saints have built up noble traditions for God-realization through individual experience. As the conclusions of all the saints of all religions point to one and the same Cod, there is a fundamental unity about the oneness of God. At at time when deadly weapons capable of blowing up the world and disturbing the balances of the universe are increasing in the arsenals of super powers and when the heads of the super powers are groping in the darkness of pride and prejudice, it is only spiritual guidance and belief in the existence and oneness of God that can prevent the holocaust. It will not be later before the wisdom of our seers in restricting knowledge and sources of knowledge, scientific or otherwise, to those who have become *adhikāris* (initiated) by learning the art of controlling passions and by undertaking the vow of using knowledge for the benefit of humanity, will be appreciated. Situated as we are, it is not possible to create a machinary which can ensure that the tremendous sources of power invented by modern science will be diverted for the benefit of humanity. The only thing that can be done is to create an awareness of the existence of God so that either the fear of or faith in God can compel application of knowledge to the cause of humanity.

I hope this Seminar will mark the beginning of a new era where the existence and oneness of God will ensure peace and prosperity for humanity.

R. V. De Smet

THE PROBLEMATICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

The unsatisfactoriness of answers often depends on the inadequacy of the questions we put. In the confusion which surrounds today the topic of God, it seems to me important to revise its problematics.

The Notion of God

Although the notion of God is part of the common heritage of mankind, it does not appear to be an innate notion or a notion imposed by ordinary experience. As handed over by the great religions, it is not perfectly univocal but apprehended in diverse ways none of which has an unquestionable right to be privileged apart from a thorough metaphysical enquiry. It may stand for a sublimation of the conception of *deva* or god as cosmic engineer, or of king as absolute ruler, or for a personalization of natural law or necessity of cosmic order, or for the idea of a first being at the top of the hierarchy of beings, or of a universal progenitor and father, or for an absolutization of the whole of reality or of the whole of the sacred, or for the difficult idea of the transcendent Absolute immanent in the whole cosmos of which it is the ontological ground. These are only some of the human conceptions behind the term 'God'.

This situation should prevent us from wanting to start from a definition of God except as a provisional indicative of the direction of our enquiry and not as a self-validated notion. We have to await the result of this enquiry before we can be rationally certain that there exists something at the end of that direction and it will then have to be defined according to the terms of its discovery. God must be proved to exist before he can be, if at all, defined.

One might object here on the Anselmian ground that a quite good notion of God is available to all as "that, greater than which nothing

can be conceived," and that this notion contains analyzably the certitude of God's existence. Indeed, the greatest conceivable appears to be that whose very essence is to exist in full intensity and without limit or imperfection. However, to conceive a notion is not yet to be sure that it is intrinsically and positively possible, i. e., not self-contradictory. The Anselmian conception may be said to be negatively and subjectively possible, in the sense that we do not see any contradiction in it but it might still be in some hidden way self-contradictory and therefote illusory. This doubt cannot be overcome unless we first prove that it corresponds to a necessary exigency of our very thinking activity. But what kind of proof can establish such an exigency?

The Proof of God

As Kant saw very well, any kind of argument grounded in merely logical principles that are not themselves critically established is insufficient to ascertain metaphysically the existence of God. Ultimately therefore, a full demonstration requires to be critically established through a transcendental analysis of pure reason in its specific activity of pronouncing judgments. Unless God is an a priori and thus necessary condition of judging as such, his existence will remain donbtful at least to the hypercritical philosopher.

Kant, however, could not fulfil his project because what he analyzed transcendentally was only pure reason considered statically. But pure reason is a dynamic function intended beyond ideas which are only instruments of signification on reals or reality as affirmable, in other terms on the true which is being as affirmable (and ultimately intuitable). The first principles of reason are therefore dynamic too. They express the various aspects of the intellect's constitutive tension towards reality, a tension which is not bound by any limit. Indeed, our actual grasp of reality by the intellect (taken here in its broadest sense as the whole of our intellectual power of assimilation of reality) may be partial and limited at every single moment, but its full range and horizon is unlimited in quantity, in intensity and in the very dimension of being. We know this from the fact that everyone of our intellections is perceived as a partial and unsatiating grasp in a vast movement which could not terminate except in a perfect intuition of the fulness of reality. We perceive it *as partial*, as having a beyond, as animated by a constitutive desire which presses forward unceasingly. Since we know it as unsatiating, we know negatively, by our very want, the ultimate aim of the whole serious of possible intellections. This aim is not a supreme idea, an ideal of reason in the Kantian sense, but the supreme Real as grasped in truth. Is this

supreme Real illusory? To hold this would imply that the very desire which constitutes our intellectual power as dynamic is deceptive. It would introduce contradiction and impossibility at the heart of the faculty of truth. Hence, we could not trust our reason and intellect. If it is radically perverse and misleading, doubt extends to everyone of its assertions including this sceptical assertion. This is a self-defeating position which no sane man can really hold.

To continue this argumentation, I would have to show that the non-illusory goal of our intellectual pursuit, a goal which is not of our own choice but is the necessary requisite corresponding to the natural dynamism of our intellectual power, must adequate the amplitude of its unlimited quest, that it is therefore the unlimited Real, the absolute Being. I would have to show further that this goal, whether we are aware of it or not, functions in our intellections as the built in Standard or Meature of all our evaluations of beings — not that we thus judge or evalute them by an explicit reference of the finite to the Infinite but rather by an implicit dynamic reference which is part of the movement of intellection independently of our awareness or choice. Thus it would appear that the Absolute is the supreme Value and the Measure of all other beings which are only limited participations of it. Both its absolute transcendence and its universal imanence would hence be revealed. And likewise both the essential relation of total dependence of those beings upon it and its own freedom of any real relation to them.

What I have briefly delineated suffices to indicate that the problematics of the argument that seeks to establish the existence of God must be contained in the critical endeavour to analyze transcendentally our function of affirmation. Indeed, it is through this function that we undeniably encounter reality. If its supreme a priori condition of possibility is the absolute Existent, the latter is *ipso facto* demonstrated as the supreme necessary condition of every other existent as affirmable, hence as true being. Attention to the dynamic character of our function of judgment will direct us to the reality of the last possible term which can give true signification to the whole tendential progress. Only the absolute Existent can correspond to the total objective capacity of this dynamism in us.

It has been said that God is the best "working hypothesis" for our explanation of the universe. And consequently those who no longer see his necessity in this role edge him out of their life and assert their atheism. But God is not a working hypothesis. He is however the radical necessary condition of the universe. A working hypothesis is a set of sufficient conditions which are the immediate antecedent of

a set of facts and can explain it according to the pattern "if a, then b." The principle of economy helps to determine which of the many possible candidates for this function is the most likely. The search for sufficient conditions is the province of the positive sciences and these have no direct competence regarding God. Metaphysics, on the other hand, looks for the necessary causes of the given world and of its very possibility. This is why it is concerned with the existence of God and tries to ascertain whether truly without him the universe cannot be.

The Knowledge of God

Even after reaching the certainty that God exists as the Absolute of existence apart from which no world can exist, we have not attained to a positive knowledge of God. Indeed, what the metaphysician posits at the end of his transcendental analysis is the supreme Pole and last End of spiritual dynamism. However much we tend in its direction, it is not directly experienced but only known through our very lack of it and the natural drive of our faculties towards it.

Yet, it is not an empty Goal but the highest Fulness. Hence, it must be designatable by means of positive terms. Let us see on what conditions.

First, they must be value-terms, since what they will designate is all Value without any disvalue. Second, their proper meaning must not include any necessary limit or degree. Terms like stone, horse, man, include materiality, biological life, finitude and can therefore not qualify. But terms like existent, true, good, knowing, even loving, and their abstract correspondents neither include nor exlude either limit or unlimitedness. Thus they are plastic or elastic enough to be stretchable to the infinite and the maximum. Their element of representation being by origin mundane and finite, they are unable to express adequately the nature of the infinite God, yet they can indicate it in a way which is correct and not simply metaphorical.

What I have just said recalls the essentials of the theory of *lakṣaṇā* and more precisely of *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā* so aptly utilised by Śaṅkara in *Taitt.Up.Bhāsya*, 2, 1. It has a perfect equivalent in the theory of intrinsic analogy of the Western Schoolmen and has a permanent value which reappears timidly in some of the discussions of the Language Analysts around the problem of God.

The Role of Mysticism

Even *lakṣaṇā* cannot raise the veil and do away with the mystery of God. The best that Metaphysics can produce is a radically nega-

tive, indirect, symbolic and unsatiating knowledge of God. But the desire of Metaphysics goes much further than its possible achievement. And this is why in the words of a modern master of Thomism, P. Scheuer, "every metaphysics worthy of its name tends to achieve itself in the deep silence of mystical introversion."

If our power of knowing were not dynamic, mesticism would not even be dreamt of. We would remain on the static level of concepts and representations. However, it is fortunately possible to follow the very movement of thinking beyond all thoughts and along its natural axis towards its supreme Pole and grounding value. This is probably what many intend to say when they speak rather weakly of the sphere of feeling to which they refer mysticism. Rather than promoting any particular feeling, mysticism inclines man to an interior attention and tension by which he coincides with the deepest dynamism of his being and perchange attains to an obscure but overwhelming experience of his very Source. Rivers cannot turn back to their sources but man, this reflective animal, can move up and down the pressing current of his highest activity and pierce the obscurity of his very origin.

William Ruddy

CAN THE JUDGMENT, "GOD IS THE PERFECT ACTUALIZATION OF PURE THOUGHT," BE FULFILLED?

1. *Introduction*

Our problem is a logical problem, namely: How can what is intended by the judgment, "God is the perfect actualization of pure thought," become itself perfectly fulfilled by the state of affairs being judged about? Whether such a judgment is true or false will not be considered. Our discussion will remain on a purely logical level. For the solution to the problem, extensive use will be made of the logical material presented by Edmund Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations*. Only two assumptions are set forth (see Assumptions A & B, below) and the model constructed from these assumptions retains coherence and lingual clarity only within the theoretical sphere of pure logic; its value for even the most rigorously systematic of theodicies remains dubious.

There is one basic principle, nevertheless, which will be followed in this paper as if its clear evidence were not open to question. This principle could be stated as follows: Only when we are clear in regard to what is intentionally meant by a judgment can we be then equally clear in regard to the perfect fulfilment of that judgment. Emphatically I urge the reader to keep this foundational principle in mind at each stage of the construction of our model. It underlies all that is said in this paper, and enables that which may seem at first to be gratuitous and obscure to become gradually clear in natural sequence *according to the perfectly intended clarity of its own logical truth.*

Part of the natural process of making a logical problem more and more clear lies quite simply in asking the right questions at the right time. "Right" questions, in this case, are merely questions

that do not demand more of the material than the material itself can supply. Accordingly, since we want to find out how the judgment, "God is the perfect actualization of pure thought," can be perfectly fulfilled, we must first find out exactly what kind of judgment the aforesaid judgment is; then we must find out what process is meant when the intended meaning of such a kind of judgment is said to be "perfectly fulfilled."

2. *What Kind of a Judgment Is the Judgment, "God is the Perfect Actualization of Pure Thought?"*

For the answering of this first question we shall set down two assumptions; but it should be clearly understood from the start that such assumptions are mere logical guidelines. They are not to be taken as statements of metaphysical or epistemological truth. Our intention is not to follow them because they are true but to follow them because they are helpful. Keeping this in mind we shall then proceed to assume (for purposes that will become clear later) that:

ASSUMPTION A: THE SELF CAN INTEND *ITSELF* AS A PURE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION

Several things follow from this assumption. It will be sufficient for our task if we draw out three of them explicitly.

1. First it is evident that such a purely intended (indeed, *self*-intended) field can only be intended as an unprecedented philosophical discipline. Its employment of judgmental statement would have to be perfectly lucid, its entire methodology would have to be already perfectly aware of itself, and all progressive advancement within its field of work would have to be transparently cognizable to itself at each step of its development. These demands are made for two reasons. First of all, such a field must possess total apodeitic certainty, i.e., it must be unfailingly certain through its own, innermost, self-given certainty. Secondly, such a field would be required to deal with what undoubtedly is (within its own range of vision at least) the most perfectly knowable of all possible "objects." (We have put the word "object" in quotes to avoid misleading analogies with empirical objects. For since the "object" of our perfect discipline is freely self-intended, it need not find its departure from (or even ground itself in) objects within the range of empirical experience. Even if all formal objectification to the present time *has* started itself and grounded itself in such a fashion there is nothing within the pure, self-intending-the-self-alone character of our present discipline which logically demands such beginning or grounding.) To put the whole

matter in as clearest terms as possible: Intending the discipline in question in any other way than as a completely new aud endlessly open creation of the ever-unfolding self would be a falsification from the start.

The reader may now object: Can an intention refer outside of itself to that which is intended, and yet still be intending the self as a field of philosophical investigation? To answer this question immediately before we have drawn out any further implications from our assumption would be misleading. The only point which we wish to make here is that the intending process in question would by its very own nature have to be a never-before-carried-out intending; it would have to demand from itself a remaining within a logical self-relatedness of the most radical kind possible, as well as a simultaneous going-beyond-itself toward a totally unprecedented objectification of the self as a pure field of work. Otherwise the intending process would be running the risk of being prejudiced from the outset by something that is not the self, and would as a consequence not be intending the self, purely and simply.

All these demands for perfect logical purity are not gratuitous. Rather they all stem from one central fact, like many flowers from a single root. And that fact can be stated as follows: The pure field in question can only be produced newly *for oneself*, and can therefore ground itself solely upon the self-certainty of such a production. Being thus grounded in so perfect a manner, it has thereby left itself totally free to create for itself what the self most needs: namely, the most radical and powerful discipline able to be thus produced.

2. Secondly, the data discoverable within such a pure and endlessly unfolding field of philsophical investigation would have to consist of "facts" of an absolutely unique variety. Even calling them "facts" prejudices the unimaginably new way in which they would have to be conceived. All facts yet discovered (by both science and common experience) up until now can give us not the slightest clue in regard to what they would be like. It is for the sake of imaginative convenience only that we call them facts at all. We may hazard this comparison only if we safeguard the primary character of an intention held to from the start. If we give ourselves footholds from empirical experience, we cannot blind ourselves to what the self has actually intended when it offers itself alone as the *solely meant* object for philosophical investigation. If this rule is kept strictly in mind we will be able to risk a certain comparison of our pure field with lower sciences of objective fact such as the empirical sciences.

If such a comparison is rigorously carried out the first thing that catches our attention is the limited character of ordinary science in relation to the pure field in question. For ordinary science assumes without proof that the only facts able to be investigated are those within the range of common sense experience or even what may be called direct sensory perception. As systems of judgmental statement they are already limited in regard to that which they intend as able to be fulfilled by the facts discovered in their range of work.

It is in the area of judgmental evidence that the limitations of ordinary science are to a certain extent able to be transcended, and we shall thus restrict our comparison to that area. In its most general form the comparison could be stated as follows: Just as empirical science grounds its judgments in the actuality of the things themselves judged about so our pure field of egological investigation grounds its judgments in the perfectly renewable, perfectly self-active intention from which it has brought itself into being. Following up these lines of thought we can then model our unlimited and self-intended field after the lower sciences. The evidence which such a pure field gives to itself might thereby be conceived as a kind of meta-evidence capable of giving total verification, even in the objective sense, to the most perfect of all possible sciences able to be imagined.

To make this conception of what I have called "meta-evidence" more precise, let us use an example from the empirical science of biology. A true biologist, even if he has spent years formulating a perfect model to explain the morphological development of a certain species of protozoa, will nevertheless put the entire model aside when he goes to his microscope to see the animals themselves. He will hold himself ready to scrap the whole model according to the actually seen shapes of the animals under investigation. This is because the evidence within the science of biology grounds itself outside of itself in the actual living beings in the real world. Similarly the meta-evidence within our self-intended field of work *gives to itself* its own going-beyond-itself-in fact, actually gives to itself the primordial, beginning foundation of its whole area of work in a special, newly self-discovered way that can be reactualized at will. In this respect, the sense in which an empirical scientist must be open to the things themselves studied is a mere shadow of the infinite sense in which a philosophical thinker must be open to the actual way in which the self-as-subject and the self-as-object unfold themselves according to the deep, over-riding sythetic unity of a self capable of intending itself as both.

If the facts answering to empirical evidence-requirements are the real things being studied, what then are the "facts" that can be said

to fulfil the requirements of meta-evidence? One theoretical way of describing them would be to say that they can be either the self-as-subject or the self-as-object. This description does not give much for the mind to hold on to. A more helpful way to conceive of these "facts" is as anything which perfectly fulfils a self-freedom that has given itself to itself in order to ground itself absolutely. But even this description offers little imaginative foothold for the mind. The root of the descriptive problem lies in the fact that our so-called "facts" are not actual facts, unless we were to give the word "actual" a new meaning entirely; rather they are self-created possibilities arising logically whenever the self intends itself as a pure field of work. This being recognized, let us formally define our pure field's "facts" as: *already-perfectly-evident, intuitive possibilities able to be infinitely modified at any moment according to the purely self-active freedom of the investigator himself.*

3. Thirdly and finally, once the self has actually star ed to work and intended itself alone as a pure field for philosophical investigation then all that subsequently appears to the self (either real or logical—at this intentional stage it makes no difference) becomes totally accessible within the field under the special aspect of "pure object"—at least to the extent that it is intended as a kind of possible material for a pure "thinking about......" One might at this point ask, How can the self do this? By what process is the self able to make thus directly accessible all appearing experience? To answer these questions one must be quite clear in regard to what actually transpires within the self when it breaks away from its natural habit of intending this or that thing in the world of ordinary experience and starts for the first time to intend its self alone as that witness for which all possible experience is pure object. The realm of all possible experience thus is radically altered from a realm "*in* which I live," to a realm "which I, as a non-involved observer, am investigating." This change in attitude is decisive.

We have drawn what we require from Assumption A; let us now proceed to our second logical guideline. Let us assume (again for reasons which will eventually make themselves elear) that:

> ASSUMPTION B: THE SELF IS ABLE TO RETAIN A UNIFIED INTENTION IN REGARD TO ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT EVEN AS IT MOVES ALONG IN A TEMPORAL FLOW THROUGH SEVERAL DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS TAKEN IN RESPECT TO THAT OBJECT.

To draw out from this assumption corollaries that can help our problem, we must first make more precise what the assumption itself

means. For, on the very face of it, it remains difficult to understand precisely how the self can clearly and with apodeitic certainty intend that which demands a flow of temporal perspectives to unfold itself. Let us then attempt to pin down the meaning of the assumption by using an illustration taken from ordinary human perception. Imagine we are walking around a large tree in the park intending to take in the full reality of the tree by grasping several different views of it. Accompanying the increasing awareness of the outside tree there seems to be within our mind a certain sense of moving through an apparently endless and infinite series of perspectives. If we reflect on the whole state of affairs, we will discover that we should not too quickly attempt to describe the given perceptual phenomena in the usual terms of classical science. Traditional neurology and physiology would speak of the tree as a "stimulus" and the series of changing perceptions as a "response". Such direct and correlative classification cannot account for the inescapable physiological fact that the edge of the ocular range of human vision does not simply end in a black limit where the stimulus of light ceases to affect the rods and cones in the retina. In the actual experience of what the human eye actually does glimpse off to the side of the main object in its field, we have, not an abrupt limit but an odd sensation of fading off into an area of *neither colour nor absence of colour*. It is an area of what might be called anticipatory sight, wherein the vision's range intends beyond itself into that which is not yet seen but openly able to be seen if the body should turn in that direction. Anticipatory vision thus gives an even *visual* presence to objects within the whole body's range of possible ocular perception, in such a way that even those objects which are not immediately being looked at (but which can be seen by a simple turn of the body) can be said to be present to sight. To this extent objects present within anticipatory vision bear a remarkable resemblance to the intuitive possibilities or "facts" of our pure, self-intended science.

But let us return to our description of the tree as a direct object of perception. Doesn't the traditional stimulus-response classification remain valid for direct perception? Certainly if we close our eyes and cease to walk around the tree, the inside series ceases also in proportion to the actual closure. But again the experience is not of a scanning mechanism switched off but of an organic closure that retains for itself a general kinetic impression of an open continuity able to be reassumed at will, able to be reassumed, in fact, as a sort of self-given and openly endless possibility of intuitive viewpoints. The remarkable point to remember here is that the intending-beyond-itself of the perspectival series, even when it to has closed off into a mere interior impetus of possible objectification, is continuously directing its

whole sense *out into the object itself* in such a way that, all along the line of the series itself, the outside tree remains "there", objectively fixed as "the same tree," and evidently and transparently open to all conceivable points of view, as a sufficient ground and primordial verification of them all.

Gathering together what our illustration has shown, let us see if we can bring the meaning of Assumption B into clearer focus. It was stated in Assumption B that the self can keep a unitary intention toward an object while yet moving in a progressively clear temporal flow of views in regard to that object. Basing ourselves on the above illustration, we can make the assumption more precise, as follows: By intending the absolute identity of any object of thought (and intending it furthermore as known from the first to be the same) and by opening up at the same time from within itself the absolute fulfilling ground for all possible views toward that object, the self is thereby free to view one single thing from diverse points of view without falsification.

From this clarified assumption we are able to draw forth two points for consideration:

1. Even though the self intends *itself alone* as a pure field of philosophical investigation, nevertheless the self is still perfectly free to take, from within itself, various judgmental-like perspectives upon the pure and perfect "object" appearing within the field. By doing so, it will not in the slightest falsify the single identity intended throughout the manifold points of view. Even if the manifoldly viewed state of affairs (the complex of self-as-subject and self-as-object) is conceived as possible material for a pure "thinking about..." the special higher freedom of being able to take diverse views within a single intended unity remains intact.

2. The fulfilment of meta-evidence need not take place in some final intuitive flash of pure self-givenness: it can take the form of a gradual, unfolding development within the temporal flow of human consciousness. This logically follows from the fact that diverse judgmental views can be taken even within the pure field of the self. For all that appears within the self's range of vision is to a certain extent both noetically identifiable with the self and able to be intended as thus identified, while yet on its own level it may still be one-sided, not yet unified and *still unfolding itself toward some final, intuitive achievement of perfect evidence in regard to a perfect object.*

We now have at our disposal sufficient logical guidelines to help us solve the first half of this paper's problem, namely: What kind of

a judgment is the judgment, "God is the perfect actualization of pure thought?" For that which is being judged about is nothing other than the absolute perfect unity of noetic activity able to intend itself as both subject and object. This is what is meant by the perfect actualization of pure thought. Therefore if we find what kind of judgments are employed within the perfect science created when the self intends itself alone as a pure field of philosophical investigation, we will then be able to identify the particular judgment in question.

At this crucial point there arises a grave doubt in regard to judgmental diversification of a pure science. If the synthesizing unity of the perfect noetic activity demanded by a pure science is, from the first, perfectly actualized, how can the subject-object diversity of judgments be introduced into such absolute noetic unification? Indeed, all that we have said so far about the self as a self-intended field of work would seem to indicate that the self cannot intend itself otherwise than as an *already perfect awareness of its own total unity*; by what stretch of the mind can we make intelligible exactly *how* this total unity can be diversified according to various judgmental stances?

We have now begun to approach the central difficulty that any pure logic must clarify for itself if it wishes to survive. And in order to confront this central difficulty effectively we must think our way through a vast and almost totally unexplored region of immense, egological tension: the tension between a unitary conscious life in which all active and passive thinking ever to become prominent within that life is completely synthesized already into a indissoluble self-unity, and the relational, non-identical plurality at the heart of judgmental cognition. To put the difficulty in as brief a fashion as possible: How can the non-identical be intended unitarily and yet truly?

Now that we have isolated the main difficulty, how are we to proceed? Extreme philosophical caution is here required if we wish to remain assured of the logical certainty of our position and avoid endless wandering in the region of uncertain noetic problems which are at their very foundation totally insoluble.

We are not entirely without aid in this unmapped territory. We have found out various facts that can help us. For one thing, we know that the *whole ground* of a perfect science must be reactualizable at will or the entire science fails. We know that the only possible object for the perfect science is nothing else but the pure self, given to itself as the *only meant* object of that science. We know that, even though the entirety of such a purely intended object already appears from the

very first as a total unity, there is still room for the one-sided unfolding of the self toward an ideal of perfect judgmental fulfilment. Finally, we know that, at the centre of the self, there is an openly endless freedom of perfectly self-unified intention capable of unifying all that has ever appeared or will appear in the stream of ordinary conscious life. This central, unifying intention might be described as a kind of ever-now and always reactualizable possibility of intending-beyond-itself which (at least within its own, self-intended limits) is able to perfectly ground each stage of its thought by giving itself its own pure, inexaustible awareness of perfect certainty. In its inmost essence, it goes deeper even than the simple *cogito* of Descartes. For Descartes' *cogito* refers to a subjective " I think... " whereas what we are speaking about would be expressed (indeed if its expression is possible at all) something along the lines of : " I am both thinking and being thought about... '. And yet even this does not bring the entire source itself to light. For, hidden at the absolute depth of this pure and perfect process of self-intending, self-giving, and self-fulfilling is a originary fact that, until now, has remained unsaid and yet implied in all that has been said. This primordial fact must now be uncovered and brought to light no matter how strange it may appear at first sight. And the fact is nothing more or less than this : that, at the very moment when the self starts to intend itself alone as a pure field of philosophical investigation, it thereby opens up for itself in a directly accessible fashion *an infinite realm of a being of a new kind.*

It is only from within this newly discovered realm that all judgments made by the perfectly self-intended discipline in question can diversify themselves out according to different points of view.

For, once the self actually intends the self and only the self as a pure field of noetic work, then it is at last free to rise up within itself in order to become totally self-active, self-active in transcendent manner, in fact, self-active in a way that it could not possibly have anticipated while it was still within the realm of ordinary experience. It thereby enables itself (from within the newly discovered region of a new kind of being) to create for itself *a new process of judgment fulfilment*, a process capable from its own power of fulfilling all judgments made by the discipline that is newly being intended. All this stems directly from its own self-certain clarity both in regard to what is intentionally meant by such judgments and what occurs when these very same judgments are "perfectly fulfilled." For if such a newborn egology is to hold, within itself, to the title of the most perfect conceivable of all philosophical disciplines then it is bound by its own law to develop, right out of its own pure thought, a new and viable idea of judgment fulfilment — an idea, moreover, which is untouched and unprejudiced by all the

various ways in which judgments have been fulfilled so far within the range of human experience.

What will such judgements be like? Enough clues have been given so for to enable us to sketch out the general logical nature of such judgments. For one thing, no matter how extensively they diversify themselves out within the new and infinite realm of being opening up for them, they would have to possess (according to their perfect employment within the discipline itself) a sort of absolute intentional unity capable of relating itself, absolutely and perfectly, to the new things or states of affairs being judged about. Thus, when we referred to the "facts" of our new and perfect science as already evident intuitive possibilities able to be modified at will, we were closer than we imagined to the actual state of affairs involved. For judgments could be made about such "facts" only insofar as they were considered as appearing or able to appear within an infinite realm of being of a new kind. This is why the visual presence of objects on the edge of the ocular range bears such close resemblance to such "facts." Following up this analogy, we can compare the absolute intentional unity of the judgments of a perfect science to the already present intentional unity of the human body as it gives itself its absolute Here in relation to the anticipated There of visual objects about to be turned to.

If the judgments in a purely self-intended science are possessed of an absolute intentional unity, exactly where does such unity come from? .For our present logical purposes we may assume the source of such unity to be the reality of the actually thinking self. For when the self intends itself as a pure area of philosophical study it follows logically that that which is intended and that which is doing the intending are (in the usual sense of one real entity existing in the only real world) the very same identical thing. The judgments are able to to branch out from such pure unity only to the degree that the one reality of the self's conscious life can constantly discover itself in the manifold form of an intentional relatedness to itself that is able to be reflected upon and even unitarily intended *as such a manifold form.*

Let us call such intentionally unified judgments simply, "inmost judgments." Defined more precisely, inmost judgments would be those unitarily intended judgments which are timelessly fixed in a purely self-achievable certainty, even if no real, material instance occur whereby they could be existentially substantiated. Thus defined, inmost judgments, once they have so perfectly directed themselves to such absolutely unified and perfectly intended objects, are therefore not able to be afterwards "sublated." By this I mean that, both in regard

to their total freedom of reactualization and in regard to their directly realizable "content," they are not able to be turned away from in the higher light of a more absolute judgment, nor is their contradictory even imaginable.

It follows from the very nature of inmost judgments that they can be best understood only in a dualistic way that takes into account both the object of such judgments and the logical character of such judgments. If we view inmost judgments from the point of view of their absolute intentional relation to their object, then they are self-fulfilling to the most perfectly conceivable degree—fulfilled indeed by the very things or states of affairs being judged about. In this sense, inmost judgment fulfilment is the ideal and theoretically absolute process presupposed in all instances of judgment fulfilment where the fulfilment comes to rest in the actually judged about entity. The theoretical requirements of a pure science of the meant self demands such absolutization of the pure process of judgment fulfilment for the very good reason that the position of judgment fulfilment on the level of empirical experience is not as secure as it may seem at first. For, although so far all ordinary judgments *have been* perfectly fulfilled when they were fulfilled by the judged about things themselves, there is nothing inherent in the judging-situation that could give us ground to assume that they will be so fulfilled in the future. The formal truth remains that all inmost judgments at least are self-fulfilling even in regard to their object, and even to the most perfectly conceivable degree.

On the other hand, if we view inmost judgments not according to their object, but according to their purely logical nature, they are seen to be perfect tools of a perfect science — to such an extent that that same science could be said to consist entirely of *an absolute system of perfectly fulfilled inmost judgments.*

Since a systematic arrangement of already perfectly fulfilled inmost judgments is nothing other than a pure logic (i. e., an ideal theory of what the perfect thought of a perfect science would have to be like), we have reached the goal of this section, and have satisfactorily answered the first half of our problem. By working out the material implicitly contained in Assumptions A and B, we are able to construct a pure logical model for an absolute system of actually realized inmost jndgments, and this model has now provided an adequate classification of the judgment, "God is the perfect actualization of pure thought." For the particular judgment in question is nothing other than an inmost judgment.

This can be proven as follows : 1. Since the judgment is a statement about pure thought, and since pure thought is that absolute unity of noetic activity able to intend itself as both subject and object, the judgment would have to be a unitarily intended statement, even though it is manifoldly expressed. 2. Since it says nothing about God's existence it is indifferent to any existential substantiation in the real world of experience. 3. Since it difines God as pure thought, the only certainty of which it is capable is a formal, timeless, and self-given certainty that is the hallmark of pure thought. 4. And, finally, since it deals with the limit concept " God " (commonly defined and understood as a word that intends the totality of noetic and existential perfection) it cannot be sublated by a higher judgment once it has been perfectly fulfilled by that about which it is judging. The judgment is therefore, by definition, an inmost judgment.

Before we proceed to the second half of our problem, let us add one final note of clarification : By calling the above judgment an inmost judgment, we are making no assertion about the reality of either God or pure thought. The pure, logical formality within which our investigation has remained permits us only the following hypothesis : In the event of the actual working out and bringing to completion a self grounded science of pure thought, the particular statement in question (about the identity existing between God and such pure thought) would be a concrete case of the general category : inmost judgment.

3. *In What Way Can the Inmost Judgment, " God Is the Perfect Actualization of Pure Thought," Be Perfectly Fulfilled According to the Judged-About Thing Itself?*

Logicians that worry too much about the unchangeable character of " pure thought, " often do not realize that the construction of a model for a pure logic can manifest many aspects of artistic creativity. For example, when we were describing, in the previous section, the way in which inmost judgments branch off from the pure self into the diversity of a non-identical expression, our position was very much like that of a sculptor in wood who lets his hands be guided by the actual curves of the grain of the wood used. By thus allowing the logical states of affairs to speak for itself, our hope was to discover a general class for the judgment, " God is the perfect actualization of pure thought. " Now, after having accomplished this goal, we can stand back from our model and ask ourself why it worked out successfully.

One reason for its success was that our basic principle from the first was a principle of intention-clarity : That clarity in judgment intention means equal clarity in judgment fulfilment. Thus we were able to isolate that absolute unity of intention whereby inmost judgments can unitarily and yet truthfully intend the non-identical (the self and the non-self).

However, no true artist likes to admit of his entire work being the result of pure chance. There was a deeper reason for the success of our model which we must admit was planned in advance, namely : the secret, dualistic character of Assumption B. This Assumption runs as follows : "The self is able to retain a unified intention in regard to one and the same object even as it moves along in a temporal flow through various views of that object." We are now in a position to be able to reveal the secret character of this Assumption : *it is itself an inmost judgment*, and furthermore, it is an inmost judgment of a very special kind.

Assumption B might be called: An Inmost Judgment That, Through Its Own Clear Truth, Is in the Process of Making An Inmost Judgment About An Inmost Judgment.

Putting the matter in clearer terms, let us say that Assumption B is nothing else but pure thought actualizing itself in regard to the central nature of an inmost judgment.

Assumption B possesses all the requirements of an inmost judgment. It is intentionally unified, fixed in its own, formal, self-given certainty, and does not depend on any material substantialization. Moreover it is unsublatable in a fashion that no other inmost judgment can be. It cannot be sublated for the pure and simple reason that its own clear intended truth cannot be understood by the human mind unless that mind intend to view the judgment in a unified way while yet moving through various timebound views taken toward the judgment. Indeed, the only way to humanly express Assumption B is *truthfully*. For, if it is truly understood, it is *by that very understanding* proven true. The assumption is a pure case of meta-evidence, since it is infinitely self-verifying: it cannot be understood except as already existentially proven by the very unitary-and-yet-manifold way in which the understanding mind approaches the Assumption.

Assumption B possesses absolute intentional unity to an extent that no other inmost judgment can hope to achieve. For the confirmation of the Assumption's intended truth is a single confirmation that yet occurs manifoldly within the human mind and within the Assumption's innermost nature as itself being a manifold understanding of a unitarily

confirmed truth. In other words, no matter how the mind approaches the Assumption, it cannot assent to it without at the same time (and from within its own self as a real, human judgment!) assenting to the unique character of the Assumption's absolute intentional unity.

Even as we worked out its implications in ignorance of its true nature, Assumption B was, all along the line, a unique, double-sided inmost judgment—for all time the only possible inmost judgment that is both double-sided and able to be unitarily viewed *as* double-sided.

Since we have formally distinguished Assumption B from all other inmost judgments, we can logically make a division between inmost judgments which are infinitely self-verifying, double-sided in their essential nature, and humanly expressable only as true; and inmost judgments which are not thus qualified. The first class of judgments (which contains only one member, namely: Assumption B) can be called absolute inmost judgments, and the second class can be called relative inmost judgments.

Let us define absolute inmost judgments more precisely by adding to the qualifications given above the further notes as follows: 1. Such judgments would not be grounded in the pure, self-intending-self character of the perfect science in which they were employed. Rather they would be grounded in the unique, renewable action of human understanding from which they have come into being. They are thus fulfilled only insofar as the human understanding completes their essentially dualistic character. 2. Each absolute inmost judgment lays open the pure field of the self as a system of already perfectly fulfilled relative inmost judgments. 3. Each absolute inmost judgment intends the self alone according to an absolute intentional unity of the highest conceivable kind.

Now we have reached the highest level that a pure logic can hope to achieve, and are in a position to tackle the second half of our problem, namely: How can the inmost judgment, "God is the Perfect Actualization of pure thought," be perfectly fulfilled according to the judged about thing itself? Let us imagine a model for pure logic at its highest level, a model which would give the key for the construction of an absolute system of perfectly fulfilled *absolute judgments*. Our problem then becomes able to be solved satisfactorily, since our particular judgment in question could be identified as a particular instance of the general class "absolute inmost judgments." The judgment, "God is the perfect actualization of pure thought," would then be fulfilled along the lines of any absolute judgment in the system, according as any such judgment is said to fulfil itself in relation to its judged about state of affairs.

Ch. Sreenivasa Rao

CAN WE KNOW GOD?

Religion is defined as the hunger of the soul for the Impossible and the Inconceivable. The religious impulse is deep down in every human heart. This impulse in man desires to break through this life and existence to get beyond into that, where there is the Great Light. The Indian sage of the Vedic Age and the natural philosopher of the ancient Greece searched for the Ultimate cause in the natural elements and natural forces. Whether it is in the East or West, the sages, saints, philosophers and theologians of every period from ancient times made every possible attempt to obtain the knowledge of God through every means, varying from the other in degrees, perhaps, due to the differences of place and age and climate and culture. Three main valid sources through which men of East and West endeavoured to know God are discussed here. They are

(1) The Scripture — Śruti Veda – Revelation (Special) — Word of God (Faith) — Revealed or Biblical theology.

(2) Reasoning (*tarka*) — Inferential or mediate knowledge — as in natural or rational theology.

(3) Religious or spiritual experience — Intuition (*anubhava*)— Direct perception (*sākṣātkāra*) — Immediate knowledge — Mystic or Integral experience — vision — discernment — Direct Intuition (*aparokṣajñāna*) — *Prajnā* (Insight).

The Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers were visionaries of truth. Through serene contemplation and deep meditation, they realised *Brahma-jñāna* — knowledge of God. Despite its ineffability, some of the Upaniṣads have clearly described the nature of this intuitive experi-

ence in human terminology. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas attempted to establish the existence of God through their nine arguments based on reasoning (*tarka*). For them, scripture is also authoritative and valid because it is the work of God. These theistic arguments were thoroughly criticised by the Cārvāka (materialist), Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā, Bauddha and Jaina systems. Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara found the arguments futile to prove the existence of God. Such proofs in the view of Rāmānuja are doubtful because, more serious counter arguments can be raised against them. Since God is not an object of perception, no generalisation can prove or disprove the reality of God. Hence for Rāmānuja, scripture is the only guide regarding matters pertaining to God; reason can he employed in support of the scripture. Likewise Madhva too believes in the absolute validity and infallibility of the Vedas. Once the validity of the Veda is accepted, even the proofs that are doubtful will be more convincing. However, both Rāmānuja and Madhva acc ept intuition — *sākṣātkāra* and *aparokṣajñāna* respectively.

But Śaṅkara takes a different view. He gives valid recognition to the scriptural truths and reasoning (*tarka*), the latter being necessary to test the scriptural statement as well as support them through rational arguments. But reasoning serves only as an auxiliary of intuition (*anubhava*) which is commended by Śaṅkara. In the absence of the intuitive experience, the statements of the scripture are, like sound without sense. Śruti has to conform to the spiritual experience. Scriptures are only pointers towards a supreme experience. This mystical experience of identification of Brahman and Ātman has some similarity to the Truth Body of the Bauddhas. Yoga also emphasises on mystical experience where the soul unites with God. Kumārila is opposed to the above view of Śaṅkara. He questions how far this experience could be true, for it may even be delusory; hence needs to be tested by other evidence.

The *bhakti* systems that came to prominence and spread from South to North in the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th centuries gave special importance to *bhakti*, emphasising the vision of God and spiritual experience rather than speculative theology. Spiritual realisation of God was the one goal of the bhaktas. These systems are similar to the pietistic movements and evangelical revivals lead by John Wesley and George Whitman in the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe and America, which laid special stress on the personal experience or confrontation with Christ, resulting in the conversion (born again) of many. In the modern period, Vivekananda, Ramakrishna and Radhakrishnan stressed the importance of spiritual experience as the goal of religion. Though Vivekananda realised the important role of reason

in understanding religion, he maintained that through direct perception alone, the essence of religion could be realised. Radhakrishnan did not accept the absolute authority of the scripture. For him, intuitive experience is the highest and only valid source for the knowledge of God.

II

Among the philosophers and theologians in the West, St. Anselm is a pioneer who wanted to prove the existence of God through his ontological argument. St. Anselm attemoted to deduce the existence of God, from the idea of the most perfect Being. He described God as "that than which no greater can be thought". He intended to show that we cannot rationally deny the living God, once we know who the most perfect being is, says Karl Barth. The five proofs of St. Thomas Aquinas for the existence of God are known as the Five Ways. By going for rational arguments St. Thomas never wanted to minimise the importance of scripture or revelacion. In his *Summa*, he said a good deal about both. His first step was to use philosophical arguments to lay the foundations; the second was to complete the job by appealing to scripture. In the middle ages two basic types of theology began to crystallise — natural or rational theology and Revealed theology.

The protestant reformers — Luther and Calvin spoke of two-fold knowledge of God. They realised that there is profound inner awareness of God, though it cannot be well defined or described. Through the glory of God, manifested in the vast expanses of the universe, man comes to know that God exists. This has its basis in Rom. 1 : 20 and other Old testament passages. Secondly, God, has revealed himself through scriptures in a special way, which is significant for all ages. Calvin compared the scriptures with spectacles which put things into focus. Men like Pascal and Rousseau emphasized on the inner awarenesss of God. Pascal said:—"The heart has its own reasons which are unknown to reasons. God is perceived intuitively by the heart and not by reason." Likewise Rousseau took seriously, man's experience of God in the depth of his consciousness rather than in any of the abstract speculations.

Kant rejected the traditional proofs for the existence of God in his 'Critique of Pure Reason' and considered God as a postulate of Practical Reason. He thinks that true religion need not concern itself in knowing God or what He does for salvation but what we must do to become worthy of it. In his view, the categorical imperative is a clear, distinct self-evident idea. Reason itself, according to him,

prescribes the course of duty. Kant did not take into account either the religious experiences or the testimony of the scripture.

Schliermacher rejected both natural theology and revealed theology. He was neither interested to prove God through reason nor took the scripture seriously in every detail. He realised that religious experience was the key to know the essence of religion. By analysing the spiritual experience, he discovered that the essence of religion lies in the sense of absolute dependence on God.

Paul Tillich asserts that it is atheistic to affirm the existence of God as to deny it. He rejected rational theology as well as biblica theology (revelation) and was in favour of analysis of the religous experience. Like Schliermacher, he makes use of the idea of dependence. Tillich speaks of God as Being Itself or the Ground of Being.

Karl Barth maintains with considerable vehemence that the only knowledge of God which man can have, is given to us by the deliberate action of God in Jesus Christ. Personal knowledge of God is possible through encounter with Christ. The encounter with God brings its own proof. He rejects the proofs for the existence of God. For him, God is self-evident ; the Bible is God's word and God speaks through the authors of the scripture who are commissioned witnesses to the Word of God.

III

In recent years many mystics, philosophers and theologians have tried to find the main justification for the belief in God in the sphere of 'religious experience', which they have sometimes interpreted as meaning a man's total experience of life and sometimes meaning as almost indescribable feeling of the certainty of divine reality. Intuition is the ineffable experience beyond thought and speech, which transforms our life and yields the certainty of divine presence.

A wide variety of religious experiences have been carefully studied and analysed by philosophers like William James, Rudolf Otto, D. T. Suzuki, R. C. Zaehner, W. T. Stace, R. M. Bucke, J. B. Pratt and many others. These varieties in religious experience are mainly due to the religiouss, cultural, climatic, racial, national and sex differences, besides the attitudes, temperament and beliefs of the individual mystics. Despite such a wide variety, there are certain common characteristic features found in them :—(1) Unifying vision that all things are One. (2) Sense of objectivity or Beyond. (3) Concrete apprehension of One (beyond space and time). (4) Blessedness and peace or a feeling of the Holy sacred or Divine. (5) Paradoxicality

(contradictions). (6) Certainty (Authoritativeness). (7) Ineffability (incommunicability, inexplicability). (8) Moral or intellectual elevation (Exaltation). (9) Transiency (Momentariness). (10) Suddenness (Spontaneity).

Broadly speaking, these mystic experiences come under two categories — the introvertive and extrovertive. Some mystics conceived the object of their realisation as immanent, while others felt the presence of the same as Transcendent; some others described as something beyond subject and object. Contemplation was primary for some, active life was felt as necessary by some, while some others took a middle course. Some of those experiences were sudden and spontaneous, while some were acquired in stages through discipline and practice. Personal gods (local) were the objects of their experiences for some, while some conceived the Absolute or the Impersonal as the spiritual object. Some were deeply emotional and some were intellectual. Some had the monistic conception of their experience while some others had dualistic conception.

Many philosophers and psychologists examined these religious experiences and criticised them severely. The authenticity of the religious experience has been questioned by many psychologists. Some of them find only a wish-fulfilment, auto-suggestion, a desire or wish to perceive God in the religious experience of the mystic. God, according to Freud, is a projection of the repressed image of one's physical father in infancy.

Some medical materialists ascribe the mystic state, to the action of intoxicants and narcotic drugs, alcohol and opium. According to H. D. Leuba, drug intoxication frees man from the worries of the worldly life and while in this state, the mystic is considered as divinely possessed. William James says that nitrous oxide when sufficiently diluted with air, stimulates the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. After taking 'mescalin' Aldous Huxley had an experience which he identified with the mystic consciousness. Prompted by this, R. C. Zaehner, made a similar experiment on himself by taking the same drug 'mescalin' and disagreed with the view of Huxley, for he discovered in it much difference from the genuine mystic experience.

The mystic's perception of voices and visions, his raptures, transports, delirium and frenzy, often associated with his experience, is considered by the psychologist as due to mental and physical ailments. St. Poul's vision of Christ on the road to Damascus was said to be due to epilepsy. The mystic language of bridal love, nuptial and wedlock,

the psychologist thinks, is resulting from erotic mania and auto-eroticism — that sex-aberration coming out as spiritual ecstacy. There may be some such cases, but it is unfair to apply these, to all cases of mystical experiences. However, the famous modern psychologist C.G. Jung writes of this :

> "Religious experience is absolute...... No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses the great treasurer of a thing that has provided him with a source of life, meaning and beauty. He has pistis and peace. Where is the criterium by which you could say that such a life is not legitimate that such an experience is not valid?".

Some philosophers who analysed the experiences of the mystics discovered that the statements of the mystics were paradoxical, containing elements of misdescription, vagueness and ambiguity. Mystic expressions contain, description of the experience in terms of mystics social, religious and cultural background. The naked experience is interpreted by the mystic in his utterances. Hence there is vagueness and ambiguity and even non-sense sometimes, in his expressions. He makes use of rational modes only as symbols to translate and describe knowledge possessing certainty. The mystic language is unconceptualisable and unverbalisable. The terms—void, desert, silence, dark night etc., are only metaphors to describe their experiences. Prof. Ian Ramsey thinks that such expressions have objective reference and are descriptive of objective depth. D. T. Suzuki, who found contradictions in mystic-statements observed that when language is forced for things of this world, it becomes warped and assumes all kinds of crookedness.

Such contradictions, according to Rudolf Otto, are the result of the peculiar logic of mysticism which does not take into account the two fundamental laws of natural logic. W. T. Stace asserts that "God is known only by intuition, and not by the logical intellect". Stace makes a distinction between natural order (of the world) and the divine order (of God). The mystical experience does not belong to the former but to the latter. Logic according to him, is applicable to the natural order and not to the divine order. In his words :

> "If He (God) does not lie at the end of any telescope, neither does He lie at the end of any syllogism. I can never, starting from the natural order prove the divine order. The proof of the divine order must lie somehow within itself. It must be its own witness. For it, like the natural order, is complete in itself, self-contained".

The divine order according to Stace is within us and within all other things. It is in the heart that the witness of Him, the proof of Him must be found and not in any external circumstances of the natural order, says Stace.

For Dr. Radhakrishnan, the experience itself is felt to be sufficient and complete. It does not appeal to external standards of logic and metaphysics. It is its own cause and explanation. It is self-established and self-evidencing. It is beyond the bounds of proof and so touches completeness. E. L. Mascall, modern catholic theologian, pointed out that catholic theology has been on the whole reluctant to admit that even in authentic religious experience, there is anything that could validly be described as a direct apprehension of an immediate knowledge of God. The only exception that it would make would be in the rare case of mystical union. Even this, it would say that the soul apprehended by God, would be seized upon by Him, rather than He would be seized by the soul. Rejecting the validity of mystical experience F. R. Tennant, another Catholic theologian, writes as follows:

> "What is called the validity of religious experience cannot be established by the ipse dixit (his mere word) of that type of experience. If it is to be established it must be as reasonable inference from discursive knowledge about the world. Thence alone are derived the notions of numinous, the supersensible, the supernatural and the theistic idea of God".

IV

So far a survey of the views of some philosophers and theologians in the East as well as in the West concerning the three valid sources through which knowledge of God can be established, has been made. These views have been briefly evaluated below.

The rational arguments of St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Descartes to prove the existence God have been rejected by Kant as futile, in the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. God is given the status of a postulate of Practical Reason. Śaṅkara and Rāmanuja also likewise rejected the arguments of the Nyāya-vaiśesikas to prove the existence of God. Śaṅkara too, realised the limitations of reason, hence regarded it as an auxiliary to intuitive experience. Modern Protestant theologians like Schliermacher, Ritschl, Karl Barth, Paul Tillich also rejected natural theology—the rational arguments to prove the existence of God. Though modern Indian philosophers like Swami Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan employed reason extensively in

interpreting ideas on reason, they did not attempt to prove the existence of God through reason. For Vivekananda religion is not in doctrine, in dogmas nor in intellectual argumentation. Logical arguments, according to Radhakrishnan, by themselves may not be able to demonstrate the existsnce of God in a way that would satisfy the seeking mind and the devout heart. Hence it is impossible to realise the knowledge of God through reasoning. So let us turn to the Scriptures.

All the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy accept the authority, infallibility and eternality of the Veda. Many common Hindus believe in the authority of the Veda. Though Indian religious thought has often considered Vedas as the scripture in a straightforward way, there are other interpretations which radically change their status. For instance, Śaṅkara's division between higher knowledge and lower knowledge, is taken to imply that scriptural authority belongs to the latter especially the identity texts that affirm the identity of Brahman and Ātman. Hence the importance of scripture in Śaṅkara's philosophy lies in pointing to certain supreme experiences.

The heterodox schools rejected the authority of the Veda. Some of the modern Indian philosophers too do not accept the authority of the Veda. Both Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan consider the scriptural authority as not essential for the realisation of God. Vivekananda said that belief in books whether Jewish or Hindu, is non-essential. Religion does not consist of books and pamphlets. In the words of Radhakrishnan "We do not accept scriptural documents as books, apart from other books, unquestionable in their accuracy and advice. The view that they are inherent word of God does not carry conviction".

In the modern period, many a philosopher and theologian in the West doubted the Verbal inspiration of the scripture, (Bible), perhaps due to the rationalistic philosophies and also due to the fresh light thrown by the German scholars through their investigations made in Biblical studies. Modern theologians — Schliermacher, Ritschl, Tillich and many others, with the exception of the fundamentalists, — did not accept the absolute authority of the Bible. But they recognised the validity of the religious experience. Hence knowledge of God cannot be obtained through scripture too; then let us turn to the religious experience, which is the standard mark of Eastern religions.

In recent years, much has been discussed and written on religious experience. Philosophy of religion, psychology of religion etc., examined, analysed and criticised the varieties of religious experience. In the light of these criticisms of philosophers, psychologists and theologians, can we accept the religious experience as a valid source of

Brahma-jñāna? Such an acceptance demands certain universal characteristic features of gennine experience as a standard, since there are diabolical and pseudo mystical experiences, besides the experiences produced by drugs, narcotics and other physical and mental ailments. In the absence of such a standard experience, it is difficult to know one's experience as genuine, distinguishing it from false experiences. If so, can such a standard experience be a possibility, with all the cultural, national, religious, racial, climate differences and personal inclinations of mystics?

Secondly, William James states that mystics who had the experience of God, have the right to be absolutely authoritative since they had the vision and they apprehended the consciousness of God. Even supposing, we take these experiences of the mystics as true, how many persons in the world have such deep and intense genuine religious experience. What about the millions who never had any such religious experience?

If knowledge of God cannot be obtained from the scripture through reasoning (*tarka*) or through the spiritual experience, then how are we to satisfy the spiritual cravings, urges or hunger of the souls in the depths of our hearts. The answer is — faith. We will have to embrace faith. Then reason and scripture shall strengthen it ... As Tolstoy has said 'Faith is that by which men live'. 'He, through faith is righteous, shall live' says Paul.

God cannot be known through our physical senses just like physical objects, for He is supersensuous. It is said that 'no man has seen God at any time'. For Vivekananda, a God known is no more God. But yet the blessed assurance of Lord Krishna is: "Those who, with faith, holding me as their supreme aim, follow this immortal wisdom — those devotees are exceedingly dear to Me'. The promise of the incarnate Son Jesus Christ is, "If any man loves me, my father will love him and we will come unto Him and make our abode with him". The acceptance or rejection of the above statements depends upon one's own individual faith. Before closing I quote below a passage from one of the articles of Prof. Malkani.

"Philosophy is said to be a thinking consideration of things. We think about the nature of reality. This emphasis upon the knowledge of reality is often deprecated as being one-sided. Philosophy has become too much a matter of the intellect. It is, therefore, suggested that any philosophy to be complete must take into consideration other aspects of human experience. We must have a well-rounded off philosophy which satisfies the whole man, not merely the intellectual man. Truth must be combined with value".

Fred W. Clothey

MIRCEA ELIADE AND MAN'S IMAGING OF THE SACRED

Historians of religion in this century, like their colleagues in anthropology, ethnology, psychology and philosophy, have been interested in the ways man has understood the Ultimate. But unlike most philosophers, historians of religion have been interested less in the essence and nature of the Ultimate as in its manifestations. And unlike many of their colleagues in the social sciences, they have asserted the *sui generis* character of the religious experience and its irreducability to terms or functions which do not comprehend its essentially religious nature. Their discussions of the question of God have assumed that the most important fact to be asserted about God is that He is a religious datum. "God" is that to which man responds religiously.

It was Rudolph Otto who set the stage as much as anyone for the assumptions of contemporary historians of religion. Otto posited the notion of the *numen*, a category translatable as the "Wholly other" which was *a priori* to every religious experience. The *numen* is the indescribable depth of the Other whose reality is only dimly described in symbols or ideograms. The *numen* is the basis of all religion. It is to the *numen* man responds. The religious experience is *sui generis*; all perceptions of the *numen* are symbolic ways by which man seeks to apprehend the Ultimate.[1]

While Otto thought the *numen* had its own ontological existence, not all of the later historians of religion have agreed. Some have assumed only that religious man *believed* the category of the other to exist, and that *therefore* it is a religious datum to be understood and interpreted religiously. Men like Joachim Wach and Gerardus Van der Leeuw have concurred that this category, given so many names—or none—by religious man in history had to be recognized as the basic fact of religion.

Van der Leeuw referred to this object of religion as "the Somewhat" to connote its indefiniteness, and its highly exceptional and impressive Otherness.[2] Wach used the term "Ultimate Reality" to refer to this basic religious category.

Mircea Eliade, one of the world's foremost historians of religions, has also participated in this discussion. However, one is disappionted if one looks to him for a description of this abstract Ultimate. The term he does use for the Ultimate is the "Sacred", a term which connotes the Real or the Meaningful. Simply put, the Sacred is that dimension of life which gives signiffcance to life. It can be understood in contradistinction to the Profane — a homogeneous, meaningless arena where man lives out a mundane existence with neither direction nor purpose. The Sacred manifests itself in the Profane by means of an hierophany. An hierophany is any object or event which embodies something of the Sacred for those who apprehend it. It is a break through of the Sacred, a bringing of a new creation, for a manifestation of the Sacred re-orders time and space into meaningfulness. There are various kinds of hierophanies — the Kratophany is a manifestation of Power which is one aspect of the Sacred; the theophany is a divine form, embodying some aspect of divinity in particular dress.

It is in discussing the symbolizations of the Sacred that Eliade becomes most explicit. Theophanies or divine forms are symbols' whether they be gods, goddesses, or their representations. As symbols they are concretizations of the religious Reality which is the Sacred, and, as symbols, they are embodiments of the apprehender's understanding of things as they are. Symbols thus tell us something of Otherness and they tell us something about religious man who apprehends Otherness by means of them. In fact, Eliade has observed that every religious symbol has some six functions.[3] (1) The religious symbol reveals the Sacred World — that World of *illo tempore* or mythic time, not ordinarily known in everyday experience. (2) It reveals Reality as Reality is embodied in the Sacred. (3) A religious symbol is multivalent, for it expresses a diversity of meanings, whose relationship or continuity may not ordinarily be evident. (4) The symbol articulates a whole and integrates a system whereby the cosmos and all of life may be apprehended. (5) A religious symbol embodies the integration of polarities — it is a *coincidentia oppositorum* which reconciles apparent paradoxes. (6) The symbol is existentially revelatory — it reflects and clarifies the meaning of the human situation in which it is set.

Thus, given the undefinable, yet pervasive, character of the Sacred, man, nonetheless, has sought to define or apprehend it in terms of symbols or images. We might call this process that of imaging.

These imagings of the divine are best understood phenomenologically, as expressions of man in dialogue with the Sacred and with his total milieu. The imagings are a symbol system, often incorporating an entire cosmological or axiological understanding in them. At the least these imagings are statements about man and his context, for they often reflect a self-perception and a context-perception. Seldom are the symbols inconsistent with the entire contextual framework in which man finds himself; seldom are they drawn from other than the images available in the givens of that context; yet on the other hand, Eliade feels each symbol, at its best, moves toward that Whole of which it is a manifestation. He suggests that the symbol becomes "one with the Whole ... to include in itself all the manifestations of Sacred power."[4] This implies, further, that the symbol addresses the total psychic life — "it delivers its message and fulfils its function even when its meaning escapes awareness."[5] That is, the symbol may have an implicit meaning, not necessarily apprehended by those who order their lives by that symbol but valorized only by the interpreter who perceives in it a deeper significance not unrelated to its conscious values and meanings.

The imaging of the Sacred, further, may be endeictic or discursive, mythic or conceptual, even though Eliade has given much more attention to the mythic than to the conceptual. Further, this imaging has a diachrony as well as a synchrony. The diachrony or history is such that there are several historical processes involved. On the one hand, symbols and divine forms develop in a way that is consistent with each successive historical, context. That is deity tends to reflect the character of historical moments in which it is found, yet what the deity is in one moment is related to past moments and succeeding moments. Eliade is not speciefic, however, as to just how this process occurs. The diachrony of man's imagings also suggests that there is a movement from the remote to the concrete, from the old to the new, from the irrelevant to the relevant, even while at the same time effort is made to relate the new to the old and to imbue the particular with the universality implicit in the particular's meaning. At the same time, there is a synchrony to this imaging as there usually is a structural or typological relationship between imagings occurring in one geographical context with those occurring in similar eco-cultural settings elsewhere, and each reflects something of the Sacred Whole. One of the implications of this affirmation is that man is psychologically and religiously related to his fellows despiet geographical and temporal distance: Eliade writes of "types" or categories of divinities: for example — the lord of the hunt, the mother goddess or the fecundating sky-god — but he understands these types more nearly in Freudian than in Kantian terms, more nearly ingrained

archetypically in the human unconscious, albeit made conscious, elaborated and modified in the context of varying historical and cultural settings. This suggests further that there is a continuity and relationship between the mythic and conceptual imagings referred to earlier. While Eliade is not explicit at this point, it is consistent with his position to observe, for example, that ontological conceptualizations of God are related, structurally, if not historically, to visions of the dualistic character of the cosmos, such as one fiinds in the Greek context ; while teleological conceptions are similarly related to a linear view of time such as was evident in the Hebrew context. Similarly, every hierophany reflects and makes meaningful the very context from which the imagings are derived. Each is related to other hierophanies and theophanies to the degree that each reflects cultural and psychological contexts similar to those out of which other theophanies are derived.

Much of Eliade's study of deities is of those of archaic and so called "primitive" man. Here he is largely indebted to Raphael Pettazzoni. Pettazzoni had identified several types of deities in early societies. Hunting societies tended to see themselves in terms of game animals and their world in terms of the familiar spaces of the hunt. Their cosmos was a single spacial unit, hardly bifurcated into sky and earth. The hunter's gods tended to be of two types : the lord of animals, a terrestrial god, who presided over the hunt, and was identified with the hunted game and the hunter ; and the creator god of the sky who presided over the cosmos from on high but who seldom entered into the ritual life of the community. Agriculturalists for whom the soil becomes crucial developed an imagery of fertility, cyclicality, and vegetation. Man in that context saw himself more in terms of the plant ; his world was more nearly understood in terms of the agricultural cycle — sowing-reaping ; death and birth. Their Gods tended to be deities of earth or vegetation, for example, mother goddesses associated with fertility, creativity, cylicality and, indeed, reflecting much of the ambivalence of the cosmos. It was with pastoral peoples that deities of the sky became particularly significant, for nomadic pastoralists experienced far more than people before them the impingency of the sky. Pettazzoni writes :

> The sky is extended equally over all the peoples of the world but the sacred experience of the sky is profoundly different where the sky is conceived as a cosmic complement of earth or eventually generated by the earth (Ouranos in Hesiod) from where the heavens are felt as a diffuse, immanent presence that intrudes on man in every place and in every instant, without escape or refuge from the all-seeing eye. The earth is always and everywhere the theater of human life ; but the sacred experience of earth is different where

the earth tilled by man is the Mother, the nurturer the giver of fruits and flowers for man's sustenance and joy; from the experience of the earth where it is sterile, the boundless extension of steppe whose fascination has inspired in modern times the naratives of Chekhov (the Steppe), the music of Borodin, and indirectly the poetry of Leopardi ......"[6]

Eliade re-asserts much of what Pettazzoni had said though offering illustrations drawn from a wider range of data and refining Pettazzoni's theories somewhat. Eliade writes a macrohistory of the notion of sky gods with which he seeks to identify certain types more specfically.[7] For example, he observed that in some agricultural and post-agricultural societies a sky god develops who is often a fertility god, virile storm god, and consort to the mother goddess. Such, Eliade suggests, were the Mesopotamian deities El, Min, Baal, and Bel. On the other hand, in certain pastoral contexts, the sky god was often a sovereign god responsible for the conduct of the cosmic order. Such is the case with the Vedic Varuna. In those cases where these two types of god coalesced the gods often persisted into later contexts, often becoming high deities, comprehending many meanings and features of earlier deities. At other times certain ancient gods became otiose, as cultural change brought change in cosmic perception; such otiose gods were often replaced by newer deities, who, nontheless, may have been rooted in earlier strata of folk society, to be sure, but who come to prominence in contexts more hospitable to the images by which the gods were understood. Thus the gods of early man inform the images of the divine which develop in later history, usually in one of two ways: First, some early gods persist into later contexts, subsuming additional meanings and images as they are adopted into each new historical moment — such was the case with Zeus, Yahweh and Ahura Mazda and perhaps with Śiva and Viṣnu, or, second, some are replaced by "younger" more concrete deities who nonetheless are ascribed some of the attributes of earlier deities. Such has been the emergence of such gods as Skanda and Marduk.

Eliade differs from Pettazzoni in interpreting this process. He rejects the assumption that the history of gods is unilinear or evolutionary as Pettazzoni tended to believe and nineteenth century anthropologists assumed. Rather, the historical process is much more complex and dynamic. There is a continuity of theme, to be sure, but there is also otiosity and decay together with a number of creative new moments which, however, were often related to past moments. Further, Pettazzoni thought of the gods as personifications of natural phenomena, whereas Eliade sees them, as we have observed, as a much more complex set of symbols that reflects man's world view and value-

system and, of course, man's attempts to come to grips with the Sacred.

Eliade's concerns are suggestive. As a phenomenologist, he urges us to move beyond sterile argument about the nature of the Ultimate to a consideration of the implications of man's responding to the Ultimate and his seeking to apprehend it. Recognition of the symbolic character of all that we and many peoples before us have said about "God" would free us to recognize that much of our discussion is more a revelation about ourselves and our contexts than about the Inscrutable. He would remind us that more disciplined consideration of the factors which lead religious man to use certain symbol-systems and conceptualizations in his attempts to understand the Ultimate would yield more insight into the nature of man, the dynamics of his myth-making and symbolizing, and the implications on all he does of his relationship to his entire context. And not a little indebted to his years of the study of Yoga under Professor Das Gupta, he would hold out to us a vision of the relativeness of our dim perceptions of the Divine — that we each see in part largely because of the color of our spectacles and that, more important, in fact, than man's concepts of the Divine are man's responses to it and the givens from which both man's concepts of the Divine and his understanding of himself are derived.

But Eliade does not leave us without a host of questions. It will be enough to pose just two or three in this context. For one, Eliade is not precise in suggesting what the manner of historical persistence is. If it is true that there is historical continuty in man's imagings (and there is evidence to suggest it has happened in the Indian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern contexts, but has it been true universally?), what is the reason for that continuity? If structures and types have persisted from generation to generation in cotexts where there has not been conscious borrowing why has it happened? Eliade implies two hypotheses: The first is that man's cultures and contexts have been somewhat limited by the substance of time and space, and hence the givens from which man's imagings are derived are limited and similar in many contexts. That is, water, sky, earth, etc. are known in virtually all geographical conditions an hence are raw materials almost universally used for imaging. The other hypothesis is more esoteric: there is something archetypal about man's structures. Jung believed the archetypes were bio-genetically a part of man's psyche and evolved over centuries in a manner not unlike the way the body is presumed to have evolved. It seems unlikely Eliade would be that mechanical or biological in his view of man's religion; yet it appears there is an unconscious, almost ontological, reservoir of structures from which man draws

and which he modifies and adapts to each new historical context. At the least Eliade implies man is psychically limited in the kinds of responses he can make, so that the emotion which a plant evoked in a farmer may be similar to that evoked in later generations or in distant places by an animal in a herdsman. The precise dynamics of this process that makes possible a historical continuity are not made clear by Eliade. That continuity exists in many contexts seems clear from the data at our disposal but whether it is actual or symbolic, conscious or unconscious, and if actual and unconscious what its dynamics are need yet to be explored.

Then too, Eliade does not deal explicitly with the data of later history. He says little, for example, about the stage of culture that might be called "early urban" in which deities like Marduk of Babylon and Skanda, son of Rudra, arise with warrior and regal attributes; wherein military paraphernalia become part of the imagery of religion, where evil is personified into the enemy of the state; and the cosmos is understood in terms of the values and aspirations of the city-state. And there have been other types of deity of which Eliade has been aware, but of which he has not written: the dema-deities, discovered by Adolph Jensen amongst food-gatherers of Indonesia; the dying-rising god first described, though incorrectly, by James Frazer; the culture hero and and heilbringer and others. Further, if a macrohistory of sky gods is possible, is not a macrohistory of terrestrial gods possible — a symbolic continuity from gods of the hunt through gods of vegetation and the herd to conceptualizations of an immanent divine presence. And what of the abundance of conceptualizations of the Divine that have been developed in man's history, to which Eliade has not yet addresed his considerable erudition? Still to be written, perhaps in a manner not unlike Paul Riceour's analyses of the symbolizations of evil, is a phenomenological analysis of the cosmological, axiological, relational, or intuitional visions of the Divine for all that these can tell us about man and his effort to relate to his total context.

Nor has Eliade addressed himself to the imagings of the recent past, the present, or offered projections of future imagings. But use of Eliade's phenomenological techniques would suggest that the imagings now occurring among many of the young in the West and articulated by such poets as Wallace Stevens, and such social scientists as Robert Bellah imply a restructured understanding of the cosmos. Gone is the special dichotomy of medieval man, and the notion of ontological transcendence. Gone even is the qualitative bifurcation between sacred and profane, even in Eliade's terms. Rediscovered is a vision of a unified world in which the transcendenti s the "immanent" where "meaningfulness" or "more thanness" is the Ultimate which

impinges on all of life or, perhaps better, rises out of all of life. Similarly, his method applied to contemporary Tamil Nadu, would suggest that the reasons for the increasing popularity of a deity like Ayyappan are to be found as much in the cultural and psychological bearings of the Tamil peoples as in the character of the God himself. Yet, Eliade argues, the contemporary moment and its imagings of the divine are related to the whole religious hisiory of which man is an inheritor. New imagings do not occur in a vaccuum; they participate in an ongoing history of symbols. That history is such that of it it is appropriate to say: "The god is dead; long live God!"

1. Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 55 ff.

2. G. Van der Leew, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1938), pp. 23 ff.

3. Mircea Eliade, "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism", *History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, ed. by Mircea Eliade and Joseph Kitagawa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 98 - 99.

4. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns of Comparative Religion*, Trans. by Rosemary Sheed (New York: World Publishing Co., 1963), p. 452.

5. Eliade, "Methodological Remaks. ......", p. 107.

6. Raphael Pettazzoni, "The Supreme Being: Phenomenological Structure and Historical Development": trans. by Lucio Chiaraviglio, *History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, ed. by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 60 ff.

7. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. ...... pp. 40 ff.

C. Ramalingam

HOW FAR IS IT CORRECT TO SAY THAT GOD IS A PROJECTION OF THE HUMAN MIND?

Psycho-analysis has attempted an explaination of this problem. According to it God is a projection of the human mind. It traces the development of the God idea.

Freudian Explanation

Freud observes certain similarities between the behaviour of a child towards his father and that of a devout being towards his God. In both cases the superior being is regarded as omnipotent, omniscient and inscrutable. Both the child and the devotee react to the superior being with utter dependence, awe, fear of punishment and gratitude for mercy and protection. These parallels suggest that the original model for the conception of God is to be found in the infantile conception of one's parents. The inclination to believe in personal deities is almost universal. These parallels by themselves do not prove that the concept of God is a projection of the infantile helplessness. According to Freud these remnants are mostly the result of oedipal conflict. According to this theory a boy at the age of four comes to desire his mother. His attachment to her is intense. It amounts to sexual desire. He regards his father as a rival. His father's attitude is hostile and he is in dread of it. He fears that he may lose his love. The result is that he abandons his sexual aims. But there is repression of the entire complex of desires, fears and conceptions. This complex remains intense in the unconscious. It is now that he comes to find the supernatural personal deity. This provides an external object on which men come to project their feeling of dependence. They adopt the attitudes and practices that go with the belief.

As for the individual, repressed material involves severe conflict between tendencies to rebel against the father and tendencies to submit

to the father. There is also a struggle between the oedipal desires and the standards that would be violated by satisfying those desires. Projection of this material on to an external deity reduces distress in several ways.

First, the externalization of the problem provides some relief. The individual now faces a clear cut opposition between the various desires of his own and a forbidding external person.

Second, because the external figure is so powerful there is less conflict. The external object being powerful weakens the rebellion. So it is idealized and this renders resentment and hostility less appropriate.

Third, there are various mechanisms that are provided for dissipation of guilt over sexual desire for the mother and the hostility toward the father. Confession, penance, and renunciations of various kinds are the various means that are socially approved. These relieve the guilt and work against the conflict in the mind.

There are certain periods in the life of an individual when he is more receptive to religious beliefs than at other times. Freud employs the mechanism of regression to explain this. When a person meets with severe difficulties and frustrations at one stage of life, he has a tendency to regress, psychologically to an earlier stage. This is because of the absence of problems at the early period of one's existence. When the problems become persistent there is generally, some reinstatement of earlier modes of thinking, feeling and relating to the environment. Oedipal material in the unconscious will become more and more intense. At the same time the person engages in the childish practice of projection.

According to Freudian approach an individual's tendency to accept belief in a supernatural personal deity, is in part caused by a tendency to project a childhood father image existing in the unconscious. This projection normally follows a regression set off by a current problem of adjustment. This serves to alleviate unconscious conflicts and unconscious guilt. It is clear that, at best, this is only a partial explanation of religious belief. For one thing, this presupposes the prior existence of the religious ideas in the culture. At the most it is an explanation of the individual's readiness to accept these ideas when they are proferred.

According to Freud, religion develops as a projection of a psychological complex that issues from unconscious racial memories of a primal murder of the tyrannical father-figure of a "primal horde". Something like a collective unconscious is posited in which psychic

material can be transmitted in an unconscious form from one generation to another. However these ideas have never won any considerable degree of acceptance.

Criticisms of Freudian Fxplanation

It is clear that the Freudian explanation does not imply that the beliefs of religion are false. Freud himself recognised this though not all Freudians do. It is often assumed that the success of any explanation in terms of factors natural would show that we do not need anything supernatural. This would seriously weaken religion's claim to credibility. However this depends on how these claims are made. If religion is based solely on divine revelation, then the fact that we can adequately explain religion without bringing in divine activity, revelatory or otherwise seriously affects the claim that certain beliefs are true because they are communicated by God. However, this does not conclusively disprove the claim. Rational arguments are advanced in support of religious doctrine. Whatever force these arguments have is in no degree lessened by the fact that the psychological bases for religion is as Freud supposed. If one had good reason, that would itself be a sufficient condition of the belief. This would show that it is possible to have the belief without needing to project an unconscious falter-image. However, it is almost inconceivable that we should show that projection is a necessary condition of belief. At most, we could hope to show that there is some correlation between degree of unconscious oedipal conflict and firmness of religious belief. Showing that a certain set of natural factors is one of the things that can produce religious belief may well nullify certain ways of supporting the beliefs, but it could hardly, show that no adequate rational grounds could be produced. There is another way in which it has been thought that the Freudian theory of religion carries with it a negative evaluation of religion. The particular causal factors to which Freud traced religion are of a sort associated with undesirable patterns of organisation. To regard religion as caused by these factors is to class it with a neurotic and infantile modes of behaviour, and as such it is hardly worthy of serious consideration. In this respect, too, the psycho-analytic explanation is typical. One can imagine an explanation that traces religious activity to evaluatively natural-factors, such as patterns of neural activity in the brain, but all the explanation in the field trace religion to states and activities that are more or less irrational, immature or unworthy. Marxist theory adds the point that religion is used by the dominant class to provide illusory consolations to those being exploited.

Sociologist, Emile Durkheim puts forward the theory that religious belief constitutes a projection of the structure of the society.

Psycho-analytic literature is often simply an enumeration of similarites between religion and compulsion neuroses, such as firm attachment to rituals, without having a rational explanation af attachment. However, the similarity in itself proves nothing. A scientist, "obsessed with an idea" also exhibits marked similarities to a compulsion neurotic but this has no implication for his work.

The more important claim has to do with the causal factors said to underlie religion. We must distinguish between (1) The claim that some neurotic condition is always or generally among the faetors producing attachment to a religion. (2) The claim that the causal basis for such attachment is markedly similar to the basis of recognised neuroses.

There is no real evidence for the first claim. As for the second we must ask how similar the causal basis is and what implications we are to draw from whatever degree of similarity exists. The mere fact that religion involves projection as a relief from unconscious conflict is not sufficient ground for labeling religion in Freud's term "the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind." We must distinguish between pathological and healthy resolutions of unconscius conflict.

The anti-freudian psycho-analyst Jung in terming religion an alternative to neurosis, expressed his belief that it is healthy outcome. The basic issue involved here concerns the definition of "neurosis". If we define it in terms of a certain causal basis, then it may be that according to the Freudian theory, religion is by its very nature a form of neurosis. Now the question is whether or not it is a desirable, justifiable, or realistic mode of activity. If neurosis is defined in this way, we may have to distinguish between good and bad neuroses. If, on the other hand we accept common usage and build a negative evaluation into the definition of neurosis (by having as a necessary condition of neurosis that it makes a satisfactory adjustment to one's environment difficult), then it would no longer be an open question whether religion, if neorotic, is a good thing. But with this concept of neurosis, we have a much stronger thesis. I do not think that "it has been conclusively shown that, in general religious believers are less able to get ahead in their work than are non-believers. Even if this were shown, there would be further problems. The believer might complain that restricting the environment to the natural environment is question begging. He would say that whatever the bearing of religions attachment in getting along in human society, it is essential to adequate adjustment to God and his demands. To ignore this aspect of "the environment" is to employ a criterion of adjustment that presupposes the falsity of religious beliefs.

One does not have to accept the entire Freudian account of religion to see plausibility in its central claim that early parent child relations of 'creaturely' dependence and reverence, with their tensions between love and fear, can yield the unconscious material from which experiences of God-man-relations are fashioned. To accept this claim is not necessarily to reduce all religion to neurosis or worse. For it is absurd to class together the person who attains a stable religious solution to his conflicts and the person who retreats to genuine neurosis, developing, say, obsessions, compulsions or delusions of persecution. Freud certainly went further in his naturalistic explanation of religious experience, being prepared to reduce God to an illusory parent substitute.

It may be possible, however, to invert the Freudian account of religious experience and instead of seeing *God as father substitute*, to see human fathers as *God substitutes* and the human experience of love as training for loving God. The close psychological relation between love of man and the love of God, would thus have its sceptical sting removed.

Do we have in theistic experience mere projection? Or do we have a projection matched by an objectively existing God?

It looks as though in theistic experience we have a case of a mere projection without the corresponding object. Icons, Idols and the various figures we worship are anthropomorphic. But for Sankara Absolute Reality is *nirguṇa* (without qualities) *nirākāra* (without form) *nirviśeṣa* (without particularity) *nirupādhika* (without limitations).

As Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it in his 'An idealist view of life' "All forms, according to Sankara, contain an element of untruth and the real is beyond all forms. Any attempt to describe the experience falsifies it to an extent. In the experience itself the self is wholly integrated and is therefore both the knower and the known, but it is not so as any intellectual description of the experience."

The idea of God is an interpretation of experience. Kena Upaniṣad says that "it is other than the known and above the unknown".

If we mean by the word projection, externalisation God is a projection of the human mind. But this need not necessarily be in the psychoanalytic sense of the term.

Thinking has to work with sense-data. Without these thinking cannot function. God is suprasensible. He cannot be argued into existence. Human mind is incapable of conceiving God because of its inherent limitations.

S. S. Raghavachar

LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND THE CONCEPT OF GOD

I propose to focus discussion on one definite aspect of the problem of God. The logical positivists reject metaphysics as meaningless and they carry over this negative attitude to cover Theism or Theology. I am having in mind writers such as A. J. Ayer, Prof. Wisdom and Anthony Flew. I wish to examine this position making use of the arguments of the critics of this tendency and also some relevant doctrines of Indian Philosophy. Marshalling of all relevant discussions on this single issue may not be altogether useless.

I

The classification of propositions into necessary and therefore tautologous and empirical and therefore calling for observational verification is not a complete disjunction. The principle of verification itself falls outside these alternatives. More fundamental still is the law of contradiction. It is this law that renders the denial of necessary prepositions and the denial of empirical propositions duly verified in observation untenable. It has to be provided for in the neat scheme of propositions. The necessity of analytical propositions and the truth of verified propositions are themselves consequences of the application of the law of contradiction.

II

That the propositions of mathematics have cogency or undeniable character because they are simply tautologies or working out of arbitrary linguistic conventions is no easy position. Kant has to be thoroughly refuted. We may leave the logical positivists to the mercies

of critics such as Brandshard, H. D. Lewis, Paton and Ewing on this issue and pass on to the next consideration.

III

The other types of propositions are more important as they are synthetic and embody assertions about matters of fact. Theological propositions to be significant should belong to this category. These propositions, it is claimed, must be capable of verification in sense-experience. One may concede the demand for verification and still not accept the rule that the verification must be by way of sense-perception. The *Sāṅkhya Kārika* tells us that certain entities are imperceptible not because they are non-existent but because they are too subtle for observation.[1] It is also ligtimate to insist that verification must be in the related frame of reference. As Sureśvara points out *śabda* cannot be verified in the field of *rūpa*.[2] The logic may be streched a little more. An aesthetic theory cannot be called upon to verify itself in the field of Geology or Astronomy. If a thesis expressly asserts a supersensuous entity, to demand of it a sensuous confirmation of its proposition is a simple violation of this law of frames of reference. A prior refutation of the possibility of frames of reference other than sense-experience is the only ground that could justify the demand for sensuous verification of admittedly non-sensuous principles. If such a refutation is already there this elaborate argumentation against metaphysics or theology is a vicious circle. We may quote a beautiful sentence of Śaṅkara bearing on this topic of frames of reference : *svaviṣayaśūrāṇi hi pramāṇāni śrotrādivat.*[3]

IV

The principle of verification as applied to the validation of empirical propositions needs a little more scrutiny. We have to distinguish between a proposition asserting a single or particular phenomenon and a proposition stating a law. With regard to particular propositions there is a great deal of difficulty with regard to propositions pertaining to past events. Verification in a direct manner is simply out of the question in that sphere. In a similar manner an astronomical prediction with regard to the annihilation of the earth or the extinction of life on it is beyond verification for no observers are envisaged in those catastrophic situations. Scientific laws cannot be as such met with in particular observation. In view of such difficulties and in view of the enormous range of human knowledge covering the past, the remote future and scientific laws the principle of verification has to be suitably weakened. The 'weak' principle of verification or verification 'in principle' has to be applied. We should be satisfied if observable

deductions can be made from the assumption of the truth of the propositions in question and these deduced consequences are found to obtain in the observed world. This is the element of deduction forming part of scientific induction fully recognised in inductive logic. Where does this weakening lead to? We have to pause and consider the nature of this deduction falling within the process of verification. Is the deduction of the nature of analytical propositions? If so, it serves no purpose and it is just tautologous. If it is synthetic, then it itself needs verification. The infinite regress so popular a fallacy in the hands of the recent philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle enters into the scene and wrecks the smooth passage of verification. Is it a very rigorous and a priori deduction but also synthetic? But where is the provision for such inferences in the seheme of propositions propounded? Unless the deduction is strong and well-founded, the principle of verification becomes too weak and can issue no verdicts of condemnation or approval. One is tempted to quote Passmore on the change of spirit in A. J. Ayer, "where once he blasted, he is now discreetely recommending".[4]

V

Observation enjoys a kind of sanctity in this new school of thought. Observation is just another word for sense-perception. It is not a safe sanctuary for philosophical adoration. What do we actually perceive? Do we perceive actual physical objects? Then how to account for relativity of perception, hallucinations and perceptual error? If we perceive merely sense-data, how to conceive of the relation between sense-data and objects? How to pass from the former to the latter? The greatest of the realists have left the problem in despair. G. E. Moore confesses "the truth is, I am completely puzzled as to what the true answer is".[5] Bertrand Russell comes to the conclusion in *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* that unless some a priori laws or principles are admitted empiricism cannot be rescued from solipsism. It may even be that only a theistic conception of reality such as the one presented in G. F. Stout's Gifford Lectures can meet the challenge of the problem of perception.

VI

There is another line of thought in Vedānta relevant to this discussion. Among the arguments advanced in Advaita against the reality of external world, there is one taking its stand on just this feature of 'its observability' (*dṛśyatva*), a feature which is the mark of reality for the empiricist. Perceptibility means being accessible to the senses and the mind. But these accessories of perception do not func-

tion unless there is a basic error, the error of subject-object transposition. Śaṅkara cites the preception of animals in this connection and generalises *avidyāvat viṣayānyeva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni.* The entire cognitive machinery including perception is vitiated at its source. Therefore no conception of the ultimate reality can possibly be validated in empirical thought. A naive reliance on perceptual knowledge does not appear to be an advance in philosophy.

VII

Anthony Flew puts himself in sharp terms and gloats over the parable of the invisible gardner invented by Prof. Wisdom. He concludes his destructive essay with a precise question. "What should occur in order to constitute a sufficient refutation of the assertion of God's existence?". The precise question merits a precise answer. "If anything occurs which could be consistently rendered intelligible without the hypothesis of a transcendent ground and if that hypothesis itself is self-contradictory and introduces discords and contradictions in the fabric of our understanding, then the hypothesis stands falsified and effectively refuted. If such is not the case, if the explanation of every finite fact necessitates the affirmation of a transcendent principle and if that affirmation is self-consistent and introduces order and integration into the world of our experience as a whole, — which would otherwise be chaotic and contradictory — then it stands validated". This is the principle of *samanvaya* in which the Vedāntic concept of God is founded.

VIII

Ayer concedes the possibility of the phenomenon of mystic experience and assents to regarding it as the possible source of theological propositions. But he argues that those propositions in order to get validated have to pass through the test of observational verification. But the verification-test if properly 'weakened', as it ought to be, becomes the coherence-criterion. The mystic can support his noetic claim by the integrative power of his vision. "This or nothing," may, after all, be fundamental criterion. Ayer objects to drawing the inference the God exists on the basis of cosmic order. If God's existence means the same thing as the order in question the inference proves nothing new but if it aims at the proclamation of a Transcendent Being as the ground of the order, it is synthetic and demands empirical verification. Even here 'weak' verification has to be permitted and that amounts to the ceherence-criterion in the last analysis. It has also to be recognised that perceptual experience, when called in question, as is

done in 'yat drsyam tat mithya' has to be vindicated by the application of the principle of coherence. Why the verificationists ignore the fact that they are just repeating in other words the old correspondence-criterion and that that criterion under systematic scrutiny turns out to be a specific form of coherence, is one of the wonders of contemporary discussion.

IX

It is time that this criticism is concluded. The theistic standpoint has been attacked from times immemorial. The *Gītā* distinctly refers to those who hold the world to be *anīśvaram*. Śaṅkara while examining materialism in his *Sūtra Bhāṣya* remarks that it collapses on even the inquiry into it for purposes of clear formulation.[6] It seems to be a true prophecy with regard to the philosophical fate of Logical Positivism. The movement cannot justify its stand on mathematical propositions. It has to withdraw in haste its notion of strong verification. It cannot prove its classification of propositions to be an exhaustive disjunction. It cannot accommodate the principle of verification itself or the much more fundamental law of contradiction. Its treatment of verification 'in principle' or the 'weak' version of verification, it has to employ the discrded a priori synthetic propositions. It has to overlook the diversity of frames of reference in the process of verification. It has no solution to the perenial problem of perception as to whether it is direct or representative. It has no answer to the Advaitic critiqe of empirical thought. In the course of its full formulation it dies the death of a thousand amputations. It is a remarkable irony of fate that Anthony Flew should have invented the phrase that describes most accurately the destiny of the philosophical movement of which he is so heroic a champion. His memorable words are "death by a thousand qualifications."[7]

1. *saukṣmyāt anupalabdhiḥ na abhavat*, 8.
2. *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*-3-84.
3. *Bṛhad-Bhāṣya*, 2-1-20.
4. Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 392.
5. *Philosophical Studies* — Quoted in Passmore, p. 214.
6. *saṁśaya mātreṇa parapakṣaḥ pratisidhyate, Sūtra Bhāṣya*, 3-3-54.
7. *Theology and Falsification*, quoted in John Hick's book *The Existence of God*, p. 226.

P. Nagaraja Rao

THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN ŚRĪ MADHVA'S VEDĀNTA

The system that emerges from the works of Srī Madhva is a unique form of theistic Vedānta based on a special trail of scriptural interpretations, fulfilling sound canons of logic. He blazes forth a resplendent pure form of Vedānta theism. Lord Nārāyaṇa is the soul and centre of the entire system, and round him all other categories rally. Madhva has furnished a distinction in the nature of philosophical categories. To him there are two categories in all, the Independent Real and the dependent reals. The only Independent Real is Lord Nārāyaṇa and all else including his consort i.e., Lakṣmī belong to the class of dependent reals. For a thing to be real, it is enough if it has existed in some space at some time. All the things in the world owe their existence, their knowledge and their activities to the Lord.

The very existence of "substance, merit, time and the nature of things and souls, are willed by him and they can be ordered out of evistence by his will" says the *Bhāgavata*. Madhva's God is both *transcendent* and *immanent*. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the worlds. He is the bestower of knowledge, bondage and release. Theism is not Deism nor is it Pantheism. God does not create the world and leave it to work itself out as a mechanic does his machine. He is continually working in all objects as the indwelling presence. The taste of the water, the glow of the fire and the radiance of the Sun are His workings. Madhva does not believe in Naturalism, for him Nature can work only when helped by the Lord. Further, the Lord is not the material cause of the world. The Lord *minus* the world is not *zero* but God. God is not exhausted in the universe. God to Śrī Madhva is the active efficient cause of the world.

Lord Nārāyaṇa is the home of infinite attributes and is the only Independent Real without a peer. When we say that he creates the

world, we should not imply that he is dependent on the instruments for creation, or that he has any benefiit accruing to him, from creating the world. All the instruments he makes use of in creation are in his control and he is not dependent on them. He can do, undo and change things as He likes. Whatever power any deity has in him does not independently belong to him, but is given to him by Nārāyaṇa. Lord Nārāyaṇa is to be worshipped as the supreme of all in the context of His retinue (*parivāra*) in a manner commensurate with their status in the His divine hierarchy (*tāratamya*).

The world, the Lord creates, is real. He takes hold of *prakṛti* and creates bodies for souls according to their intrinsic nature (*yogyatā tāratamya*). He creates not for any specific selfish end. It is his sport (*līlā*). The individual souls are all not of one kind. They differ in their fundameutal intrinsic nature. It is this nature that is determining and responsible for the contrasts and inequality in the lives of men. God is not responsible for them. *Karma* which is beginningless in the soul, and the nature of the soul are responsible for the inequalities in this life. According to Śrī Madhva, there is difference in the very intrinsic nature of the souls (*jīva yog yatā tāratamya*). When we say that Lord Nārāyaṇa creates the world, we have to understand creation, in a specific sense in the philosophy of Madhva. He postulates that souls are eternal, and *prakṛti* is uncreated, and that we know that Lord's creation needs these categories. With all these co-operative elements, one has to reconcile Madhva's contention that the Lord is the creator of all things (*sarva kartā*).

Madhva defines creation as the production of change in the state of an entity dependent on God. The souls are no doubt eternal, but their acquisition of bodies at birth is dependent on God's will. *Prakṛti* is eternal and its transformation into different forms (*pariṇāma*) are dependent on the will of God. This doctrine is called *pradhana viśeṣāpti*. Such an explanation seeks to reconcile the Lord's omnipotence (*sarva kartṛtva*), and the existence of the souls and *prakṛti* as eternal entities.

Śrī Madhva has a theory relating to the meaning of words. According to his views, all the words in the language and non-sensical sounds too have their primary significance and reference to Lord Nārāyaṇa. Primarily all the words refer to Him and their reference to other things are secondary. From the point of 'primary significance' (*paramamukhya-vṛtti*) words refer to Lord Nārāyaṇa and this He expounds in his commentaries on the *Aiteraya Upaniṣad*, and on the first three chapters on the *Ṛg Veda*. To Madhva, God is all in his philosophy. Everything and every soul owes its existence, knowledge and

activity to Him (*sattā*, *pramiti* and *pravṛtti*). He sustains and inspires all our mental activities (*sarva mano vṛtti preraka*).

What little freedom the human being enjoys is given by His resolve (*saṁkalpa*). He determines that particular good deeds and dispositions must reap the appropriate results (*phala*). This is determined by the *karma* and the nature of the soul (*jīva svarūpa*). God in Madhva's philosophy does not bestow the prizes of life in whimsical or arbitrary way. The greatest gift the Lord bestows on man is *mokṣa* i.e., liberation. It is a state of existence from which there is no return to the cycle of births and deaths (*saṁsāra*), and it is a state in which man lives with no tension or strife, in perfect bliss. This is attained by the grace of the Lord alone and not by any other means. He writes: "*Nārāyaṇa prasādam rite na mokṣaḥ, nā ca jñānam vinā athyartha prasādaḥ ataḥ brahma jijñāsa kartavya*".

The relation between the soul and the Lord is stated in terms of the analogy of a reflection and its prototype (*bimba pratibimba*). The Lord is the prototype, and the soul is the reflection. Man is made in the image of God. This relationship has to be understood with care, consistent with Madhav's realism and pluralism. It means (1) the reflection does not possess all the excellences of the prototype. The suggested similarity is just nominal and does not imply absolute parity. The significance of the analogy is the relation of dependence of the reflection on the prototype and not its identity.

According to Śrī Madhva, all the souls are not alike in their intrinsic nature. The nature of the soul is a fixity and it is unalterable. The destiny of the soul is determined by its *svarūpa*. In all, there are three kinds of souls (1) *mukti yogyas* (those destined to attain *mokṣa*, (2) those that eternally dangle between death and birth called *nitya samsārins*, and (3) the last class called *tamoyogya* are destined to eternal hell. There is no hope for them. No soul can outstrip and change its nature (*svarūpa*).

The souls, the physical world and Lord Nārāyaṇa are all distinct realities. They are absolutely and eternally different from one another. Difference is fundamental and foundational to reality according to Śrī Madhva. There is the celebrated scheme of fivefold differences adumbrated by Śrī Madhva (*pañca bheda*). They are the differences between the Lord and the souls, Lord and the world, soul and souls, soul and the world and between the worlds. Every entity is distinct from another. He does not admit any class (*jāti*) or generality (*sāmānya*) among the objects of the world.

The physical world for Śrī Madhva is the creation of the Lord. He is its efficient cause and not the material cause. The world is absolutely real and not illusory. The real for Śrī Madhva does not mean that it must eternally exist. The real is that which is not superimposed. The Lord is the only independent Real and the rest are all dependent reals. The world of pots and pan is not the transformation or work of Nature alone. The Lord is the creator. Śrī Madhva in his highly moving devotional hymn raises the questions "If the world is not the creation of the Lord, who then created it?" If it is argued that men created it, Madhva says: "If that is the truth, men should have created themselves as creatures of complete and eternal happiness (*nitya sukham*). Experience falsifies this, hence the Lord is the creator". To Madhva, many of the Sāṅkhya categories are acceptable. He looks upon the physical universe as the place for man to work out his destiny. It is the *karma phūmi* for the evolution of the soul. Hence, great significance is attached to life on earth and the way it is lived. Śrī Madhva throughout his writings has argued against *nirguṇa vāda* and *karma sanyāsa vāda*, the attributelessness of the Lord and the giving up of all activities. To Madhva, the world is real and is the creation of the Lord. The doctrine that the world is neither real nor unreal is unacceptable to him. He does not admit any middle ground between the real and the unreal. Further, he holds that to describe the world as illusory goes against the glory of the Lord, for, if the world is illusory its creator will be no better than a juggler and will not be the omnipotent Lord.

The highest human aspiration is *mokṣa*. This state of bliss implies release from *samsāra*. *Samsāra* is our present state of bondage and existence here and now. Bondage is the result of our ignorance that we are autonomous independent agents of our activities and that our activities and that our body is our soul. Ignorance makes us act foolishly and forget the Lord. In the state of bondage, the soul has two veils covering its true nature (*svarūpa*) i.e., the veil that coverse the the nature of God (*iśvarācchādika*) and the cover that hides the very nature of the soul (*jīvācchādika*). Both must be rent asunder. This is done by the grace of the Lord (*prasāda*). Again and again Madhva states that *mokṣa* is the result of grace and not mere *jñāna*. For obtaining the grace of the Lord, human effort is necessary but not enough. The process by which man seeks to obtain *mokṣa* is called by the compendious term *sādhana*. It is the organised effort of man using and utilising all his resources in the proper order, with a correct perspective of the relative values and their ntegration. The different factors of *sādhana* are (1) Lord's grace: (2) Guru's grace: and (3) human effort. Human effort expresses itself in three ways: *karma*, *bhakti*, and *jñāna*. Madhva values ceremonial purity as the

essential pre-requisite for practising *bhakti*. First of all the aspirant has to learn the meaning of the scriptures from a competent preceptor. Going to Guru is not an act of formality but is a necessity. What is learnt from a Guru alone is called *śravaṇa*. While learning the scriptures, one has to bring devotion and faith to his study and must do it in a spirit of adoration to the Lord. What is learnt through the Guru has to be reflected on to arrive at a conviction (*manana*). Once the aspirant is convinced of the truths, he has to meditate on it continuously till he has the immediate vision of the Lord (*aparokṣa jñāna*). This is described as *nididhyāsana* by the Upaniṣads. For achieving all these states, *bhakti* is esssential. *Bhakti* comes into play at all stages. There are degrees in the efficacy of the *bhakti*. *Bhakti* is necessary for the practice of ethical virtues like self-control, equanimity, withdrawing of the senses from objects eg., *śama, dama* etc. *Bhakti* causes many things and is the consequence of many things in spiritual life.

Sri Madhva defines *bhakti*, "as the deep love for the Lord born out of the knowledge of His majesty that transcends all, and it is the means for *mokṣa* and not any other". This definition is elabarated by Jayatirtha in the Nyaya Sudha — "Bhakti is the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to God impregnable by any amount of impediments and transcending the love of one's own souls over kith and kin and the cherished belongings fortified by a firm conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God as the abode of all perfections, free from all blemish." Intense meditation results in the vision of the Lord (*aparokṣa*). Once the Lord is seen, the aspirant's growth in *bhakti* grows more and more. It becomes *parama bhakti*. *Mokṣa* comes into operation with the grace of the Lord. The grace is his gift. On our part, we have to practise *bhakti* and wait for the grace of the Lord. *Mokṣa* is not the extinction of the soul. It is the realisation of the true nature of the soul (*svasvarūpa*). Even after *mokṣa*, the released soul remains as the servant of the Lord. The servant-master relationship is eternal as is the difference between them. The differences between souls in the enjoyment of bliss is there, though there is no sorrow for them.

M. Arunachalam

THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

Worship of one God was there in this land several millenia ago, and in the course of the years, it came to be termed Śiva Worship, early in the Christian era. The Philosophy of this cult came to be known as the Śiddhānta System, by about the third century A. D.

This system is a clear and specific exposition of the higher truths realised by enlightened souls and gifted seers in the most ancient past in this country. The Śaiva in the Tamil land finds the Śaiva thought, its technical terms and also the way of life which is the fruit of that system of thought, expressed in the Upaniṣads, and also in its cognate literature the Śaivāgamas, both of them in the Sanskrit language. The sources of Śaiva philosophy are not only the Āgamas, but also the devotional hymns sung by inspired saints in the Tamil language, during the 3rd to the 12th centuries, and the systematic philosophyical treatises written by the Śaiva teachers between the 12th and the 14th centuries. The Śaivas call their philosophy the Śaiva Siddhānta; this term finds mention in the most early writing of Tirumūlar; the ācāryas say it is also the essence of the Vedānta. This system is not only a religious way of life based on the best traditions of the land, but is also the choicest product of the higher logical thinking, reflecting the spiritual aspirations and thought currents of enlightened seers who have left brilliant records of their life divine. The philosophical literature of this system is a happy blend of both the Tamil and the Sanskrit languages.

Many schools and many cults of Śaivism are mentioned by writers in Sanskrit and in Tamil, but only the Śaiva Siddhānta school has been followed in the Tamilnad during the last two thousand years; the other schools of Śaivism had not existed here nor had they inflluenced the life or thought of the people.

The Śaiva Siddhānta system recognises as ultimate three realities, or categories, God the Supreme, the Soul, and the bonds which fetter the soul. God is the supreme reality, independent, blissful, immutable and perfect. His attributes are the traditional eight — self-existence, purity, absolute intelligence, omniscience, independence, boundless grace, omnipotence and infinite bliss. His power of cognition is not objective and so the fettering bonds cannot soil or attract His conscious force; as heat pervades a piece of wood, He pervades everything; both the sentient beings and the non-sentient things.

Of the three categories God, soul and the world, God will not be subject to the experience of the world. The world being insentient, cannot know or experience God. It is only the soul that can have cognition of both the world and God. Since the soul is enmeshed by the pre-cosmic and pre-existent spiritual darkness, God, as an act of grace, undertakes the function of creation in order to free the soul from the clutches of the spiritual impurity and enable it to realise its true nature and lean on God the blissful. While God's conscious force is eternally pure and cannot be soiled, the soul's power of cognition is such as to identify itself with the thing cognised. So the soul in its state of bondage cognises the world with the aid of worldly organs and identifies itself with the world. The identification is a clinging to the bond itself and hence the soul has the experience of the world which is pleasure, pain or stupor.

The bonds in the Siddhānta are classified as three. They are *āṇava* or the spiritual darkness, that enshrouds the potentiality of the soul, *māyā* i. e., the world and its causes, and *karma* or the tendency on the part of the soul to act when moved by God, under the influence of the spiritual darkness and of the world and its causes. The world constitutes the four heads of enjoyment for the soul such as the body, the organs internal and external, the environment and the wordly things for enjoyment. The ultimate substantial or material cause of these four effective states, which is conceived to be an everlasting, all pervading, invisible force or potential, is called *māyā*, which is insentient but real, requiring to be acted on or energised by an intelligent being.

Though all the three are equally ultimate and eternal, God includes the other two under his vast infinite consciousness-force and dominates and controls them.

The Siddhānta is positive that God is the one, indicated severally as He or She or It. He is neither with form nor formless. It recognises that all *rūpa* and *arūpa* are only forms of matter which is

objective to our senses. God can never be objective to us and cannot possess any material form or body. The nature of matter is to limit, and God is the illimitable and can never be found by any material forms. Matter exists in a formless condition also, such as air, and so the term *arūpa* cannot also be applied to Him. He is often called the *nirguṇa*. This only means that He has none of the guṇas of *māyā* (*sattva, rajas* and *tamas*). This again means only that He is beyond the reach of the senses and the mind. He cannot be comprehended by the limited tools of man, but out of His own grace He manifests himself to liberated souls. In this sense, as He cannot have a form out of matter, the Siddhānta says that the Supreme has no *avatāra* because the form of the *avatāra* is comprised of matter which is an evolute of *māyā* and has a beginning and an end i. e., birth and death, while God has no birth and no death in Śaivism.

For the purpose of comprehension, the entire universe is said to be His form and He is in everything, as *viśvantaryāmi*. But He is to be seen, heard and contemplated and enjoyed in the soul. He penetrates into a recess of the soul. Conventionally He is said to manifest himself in the eight forms as the earth, water, fire, air, sky the sun and the moon and the soul.

Fivefold functions are attributed to Śiva, namely, creation sustenance, dissolution, obscuration and grace. These are sometimes said to be a sport of Śiva. By sport is not meant amusement. The word 'sport' (*leela*) is merely intended to indicate the ease with which the functions are performed. The form of God is all love and all these functions are wholly acts of kindness towards the soul. The soul is enveloped in pre-cosmic darkness. It has to be helped to shed this darkness, perceive light and ultimately to attain its goal of inseparable oneness with God who is all light, love and truth. In order to bring this about, God creates the world and its objects and sustains them for the sake of the soul. He gives the soul its body and the objects for experience. According to its own *karma* the soul takes bodies aud goes through various births and deaths. In the course of this experience, when the time is ripe, grace descends upon the soul, when its spiritual darkness ceases to enshroud its intelligence, when all its *karma* has been reduced to nought through experiencing. In the course of its births and deaths, it is not always that the soul drops its darkness easily. A period of enforced rest also becomes necessary. This is dissolution, where the bodies disappear but the souls exist, the karmas and the darkness all exist in a subtle form. Creation bestows bodies and converts the subtle *karma* and darkness into gross shapes.

Why did God create the whole Universe out of *māyā*? He is always pure bliss and He has no attachment or antipathy, is always impartial.

But the world said to be created by him is full of happiness to some and so full of sorrow and misery to others. This naturally gives rise to the charge of variability and cruelty. Universal destruction also could mean only simple cruelty.

The answer to this charge is that the creation and destruction of the world is in accordance with the diversity of human action and its result. Even before the creation the soul existed ; both God and the souls existed eternally. The souls have no beginning in time and so their deeds are also beginningless. Thus the cycle of births and deaths in the world in different bodies goes on within the stream of the beginningless *karma*. God in His omniscience directly knows the souls and their deeds. So He arrays suitable bodies and environments for their enjoyment or suffering. Hence differences in creation is due to the diversity of the soul's deeds. The time of destruction comes when He finds that the souls have become tired and fatigued by the cycle of births and deaths and require some rest as it were. This destruction or dissolution does not indicate therefore any cruelty on the part of God, but only a kind of rest in the soul's onward march.

The Siddhānta upholds the principle of *sat-kārya-vāda* i.e., that whatever *is* will even be and whatever *is not* can never be. (In other words some thing cannot come out of nothing and some thing cannot disappear into nothing). All matter and all souls in their unmaifested potential exist involved, having for their mainstay the Supreme Will. The will power of God makes them evolve and enables them to take the manifest forms which we cognise. Creation is thus not out of void but only out of the unmanifest into the manifested condition.

Creation as well as dissolution may thus seem to have a great purpose, both out of grace.

Obscuration is also an aspect of God's grace. In order to gain liberation from the spiritual darkness, *karma* has to be reduced to nought. So long as *karma* lingers, darkness cannot be dispelled. Hence to enable the soul to go through the working of *karma*, partial obscuration of its own limited intelligence becomes necessary.

Experience means both pleasure and pain, and no one would voluntarily seek pain. Experience of pain is the result of *karma*. On that account God who links such a *karma* to the soul cannot be considered to be a cruel dispenser. In this case He acts like a parent who gives also harsh treatment to the child. God in his infinite mercy is never cruel or harsh. But the individual soul invites upon himself the fruits of his own action.

Emancipation from the bonds will not result without neutralising *karma*. God is in Himself the Just, the eternal Law. Hence, when action results in *karma*, the doer has to reap the fruits of his own action; no one can get round this position.

Hence enjoyment and suffering become part of experience. Oneness with God, that is evolution of the soul from the condition of impefect intelligence to a state of perfect bliss and perfect intelligence, is through the process of the experiencing of *karma*. God directs *karma* with a view to help the soul forward on its march. *Śakti* or consciousnes-force of God is the instrumental cause. God is *Nirguṇa* and immutable. His form is truth, intelligence and bliss. But He helps the suffering souls through His *Cit-Śakti* or consciousness-force; this *Śakti* is in no way different from Him; but for the purpose of understanding, it is mentioned separately as His own *Śakti*. The concept of *Śakti* is a central doctrine in Śaiva Siddhānta. *Śakti* is the energy or consciousness-force of Śiva. Śiva is the efficient cause while *Śakti* is the instrumental cause. Śiva enters into all of his functions only through His *Śakti*; He pervades all things only through *Śakti*. *Sakti* is one but its functions are varied.

The problem of the freedom of will for man remains. If God is responsible for making him act in a pre-ordained nanner according to his *karma*, man is no longer a free agent in his actions and liberation from *karma* does not appear to be in sight. If God had really made us act and enjoy or suffer in a particular manner, then we are not responsible for our actions and God can certainly be said to be partial. But this is not really so. God makes us act in a particular way only with the purpose of lifting us up. Our bondage consists of the veil which enshrouds our knowledge and action. God in his infinite mercy makes us act in the particular way in order to purify us. The removal of our impurities or bonds, may be even through suffering, is like the painful opening of a wound in the body in order to heal it. Even so, the attitude of the sufferer towards the particular action, his manner of doing it and his attitude towards the furits thereof determine the effect of the *karma*. To this extent he is a free agent and the accrual of the future *karma* depends only on himself.

Again, the conception of a God who bestows grace on man and protects him is sometimes objected to on the plane of the development of the human personality. The individual may not have any urge or stimulus for development in a protected world. Man growing under the fostering care of a benevolent heavenly father has no self-reliance and self-confidence; he cannot meet the challenges of the changing times with courage and self-assertion. But this is not really so. The

verdict of history has been otherwise. Faith in God just teaches him to go on striving, without being cowed down by failures. Equanimity in the face of any adversity is the lesson taught by faith in God and there is no better lesson for the development of personality and for successful achievement.

Finally, there is the ultimate question — What is philosophy for? It must have a purpose. It must have the noble purpose of uplifting the soul and making it act with God. The mere super-man does not satisfy the yearning of the spirit. The void in the spirit is in evidence in all materially advanced nations. Man must have spiritual evolution leading him on to final liberation from all attachment and to the attainment af absolute inward peace, which is the forerunner of spiritual joy. His conception of God should therefore be helpful to such an evolution for himself. Later philosophical systems in Hinduism have had this conception of God and they have all benefited by the concept. Śaiva Siddhānta also has had this concept and has thus shown the pathway to the attainment of the goal of spiritual advancement and ultimate oneness with Him.

V. A. Devasenapathi

THE CONCEPT OF GOD

A concept or an idea, in general parlance, is something which the mind entertains, something which may not have objective reference or reality. Is the concept of God also a similar one — with this difference that from the dawn of reflective thinking, some have taken it as referring to the one and only Supremely Real on which everything else depends for its existence — whether these be souls or material objects while some others have as confidently maintained on different grounds that it lacks reality? According to the former, the very idea of God as the idea of a Perfect Being necessarily implies existence, for it is not an idea like any other idea. It is the idea of a Perfect Being, and perfection, especially in respect of being, would fail to be such if it lacked existence, — a mockery, like Beauty without Reality or like a circle which is not a fully rounded-off figure. In one way or another, the nerve of this ontological argument is behind all affirmations of the Reality which is the content of the concept of God, whether these affirmations are based on arguments or experience. Expressions like *kuṟaivilāniṟaive* (perfection which has no deficiency) — suggest a perfection that is ultimately not merely conceptual but is veritably Real.

As for the denial of content in respect of the concept, we have various types of reaction such as — (1) the forthright and perfunctory dismissal that the idea of God was invented by a knave to dupe a fool, (2) unconscious projection of the father image, (3) the existence of the noun 'God' fosters the illusion that there is a real or a possible entity corresponding to it. God is not a genuine name or noun. 'The theist, like moralist, may believe that his experiences are cognitive experiences, but unless he can formulate his knowledge in propositions that are empirically verifiable, we may be sure that he is deceiving himself' (Ayer). Instead of verifiability, falsifiability may be suggested, 'What

would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute (for you) a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of God ' (Anthony Flew).

God may be an illusion of some sort. But as MacMurray reminds us an illussory experience must arise from such facts as are not illusory. To hold that religion is illusory is not to maintain that the data from which religion arises do not exist, but merely that religion distorts and misrepresents the data from which it starts. Thus when religion is said to be a product of fear it is implied that the field of religion is the field of terrifying facts in human experience. Or, if the idea of God is said to be an unconscious projection of the father, the field of religion is defined in terms of the experience we have as children in relation to our parents. Thus there is response with reference to some stimulus in our experience. To omit the stimulus is to give a partial account of the event. MacMurray says that to a man who had knowledge of religion, prayer would appear simply as a man talking to somebody who was not there.

I shall give some gleanings mainly Tamil sources regarding the ' concept of God. There is a verse in the *Tiruvāimoḷi* which can be paraphased as follows :

If the Lord is said to exist, He is existent —
all these objects are His form.
If He is said not to exist, He is non-existent —
all objects without form are His non-forms.
As He has the attributes of existence and non-existence,
He is of this double nature and is all pervasive.[1]

We are reminded of similar utterances :

You exist for those who realise your existence
You do not for those who contemptuously deny
your existence.[2]

It is paradoxical that while the believers find God even in denial, the uncommitted question His existence even in affirmation. It may be noted that to the genuine believer, God is not a concept in the sense of an abstraciion. God is a living presence. Awareness of this presence is possible only when God Himself is pleased to reveal it. Arguments at best are ancillary. They cannot create faith. The Śaiva Siddhāntin gives arguments for the existence of God. In fact, so far as the formal inference part of it is concerned, Śivāgra yogin, a commentator on the Śivajñāna Siddhiyār, states the main arguments as a five-member syllogism, and explains it in detail to show that it is free from defects which a valid syllogism should not have and that it has

all the essential characteristics of a valid syllogism. But it may be noted that Saint Kaṇṇappar was not argued into acceptance of the existence of God. He felt God's presence. The Siddhāntin makes it clear that only through grace one can understand the force of the arguments. The Lord is beyond the scriptures, the gods, the mind and speech. None of these will be of any avail without God's grace. The arguments are:

(1) The world, consisting of parts, and being subject to chances, is an effect. Therefore it must have a cause. This cause is the beginning and the end of all things. But it is Itself without a beginning. It is an ever free and intelligent Being.

(2) Souls engage in action. The fruits of their action have to be awarded to them. This is done by God. The doer, the deed, its fruit and the One who brings it about — these are the basic foctors in religion, as set forth in the *Periya Purāṇam.*

There is a verse of the *Tirumandiram* which is suggestive of the teleological argument:

'Do not deny the existence of the Almighty who in His justice commanded fire to remain in the middle of the sea (to prevent its overflow on the land). He is the Lord of the gods. He showers His grace day and night.'

If this is treated as an argument, immediately a counter argument can be advanced, giving cases of dysteleology, lack of adaptation and so on. Instead of treating it as an argument there is a suggestion in a parallel case that it may be treated as a sacrament.

"When psalmist or prophet calls Israel to life their eyes to the hills or to behold how the heavens declare the glory of God or to listen to that unbroken tradition which day passes to day and night unto night, of the knowledge of the creator, it is not proof to doubting minds which he offers; it is spiritual nourishment to hungry souls. These are not arguments, they are sacraments."[8]

Kierkegaard who is against the use of arguments to prove the existence of God refers to the difficulty in the argument *from* or *to* design. According to him, "Socrates who is credited with the physico-teleological proof always presupposes God's existence and under this presupposition seeks to interpenetrate nature with the idea of purpose. Had

Socrates been asked why he pursued this method, he would doubtless have explained that he lacked the courage to venture out upon so perilous a voyage without having made sure of God's existence behind him. At the word of God he casts his net as if to catch the idea of purpose, for nature herself finds many means of frightening the inquirer and distracts him by many a digression."[4]

As for the argument based on morality or the requirements of *karma*, the objection may well be that morality is enough — God is a needless addition.

Reason is not given up altogether when faith seeks understanding. Reason has a role to play. As for arguments and counter-arguments, I should like to invite your attention to a Note in Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's *The Śivādvaita of Śrikaṇṭha.* Śrīkaṇṭha maintains that God's creatorship cannot be a matter of inference because we may infer at best only creators like those we know, e.g., potters etc., who are subject to ignorance and *karma.* Professor Sastri has drawn attention to a commentary on an early *Āgamic* work, the *Mokṣa kārikā* of Sadyojyoti Śivācārya, where the objections are met. In reply to the objection that potters etc., are subject to ignorance and *karma*, the reply is that the potter is no doubt ignorant in many ways but not in respect of the making of the pot; the universal creator we infer cannot similarly be ignorant either of the universe or of the mode of its creation. And since the universe is all that is, the God we infer cannot be ignorant of anything.

As I understand it, the modern test of falsifiability in respect of religion seems to be in effect a reformulation of the old problem of evil. To recall Anthony Flew's test of falsifiability: 'What would have to occur or to have occured to constitute (for you) a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of God?' The overwhelming impression I get from Theism in general and Theism as seen in the works of the *Nāyanmārs* and the *Aḻvārs* is, no matter what happens in the world God exists and — He loves us. There is a divine purpose running through it all — Divine 'Destiny shaping our ends rough hew them how we will'. What is more, their approach is to understand everything in relation to God and not God in relation to everything. What though the Heavens fall? Let them fall! It is also noteworthy that the devotees do not offer their love to God on a reciprocal basis — only if you love me, I shall love you. There is no bargaining or barter. They are assured of God's existence. They seek nothing more and nothing less than unceasing awareness of His existence. They do not derive God's existence from anything — rather they derive the existence of everything from Him. I invite your attention to Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's review of a *Vīraśaivite* work. After making a few

critical comments, Professor Sastri goes on to pay a tribute to Basava, the Vīraśaivite teacher in the following words : 'Theoretical defects notwithstanding, one cannot fail to be impressed by the magnificence of a personality which could proclaim : "Destroy my possession and property, tear my own children to pieces, outrage my wife in my very presence; attack me personally, smash me to pieces, flay me alive, cut off my limbs piecemeal, drag me brutally this way and that: I would never fail in my service to my Lord. Should I ever swerve a hair's breadth from my vow, let my life be forfeit, Oh Lord Kudala Sangama."' Passages like these can be cited from other religious works also. It is possible to treat them as cheap religious rhetoric. But that one such passage has impressed an exacting metaphysician like Professor Sastri is worth noting.

Leaving the arguments and counter arguments aside, I should like to invite your attention to a few features in the concept of God as found in Tamil works. For all His self-sufficiency, God cares intensely for souls. He is in distress so long as souls are in bodage. This is brought out in Rāmānuja's interpretation of the words *tuyaraṛu cuḍaraḍi* occurring in the first decad of the *Tiruvāimoḻi*. Commentators used to explain these words as 'Radiant Feet of the Lord that rid souls of sorrow'. Rāmānuja brought out the solicitude of the Lord for the souls in distress by interpreting the words as 'Radiant Feet that are rid of sorrow'. In other words, so long as souls are deluded the Lord is in sorrow. When their delusion is removed, the Lord is rid of grief. Perhaps the same idea is conveyed in the words of the *Tiruvācagam*. 'Oh you who have not and yet have joys and sorrows.'[5] Obviously the Lord's sorrow is occasioned by the plight of the souls.

The Lord looks for no return from the souls for bestowing grace on them. Even their total surrender is no return for they are His own all along. Hence there is in their awareness of Him, a constant under-current of their gratitude to Him. But for His mercy what would be their plight? 'There but for the grace of God, go I.' Expression of gratitude is spontaneous. But Meykaṇḍār utters a warning. 'To forget again the Lord who made the soul realise its nature as like unto His own and revealed Himself to it, is a lapse.' The well-known commentator, Śivajñāna Munivar, explains this statement by saying that if the soul had forgotten the Lord earlier, there was an excuse for it. It was in the grip of *āṇava*. Its vision was obscured by egoism. To forget the Lord after he has removed the obscuration is a lapse for which there can be no expiation. He quotes the *Tirukkuṟaḷ* : 'There is expiation for every lapse except that of ingratitude for which verily there is no expiation'.

Briefly, all too briefly, I invite your attention to the concept of Śiva as the beautiful One. Śiva is sometimes identified with Rudra, the terrible. One has only to go through the *Tevāram*, *Tiruvācakam* etc., to see how Śiva also is associated with Beauty.

The concept of God we come across in the sacred works is such that instead of our feeling that His infinitude is compromised by the existence of the souls and the world, we feel that the existence of cosmic immensities and countless souls is a tribute to His glory.

That God is like a fond parent fostering the souls is orthodox theism, as seen in phrases like *ennai valarppavane*. But could we think of God also as growing so as to be an ever-shifting horizon to the souls to be perpetually on the move? I like to think that the phrase *nimirntān* and *vaḷarntān* (roughly 'grew tall' and 'grew') occurring in Sambandhar's *Tevāram*[6] may also be understood as supporting such a view.

> 'As a mother bird each fond endearment tries
> to tempt its newfledged offspring to the skies'

God tries each endearment to make us realise that even the sky is no limit to our growth in perfection — that even perfection is dynamic.

1. *uḷaṉ eṉil uḷaṉ avaṉ uruvam ivvuruvukaḷ*
   uḷaṉ alaṉ enil avaṉ aruvam ivvaruvukaḷ
   uḷaṉ eṉa ilaṉ eṉa ivai guṇamuḍaimaiyil
   uḷaṉiru takaimaiyoḍoḷivilaṉ parante
2. *uḷaṉ eṉa uṇarntārkku uḷaiyum āyiṉai ilaṉ eṉa ikalntārkku illaiyum āyiṉai*
3. Sir George Adam Smith, quoted in Baillie's *Our Knowledge of God* (Oxford University Press), p. 121.
4. Extracted in John Hick's *The Existence of God* (Problems of Philosophy Series), p. 214.
5. *iṉbamum tuṉbamum illāne uḷḷāṉe*
6. *nīṇutal ceitoḻiyannimirntāṉ enadu uḷḷaṅkavar kaḷvaṉ* and *vācilīra aḍiyārkku aruḷceidu vaḷarndāṉ validāyam*

Ignatius Hirudayam

THE CONCEPT OF GOD IN ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA AND IN MODERN CATHOLIC THOUGHT

The first question the title of this paper suggests is: "Can there be a concept of God? Is it not a contradiction in terms?" Aristotle understood by concept a representation formed by the mind within itself, in which it simply apprehends the nature of something without affirming or denying anything of it. To this idea of representation, Aquinas added the notion of intentionality because, through its concept the intellect 'tends' to the thing. The comprehension of a concept is the sum of intelligible aspects or notes that constitute the objective concept itself, while the extension of a concept is its breadth in relation to the individuals in which it is realised and which it groups into a unity. God, however, is incomprehensible by any mind except His own. He is indefinable, ineffable.[1] Yet God is known and therefore can be known. How?[1a]

Mystical Intuition

Texts which can be piled from Christian, Śaivite and Vaiṣṇavite literature give witness to a kind of knowledge of God, but at the same time they affirm that this knowledge ean never be attained by even the most profound searchings of the human intellect.

Mystical Theology speaks of this intuition as infused contemplation, a supernatural experience received in the darkness of faith, a cloud of unknowing knowledge in the "fine-point of the soul". If we have to have this experience, God must take the initiative and implant in us a "divine eye" as He did in Arjuna (*Bhagavad-gīta*, ch. XI). For the Upaniṣads had already declared that He is "obtained only by the one whom He chooses. To such a one the Ātman reveals His own Person".[2]

All the mystics agree that even after the experience has been had, it still remains ineffable. But they are all driven to give some witness to it by some utterance or other.

Metaphysical Approach

The mystic is a witness to an experience which the metaphysician is not able to verify to his own satisfaction according to his own canons of verifiability. And yet the very existence of the mystical witness — and this has been from the very beginning of human history — creates a philosophical problem for the metaphysician. The metaphysician's own approach has been both objective and subjective, the subjective sometimes bordering on the mystical.

Subjective Approach

The author of the *S'ivajñāna Bōtham* in his introductory apology, *avaiyadakkam*, has recourse to the subjective or existential approach to ensure his own security : "Those who have a true experience of themselves, and this true experience of themselves includes an experience of the Lord to whom they belong, will not despise us."[8] Those who truly experience themselves, experience that they are sadasat, being-with-nothingness, or contingent beings. Now beings-with-nothingness postulate for their existence the existence of a Being-without-nothingness, i.e. pure Sat, or Absolute Being. This is not a direct, conceptual apprehension of God in the mind. It is the grasp of oneself as a contingent being, or *cārpi* as the commentary on *Tirumandiram* 1548 says, which leads the mind immediately by illation to the affirmation of the necessity of the Necessary Being who is the source and ground of One's own being. This is indeed a preconceptual awareness of God's creative hold on oneself. Understood in this way, the knowledge of God "implanted in man", about which John Damascene spoke and the knowledge "innate to the rational mind" about which Bonaventure spoke, are all quite valid.

Objective, Empirical Approach

From a purely philosophical position, Aquinas taught that it is through "the principles which are innate in us that we are able to perceive that God exists." And in this sense, he affirmed that "all knowing beings know God implicitly in every known object". (De Ver 22. 2ad lm). And Duns Scotus affirmed that in the knowledge of any being as this particular being, God is conceived in a most indistinct manner. Aquinas however reiterated that the existence of God is not naturally self-evident, although it is a naturally knowable truth. The existence of God needs demonstration. The Thomistic proofs start

from the empirical datum of knowledge. The middle term of the reasoning gives the meaning of the name, 'God', and the conclusion is "that is what we call God" or some similar statement. Through this reasoning, we never grasp God directly as the object of our knowledge. We only know that the conclusion effected by the mind by joining the subject and the predicate, namely, "God exists" is true (S. Th. Ia. q. iii. a. 4. ad. 2m). Existence of God in the sense of actuality is no more known than God's essence, for in Him they are identical. The middle term gave us the meaning of the name God, i.e. it gave us a concept which contained a representation, according to Aristotle, and a tendency also, according to St. Thomas Aquinas. The representation is creaturely, having been drawn from the knowledge of creatures. But the tendency is not towards a creature, but we reach out towards God and know that what we call God lies in that direction.

Śivajñāna Bōtham builds up this objective or empirical argument in the first *sūtram* as follows:

> "Since they (that are) called he, she, it, are of the
> nature of triple activity,
>
> the subsistence which (the Absolute First) produced,
> being involved, is real, through *malam*;
> the Eschaton is, therefore, the Arché, declare the sages."[4]

Sivajñāna munivar's commentary builds the argument on *satkārya-vāda* and quotes the tenth Sāṁkhya Kārika's enumeration of the properties which constitute the 'vyaktahood' of the effect, viz. *hetumat, anityam, avyapi, sakriyam, anekam, asritam, lingam, savayavam, paratantram vyaktam*; *viparitam avyaktam*. But this text is translated at least in four different terminology.[5] If we could be sure of the exact meaning of these nine terms, nine proofs could be formulated from them, for God's existence.

Mū Vinaimaiyin

But the peculiar aspect of these arguments is contained in phrases like "mūvinaimaiyin," "odungi ulatām", "antam āti". While the *Brahma Sūtra* I, i, 2 reads: "Ultimate Reality is that from which the *janmādi* of the world proceed," the first *sūtram* of *Sivajñānam Bōtham* argues as follows: "Since the world consisting of things which can be pointed out as he, she, it, are of the nature of triple activity, viz., *utpatti, stiti, vināśam*, it follows that it is *vyaktam*, involved in *avyaktam*, which is real through *malam*". I have discussed elsewhere why *mūvinaimaiyin* must be rendered as "since (it is) of the nature of triple activity."[6] *Odungi* is said to be a noun, according to the commentaries.

Therefore *odungi* is *ulatu* through *malam*. *Odungi* is *samharam, avyaktam*. The *avyaktam* is itself real, *ulatu, vyaktam*. And this through the instrumentality of *malam*. The telos, or Eschaton is indeed the Arché: *antam ādi* according to the sages. These are not entities or events separated by a *yuga* or *mahāyuga*. The Eschaton is present throughout the duration of the world as a continuous dynamism behind the Creative Evolution or "Elan Vital". This *antam* or *samhāram* or Eschaton is what Teilhard de Chardin[7] would call "The heart and Beyond of all things ... the Heart of every substance and every action." It is the Omega Point which is at the same time the eternal Alpha which is so immanent in things that it is truly transcendent. Dostoevski had made Ivan Karamazov declare: "I believe in the Word towards which the universe is striving and which Itself was with God." I would therefore suggest that Involution, *Odungi*, and Evolution, *Ulatu* are *simultaneous* and the Beginning and the End, *ādi* and *antam*, too are *simultaneous* for the understanding of this argument.

Avāy Nilai

The second line of the first *sūtram* of *Sivajñāna Bōtham* contrives a cunning grammatical ellipsis called by the Tamil grammarians *avāy nilai*. *Toṉṟutal* is an intransitive verb meaning 'to appear', 'to come into existence'. If the author had written *tōṉṟiya titiyē*, it might perhaps have signified spontaneous origination, and would be complete in meaning. But *tōṟṟiya* is a transitive, causative verb, active participle qualifying *titiyē*, but itself demanding a subject to be supplied in order to complete its meaning (here: *Iraivan tōṟṟiya titiyē*). This syntactical expectancy of the phrase *tōṟṟiya titiyē* for its subject suggests an ontological expectancy of the whole universe for the source of its existence. Till these implications are expatiated and systematised, the commentaries cannot be said to have done justice to the profound intuitions of Meikaṇḍa Devar. But this will involve also the demythologization of the Siddhānta Thought.

Demythologization and Death of God

The demythologization of Christian Thought started when Pascal, Descartes, Kant, the Modernists and others denied the conceptualistic claims of Scholasticism and challenged the probative value of the traditional proofs for God's existence. Though Aquinas had declared that through our concepts, which are creaturely, we cannot grasp God but only reach out in His direction, the Scholastics, especially after Scotus, taught that, since our concepts are abstract, they are applicable both to the creature and to the Creator in an analogical manner. The Being that is proved to exist as the conclusion of the traditional proofs

is understood first of all as self-existing, and hence, infinite (since there is nothing that puts limits to the perfections of a self-existing being), eternal (as is evident from self-existence), perfect knowledge, perfect bliss, i.e. Sat-Cit-Ānanda, in brief. This may be said to be a concept of God common to Catholic Thought as well as o Śaiva Siddhānta.

But the demythologizers argued that the word, 'God' originating probably from the pre-Christian Germanic language group was used during the centuries of the Christian era to translate a number of different terms including 'Theos' of Greek Philosophy, the 'Deus' of Western metaphysics, and the 'Yahwah' of the Hebrew Bible. It served, it is said, as a linchpin by which these three traditions were fastened together in that cultural synthesis called "Christendom". Now Christendom is going, if not gone, yielding place to a highly differentiated secular civilization. Scientific technological revolutions reaching up to Cybernetics, wars, social revolutions, etc. have established an empirical way of seeing and thinking of the world. Primitive faith, it is said, babbles through myths; adoloscent thought forages in the jungles of metaphysics; but a society come of age and in the process of secularization and liberation from religion, discards these trappings of myths and metaphysics. The proofs for the existence of God form part of an outmoded phase of human development and are no longer tenable. Harvey Cox, therefore,[8] said that God was a word that had ceased to function in our generation. If we could not find a new word we must do without it. While Nietzche's was a solitary cry of a madman: "God is dead, we have killed him," some today call themselves theologians of the "Death of God". William Hamilton explains the phrase "Death of God", as the death in us of any power to affirm any of the traditional images of God.[9] And so Thomas Altizer published the obituary notice: "God is dead *in our* time, *in our* history, and in our existence".[10] Paul van Buren teaches the "Secular Meaning of the Gospel": "Increasingly, we shall have to find other ways to express that dimension in human existence to which the word 'God' has traditionally drawn attention. It is the word, rather than the reality that is dead. Paul van Buren dissociates himself from the talk of "Death of God".

Yet, "God is a serious question," says Jacques Durandeaux[11] and immediately asks: "What does the word 'Question' mean when we use it about God?" And he continues: "The question means that we are discussing a possible presence, neither attained nor dismissed; it means both absence of a presence and the presence of an absence..." "The question is serious because it touches the very core of my being... (p. 84)". Now, every question presupposes a problematics including the classical proofs for the existence of God...

"Problematics denotes (p. 82) a cluster of historical circumstances prompting human groups to raise a given question in a given manner... This complex differs from age to age ... we are men of our times and the question we put to ourselves belong to the times we live in ... The question, "Can we demonstrate the existence of God through reason?" made sense in a classical problematics which focussed the debate on the relationship between the concept of faith and the concept of reason ... Many people today cannot help smiling when they hear the question: "Can we demonstrate the existence of God?"... On the other hand, the question would be authentic if one asked, "Can the question of God be a serious question and if it is a serious question, what are the conditions that allow it to be so?" This new question reflects the fact that we are living in a historical context which has become consciously post-Marxian and Post-Freudian; it assumes that we have accepted the validity of a series of criticisms and analyses of certain aspects of our religious practices and that our problem is one of discovering how we can conduct a religious endeavour which is valid in the philosopher's eyes. The debating parties have changed, the historical conditions have changed and the question itself is different ... To refuese a change of problematics is to betray today's humanity in the name of the attitudes belonging to yesterday's humanity ..." I have loosely restrung the sentences of Durandeaux form various places to bring out briefly the logic of his book. Gabriel Vahanian[12] in his introduction to Durandeaux's book writes: "Reduced to our images of Him, and these images being no longer serviceable, God must die. But when God is dead and an entire civilization collapses at the same time, as Jacques Durandeaux points out, what nevertheless remains is the problem of God."

Modern Catholic Thought

From the turn of this century, an attempt at a more profound understanding of Aquinas was initiated by Sertillanges and others. The primacy given by Kant to Practical Reason influenced Neo-Scholasticism to formulate the deontological argument as follows: "Man is aware of obligation. But obligation makes no sense unless one admits the existence of God. (Dostoevski made Ivan Karamazov say: If there is no God, all is lawful.) Therefore one must admit the existence of God."

Aquinas rejected Anselm's ontological proof as not strictly philosophical. It is now recognized that Anselm's is not strictly a philosophical proof, because Anselm speaks of the searcher as a mystic and a *yogin*: "Enter the inner chamber of thy mind, shut out all thoughts save that of God and such as can aid thee in seeking him; close the

door and seek him."[13] Its probative value, therefore, must be sought in its own plane. Durandeaux tries to see "a religious dimension in Descartes point of departure."[14] Hence there is a reevaluation of all the mystical and subjective approaches to the problem of God. Anselm had confesed that the purpose of his argument was to help to understand "in some degree, O my God, Thy truth which my heart believes and loves." The argument is restricted to understand "that Thou art as we believe." It is a movement from faith to reason. Aquinas' rejection of the argument turns on the question "Whether the existence of God is self-evident."[15]

Modern Synthesis

Belief, experience and metaphysical analysis are in dialogue at present. Pure empirical, Scholastic conceptualism had got itself into an impasse. Modernism and other purely subjective or existential systems were not able to propose a satisfactory alternative. Joseph Marechal S. J., by a more profound understanding of Aquinas, attempted this much needed synthesis. According to Aquinas, as we said before, our concepts are creaturely and we may not attribute them to God, but through them we do reach out towards God without actually grasping Him conceptually. Scholasticism distinguished that though we do not attribute them univocally, we may attribute them to God in a proportionally analogical manner and so we could be said to grasp God, in some way. The direction of reaching out towards God is not special but relational, for God is so immanent that He is truly transcendent. If the representational character of our concepts are creaturely and not applicable to God, and yet we do apply certain concepts to God, we do not base the validity of our knowledge of God on the concepts themselves. On what else? Marechal, starting from experience of God, finds it a response of man to the presence of God. This presence, therefore, must be a pre-conceptual wordless contact. And the basis of the validity of our knowledge is placed by Marechal in the dynamism of the human spirit towards God who is immanent and transcendent, as the Infiinite. The conceptual contents, therefore, are taken up in this dynamism of the human spirit and this conceptual content is transcended and projected towards God. Our metaphysical knowledge of God is, therefore, a projective act by means of which we reach out beyond our concept in the direction of God, thanks to the dynamic impulse which animates the concept.

The Dominican School of D. de Petter prefers to situate this non-conceptual aspect formally in real intellectual element rather than in an extra-intellectual dynamism. They speak of a non-conceptual dimension of knowledge itself and thus of an objective dynamism i.e.

an objective dynamic element in the contents themselves of our knowledge, which themselves refer to the Infinite. The concept is a "limited expression of an awareness of reality that is in itself unexpressed, implicit and pre-conceptual." "This pre-conceptual awareness of reality is in itself not open to appropriate expression. Our concepts refer to this non-conceptual awareness essentially as to something they aim to express, but to which they can give only inadequate and limited expression."[16]

Conclusion

"Is it possible to demonstrate the existence of God through reason alone?" was a question addressed by the believers to the believers in the Church. Now the question is, "Under what conditions can the question of God be raised in a serious way?" This new question reflects our historical context, consciously post-Marxian and post-Freudian. To ask the question: "Does God exist?" is really to ask, "Does my idea of a certain God correspond to something real?" or "Does the God I conceive of exist?" It goes with the question "Can I assert the existence of a being whose image I myself have created?" When man takes the initiative, his discourse on God becomes a discourse on himself. Therefore, Durandeaux concludes, "As a rule it is the mystical experience alone that justifies our question of God." If an Other is there, it is upto the Other to reveal Himself, to speak and make Himself understood. God is an irruption, an unanticipated occurrence in man's life. Philosophy looks with disfavour on the idea of experience. But the believer affirms that God is there, that he knows that He is there, even though the philosopher has deprived him of all his images, ideas and feelings of God. God alone is capable of giving us true images and ideas of himself. If God is not the product of man, He will appear as the unanticipated. And any discourse on God, if serious, will presuppose the dawn of revelation. John A. T. Robinson shocked Christendom with his "Honest to God": "The obstruction between God and man is the image of God which man fabricates and this is the reason why many serious believers feel a sympathy with atheists... If a religious endeavour is to be serious, it must be freed of its images and its ideas in so far as they are the products of man".

"Yet", says Durandeaux, "this image is a powerful aid to speculation. Civilizations are built with images and mythology has served as the matrix for all human development. The image is the source of countless errors, yet without it, nothing could have evolved. It is not, therefore, a question of foregoing images but of appreciating them for what they are. If our idea needs an image for its expression,

if our image contains an abundance of ideas why not respect both and define their exact functions, instead of merely making an iconoclastic revolt against images?

Both Śaiva Siddhānta and Catholic Thought start with the experienced ontological "avāy nilai" of man. Catholic Thought has developed it somewhat and Śaiva Siddhānta will profit by a dialogue with it. Man as he discovers himself, says a great catholic thinker today, includes a dynamism towards an absolute in being, meaning, truth and life, and this absolute is designated by the term 'God'.[17]

On the one hand both Śaiva Siddhānta and Catholic Thought are built on the basis of a living experience of the absolute otherness and non-objectifiability of God and only admitted negative statements about Him. The Augustinian principle that God is more known by non-knowing than by presumptuous curiosity and the Thomistic affirmation that the highest human knowledge is to be found in conscious unknowing is the same as the Indian "neti, neti".

On the other hand, both Śaiva Siddhānta and Catholic Thought understand man by his creation and endowment with God's grace as a "theomorphic" being called to speech about God and speech with God.

Therefore, even if the concept of God changes with a new world-picture (and both Śaiva Siddhānta and Catholic Thought will do well to make the needed adjustments), and understanding of being, yet, it contains an immutable element, and something constant in man himself corresponds to this. Both Śaiva Siddhānta and Catholic Thought profess that they are fundamentally advaitic. Śaiva Siddhānta explains that *advaitam* does not mean "ekam" or monism; *advaitam* it says, means only "not two" i.e. Creator and creature are not two. Aquinas put it thus: "By creation being is not multiplied." They both may call their systems Supra-Monism.

onṟu nī allai, anṟi onṟu illai.
yār unnai aṟiya kiṟpāre!

And *tattvamasi* means:

avaṉ ivaṉ āvatu avaṉ aruḷāl allatu
ivaṉ avaṉ ākāṉ enṟuntipaṟa
enṟum ivane eṟṟuntipaṟa

He is I through His grace. I do not become He except through His grace. I remain ever I.

1. *corpatam kaḍanta tollōṉ kāṇaka*
cittamum cellāc ceḷciyōṉ kāṇaka
uraiyaṟṟa toṉṟai uraicaiyyum ūyarkaḷ
karaiyaṟṟa toṉraik karaikāṇalākumō ?

1a. *tiraiyaṟṟa nīrpōl cintai teḷivārkkup-*
puraiyaṟṟiruntāṉ........ —Tirumūlar

taḍakkai nellik kaṉi eṉakku āyiṉaṉ
śollutal aṟiyen. —*Tiruvācagam*

avaṉ aruḷe kaṇṇāhak kāṇīṉ allāl
..................oṇṇāde —Tirunāvukkaraśar

aruḷāl evaiyum pār enṟāṉ etc. —Tāyumānavar

śollil paravum nāmattāṉai
śollum poruḷum iṟanta cuḍarai.....
cintaittanai teḷivittuc civamākki enai āṇḍa
antamilā ānandam aṇikoḷtillai kaṇḍeṉe.
aruḷuḍaic cuḍare aḷinttōr kaniye
peruntiṟal aruntavarkkarace
poruḷuḍai kalaiye pugaḻcciyaik kaḍanta
bōgame yōgattiṉ polive
teruḷiḍat taḍiyār cintaiyuḷ puhunta
śelvame śiva perumāṉe
iruḷiḍat tuṉṉaic cikkeṉap piḍittēn
eṅgeḻun turuḷuvatiṉiye. —*Tiruvācagam*

2. *Kaṭha Up*, II, 23; *Muṇḍ Up*, 3, 2, 3.

3. *tammai uṇarntu tamai uḍaiyataṉ uṇarvār*
emmai uḍaimai emai ikaḻār.........

4. *avaṉ avaḷ atu eṉum avai mūviṉaimaiyiṉ*
tōṟṟiya titiye oḍuṅgi malattu uḷatām
antam ādi eṉmaṉār pulavar

5. cf. *Śaiva Siddhānta*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 46 ff.

6. cf. *Śaiva Siddhānta*, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 98-100.

7. Le Milieu Divin

8. In his "Secular City": last chapter

9. William Hamilton: *The New Essence of Christianity.*

10. Mercea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred" 1963.

11. In his "Living Questions to Dead Gods"... "Question Vivante a un Diew Mort"-p. 37

Harvey Cox in his later book ("The Death of God and Future of Theology" in W. R. Miller ed. The New Christianity) also dissociates himself from the "Death of God" and also differs from the position of Van Buren.

12. Author of "Death of God" (1961) and "Wait without Idols" (1964)

13. Proslogion, ch. 1.

14. *op. cit*, p. 121 ff.

15. cf. Dr. Bayart S. J.: The concept of Mystery According to St. Anselm, Rech. De Theol. Ancienne et Meievale. Avr. Juil 1937. Compare and contrast: Śaṅkara Bhāshya, Ved Sūtra, I, i, 1 and footnote SBE. XXXIV, p. 14.

16. Edward Schillebeeckx: *Concept of Truth and Theological Renewal.*

17. Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. 2, "God".

M. Muthuraman

THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF GOD

Driven by religious doubts in practical life, people are confronted with the problem of existence of God. Consequently, we find how arguments are advanced. For instance, Plato and Aristotle in ancient times have dealt at length on that issue and those discussions were primarily done on philosophical considerations. In a way such arguments generally arise only to defend the position of a particular religion. However, this does not alter the essential aspect of the problem, namely the philosophical nature. For it is only on their rational soundness they either succeed or fail to get approved.

The traditional proofs of the existence of God are the four types : ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral. Briefly explaining, the ontological proof argues from the idea of God to the existence of God, while the other proofs generally argue from the existence of something finite to the existence of God the Infinite. The cosmological proof as its name suggests, goes from the existence of the world as we ordinarily experience, to the existence of God. Thus if the existence of God is to be shown by argument then it must be shown to follow from the fact that something else exists, namely the world that it exists. The world exists, and there is nothing in the world to account for its own existence, therefore God exists. As a matter of fact, the cosmological argument has many forms, as there are many aspects of the world indicating its dependence for its existence on something other than itself. The well known formulation of these arguments is by Thomas Aquinas and it is my endeavour to present those arguments as well as criticisms as much briefly as I could.

Thomas' first argument assumes that some things in the world are in the process of change. Anything that changes, as a matter of fact,

could be changed by something else. For nothing could change unless first it is capable of becoming something different from what it already was. According to Thomas, "change is the reduction from potentiality to actuality." From this point of view, Thomas proceeds to explain that the potentiality of anything could be brought about only by a change; for if a thing is to be changed from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality, only something actual could bring about that change. Thus the potential, as potential could do nothing; for the potential is only what can be, not what actually is. A mere could-be cannot act. So a thing cannot be in the same respect that which is changed and that which brings about the change. Therefore it is assumed as indicated earlier that whatever is changed must be changed by something else. If this something else undergoes change then it, in turn, must be changed by something other than itself. However, this process cannot go on ad infinitum. Thereby it is further presumed that there must be a first agency of change and Thomas designates as the 'First Mover'. It is further explained that without a first agency of change, that is, one which does not itself change and thus help another agent to bring about that change, there would be no agency of change at all. The first mover "everyone understands to be God" says Thomas.

A critical assessment of the first argument does not make it entirely clear as to whether the "First Mover" is first in time or first in any other sense. If first in time only, then this argument would suggest a deistic conception of the relation of God to the world. Even if Thomas did not so intend his argument, yet the above interpretation holds good as far as the statement is concerned. For the dependence of a thing which changes upon something else to change it, he says, "cannot go on to infinity". This may be supplemented by saying that even if the relation of dependence continued to infinity, there would be nothing in that infinite series of "movers" to make any of them actual. In other words, they would all be potential only. No mere possibility can account for the existence of an actual world. Thus the world must receive its existence from something that does not depend on something else for its own existence. As a matter of information, this pertinent supplementation of Thomas' first argument, is indicated in the other arguments. Therefore the first argument is not complete in itself, hence it needs the second and third arguments for a satisfactory completion.

The second argument is from the nature of efficient cause. It is explained that we do not find in the world of nature that which is the efficient cause of itself. For if a thing were to be its own cause it would have to be prior to itself and this is impossible. It is also explained that no series of efficient causes could be an infinite series. For if we take any specific cause as the last cause of some specific

change we are considering, then it must be itself the effect of a preceding cause and the preceding cause of one prior to it. The preceding cause Thomas calls an "intermediate cause." The intermediate cause, however, must have a first cause, for if in any series of causes, we take away a cause then we take away its effect as well. Without a first cause there would be no intermediate cause and without intermediate cause there would not be the cause whose operation we are aware of, namely the last cause. Thus all the causes in nature are dependent on other causes; none of them accounts for itself. So there must be a first cause, "to which everyone gives the name of God".

Thomas' statement of the second argument is said to beg the question. This would be clear once we perceive the heart of the argument as follows: "Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause."

The apparent begging of the question could be avoided if we understand the statement to mean that no system of causes composed solely of causes which themselves depend on other causes can be in operation without a first cause, namely a cause that does not itself depend on other causes. For no one of a system of dependent causes can initiate causal action by itself. For where all causes are dependent causes, no action would take place.

The third argument is based on the distinction between possibility and necessity. Generally when we say that something exists, we mean by that that something comes into existence as well as passes out of existence, thereby it implies that there was a time when it did not exist; if this were true of everything and so the existence of things extended back into an infinite past, then there would have been a time, when no things existed. For in an infinite past time all possible contingencies and combinations of contingencies must have taken place. In a world in which everything comes into and goes out of existence, one possible combination of contingencies would be for all things in existence to pass out of existence simultaneously. But if there had been such an infinite past time then no things could exist now, for no things could have begun to exist then. Therefore, something does exist whose existence is necessary. This necessary existence must have its necessity in itself and not from some other being, for, as it is stated in the second proof so it is impossible for a causal series to go back to infinity. This being which possesses the neeessary self-existence "all men speak of as God."

According to the fourth argument, the intrinsic,-value differences and their relationships, we find in things take for granted the existence of the standard of value, namely God. For instence, we ordinarily distinguish between the more and less good, true, beautiful and so on. Thus if things show an order of perfection, then there must be a being which is the maximum of perfection and that is God.

The fifth argument is based on the fact that nature seems to show a design. Although natural bodies may be functioning mechanically yet their functions are directed towards an end. Thomas points out: "Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence." So there must be some intelligent being, "by whom all natural things are directed to their ends; and this being we call God."

In conclusion Thomas' five arguments could be summed up as the contention that the world of nature is a contingent world. Its contingency is apparent in the fact that it is a world of change and the change takes place in an orderly manner. From modern perspectives this may be reinforced by our recognition that the natural order is one in which latent potentialities of the earlier stages become actual in the development of a continuous process. For those who perceive the world as contingent, the reality of God as a self-existent being on whom depends the whole order of nature could be an evident truth. But for those who do not perceive such a meaning in the orderly process of the world, such arguments would amount to be a tale though not to be told by an idiot signifying nothing. That is why Francis Bacon reminds us that it is only a little philosophy which leads to atheism. And to substantiate it, I am to mention that it is only in the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant denies God but the same God is welcomed and justified by the same Kant in his further writings of Practical Reason and Judgment. If we take only one part of Kantian writings, then we are not getting a complete and satisfactory explanation. For that we must take into account of a total perspective so that we shall be rewarded freely and fully of a complete meaningfulness. It is in that perspective Lord Arthur J. Balfour, wrote a book called *Theism and Humanism* wherein the British scholar explains the necessity for God on the basis of three spheres of human thought and action namely, the good the true and the beautiful (ethics, epistemology and aesthetics). Understood in that sense the conception of God as the soul of the world, an immanent spiritual power, a creative and perfecting agency who is the source of all values, may give us helpful notion of God, which I presume shall be consistent both with

science and philosophy along with the meaning of the word God in common speech.

In conclusion, substantiating my assumption, I am inclined to mention the thought-provoking observation of the great scientist Einstein, in this connection. Most scientists, when referring to the mysteries of the Universe, its vast forces and its rationality and harmony, tend to avoid using the word, God. Yet, Einstein has no such inhibitions. " My religion," he says " consists of a humble admirations of illimitable superior spirit, who reveals Himself in the slight details we are able to perceive with our frail and feeble minds. That deeply emotional conviction of the presence of a superior reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible universe, forms my idea of God." (*The Universe and Dr. Einstein* by Barnett p. 112).

S. Gopalan

ATHEISM AND ETHICS

The aim of the paper is to examine the question whether an atheistic system of philosophy should necessarily entail a negative attitude towards ethical living. If God's existence is repudiated, will it necessarily also reject the value and worth of individuals in society? In this paper we shall point to the Jaina tradition which is well-known for its atheism and indicate how the type of atheism we find in it does not affect at all the ethical aspects of life. We shall therefore make references to certain aspects of Jaina ethics.

In regard to the Jaina arguments against the existence of God: we shall make mention of some of them to indicate the type of atheism we have in Jainism and the result we can expect for ethics, rather than go into the logical aspects of the arguments. We are more concerned to examine the impact of such a *view of God* on the *way of life* enshrined in the Jaina tradition.

We should, however indicate the type of atheism we find in Jainism so that the ultimate seriousness in life that is accepted by the Jainas is properly understood. As Garbe suggests,[1] atheism itself may be of two types: naive and philosophical. The former type of atheism results from the attitude of disbelieving in things unperceived. The Cārvāka's disbelief in God and all the non-perceptual categories of existence is attributable to his abiding faith in the efficacy of perception. The latter type of atheism has only one thing in common with the former, viz., the conviction that God (in the popular understanding of the term) does not exist, but the conviction itself is a result of serious philosophical speculation. Jaina atheism belongs to the category of 'considered atheism', — reflective rejection of God — for there is a deep analysis of the concept of God as the Supreme Cause of the

Universe and a systematic refutation of the arguments of the philosophers, who have sought to prove the existence of God.

The term God is used in Jainism to denote a higher state of existence of the *jīva* or the conscious principle. The system believes that this state of godly existence is only a shade better than that of the ordinary human being, for, it is not free from the cycle of birth and death. The longest period of celestial existence in the highest heaven (*sarvārthasiddhi*) is between thirtytwo and thirtythree 'oceans of years' (*sāgaropamas*). The moment the 'gods' exhaust their good *karmas* because of which they attained a better status than that of the ordinary human beings, they come down to the earth, unless in the meanwhile they gain the saving knowledge which enables them to come out of the vicious circle of birth and death.

The liberated souls, according to the Jaina view, go up the top of the universe and they are those who have perfected themselves absolutely and hence are those who have no longer to 'face the fall', for they eternally remain there. They have cut themselves away from the world of life and death (*saṁsāra*) and so by hypothesis cannot exert any influence over it. Hence the functions of a Supreme Ruler, Creator or Regulator cannot be attributed to them. In regard to others who are still in *saṁsāra* they cannot be regarded as eternal gods. It is in this sense that the *Tīrthaṅkara's* is a more covetable position than that of 'God'. Attaining the status of the *Tīrthaṅkara* is the aim of life and the *Tīrthaṅkara* is the shining example to humanity, assuring it that spiritual perfection is attainable and is not merely a speculative value.

Let us consider the Jaina repudiation of God's existence. Jainism, unlike the theistic schools does not accept the existence of a supreme creator and sustainer of the world. The system maintains that the world is without a beginning and an end. In this we see the most consistent theory of realism, it being maintained that each and every one of the categories is eternally real and hence that logically they are in no need of postulating a god who is the supreme cause and ruler of the world. Ācārya Jīnasena asks: "If God created the universe, where was he before creating it? If he was not in space, where did he localise the universe? How could a formless or immaterial substance like God create the world of matter? If the material is to be taken as existing, why not take the world itself as unbegun? If the creator was uncreated, why not suppose the world to be itself self-existing?" Then he continues: "Is God self-sufficient? If he is, he need not have created the world. If he is not, like an ordinary potter, he would be incapable of the task, since by hypothesis, only a

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perfect being could produce it ... "[2]. The Jaina philosopher pertinently asks: "If every existent object must have a maker, that maker himself would be explained by another — his maker, etc. To escape from this vicious circle we have to assume that there is one uncreated, self-explaining cause, God. But then, if it is maintained that one being can be self-subsistent, why not say that there are many others also who are uncreated and eternal similarly?" Hence "it is not necessary to assume the existence of any first cause of the universe."[3]

It now becomes evident that the type of ethics to be expected of such a denial can bear no resemblance at all with that which emanates from naive atheism such as that of the Cārvākas. The Jaina refutation of God's existence is not followed by the rejection of the doctrine of *karma* as is the case with the Cārvāka atheism. It is because of the acceptance of the principle of *karma* that the Jaina ethics bears a remarkable similarity with the ethics of the Hindus.

We see therefore that the Jainas disagree with the Cārvākas and the Hindus alike, with the Cārvākas in regard to the possibility of ethical living and with some of the Hindu systems in regard to the acceptance of God as the creator and sustainer of the world. The agreement with the Cārvākas, though it seems on the surface to be great, on examination is seen to be insignificant just as the disagreement with the Hindus on the necessity of positing a personal God is seen to be trivial though at first sight it looks as if it cuts at the very root of ethics.

The aspects of Jaina thought immediately relevant to our problem are: (i) the doctrine of consistent realism, (ii) the doctrine of continuity of consciousness, (iii) the doctrine of purity of consciousness and (iv) the theory of metempsychosis.

The significance of (i) has already been hinted at and may now be made more explicit. The hard-core realism of the Jainas is such that the various metaphysical categories accepted by them are all said to be real. According to Jainism a proper understanding of Reality consists in comprehending consciousness and matter for they both exist. Leaving out of account either of them is, to say the least, taking a partial view of Reality, and as such to have an incomplete picture. The emphasis on taking into consideration both the conscious and the non-conscious aspects (*jīva* and *ajīva*) at once distinguishes Jainism from naive realism of the Cārvāka type and makes all the difference between according supreme importance to ethics and considering that the end of life is death and there is nothing beyond.

Such a view of realism is closely related to the second aspect we mentioned above, the doctrine of continuity of consciousness. Consistently with the view that the *jīva* (like any other category of existence) is real and eternal, and also with the more foundational doctrine of Identity-and-Change, we find the term *jīva* representing the conscious principle as such.

Consciousness is discernible in four different states of existence (*gati*), these states representing different levels of consciousness. The levels are that of the animals (*tiryañc*), the humans (*manuṣya*), the infernal beings (*nāraki*) and celestial beings (*deva*). Leaving the *nāraki* stage out of account, it may be pointed out that the other stages represent the progressive steps through which the *jīva* passes before attaining perfection. These various stages in the *jīva's* evolution are referred to as the modes (*paryāyas*). In every one of these stages the *jīva* undergoes real changes, though its identity itself is not lost. The changes are seen in the facts of birth, growth and death.

For the reflecting being that man is, consciousness is seen to be mixed up with the non-conscious principle. The Jainas maintain that regaining the independence of the *jīva* from the shackles of *ajīva* is extremely necessary for only then can the purity of consciousness be regained, and spiritual perfection attained. Mixing up of the conscious principle with the non-consciousness (*jīva* with *ajīva*) constitutes *saṁsāra*. Association with the kārmic particles makes the *jīva* get bound up and is hence considered impure (*aśuddha*). With the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*) the *jīva* becomes pure (*śuddha*). Thus the second aspect of the Jaina ethics lead us to the third, and the transition to the fourth can easily he anticipated.

The doctrine of metempsychosis is the logical corollary of the theory of purity of consciousness inasmuch as attaining purity of consciousness may entail taking many births involving the transmigration of the real *jiva*, the process through which purity can be attained.

From these four aspects of Jaina ethics, four other vitally important aspects of the Jaina view of life follow. These refer to the *ethics of purity*, *ethics of evolution*, *ethics of human dignity* and *ethics of responsibility* discernible in the Jaina tradition.

The ethics of purity is foundational to Jainism itself in the sense that all the ethical disciplines prescribed are ultimately aimed at attaining purity of consciousness and the rigours of the ethical discipline prescribed give us a clue to the fact that the concept of purity of consciousness is not a theoretical value merely but is a persistent problem waiting for solution in each *jīva's* life.

The ethics of evolution is directly derived from the continuity-of-consciousness doctrine and clearly points to the various 'levels' — from the lowest of animate beings to the highest stage of perfection in which purity of consciousness is regained, — the stage which is clearly far above the ordinary human level. The implication of such a theory is that at no stage is a *jīva* which is at a lower level than the human to be looked down upon or despised. More often than not, this fundamental truth about the state of human existence — that it is only an intermediate stage towards perfection is forgotten. The result is that man is given so much of importance that the sub-human species is ignored completely. The Jaina theory of consciousness, in keeping with its logic of continuity of consciousness insists on *reverence for life*, to use the terminology of Albert Schweitzer. The result is that a strong foundation is laid for a severe ethic of *ahiṁsa*, the high-water-mark of Jaina philosophy and culture.

The ethics of human dignity and responsibility may now be detailed. Once it is accepted that there is a need to purify oneself, and granted that purification itself can only, by a process of evolution attained, an important question arises. Does reincarnation denote always an upward evolution, so that once the stage of the human being is attained, there is no danger of slipping down the scale of evolution to attain a sub-human stage? No doubt, oftentimes we are inclined to answer the question in the negative. It may be argued that the proviso that a person indulging in evil acts has to undergo suffering for the same itself indicates a just punishment for the evil-doer. Read along with the implication that such a person naturally encounters the situation of his having to stay on at the human level without any prospect of an upward evolution, it seems the possibility of man slipping down need not even be thought of. But the strict application of the theory of *karma* requires that if acts indulged in by man do not befit the status and dignity of man but that of a sub-human level, the individual be pushed down the human level. The Jaina view is that a just punishment requires a corresponding degradation even in the level of life.

The four states of being of the *jīva* or the conscious principle already referred to give us the cue to the Jaina theory of reincarnation, since they unambiguously point to the fact that the human stage is only one of the stages in which we find the conscious principle, and, as such we do not have any right to imagine that once the human state is attained, attainment of the superhuman state (that state of perfection connoting the permanent escape from the cycle of birth and death) is something automatic.

The significant point regarding the Jaina theory of retrogression is that it supplies the basis for an ethics of responsibility. The *karma* theory with its corollary, the theory of reincarnation, even in the popular understanding, provides the basis for an ethic of individual responsibility. In the Jaina theory this principle is accepted but there is an emphatic assertion that if man is a responsible being, he is responsible not merely for the good and bad acts he does at the human level and for which he answers at the human level, — in the same or in a future life. If his sense of responsibility is really to play the significant role in the matter of perfecting himself by elevating him far above the ordinary human level, it cannot but be brought in when he errs, when he commits acts which have the mark of the animal in them. He cannot indulge in acts which are beneath his dignity as a human being and escape from the consequences. He gets degraded and is pushed down to the sub-human level.

The Jaina theory may be approached also from a slightly different angle. Whenever we discuss man and his efforts to realize his ultimate nature, our discussion is in terms of consciousness. Spiritual evolution is a conscious process, not an unconscious one. It is because this aspect of man is discussed in ethics that we have a tendency to forget that consciousness is not something unique to the human species, though self-consciousness probably is. The Jaina tradition like any other system of ethics lays emphasis on the self-conscious aspect of man but it consistently maintains that consciousness as such does not have a break, be it the transition from the plant level to the animal level or from the animal to the human and super-human levels. It is in this sense that Jainism talks of two main categories of existence — *jīva* and *ajīva* — the conscious and the non-conscious. Since however the universe of discourse in ethics is the human potentialities and propensities, it looks as if we cannot conceive of man being lowered, however bad he may be. But the Jaina philosophers' referring to the conscious principle has the wholesome effect of making us ponder over the conscious principle in the universe and of making us trace the evolution of consciousness not from the human level alone but from the very stage where only traces of consciousness can be discerned. In this emphasis on taking an integral view of consciousness we see that far from laying less emphasis on human responsibility there is a consistent exhortation for man to live really a life worthy of his stage of evolution, first to see that he maintains the level without slipping down and then to aim at the higher evolution of his consciousness. It is evident then that the *responsible nature of the human situation* is emphasized most in the Jaina tradition in spite of its denial of God's existence, and the necessity for *authentic existence* is pleaded for.

Thus the Jaina ethics is an exemplification of the possibility of arguing the case for authentic existence, and the reverence for life that it insists emanates ultimately from the acceptance of continuity of consciousness independently of conceding the significance of God as is generally understood.

1. *Encyclopaedia of Ethics and Religion* (Edinburg: T & T Clark, 1958), Article on Atheism, Vol. 11, p. 185

2. *Ādipurāṇa*, Chapter 3

3. See Hemacandra, *Syādvādamañjari*, verse 6

R. Sundara Rajan

THE LOGIC OF PERFECTION

In his extremely powerful defence of St Anselm's Ontological Argument, Prof Hartshorne brings out an unsuspected logical feature of the theistic position in general, namely the fact that the question of the existence or non-existence of God understood as 'that greater than which cannot be conceived' is a logical or a priori issue and not at all an empirical or factual one. In other words, the existence of God is not a fact but a logical necessity and as such, it can be established on purely logical considerations. To have seen this purely logical or cenceptual status of the question at stake is one of the great merits of St Anselm.

At first, it would seem that there are four possible alternatives here.

1. The property G (of being such that a greater is inconceivable) is itself inconceivable ; i.e. there is no idea of God.

2. The property G is conceivable but only as not existing.

3. The property G is conceivable as either existing or as not existing.

4. The property G is conceivable but only as existing.

(1) may be called 'logical atheism' since it holds that the idea of God as unsurpassable perfection is a logically impossible idea and hence meaningless. (2) may perhaps be identified with Kant's doctrine of the merely regulative use of an ideal of Reason. According to this view, the idea of God has a clear and consistent meaning but we cannot take it as representing any object so conceived. Rather, we

must regard the idea of God as a regulative functional maxim which serves to unify our cognitions. (3) is empiricism. In its positive form, it holds that the existence of Perfection has to be established only on factual grounds (such as the existence of order and harmony in the world etc). In its negative from, it holds that although the idea of God is meaningful, yet the observed facts of evil, suffering etc tell against that hypothesis. (4) is logical or a priori theism which holds that if we understand the idea of God to be the conception of something greater than which is not conceivable, it follows, for purely logical reasons, that we must admit that God necessarily exists. This is, of course, St Anselm's choice but a seldom noticed peculiarity of this mode of argument is that it not merely rules out empirical atheism but it precludes empirical theism as well, for, if the existence of God properly uuderstood, is a necessary truth, then factual considerations are irrelevant and out of place. This can be generalized further. As modern logic tells us, a necessary truth is entailed by any proposition whatever. Hence, the proposition affirming the existence of God also is entailed by any proposition you care to mention. But then it is obviously entailed by the proposition : 'there is an idea of God in us'. Hence, if we properly understand him, what Anselm has shown is the irrelevance of both empirical atheism as well as empirical theism. Both forms of (3) are ruled out. (2) is likewise ruled out, for given the meaningfulness of the idea of God as unsurpassable perfection, it follows that God necessarily exists. This can be seen in the following way.

1. *A possibility granted by the kantian type of argument.*

We can conceive of a Being a greater than which cannot be conceived (i.e. the idea of God is a possible idea)

2. *Anselm's principle.*

To exist with the possibility of non-existence is an inferior or imperfect mode of existence, whereas to exist so completely as to rule out the very possibility of non-existence is a superior perfection.

3. *Anselm's conclusion.*

Hence to conceive of a Being than which a greater connot be conceived as itself not existing is to contradict oneself. If it is once allowed that the idea of God is meaningful, then God necessarily exists. The idea of God cannot be merely regulative; it is 'constitutive' as well. (2) also is ruled out.

Here it may be remarked that the conventional objections to the ontological argument do not seem to be relevant, at least to the second

version of the proof that we have in St Anselm. Thus, the objection that existence is not a perfection is beside the point for the proof presupposes, not that existence as such is a perfection, but that necessary existence is a perfection. Against this it has to be argued that 'necessary existence' does not make sense. But Malcolm and others have argued to the contrary recently. If one were to seriously press the objection, one must show that modal predicates are all intra-linguistic. But if 'necessity' is intra-conceptual, then its polar contrast, 'impossibility' also must be intra-conceptual. But if so, it would be impossible to infer non-existence from impossibility. But this of course is possible. From the proposition 'The concept of 'married bachelors is an impossible concept' we can infer 'married bachelors do not exist'. If non-existence can be inferred from impossibility, why not existence from logical necessity?

The alternatives (2) and (3) seem to have been ruled out. But what about ? (1) It must be admitted that Anselm's argument seems to be powerless against the positivistic version of atheism. Hence, the only contenders left in the field are (1) and (4). The point to note is that both are logical or a priori theses. The choice lies between logical or a priori theism (St Anselm) or logical or a priori atheism (Ayer).

The idea of God

Once the issue is thus posed, it becomes clear that the ontological argument by itself cannot settle it for it is one of the presuppositions of St Anselm that the idea of something greater than which cannot be conceived is a conceivable or meaningful concept. Indeed, when Gaunilo suggested that this may not be so, Anselm appeals to his faith to show that this is manifestly wrong. But then, it may be questioned whether the conception of perfection or unsurpassability is a correct rendering of faith. This would be to quesion whether the idea of God understood in a certain way is adeqaute to the needs of a believer and here it may be pointed out that classical theism conceives of God in a certain way which, on reflection, seems to make that idea a logical absurdity. Thus, it is here, in the idea of God and not in the proof of His existence that the real weakness of classical theism seems to lie.

In order to bring out more clearly some of the tensions and ambiguities in the classical idea of God, we may comment briefly on some of the logical features of that conception.

God as maximal or complete perfection

Classical theism conceives of God as absolutely unsurpassable or as a maximally complete being; He is regarded as exhausting all

'perfections' and all value. But 'maximal concepts' as Leibniz pointed out have to be handled with care for they may harbour contradictions. For example, quantitative concepts like the greatest number or the greatest size are not logically possible. Hence, traditionally, all quantitative concepts are denied of God and only qnalitative maxima are applied to Him; i.e. it was held that only those properties can be attributed to God, which, unlike quantity admit of a maximal case. The others simple do not apply. But it was not noticed in this outright exclusion of magnitude that quantity may after all, have a value not attainable without it. The contention that all having of parts must mean corruptibility is the principal basis for the exclusion of magnitude and composition in the case of God. It was held that just as all existing is contingent existing, so also all complexity is corruptible complexity. But the true rule seems to be less simple; it all depends upon the kind of thing and the manner of its existing and of having parts. If there can be an eminent manner of existing, why not an eminent manner of having parts? So far from it being obvious that absence of parts is a merit, one of the normal procedures in estimating value is to compare degrees of complexity arising from parts.

The above remarks suggest that the notion of 'maximal states' may not be logically possible and since the traditional conception of God envisages Him in terms of such maximal states of perfection is to conceive of Him as absolutely unsurpassable. Hence, what we have just now seen comes to this: it may not be logically appropriate to conceive of God as absolutely unsurpassable.

The denial of accidental predication

Another characteristic logical feature of the classical conception of God is the denial of all accidental or contingent states in Him. This is the result of conceiving Him as without even the shadow of turning. Everything in Him, all His perfections or attributes follow from His essence, or as it sometimes said, in Him essence and existence are one. This means, to take the case of divine knowledge, that His omniscience is not only fully complete but also necessary; it is precisely in this that the divine infallibility is supposed to lie. Similarly, with the other attributes such as goodness. God, it is said, does not merely have goodness, but *is* goodness in the sense that goodness is not merely a property of God but is His very essence. In short, the classical conception of God denies all accidental or contingent states in Him and so precludes the very possibility of accidental predication. But this denial of accidents or contingent states leads to certain serious embarrassments, two types of which may be singled out here.

Classical theism holds that while God's knowledge of the world is infallible and necessary, yet the actuality of the world itself is only contingent. But necessary knowledge that the world W1 is actual, and world W2 only possible is incompatible with the inactuality of W1 and the actuality of W2. Hence if this knowledge is necessary, then, that with which it is incompatible, i. e. the inactuality of W1 and the actuality of W2 must be impossible. This simply means that the actual world is necessary.

In order to avoid this, it may be said that divine knowledge is creative and hence determines its objects. But this does not really help, for consider the following :

1. If and only if W is actual, God knows it as actual.

2. If and only if God knows W as actual, is it actual.

Those who hold the doctrine of the creative knowledge of God reject (1) and would accept some form of (2). But logically there seems to be no difference between the two. In any case, (2) makes the divine cognition subject to contingency as well. In order to remove this, it may be said that the 'if' in (2) really denies the possibility of its contradictory. But if the negation of (2) is contradictory, then (2) itself must be taken to be necessary and this as we have seen, entails the necessity of the actuality of W1 as well.

This may be stated more formally as follows :

Let W be a certain kind of world.

Let P be the proposition : God knows W exists.

Let Q be the proposition : W exists.

Axiom : $P. \sim Q$ is impossible. (The conjunction of P and the negation of Q involves a contradiction, since what is divinely, i. e. infallibly known to be true cannot be false)

Thesis to be refuted : P is necessary or $\sim$ P is impossible.

Proof :

Since $P. \sim Q$ is impossible (axiom) and since (thesis) $\sim P$ is also impossible the oniy permissible joint truth values are PQ. Hence, P and Q are both necessary in the same sense, there being no alternative to either. In every way, the logical status of Q becomes indistinguishable from that attributed to P. If $P \sim Q$ is impossible, no less so is $Q \sim P$. For assuming as the thesis implies that an

omniscient being exists, a proposition cannot be true without God knowing that it is true; and besides $Q.\sim P$ must be impossible if $\sim P$ is impossible. But again, if $\sim P$ is impossible, it follows that Q is equally so, for Q entails the disjunction $\sim QP \vee Q\sim P$. But the first is impossible (axiom) and if $\sim P$ is impossible $Q\sim P$ is equally impossible. Altogether P and Q function alike together logically on the assumption that P is necessary, Q must be considered to be necessary in the same sense.

What is proved above is not simply that assuming P to be true, the truth of Q follows, but rather, assuming P to be necessarily true, it follows that Q also is in the same sense, a necessarily true proposition. To say then that God is a necessary being in a sense in which the world is not and that qua necessary, He knows the world to exist as non-necessary is a jumble of contradictions.

If it is admitted that the logical status of Q also is necessary, then apart from violating traditional assumptions about the contingency of the world, the very contrast between necessity and contingency would be deprived of its point.

What seems to be required is to allow that the contradictory of P, namely $\sim P$ is possible. This would mean that God's knowing that such and such a world exists must be a contingent knowing. The point of this proposal is that it allows us to hold that the abstract property of omniscience as such is necessary, whereas His actual cognitions are contingent. We could distinguish between :

P: God knows W to be actual

P1: God knows as actual whatever is actual.

P1 is not only different frnm P; it is compatible with P as well as $\sim P$.

To deduce P from P1, we must have a further contingent premise: W exists or is actual. The point is that God designated by P and P1 cannot in all respects be identical. Here are two modally diverse, not logically equivalent propositions about God which are both however true. It follows, in other words, the there should be two distinct aspects in the divine being, one essential and the other contingent.

The same need for allowing contingent states in God can be seen if we consider the following: God, as is just, would respond with greater joy if his creatures were more perfect. The religious instinct

seems to demand this, but if we hold on to the impassiveness of the deity, then such a possibility seems to be ruled out. In general, to take divine compassion seriously seems to demand that God should really relate himself to his creatures which are contingent. Hence his compassion should allow free contingent states of its own manifestation. To rule this out is, in effect, to say that we derive the benefits of God's compassion, but in Himself or in His own being, there is no compassion or pity. This is to say: we derive the benefits of God's love without God really loving us. Here again we begin to see that we must distinguish between two logically different types of predication.

R: God loves his creatures in all their states in the most adequate way.

R1: God responds with a specific love to each and every specific state of his creatures.

While R is necessary, R1 is contingent upon the specific states of contingent beings and while both R and R1 describe God's love, they do it in logically diverse ways. Here again we have a hint about the internal economy of the divine life.

Distinction between essence, existence and actuality

In general, classic theistic thought seems to have operated merely in terms of a major distinction between essence and existence. Thus, existence was identified with full concrete actuality and it was felt that when an argument succeeds in proving the existence of God, it would refer to his actuality as well. But the total concreteness of the divine actuality transcends by far, any abstract logical necessity of thought; so much so, we have here a serious dilemma first pointed out by J. N. Findlay. As we have seen, the ultimate theistic question as to whether God exists or not is a logical or conceptual one. His existence must be either a logical necessity or a logical impossibility; hence the existential proof must be purely a logical argument. But how can an abstract logical demonstration or conceptual proof capture the fullness and richness of the divine actuality? The existence that the proof can establish must be abstract and not an actuality. But since existence and actuality were identified, it looks as if, any proof, of necessity must fail since no abstract argument can establish an actuality, leave alone the divine actuality.

The proper resolution of the dilemma requires that we make a three fold distinction between essence, existence and actuality. The distinction between existence and actuality may be brought out thus: An essence exists if there is some concrete reality exemplifying it;

existence is only *that* an essence is concretized; actuality is the *how*, the particular manner in which it is concretized. The particular form, the actuality is always contingent, but it does not follow that existence is contingent. For existence only requires the non-emptiness of the appropriate class of actualities and a class can be necessarily non-empty even though it has only contingent members. From this distinction between existence and actuality as applied to God, it follows that:

1. The existence of God is an abstract aspect of the divine actuality and hence a logical a priori argument is eminently appropriate to it.

2. The actuality of God is always contingent and hence there is a contingent or 'accidental' aspect to the divine life. This may be called the Two Aspect Theory of the Deity.

God as Absolutely Unsurpassable

It will be a fascinating study to pursue in detail the complex ways in which the above mentioned logical decisions regarding the idea of God have shaped the conceptual structure of classical theism but we cannot stay with the details of such a study beyond pointing out one significant consequence of these decisions. The conception of God that we have in classical theism is that of an absolutely unsurpassable being who has all perfections in a maximal state. His knowledge and goodness and enjoyment are maxima in the senre that they are absolutely unsurpassable. He is such that he outdistances all other beings both in existence and value. Here, no doubt, there is an important insight, for an adequate object of worship must be not merely great and powerful and excellent but he must be super-eminently so. He must tower above others in existence and value and power if he is to be a fit object of a truly religious reverence and worship. To worship any lesser being would be idolatry whose essence consists in the fact that reverence and gratitutde are paid to something which does not completely or fully deserve them. Hence, if God is to be a fit object of the religious attitude, he must be conceived as unsurpassable, as something greater than which cannot even be conceived But must this unsurpassability be understood as unsurpassability even by self, or rather, can we not think of God as the self surpassing surpasser of all? In these matters, one must be sensitive to logical nuances or perish; one must, for instance, capture the criteriological difference between surpassability by others and surpassability by self, since while surpassability by others is a criterion of imperfection and weakness, surpassability by self could well be a criterion of creativity. The idea that God must be absolutely unsurpassable, I am arguing, is

in part at least the consequence of the logical decision to deny accidental predication in His case. It is because we do not distinguish between divine existence and divine actuality that we think of God as absolutely unsurpassable, for if there were no contingent states in God, if every state of the deity expresses his essence, then obviously such 'states' must absolutely unsurpassable. But then we must admit that if we describe the absolute unsurpassability in this way, we are thinking of a divine state and and not of God as an individual or a person. This is merely another consequence of the view that in God essence and existence are one. But this has further embarrassments for us, for, since the idea of a plurality of absolutely unsurpassable states does not make sense, we will have to say that divinity is a maximal state and not in any sense an individual or a person.

But if we conceive God as self-surpassing then obviously we can distinguish between God in His being and God in any one of His states. In other words, in the case of God also, we must distinguish between predicates, individuals and states, where a predicate is an essence instantiated in a state and a state is owned by an individual. In this fashion, we can come to see that any given state of the Deity is such that it is surpassable by another state of the Deity and yet unsurpassable by any other individual, In this way, God would still be unsurpassable or perefct in comparison with all other beings. Of course, we now have the problem of showing that given two other-unsurpassable states, x and y that they belong to the same divine life. But this can be done in terms of the modern logical theory of 'geneidentity'. We have already seen that 'existence' is that an essence is concretized and 'actuality' is the how of its concretization. Actuality always involves contingency and therefore there can be no logical proof of it. But it does not follow that existence cannot be necessary for existence only requires the non-emptiness of the corresponding class of actualities and a class can be necessary even though all its members are contingent. In this sense, God could be said to be necessarily exist though his actuality is contingent. We must admit accidental or contingent states in the case of God but this need not be an imperfection. What is imperfect is not contingency as such but a double contingency which infects all beings other than God. This double contingency may be explained as below: Consider any predicate as applied to human beings, such as 'human' or H. H is concretized or actualised in a certain spectific way to which there are other alternatives; it could have been actualised in other ways also. In this sense, the actuality of H is contingent. But it is doubly so in the sense that it need not have been actualised at all; it is possible that the class might have been empty. That there is some actualisation of H is itself contingent. In this manner, not only the actulaity of H

but its existence also is contingent. It is this double contingency that is the imperfection of all finite beings and God alone is free from this. For example, consider the divine predicate 'love': L: L is actualised in a certain manner now but it could have been actualised in a different way also. In this sense, the actuality of L is contingent. But whatever may be the other conditions, L would assume some actualization or other. There cannot be any sort of would which would be lacking in L. So the divine predicate has necessary existence, although every concrete actualisation of it would be contingent. This simply means that while in one sense the world is gauranteed of divine ove, yet the specific concrete embodiment of that love is contingent upon, among othor things, the very factualities of the world itself. It is in this way that we could say that God's love would be greater, if the creatures were more perfect than they are now, even though in both cases his love would be unsurpassable by any other love.

In thus applying the two poles of necessity and contingency to God, we must take care to keep two points in mind. (1) The polarities are attributed to God in their eminent forms; thus God is relative and dependent in an eminent or perfect manner. (2) Those categories or concepts which do not admit of a maximal case case cannot be attributed to him. Thus while 'love' admits of a maximal case in 'all loving', 'hate' does not admit of a maximal case in 'all hating' for even the most hateful being, the devil, cannot be said to hate himself.

A simple logical consequence of the distinction between existence and actuality is that the existence of God is an abstract aspect of the divine life and hence a purely logical or conceptual proof is adequate to establish it whereas the concrete actuality of God is always contingent and hence beyond any a priori proof. But this is enough to resolve the Findlay paradox for what a logical demonstration can establish is of course an abstract and the divine existence is such an abstract necessity. As to the concrete actuality of God, only an experience or encounter can be adequate to it.

In conclusion, we may note that the classical conception of God has been mono-polar in the sense that given the polarities of necessity and contingency, independence and dependence, absolute and relative, the classical conception has attributed the first pole in all these polarities to God; thus God has been conceived as completely necessary, independent, absolute and active pure act and so on. But so to conceive of God leads to serious logical tensions and puzzles. But at the same time when the remoteness and aloofness of God conceived in terms of classical theism become apparent, the temptation is great

to substitute in its place, a conception of a finite or growing god, as Mill and James have suggested. But as we have seen the religious attitude itself requires that the object of worship must be maximally perfect in some sense; we cannot truly worship any limitted or finite being. So the resolution of the tensions of classical theism cannot be sought for in terms of any finite God; rather, we must re-shape the classical idea itself.

It is this re-fashioned conception of God that preserves the classical features in due balance that may be called Neo-Classical Theism. The essence of the neo-classical conception of God is that, unlike the classical idea, it is bi-polar. This means that given the polarities of necessity and contingency, absolute and relative, active and passive, independent and dependent, it applies bŏth the categories to different aspects of the divine life in an eminent fashion. Thus, just as there is an eminent sense of independence, there is also an eminent sense of dependence and both are applicable to God. He is, for example, necessary in his existence but contingent in His actuality. Similarly, His knowledge is absolute in its generic essence, but relative in its actual state. This means that while God necessarily has absolute knowledge, the concrete case of divine knowing takes account of and is hence relative to all contingent facts. The main principle is that the polarities apply to different aspects of the divine life in their eminent forms. That they apply to different aspects is enough to safeguard ourselves from contradiction while the fact that they apply in their eminent forms prevents any degradation of the nature of God.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate once again the possibilities before us. If one were to retain unchanged the classical idea of God, one could respond to the logical tensions and infelicities of this conception in either of two ways. One could for instance, deny the meaningfulness of the idea of God, or one could insist upon the need for transcending the language and conceptual structure of theism. Or, thirdly, one could remain committed to the ontological ultimacy of the theistic language, in which case the paper has tried to argue that the idea of God may have to be re-conceptualised in certain ways so as to bring the logic and rhetoric of theism closer together. In sum, we have three choices before us—logical atheism, transcendence of theism and neo-classical theism. Although personally, I feel drawn towards the first, yet I do believe that both the second and the third are arguable possibilities and in effect, I have tried to argue for the third. I only hope that the fact that the suggestions come from an atheist would not be held against them.

T. S. Devadoss

GANDHI'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

God has been the object of search for the best of human minds since the dawn of civilization. These souls have not been the monopoloy of any chosen people, but have belonged to the whole humanity. The paths they have trodden and the trials they have blazed; have been many and varied. Lives of these pioneers in the realm of spirit have been characterized by a high degree of divine qualities described in detail in Canto XVI of the *Gītā*. Rarely does there arise above the common level some rare spirit who, having thought about God more deeply, reflects more clearly the divine purpose and puts into practice more courageously the divine guidance. Mahatma Gandhi belonged to this race of immortals.

In Gandhi, we had a witness to a living experience of spiritual power, bursting forth in a life of heroic activity and an utter indifference to the names we give to the nameless spirit. We find the emphasis on a positive experience of God, a life of dedicated service and sacrifice, and a definite denial of all exclusive claims and labels.

At the outset we should note that Gandhi's philosophy is not an abstract system of thought. It is obvious that Gandhi cannot be considered as a theorist who evolves a system which would give a rational explanation of life and its different facets and, its ultimate goal. It is true that he was not a builder of a conceptual edifice; but this is not to say that he lacked philosophical vision or depth. 'I do not claim to have originated any new principle. I have simply tried in my own way to apply the eternal truths to our daily life and problems. Well, all my philosophy, if it may be called by that pretentious name, is contained in what I have said. You will not call it "Gandhism"; there is no "ism" about it.'[1]

Gandhi tried to unite philosophy with life, abstract principles with concrete realities, religion with politics, and ethics with a programme for social evolution. When Gandhi described his life as an experimentation with truth, the emphasis falls equally on the changing experimentation and the abiding truth. Like a scientist, Gandhi made experiments about some of the eternal verities of life. Making of experiments is necessary to put principles to proof, and to verify the validity of spiritual experiences. To him, all experience is self-experience, which is spiritual experience. In the spiritual dictionary of Gandhi, faith, experience, intuition, revelation, the voice of God, of conscience, of truth or the inner voice or 'the still small voice' mean one and the same thing. Experience is one though its expressions are many. Thus, Gandhi had a unique approach to life, a conviction which grew in intensity throughout his action-studded life. He considered himself to be a practical idealist: 'I care for only one thing in life and that is about my passion for following the dictates of Satyanārāyana.' Right from his childhood his ideal had been to become a votary of truth in life; and later on, through its application to the varied actual problems of everyday life he demonstrated how eminently practical this ideal was.

Let us now analyse Gandhi's spiritual quest. It is true that Gandhi started as an ordinary aspirant with all kinds of doubts and it can be said that at one time he was quite sceptic. He says: 'I was first lacking in faith, but I acquired it by contemplation and the study of religions. It grows day by day as I have an increasing realisation of the fact that God abides with me in my heart.'[2] Though he learnt to rely on God consciously before he was fifteen years old, it required a lot of time and experience for his faith to be as strong as a rock. It is the vision of God, the constant feeling of His Presence which strengthens faith. In his Autobiography, Gandhi wrote: 'It is an unbroken torture to me that I am still so far from Him, who as I fully know, governs every breath of my life and whose offspring I am.' It is with this kind of intense aspiration that Gandhi started his spiritual discipline for the attainment.

The Mahātma presents his conception of God in the following significant statements: 'The Vedas describe Brahman,' says Gandhi, 'as not this, not this.' But if He or It is not this, He or It is.'[3] And again, 'God is that indefinable something which we feel but which we do not know ... To me God is Truth and Love ... God is fearlessness. God is the source of light and life and yet He is above and beyond all these ... He is the purest essence. He simply is to those who have faith.'[4] 'I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around me is ever changing, ever dying, there is underlying all that change a living

power that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves and recreates. That informal power or spirit is God. And since nothing else I see merely through the sense can or persist, He alone is.'[5] Gandhi considers God as benevolent Power. He writes: 'For I can see that in the midst of darkness light persists. Hence I gather that God is Life, Truth, Light. He is Love. He is the Supreme Good.'[6] From the above statements, it is argued rightly that Gandhi's conception of God comes closer to Advaitic thought.

Professor D. M. Datta has pointed out that Gandhi was rather a theist than an Advaitin, that is, he was not a follower of Sankara — a believer in an Indeterminate, Attributeless, Impersonal Absolute (Nirguna Brahman).[7] Against this view Professor T. M. P. Mahadevan, in his National Lectures on 'The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi' delivered at Osmania University, Hyderabad, conclusively proved that the Mahātma was an Advaitin par excellence.

It is to be noted that Gandhi declared explicitly that he was a believer in *advaita*, 'the essential unity of God and man and for that matter of all that lives.' This doctrine has several implications. First of all, this doctrine is incompatible with the belief that an individual may gain spiritually and those that surround him suffer. Gandhi believed that if one man gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him and, if one man falls, the whole world falls to that extent.[8] The Advaita doctrine of *sarva-mukti*, i.e. release of all, lays the spiritual foundation for *Sarvodaya* which is the crux of Gandhian Social Philosophy. According to the Advaitic view, no single individual soul is finally released until all souls are released. There is said to be a class of *muktas* (released souls) called *ādhikarika muktas* who sole purpose in retaining their apparent individuality even after release is to help other souls gain release. Secondly, the monistic doctrine implies that all human beings are working consciously or unconsciously towards the realization of that identity. Gandhi wrote: 'I believe that the sum total of the energy of mankind is not to bring us down but to lift us up.'[9] Thirdly, what one man is capable of achieving is possible for all to attain.[10] The soul is one in all. Its possibilities are the same for everyone.[11] Fourthly, man's ultimate aim is the realization of God, and all his activities, social, political, religious, have to be guided by the ultimate aim of the vision of God. All religions require us to look upon life as an opportunity for self-realization, *ātmanastu kāmaya*'. Gandhi believed in Advaita. He was an apostle of humanitarianism to whom the poor were 'Daridra Nārāyanas'. The immediate service of all human beings becomes a necessary part of the endeavour, simply because the only way to find God is to see God in creation and be one with it. This can be done by service all. Gandhi wrote: 'I am a

part and parcel of the whole, and I cannot find Him apart from the rest of humanity.'[12] Again true individuality consists in reducing oneself to zero. The secret of life is selfless service. Thus for Gandhi men must unite themselves 'by bonds that make all of them as one man'. Although at times, Gandhi spoke of God as a person and the ideal man as a servant of God, he really regarded God, as the Stoics did, as an indefinable and universal power that cannot be conceived apart from humanity or from the whole of nature; each man is a ray or a part (aṁśa) of the divine Power that underlies all change, that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves and re-creates all forms of life.[13] Does not all those statements prove to show that Gandhi was inspired by the basic philosophy which Hinduism teaches in its loftiest form known as *Vedānta*? To cite Gandhi's own words: 'I believe in Advaita. I believe in the essential unity of man and for that matter of all that lives.'[14]

Although an advaitin ultimately and a believer in the one formless and nameless God, Gandhi as he himself said, could be a dvaitist. We should note here that Gandhi used the words 'dvaitin', and '*syādvādi*', without having a precise knowledge of the meanings of these terms in the strict philosophical sense.

That Gandhi is an advaitin is evident in this statement: 'I do not regard God as a person. I understand God to be a Universal Law. God, however cannot be described in His fullness. You may give Him as many names as you like, provided it is the one God without a second.' He added, 'My Rama, the Rama of our prayers is not the historical Rama, the son of Dasaratha the King of Ayodhya. He is the eternal, the unborn, the one without a second'.[15]

Whatever opinion we may hold of God in the Gandhian sense, it is impossible to deny that He means something of supreme importance and absolute reality, 'an all-embracing living light' which is called 'sat-cit-ānanda'. Gandhi wrote: 'It is a fine combination. The three together make one word. Truth is knowledge also. It is life. You feel vitality in you when you have got truth in you. Again it gives Bliss. It is a permanent thing of which you cannot be robbed. You may be sent to the gallows, or put to torture, but if you have Truth in you, you will experience an inner joy.'[16] Gandhi holds Truth above all as expressing accurately the idea of God.

Gandhi distinguishes between relative truth as perceived by finite individuals in relation to a particular set of ideas and circumstances and Truth as the *sumum bonum* i. e., Absolute Truth which he identifies with God. The samskrit term for truth is *Satya* which is derived from

sat which means *being*. *Sat* is the metaphysical expression of Ultimate Reality. But the concept of *sat* as a metaphysical entity is rather vague and mystical. A doubt may arise as to the state beyond, that is before or after *sat* and *asat* or reality or unreality. This doubt is removed in the expression *satya* (truth) which means agreement with reality or adherence to Nature. Truth cannot be thought of as non-existent, for it is the supreme value of life, abiding and ultimate.

Gandhi equates absolute Truth with God. He wrote: 'Of late, instead of saying God is Truth, I have been saying Truth is God in order more fully to define my religion. Now-a-days nothing so completely describes my God as Truth.' This Truth is Absolute and Ultimate, is Existence or Being. Truth alone is or that which really exists. Untruth is *asat*. It is unreal. It does not really exist. It is only apparent existence or being. We find the same idea expressed in *Gītā*.

Gandhi refers to this Truth 'as an unalterable law governing everything that exists or lives. It is not blind law; for no blind law can govern the conduct of living beings. That law which governs all life is God; Law and Law-giver are one.'[18] Further, he observes: 'There is an indefinable, mysterious power that pervades everything. I feel it though I do not see it, It is this unseen power which makes itself felt and yet defies all proof because it is so unlike all that I perceive though senses ... To reject this evidence is to deny oneself.'[19]

The supreme, absolute, ever present spirit or God is both the beginning and final goal of Gandhian thought. To Gandhi, Truth is the end and non-violence is the means. Gandhi's main emphasis is on the integral approach to Truth which pervades life, which when found or even in the process of finding must guide life itself. It is the very nature and the law of Being and Becoming which Gandhi wants to discover and not only an intellectual and logical explanation of things and their relationships. The object of discovering the law is to live accordingly and not only to achieve the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity. Truth is something to be realized in the inner being of one's own self and therefore it is to be experienced by one's whole being. Gandhi's experiments with and discovery of Truth is that of a mystic, intuitionistic, religious seeker, rather than of a curious intellectualist, who wants to probe into the how and the why of things.

Since Truth is the highest being — *sat brahman* — it necessarily follows that the attainment of truth can be considered as complete freedom. This truth is to be nourished not by hand-grenades but by reverence for life — *satyam nāsti paro dharmaha*. There is no religion or

duty higher than Truth to Gandhi, a view which finds full expression in every thought, word and deed of his. He expressed it in the words: 'I often describe my religion as Religion of Truth ... Denial of God we have known. Denial of Truth we have not known. The most ignorant among mankind have some Truth in them. We are all sparks of Truth. The sum-total of these sparks is indescribable, as yet unknown Truth which is God. I am being daily led nearer to It by constant prayer.'[20]

Gandhi dedicated his life to the searching quest of truth in its varied aspects in his own life and in trying to seek self-realization, he made his life into 'numerous experiments with Truth.' He said, '... I am but a seeker after Truth. I do not claim to have found the way to it. I claim to be making a ceaseless effort to find it. To find Truth completely is to realize oneself and one's destiny, that is, to be perfect. I am painfully conscious of my imperfections and therein lies all the strength I possess, because it is a rare thing for man to know his own limitation.'[21] Gandhi, therefore, was concerned with the means whereby the realization of absolute Truth might be advanced. He humbly admitted that he claimed no new truths. He wrote: 'I simply endeavour to follow and represent Truth as I know it. I do not claim to throw a new light on many an old truth. I hope that the declaration will satisfy my inquirer and others.'[22] Gandhi admitted that the path towards the realization of God is difficult. He says: 'I know the path. It is straight and narrow. I weep when I slip. God's word is "He who strives never perishes." I have implicit faith in that promise. Though, therefore from my weakness I fail a thousand times, I will not loose faith but hope that I shall see the Light when the flesh has been brought under perfect subjection, as some day it must.'[23] Further he felt that this Truth could be realized by one and all. The essential qualification required by the aspirant is that He should be humbler than dust. He says: 'The seeker after Truth should be humbler than the dust. The world crushes the dust under his feet. But the seeker after Truth should so humble himself that even the dust could crush him. Only then, and not till then, will he have a glimpse of Truth.'

Such humility is the outcome of perfect non-violence or love in its broad sense. To Gandhi, the means and end are convertible terms. The extreme of means is itself the end. Hence, according to Gandhi, God as Truth is also God as Love. Then naturally compassion follows. It was Gandhi's inner experience of God as Love, and of all phenomena as the manifestations of God which were the spiritual foundations of his ethics.

If one is to characterise Gandhi's spiritual discipline in terms of the Sanātana Hindu Dharma or in terms of Vedānta and Yoga, it was a synthesis of the three *Yogas*, viz., *bhakti*, *jñāna* and *karma*. He remarked ; 'The *Gītā* contains the gospel of work, the gospel of *bhakti* or devotion, and the gospel of *jñāna* or Knowledge. Life should be a harmonious whole of these three'.[24] It is admitted that Gandhi was a *karma-yogi* par excellence. He was a *bhakti-yogi* more than a *jñānī*. but he was a *karma-yogi* more than either. He conceived life itself as incessant action, or, in the words of Carlyle, 'the infinite conjugation of the verb to do.' Though a born idealist, nothing interested him so much as the translation of ideas into practice, of thought into action, of theory into a concrete programme of work. A devotee of God is always in action in the service of other and never gives up Truth. Action mostly spelt for him the service for humanity. Gandhi declared : 'I cannot find Him apart from humanity.' It was this constant and ceaseless *sādhana* which took him to the dim heights of spiritual attainment rarely reached even by great aspirants.

In the quest for ultimate Truth, Gandhi refers to ethical preparation (*yama* and *niyama*) for the realization of Truth. He enumerates (i) *ahimsā* (non-violence), (ii) *satya* (truth), (iii) *āsteya* (non-stealing) (iv) *aparigraha* (non-possession), (v) *brahmacārya* (celibacy). Besides, restraint in food and drink, renunciation and self-sacrifice, bread-labour, swadeshi, untouchability, and finally the doctrine of *sarvadharma-samabhāva* i.e. reverence for all religions. The practice of humility integrates these observances. The manner of integrating act and thought, of thinking in terms of the act, of renouncing in the midst of action, and of renouncing the fruits of action is the essence of Gandhi's philosophy of life. To him '*jñāna-karma-sammuccaya*', i.e. the integration of action with knowledge and knowledge with action is the sumum-bonum of integral philosophy.

It has been stressed through the ages the mystic nature of Brahman as indwelling Love, the nature of *mumukṣutva* as soul hunger for Brahman who is the inner Life and Light of the *jīva* and the ultimate good as intimate union between the two. Brahman is the all-pervasive Divine Presence that has specially entered into the heart of every *jīva* or *ātman* in order that it may be transmuted into its own shining blissful *svarūpa*. Brahman or God is life of our life '*satyasya satyam*', light of lights *jyotiṣām jyotis*' and beauty of beauties '*bhuvana sundara*.' The Vedāntic schools agree in the fundamentals, namely, the common authority of the *prasthānas*, the need for *Brahmajñāna* consequent on the removal of *ahaṅkāra* and the goal as *Brahmānubhava* and *Brahmānanda*. The experience of saintly person or a mystic is 'ananda' pure unalloyed bliss in the realization of being one with the universe and the crea-

tor. It is the joy of affirmation, of life and being, joy of the universe; this supreme super bliss is a vital spark which illumines and guides, the life and work of a saintly person. For him there is joy in being, in serving.— '*Ānandam brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kutaścaneti*'. The whole world is replete with joy for him and he is fearless and peerless because his self is *Ātmānandamayaḥ*. The entire universe comprehending man within it glows with radiance (tejas) of God. The realization of this great truth of universal pervasion of the deity dawns only in the lives of spiritual seekers whose illumination and influence make the impression on those in the midst of whom they live. The greatness of a Buddha, or Christ, or Mohammed or a Gandhi was due to the essential spirituality or intimate religiousness which pervaded their whole life and action.

Extensive researches carried by Professors Underhill and George Godwin show that the mystics, the world over, have followed the same way, viz., first, awakening God awareness, secondly, ridding the mind of temptation, values and influences by attachment, fear and wrath; thirdly, illumination of the self; fourthly, surrendering the Self to God, fifthly, union with God, and finally liberation from the control of finite things. This mystic way is common to mystics throughout the ages. The *Gītā* aptly describes such mystics thus: 'They are asleep in the world of senses in which ordinary men are awake, they are awake in the world of the spirit in which ordinary men are asleep.'

Speaking of his own aim in life, the Mahātma said: 'What I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain mokṣa ...All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field are directed to the same end.'[25] At another place, Gandhi elaborates the implications of seeing God, 'face to face.' 'To see the universal and all-pervading spirit of Truth face to face, one must be able to love the meanest of creation as oneself. And a man who aspires after that cannot afford to keep out of any field including politics.' His love of God, as of all mystics, was founded on an unshakable faith in God: *Para śraddha* like all great mystics who have known Reality or God face to face, Gandhi revolted against the Supremacy conceded to reason in judging spiritual experience. He says: 'He is no God who merely satisfies the intellect if he ever does. God must rule the heart and transform it. Sense perception can be, often are, false and deceptive, however real they may appear to us. Where there is realisation outside the sense, it is infallible.'[26] He further says: 'We must ever fail to perceive Him through the senses, because He is beyond them. We can feel Him if we will but withdraw ourselves from the senses. The divine music is incessantly going on within ourselves but the loud

senses drown the delicate music, which is unlike and infinitely superior to anything which can perceive or hear with our senses.'

The mystic way prescribes purging oneself of attachment, wrath and fear. Gandhi placed great emphasis on public and private prayer as a means to purge the heart of passions. In his Autobiography, Gandhi sums up his attitude on prayer in beautiful words: 'Supplication, worship, prayer are no superstition ... Worship or prayer is no flight of eloquence, it is no lip-homage. It spirings from the heart. If, therefore, we achieve that purity of the heart when it is "emptied of all but love", if we keep all the chords in proper tune, they "trembling pass in music out of sight." Prayer needs no speech. I have not the slightest doubt that prayer is an unfailing means of cleansing the heart of passion. But it must be combined with the utmost humility.' Worshipping God is like singing the priase of God. Prayer is a compression of one's unworthiness and weakness.'

The mystic way enjoins solitude. Gandhi though living in the midst of crowds, had his own way of returning into solitude by imposing silence upon himself and became a hermit in the midst of crowds. He said: 'Voluntary solitude is the surest way of developing contact with God ... Employing of the mind of all conscious processes of thought and filling it with the spirit of God unmanifest brings one ineffable peace and attunes the soul with the infinite.' It is through solitude that the great mystics have transfigured themselves into moral leaders of humanity and finally exerted enormous spiritual influence upon humanity. By their very presence, as in the case of Bhagavān Ramana Maharshi, Rāmakrishna Paramahamsa, they became symbols of creative love and spirituality. As the Bible states:

'My soul, be thou silent unto God.'

'Speak Lord, for thy servant hearkeneth.'

Just as prayer is addressed by a mystic to God for His mercy and kindness, so is fasting. Fasting, according to Gandhi is not an act of coercion. It is the last weapon in the armoury of *ahimsā*. When human ingenuity fails, the votary fasts. This fasting quickens the spirit of prayer. It is a spiritual act addressed to God. Jesus and Muhammad fasted so as to see God face to face. Bhagavān Rāma fasted so that the sea might give way for his army of monkeys. Gandhi fasted in order to become one with serving humanity.

To Gandhi, the Voice of God, of conscience, of Truth or the Inner Voice, or 'the still small voice,' mean one and the same thing. He wrote: 'My claim to hear the Voice of God is no new claim.

Unfortunately, there is no way that I know of proving, the claim except through results. God will not be God if He allowed Himself to be an object of proof by His creatures. But He does give His willing slave the power to pass through the fiercest of ordeals. I have been a willing slave to this most exacting Master for more than half a century. His Voice has been increasingly audible, as years have rolled by. He has never forsaken me even in my dark hour. He has saved me often against myself and left me not a vestige of independence. The greater the surrender to Him, the great has been my joy.'[26]

Gandhi, thereby does not throw off reason to the winds. Reason and Faith are not the opposites of each other. Unfaithful reason and irrational faith are, in fact, contradictions in terms. Reason gains stability through faith and faith acquires clarity through reason.

Here I think, is the core of Gandhi's image — of a man endlessly, tirelessly in search of truth. Nandlal Bose, in that famous linocut, immortalized the walking Gandhi, the eternal pilgrim with the staff in his hand and the forward gait, moving endlessly on, never looking back. But Gandhi was more than a pilgrim : he was an indefatigable searcher for Truth. Gandhi cannot be understood in terms of the Mahābhārata or Harischandra. If we may put this in the form of an equation.

Gandhi — God = Zero

Unless we take into account Gandhi's open and avowed absorption in God — which to him was the same thing as truth — all our attempts to understand and interpret him will lead to nothing. Not only did the Mahātma reveal to us anew the excellence of the Vedāntic truth that God alone is real, and nothing else is, but also he showed the way of realizing this truth through selfless service to humanity. In short, the story of Gandhi's life is the story of his experiments with Truth. He was a great *bhakta* of God. Who else but Gandhi could have uttered the name of God — 'Hei Rām Rām', before his soul was released from this '*māyā prapañca.*

1. *Harijan*, March 28, 1936, p. 49.
2. *Harijan*, March 11, 1939.
3. *Young India*, January 21, 1926.
4. *Young India*, March 5, 1925.
5. *Ibid.*, October 11, 1928.
6. *Ibid.*, October 11, 1928.

7. D. M. Datta, *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, (University of Calcutta), 1968, p. 26.
8. *Young India*, December, 1924.
9. *Young India*, Nov. 1931.
10. D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahātma*, Vol. 4, p. 353.
11. *Harijan*, May 1940.
12. *Ibid.*, August, 1936.
13. *Young India*, October 1928.
14. *Ibid.*, December 4, 1932, p. 398.
15. M. K. Gandhi, *The Supreme Power, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan*, Bombay, 1963.
16. Shriman Narayan, *The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Navajivan, 1969, Vol. VI. p. 97.
17. S. Radhakrishnan, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 21.
18. C. F. Andrews, *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, Macmillan, 1930, p. 43.
19. *Young India*, October. 11, 1928.
20. Radhakrishnan and Muirhead, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, 1936, p. 21.
21. *Young India*, November 17, 1921.
22. N. K. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi*, Navajivan, Ahmedabad, 1948, p. IX.
23. M. K. Gandhi, *My Experiments with Truth*, Navajivan, p. 4.
24. *Young India*, November, 1927.
25. *Harijan*, 29—8—1936, p. 226.
26. *Young India*, 14—10—1926.
27. *Harijan*, 18—3—1933.

PART THREE

SPECIAL ARTICLES

K. C. Aravinda Rajagopal

TRUTH AND BEAUTY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIVEKĀNANDA

It is conceived by Vivekānanda that in the whole of this universe there is but one Existence, and that one Existence when seen through the senses is called the world of matter. When this is seen through the mind, it is called the world of thoughts and ideas, and when it is seen as it is, then it is the One Infinite Being. It is not that there is a soul in man, although Vivekānanda had taken that for granted in order to explain it at first, but that there is only One Existence, and that One, the Ātman, the Self, when perceived through the senses, through sense imageries, is called the body. When it is perceived through thought, it is called the mind. When it is perceived in Its own nature, It is the Ātman, the only One Existence. Hence it cannot be conceived that there are three things in One, the body and the mind and the Self, but all is that Ātman and that one Being is sometimes called the body, sometimes the mind, and sometimes the Self, according to different visions. There is but One Being which is called the world by the ignorant. When a man attains higher knowledge he calls the very same being the world of thought. Again when knowledge itself comes, all illusions disappear and man finds it is all nothing but Ātman. I am that One Existence. There are neither three nor two in the universe; it is all one. That One, under the illusion of *Māyā*, is seen as many, just as a rope is seen as a snake. It is the same rope that is seen as a snake. We always perceive that One. When we perceive the rope, we do not perceive the snake at all; and when we perceive the snake we do not perceive the rope at all. When we perceive illusion we do not see Reality. When we perceive ourselves as bodies, we are bodies and nothing else and that is the perception of several men. They may talk of soul and mind, but what they perceive is the physical form, the touch, taste, vision and so on. Again, with certain men, in certain states of consciousness, they perceive themselves

as thought. There are many people who, of course, know the story of Sir Humphrey Davy, who was making experiments before his class with laughing-gas, and suddenly one of the tubes broke, and the gas escaping, he breathed it in. For some time he stood like a statue. Afterwards he informed the students that when he was in that state, he actually perceived that the whole universe is made up of ideas. The gas, for a time, made him forget the consciousness of the body, and that very thing which he was seeing as the body, he began to perceive as ideas. When the consciousness rises still higher when this little puny consciousness is gone for ever, that which is the Reality behind shines, and we see it as the One Existence-Knowledge-Bliss, the One Ātman, the universal. "One that is only knowledge itself, One that is Bliss itself, beyond all compare, beyond all limit, ever free, never bound, infinite as the sky, unchangeable as the sky. Such a one will manifest Himself in the heart of every devotee in meditation." Every one must meditate on that One Supreme Truth and every idea that strengthens the mind must be taken up and every thought that weakens his mind must be eliminated. The *bhakta* meditates upon froms and images and all such things and upon God. This is the natural process, but a slower one. The *yogī* meditates upon various centres in his body and manipulates powers in his mind. The *jñānī* says, the mind does not exist, neither the body. This idea of the body must go, must be driven off. It would be like attempting to cure one ailment by bringing in another. The *jñānī* wants to get rid of the universe from the Self by the sheer force of analysis. The *jñānī* wants to rise above every idea of body and mind, to drive away the idea that he is the body. The *bhakta* says: "The Lord has given me this body that I may safely cross the ocean of life, and I must cherish it until the journey is accomplished." "The *yogī* says: "I must be careful of the body, so that I may go steadily and finally attain liberation." The *jñānī* feels that he cannot wait, he must reach the goal this very moment. He says: "I am free through eternity, I am never bound; I am the God of the Universe through all eternity. Who shall make me perfect? I am perfect already."

Vivekānanda points out that it is not possible for everybody to live in harmony in the building of characters in this life; yet we are aware that character is of the noblest type in which knowledge and love and *yoga* are harmoniously fused. *jñāna* (knowledge) is the one thing, *bhaki* (devotion) is the other, and *yoga* is the link that brings unity between the two by way of synthesis. For those to whom these three forms of worship cannot be followed together in a harmonious manner and who take up, therefore, *bhakti* alone as their way, it is necessary always, to remember that forms and ceremonials, though absolutely

necessary for the progressive soul, have no other value than taking us on to that state in which we feel the most intense love to God.

Further, we find that different opinions are held between the teachers of knowledge and those of devotion, though both admit the practice of devotion (*bhakti*). The jñānins hold *bhakti* to be an instrument of liberation, the bhaktas regard it both as the instrument and the thing to be attained. To Vivekānanda this is a distinction without much difference. As a matter of fact, when *bhakti* is employed as an instrument it really means a lower form of worship and the higher form becomes inseparable from the lower form of realization at each stage. Each lays great emphasis upon his peculiar method of worship, forgetting that with perfect love true knowledge is bound to occur even when it is not sought and that from perfect knowledge true love is inseparable.

Let us now try to understand what the great commentators have to say on the subject. In explaining the Sūtra *āvṛttiraśakridūpadesāt*, Śankara says: "Thus people say,—'He is devoted to the king, He is devoted to the Guru:' they say this of him who follows his guru, and does so, having that following as the one end in view. Similarly, they say— 'The loving wife meditates on her loving husband'; here also a kind of eager and continuous remembrance is meant." This is devotion in the view of Śankara.

Meditation, again, is a constant remembrance flowing continuously like an unbroken stream of oil. When one attains this kind of remembrance all bondages are removed. Thus it is declared in the scriptures that constant remembrance is used as a means to liberation. Worship is constant remembering as may be seen from the essential texts of scriptures. Knowing which is the same as repeated worship, has been described as constant remembering. Thus the memory, which has attained to the height of what is as good as direct perception is spoken of in the *śruti*, as a means of liberation. "This Ātman is not to be reached through various sciences, nor by intellect, nor by much study of the Vedas. Whomsoever this Ātman desires by him is the Ātman attained, unto him this Ātman discovers Himself."[1] Here after saying that mere hearing, thinking and meditating are not the means of attaining this Ātman, it is said, 'whom this Ātman desires by him the Ātman is attained. The extremely beloved is desired: by whomsoever this Ātman is extremely beloved, he becomes the most beloved of the Ātman. So that this beloved may attain the Ātman, the Lord Himself helps. For it has been said by the Lord: 'Those who are constantly attached to Me and worship Me with love — I give that direction to their will by which they come to Me'.

Therefore it is said that, to whomsoever this remembering, which is of the same form as direct perception, is very clear because it is dear to the object of such memory-perception, he is desired by the Supreme Ātman, by him the Supreme Ātman is attained. This constant remembrance is denoted by the word *bhakti*. These are the sentences uttered by Rāmānuja in his commentary on the Sūtra *Athāto brahma jijñāsā*.

According to Vivekānanda, *bhakti yoga* is the science of higher love. It does not say " Give up ", it only says " Love ; love the highest " : and everything low naturally falls off from him, the object of whose love is this highest. Vivekānanda says " I cannot tell anything about Thee, except that Thou art my love. Thou art beautiful, Oh, Thou art beautiful ! Thou art beauty itself." What is really required of in this *yoga* is that our attention should be directed towards God. The beauty in the human face, in the sky, in the stars, and in the moon is only the partial apprehension of the real all-embracing Divine Beauty. " He shining, everything shines. It is through His light that all things shine." A further quotation can be cited in this connection. " Whenever there is any bliss, even though in the most sensual of things, there is a spark of that Eternal Bliss which is the Lord Himself." The germ of Divine Love is present even in the lowest kinds of attraction. One of the names of the Lord is Hari, and this means that He attracts all things to Himself. For instance, when you see a man going after a beautiful face, you cannot think that it is the handful of arranged material molecules which attracts the man. Behind those meterial molecules, divine influence, divine play is at work. Though the ignorant man does not know it, yet consciously or unconsciously, he is attracted by it alone. In the same way, the lowest forms of attraction derive their power from God Himself. " None, O beloved, ever loved the husband for the husband's sake ; it is the Ātman, the Lord who is within ; for whose sake the husband is loved."[2] Loving wives may know this or they may not ; it is true all the same. " None, O beloved, ever loved the wife for the wife's sake, but it is the Self in the wife that is beloved." Similarly, no one loves a child or anything else in the world except on account of Him who is within. The Lord is the magnet, and we are like iron filings ; we are being constantly attracted by Him, and all of us are struggling to reach Him.

However, the *bhakti-yogin* passes through several obstacles and struggles in life and knows what they mean and tries to get rid of them. He wants to avoid the clash and go direct to the centre of all attraction, the great Hari. This is the renunciation of the *bhakta*. By *bhakti* his heart is filled with the Divine waters of the ocean of love,

which is God Himself, there is no place for little loves. That is to say, the bhakta's renunciation is that *vairāgya* or non-attachment for all things that are not God, which results from *anurāga*, or great attachment to God.

By the renunciation of all things the individual soul reaches the highest stage of supreme devotion or *parā bhakti*. Then only has a person the right to say that all forms and symbols are of no use to him for the attainment of realization. He alone has attained that supreme state of love. Through every face shining to him is Hari. The light in the sun or the moon is all His manifestation. Wherever there is beauty or sublimity to him it is all His. Such bhaktas are still living; the world is never without them.

A problem is posed by Vivekānanda whether it is possible to love the *Vyaṣṭi*, the particular, without first loving the *samaṣṭi*, the universal. God is the *samāṣṭi*, the generalized and the abstract universal whole; and the universe that is perceived by us is the *vyaṣṭi*, the particularized thing. It is possible to love the whole universe only by loving the *samaṣṭi* — the universal which is one unity in which several smaller unities were found. The devotee of God realizes that one abstract Person in loving whom he loves the whole universe. The *yogin* tries to attain that one generalized form of power, by controlling which he controls the whole universe. If one goes on loving one person after another, he may go on loving them so for an infinite length of time, and will never be able to love the world as a whole. The central idea is that when one realizes that the sum total of all love is God, that the sum total of the aspirations of all the souls in the universe, whether they be free or bound or struggling towards liberation, is God, then alone it becomes possible for any one to show love towards all. God is the samaṣṭi and the universe is the manifestation of God which is an undifferentiated and unmanifested One. If we love the One God, we love everything. "Everything is His and He is my lover; I love him," says the *bhakta*. All are His children, His body, His manifestation. When we come nearer to God we begin to see that all things are found in Him. When the higher states of this love have been reached by us all the differences between the things of the world vanish; man remains as God. Thus in this state of *bhakti* one offers worship to every one, to every life, and to every being. As a consequence of this intense all-absorbing love arises the feeling of perfect self-surrender, the conviction that nothing that happens is against us — *apratikūlya*. The *bhakta* in this state of absolute self-surrender arising out of intense love to God and to all that are His fails to make a distinction between pleasure and pain in so far as they affect Him. He treats both pleasure and pain alike. He does not realize what it is to complain of

pain or misery; and this kind of uncomplaining resignation to the will of God, who is all love, is indeed a worthier acquisition than all the glory of grand and heroic performances.

In this state of sublime resignation all kinds af attachment go away completely except that one all-embracing love to Him in whom all things live and move and have their being. This attachment of love to God and detachment to all other things does not bind the soul but remove all its bondages. Thus in the philosophy of Vivekānanda, one can attain the highest knowledge of God who is the Absolute Truth and Absolute Beauty by means of *bhakti yoga* though it paves the way for the other means of *jñāna yoga*.

1. *nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyaḥ na medhayā na bahunā śrutena. yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyastasyaiṣa atmā vivṛṇute tanūm svām. Kaṭhopaniṣad* II—23 and *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III, 2,3.

2. *na vā are patyuḥ kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati.*

T. P. Ramachandran

SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF DVAITA

In a composite philosophy like that of India differences between one particular school and another may exist in two ways. A school may possess certain concepts, or ideas, not found in another. For example, the concept of God is found in a school of Vedānta, but not in Jainism or Buddhism. Again, even when a certain concept is subscribed to by more than one school, the particular conception of it, i. e. the manner in which the idea is conceived, the specific meaning attached to it, may vary from school to school. The idea of God as it is found in Dvaita, for example, is not exactly the same as it is found in Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus the features which distinguish one school from another are partly the concepts peculiar to that school and partly its special conceptions of common concepts. In this article an attempt is made to indicate the distinctive quality of Dvaita Vedānta by presenting, as specimens, its conceptions in regard to three concepts which it shares with some other schools. The first of these concepts relates to epistemology and the other two to metaphysics.

1. 'The Witness' (*sākṣin*)

The term *sākṣin* implies the idea of something that stands aloof from an activity and bears testimony to it. Many a school of Indian philosophy seems to have felt the need for such a concept in its epistemology for the reason that knowledge as we are commonly familiar with involves change.

In the first place, with reference to its content, knowledge appears and disappears. The knowledge of one object is succeeded by the knowledge of another object, and so on. Besides, new knowledge

sometimes contradicts old knowledge. We are also given to forgetfulness, that is the knowledge of an object previously gained may go into oblivion. The fact that knowledge thus goes on changing with reference to its content presupposes an unchanging principle behind it that unifies the different items of knowledge, so that it is able to testify that such and such knowledge is present or absent or that no knowledge takes place at a particular time.

In the second place, what is recognized in common by most schools of Indian philosophy as the chief instrument of knowledge, namely the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), is recognized to be active in the formation of knowledge, although the nature of its activity is conceived differently by different schools. Now, what is subject to activity cannot be constant. As the internal organ is not constant, it cannot itself be a unifier of the different items of the knowledge that it produces. Hence the activity of the internal organ presupposes the existence of an entity that witnesses that activity without being involved in it.

For these reasons, the idea of a witness (*sākṣin*) is present, implicitly if not explicitly, in the epistemology of most schools of Indian philosophy. In at least three schools, the idea takes explicit form. They are Sāṅkhya, Advaita, and Dvaita. The conceptions of the *sākṣin*, however, differ in the three schools.

According to Sāṅkhya, the individual soul, called *puruṣa,* is itself the witness (*sākṣin*). Cognitive activity belongs to the internal organ, which is a product of matter (*prakṛti*). By association with the internal organ, the *puruṣa* imagines itself to be involved in the cognitive activity ; in reality, it is merely a looker-on, a witness (*sākṣin*), of not only the cognitive activity of the internal organ, but also of all the activities of *prakṛti*.

According to Advaita also, the term *sākṣin* is a synonym for the individual soul in its true character, namely as aloof from the internal organ with which it is identified through ignorance. This *sākṣin*, which is identical with the individual self, is also called *jīvasākṣin* to distinguish it from a similar concept on the plane of the supreme being, which is called *Īśvara-sākṣin*.

The *jīva-sākṣin* is different from what is called the *jīva*. The *jīva* is consciousness defined, or delimited, by the internal organ. It is consciousness which is (falsely) identified with the internal organ and which by such identification imagines itself to be localised and particularised in the internal organ. As the *jīva*, one imagines oneself to be a knower of objects (*jñātṛ*), an agent of actions (*kartṛ*), and an

enjoyer of the results of actions (*bhoktṛ*). But the self in itself is not identified with the fitful internal organ. It stands aloof and unaffected by the states of the internal organ and merely witnesses them. It is in this true condition that the self is called *sākṣin*, or *jīva-sākṣin*. This character of the self is not evident in the waking state, although it is present even then. It is partially evident in the dream state and fully evident in the state of dreamless sleep, when the self is dissociated from both the senses and the internal organ, their activities being absent.

To regard the self as the *sākṣin*, or *jīva-sākṣin*, is nearer to its real nature as identical with Brahman than to regard it as the *jīva*. But even the concept of the *sākṣin*, or *jīva-sākṣin*, does not represent the final truth about the self, for even the idea of a witness implies the distinction between the witness and what is witnessed, in other words, between the subject and the object in knowledge. This limitation is explained by stating that, although the self as *sākṣin* is not associated with the internal organ (as in the case of the self as *jīva*), it nevertheless is hidden, or screened, by the internal organ, so that it still appears as a finite centre of consciousness. For this reason, the *jīva-sākṣin* is said to be different for each individual.

We may now pass on to the Dvaita conception of the *sākṣin*. Both in Sāṅkhya and in Advaita, consciousness is regarded as the essence of the self, and the self, which is consciousness, is called the *sākṣin*. As a reaction against this view, Dvaita regards consciousness as belonging to the self, as its essential attribute. And it is as the essential attribute of the self, that consciousness is called the *sākṣin* in Dvaita. Thus, in Dvaita, the *sākṣin* is not the self, but what belongs to the self. The self is called *jīva*, or *jīvātman*, or *ātman*, and the *sākṣin* is its faculty of knowing. (Unlike in Advaita, the concept of *Īśvara-sākṣin* does not occur in Dvaita. Hence there is no need to use the term *jīva-sākṣin*. The concept of *sākṣin* here is with reference to the *jīva* only.)

As the essential attribute of consciousness belonging to the individual soul, the *sākṣin* is said to have a two-fold function. It has a part to play in the production of knowledge and in the ascertainment of its presence and validity.

I. The *sākṣin* contributes to knowledge by perception (*pratyakṣa-pramā*). In this role, it functions as a sense (*indriya*). According to Dvaita, the senses are seven in number — the five external senses, *manas*, and *sākṣin*. The conception of the *manas* and the *sākṣin* as senses is a special feature of Dvaita. The *sākṣin* is said to be the

purest form of *indriya*. It is not subject to defects and so always produces absolutely valid knowledge. The *sākṣin* perceives two types of objects in two different ways. (A) It perceives those objects which are presented to all the other senses through those senses. Thus this perception by the *sākṣin* is indirect. (B) It directly, or intuitively, perceives those objects which cannot be perceived by the other senses. The objects directly perceived by the *sākṣin* are (1) the five external senses, (2) the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*, or *manas*), (3) the attributes of the *manas*, namely pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), (4) ignorance (*avidyā*), (5) time (*kāla*), (6) unmanifested ether (*avyākṛta-ākāśa*), and (7) the self (*ātman*).

The mention of the last, namely the *ātman*, brings out another special feature of Dvaita. It is that the self is known as an object by its own sentience, namely the *sākṣin*. According to Advaita, self-knowledge, i. e. knowledge of oneself by oneself, is a contradiction in terms, as one and the same entity cannot be both the subject and the object. But, according to Dvaita, self-knowledge, like any other knowledge, is meaningful, and it is explained in Dvaita as perception of the self by the *sākṣin*. The *sākṣin* is not an entity apart from the self. It is the self's own permanent quality of sentience. Yet, a distinction is made possible between the two by the presence of *viśeṣa* in the self. *Viśeṣa* is that peculiar power of a substance by virtue of which a quality is distinguished from the substance to which it belongs. By virtue of *viśeṣa*, the consciousness belonging to the self is distinguished from the self as such, and thus perception of the self as an object by the *sākṣin* is rendered possible.

II. The second important role of the *sākṣin* is the revelation of the presence and validity of knowledge. The *manas* is the chief instrument of knowledge in that knowledge takes place by a modification (*vṛtti*) of the *manas*. But the *manas*, being insentient (*jaḍa*), cannot reveal the existence and validity of knowledge. The power to reveal the presence and validity of knowledge belongs only to the *sākṣin*.

Firstly, the presence of knowledge is said to be ascertained by the *sākṣin*. Knowledge reveals objects. But how is knowledge revealed? When I know *the table*, I also know *that I know the table*. How is this possible? According to the Nyāya school, the knowledge about the knowledge of an object is an after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*). It happens subsequently when we reflect upon the knowledge that we earlier had about an object. But this view is highly artificial. In the first place, it involves the logical difficulty that if one knowledge has to be revealed by a subsequent knowledge, the second too will have to be revealed by a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. In the second, the view is

not supported by facts. The fact is that the awareness that we have of our knowledge of an object is simultaneous with that knowledge, and not subsequent to it. This fact is explained by the Dvaitin by reference to the *sākṣin*. The *sākṣin* is the constant witness of all the knowledge that takes place by the activity of the *manas*. Hence it reveals to the self whatever knowledge that takes place thus. But, while the *manas*, which is insentient, undergoes modification (*vṛtti*) and reflects the light of the *sākṣin* in order to provide for the knowledge of the object, the *sākṣin*, which is the faculty of consciousness reveals the activity of the *manas* by its own natural power (*sahaja-śakti*). For this reason, while the knowledge of objects, which takes place by the activity of the *manas*, is called *vṛtti-jñāna*, the knowledge that is the inherent revealing power of the *sākṣin* is called *svarūpa-jñāna*.

Along with the presence, the validity of knowledge is said to be ascertained by the *sākṣin*. Like the other schools of Vedānta, Dvaita subscribes to the theory of validity called *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*, represented by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. According to this theory, whenever knowledge arises, we presume that it is valid and act upon it. We do not stop to consider every time that knowledge arises whether it is valid. In fact, such an attitude would have made life itself impossible. We go about our activities on the supposition that the knowledge that we form about various objects is true. Thus the arisal of knowledge is accompanied by the certitude that it is true. Knowledge is known to be valid even as it arises, and by its own nature, i. e. without requiring any extraneous evidence. Now, the question is, what is it that enables us to discern the validity in this manner? What is it that gives us the implicit assurance that the knowledge formed must be true? This question, left unanswered by Mīmāṁsā, is sought to be explained by the Vedānta schools in their own ways.

According to Dvaita, the *sākṣin*, which reveals the occurrence of every case of knowledge, reveals also the validity of that knowledge. Thus the basis for the ascertainment of validity is the *sākṣin*. The validity of knowledge is self-evident in the sense that it is apprehended, or revealed, by the *sākṣin*. The Dvaitin also makes it clear that the *sākṣin* has no part to play in the ascertainment of invalidity. Invalidity is revealed by the failure of knowledge to produce expected results (*visaṁvādi-pravṛtti*), and not by the *sākṣin*. When, sometimes, the natural capacity of the *sākṣin* to grasp the validity of knowledge is obstructed by defects in the *manas* and other instruments, there results doubt. To remove the doubt, a practical test is resorted to. If the activity produces the expected result, the doubt being removed, the *sākṣin* reveals the validity of the knowledge. If the activity does not

produce the expected result, the knowledge stands self-condemned as false. Thus validity alone is revealed by the *sākṣin*.

We have seen that, according to Dvaita, whenever knowledge occurs, that it has occurred and that it is valid is revealed by the *sākṣin*. That a case of knowledge is invalid alone is revealed by extraneous tests. These are points which Dvaita has in common with Advaita, although the conceptions of the *sākṣin* are different in the two schools. But, because of the difference in the conceptions, the role of the *sākṣin* in these respects is conceived differently in the two schools.

It may be remembered that the *sākṣin*, in Dvaita, is the essential attribute of consciousness belonging to the self, or subject. Thus a distinction is maintained between the subject of knowledge and the *sākṣin*. For this reason, the *sākṣin*, which reveals the presence and validity of knowledge, may be said to reveal them *for* the subject, or self. But, according to Advaita, the *sākṣin* is the self, or subject, itself, and not its attribute. Hence that which reveals the presence and validity of knowledge and that for which such revelation is made are identical.

As a corollary of this difference, the *sākṣin* is regarded as the criterion of validity in Dvaita, but not in Advaita. The term 'criterion' implies a distinction between itself and the subject which resorts to it. The Dvaita conception of the *sākṣin* as distinct from the subject permits the *sākṣin* being called the criterion of validity, but not the Advaita conception which identifies the *sākṣin* and the subject.

2. Difference (*bheda*)

That one thing differs from another is a fact presented to knowledge. Hence the fact of difference cannot be ignored by anyone, and it calls for an explanation from the philosopher.

What is meant by the term 'difference'? The Nyāya school defines difference as mutual negation (*anyonya abhāva*) between two objects. For example, the paper and the pen exclude each other. That the paper is not the pen and the pen is not the paper is the import of their difference. This definition has been generally accepted by other schools of Indian philosophy.

The important question that has been discussed by the schools is the relation between *the object that is said to differ* (from another object) and *the difference*. On this question there are mainly three views..

(1) The Vaiśeṣika school holds that difference is a category (*padārtha*) independent of the things that differ. (2) Schools like Nyāya and Sāṅkhya regard difference as an attribute (*dharma*) of the thing which differs from another. (3) The third view is represented by the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā. We may state this in some detail, as the Dvaita view, which we shall state shortly, bears a close similarity to this.

According to the Prābhākara school, difference is the very nature (*svarūpa*) of the object (*dharmin*). Hence this view is called *dharmi-svarūpa-bheda-vāda*. To explain: when we speak of the difference of A (from B), there are not two factors, 'A' *and* 'its difference (from B)'; the object A itself constitutes the difference from B. This will be evident when we consider a concrete example. We know that the pen is different from the paper. But we do not first know the pen as such and then know its difference from the paper. To know the pen is itself to know its difference from the paper. That is why we call it a pen, and not a paper. There is no object apart from its differences from other objects. It is these differences that give to the object its special character. Hence an *object* and its *difference* (from another object) are not two factors; they are identical.

According to Advaita, difference, though cognized, is not real. Analysing the conceptions of difference till then held, post-Śāṅkara dialecticians like Citsukha and Śrīharṣa have shown that in whatever way difference may be conceived as pertaining to objects, the concept of difference is riddled with contradictions. Hence, according to Advaita, the notion of difference is false, and the implication of this analysis is that non-difference (*abheda*) alone is the reality. We may confine our attention to the objections raised by Advaitins against the last of the three views referred to above, namely the *dharmi-svarūpa-bheda-vāda* of the Prābhākara school. These objections may be summarised as follows.

(1) To identify the difference with the object would mean that the object alone exists, and not the difference. In the alternative, it would throw the object in jeopardy. If innumerable differences are said to be identical with the object, there would be no meaning in speaking of a single object and the conclusion would be that there is only the void (*śūnyatā*).

(2) If differences were identical with the object, the moment the object is known, its difference from every other object should also be known. In other words, there should be no room for doubt in regard to its difference from every other object. But such is not our experience.

We sometimes fail to distinguish one object from another, which means that all its differences are not known by knowing the object. Hence difference cannot be identical with the object.

Madhva felt the force of these arguments. At the same time, as a realistic Vedāntin, he was convinced that difference, which is actually cognized, ought to be real. He felt that the objections raised by the Advaitins would apply, not to difference as such, but only to the way in which it had been conceived by earlier philosophers. He therefore sought to revise the conception of difference in such a manner as to obviate the objections raised by the Advaitins.

The theory of difference propounded by Madhva and developed by Jayatīrtha is similar to the *dharmi-svarūpa-bheda-vāda* of Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā. But it is not a mere reproduction of the latter. Like the Prābhākara, Madhva regards difference as identical with the essential nature (*svarūpa*) of the object (*dharmin*). However, it is not a bare or absolute identity that is meant. If the difference and the object were absolutely identical, common language would not have permitted a distinction between the two. If 'A' and 'its difference' were absolutely identical, how is it that we often speak of 'the difference *of* A', implying thereby a distinction between the two? Hence the identity of the difference with the object is a special type of identity which provides for an occasional distinction between the two. Madhva explains this relationship by means of the concept of *viśeṣa*. Every substance has the unique capacity to show distinctions within its own structure. The identity of the difference with the thing is identity on the basis of *viśeṣa* (*saviśeṣa-abhinna*). Thus the Dvaita view of difference is unique in that, while it regards difference as the essence (*svarūpa*) of the object (*dharmin*), it at the same time provides through *viśeṣa* the means of distinguishing the difference from the object as such. It may therefore be called *saviśeṣa-abhinna-dharmi-svarūpa-bheda-vāda*.

Such a view of difference is said to be unimpaired by the objections raised by the Advaitins. Firstly, as the relationship of the difference with the object is not an absolute equation, the reality of neither the difference nor the object is nullified by that of the other. Secondly, the objection of the absence of doubt does not hold good. The first knowledge of the object cannot necessarily imply the knowledge of its differences from every other object. All differences do lie within the nature (*svarūpa*) of an object. But, as they are based on *viśesa*, all of them are not manifested at the same time. They become manifest through the operation of *viśeṣa* only as occasion demands. Hence it is wrong to say that on knowing

an object even for the first time, one knows its difference from every other object and that therefore there will be no room for doubt and enquiry. According to the Mādhva view, on our first acquaintance with an object we come to know only *in a general way* that it is different from other objects. Owing to its resemblances with certain other objects, doubts and mistakes may arise leading to closer observation, which, in turn, reveals how exactly the object in question differs from these objects.

3. Causation (*kāraṇatā*)

What is the relation of the effect to the material cause? Does the effect exist in the material cause prior to its production or not?

According to the Nyāya school, the effect does not exist prior to its production. This theory is called *asat-kārya-vāda*. Since what was non-existent *begins* to exist, the theory is also called *āraṁbha-vāda*. The effect is an entirely new product. It is something that is *added* to the cause.

According to Sāṅkhya, the effect exists in a latent form in the material cause. This theory is called *sat-kārya-vāda*. Causation consists in the manifestation of what was already existent in an unmanifest condition. This implies that the material cause undergoes a change (*pariṇāma*) in giving rise to the effect. Hence the Sāṅkhya theory is also called *pariṇāma-vāda*.

The theory of causation propounded by the Dvaita school is a combination of *sat-kārya-vāda* and *asat-kārya-vāda*. So it is called *sad-asat-kārya-vāda*. It implies that the effect is in one sense present in the cause and in another sense absent in it. If the effect must be said to have followed from the cause, it must be supposed to be present in the cause. In this, Sāṅkhya is right. But the Sāṅkhya theory implies the absolute identity of cause and effect. If the effect is nothing different from the cause which existed already, there would be no meaning in causation. So Nyāya is right in saying that the effect must be a new product. But the Nyāya insistence on total non-existence prior to production will sunder the connection between cause and effect. Therefore the Dvaitin concludes that a satisfactory theory must include the valuable elements in the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya theories and exclude their defects. This he achieves by saying that the effect is existent in the cause in substance, but non-existent in it in its special form. A ring is present in gold as gold, but non-existent in it as a ring. The substance remains the same, but it puts forth new forms, forms which are not already present in it. This is made possible by the

presence of *viśeṣa* — that peculiar power of a substance to put forth variations from within its own structure. Hence the Dvaita theory of causation is called *viśeṣāpti* — the emergence (*āpti*) of new traits, or features (viśeṣas). (It is to be noted that the term *viśeṣa* is used in a double sense. It stands for the power to produce distinctions. It also stands for the distinctions so produced.)

The metaphysical significance of a conception of causation is its application to the world as a whole. The Dvaitin explains the origin of the world as the emergence (*āpti*) from matter (*prakṛti*) of newer and newer forms (viśeṣas). And as this emergence depends for its operation at every stage on the will of God, the Dvaita conception of world-creation is called *parādhīna-viśeṣāpti*.

R. Sundara Rajan

RELATIVITY AND INVARIANCE IN CASSIRER'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The fundamental principle of Ernst Cassirer's philosophy, as he himself has stated it in his '*Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*' is the principle of the supremacy of funtion over object.[1] This principle, which is strictly Kantian in intent, could be described as the view according to which the aim of thought or exact cognition is not to copy any antecedently given reality but rather to determine the range of objective validity by means of forms and criteria internal to thought itself. In other words, objectivity is a function of the principles of thinking and the achievement of knowledge is the index and criterion of objective validity. "We do know objects as if they were already independently determined and given as objects-but we know objectively, by producing certain limitations and by fixating certain permanent elements and connections within the uniform flow of experience. The concept of the object in this sense constitutes no ultimate limit of knowledge, but is rather the fundamental instrument by which all that has become its permanent possesion is expressed and established. The object marks the possession of knowledge and not a dark beyond forever removed from knowledge."[2]

Combined with this purely functional principle, Cassirer also emphasizes the dynamic or progressive character of human cognition. Merely the functional principe by itself could only give us, as it were, the stationary equilibrium positions of the human mind ; it would enable us, at the best, to understand how the criteria and forms of cognition give structure and stability to the contents of experience and thus render objective validity possible. But cognition is dynamic and objectification therefore is not an once and for all achieved accomplishment, but rather an ever renewed process of expanding levels of integration. The functional principles are active in the formation of a

series or hierarchy of forms of unity and objectification such that the history of the development of exact cognition is at the same time the history of the mind's constant formative activity ; in its deepest esssence, the spirit is form giving and this formative activity is a perpetual process, and not, at any stage, a finished and completed disclosure. Thus Cassirer writes "... all knowledge contains a static and a dynamic motive, and only in their unification is its concept realized. Knowledge realizes itself only in a succession of logical acts, in a series that must be run through successively so that we may be aware of its progress ... We must conceive this series as converging towards an ideal limit. This limit 'is' and exists in determinateness although for us it is not attainable save by means of the particular members of the series and their progress according to law."[3]

The perspective of Cassirer's epistemological analysis may be termed critical functionalism. Such a theory allows us a more natural and smooth reconciliation of customary epistemological tensions, of the opposition and strife of the categories of permanence and change, of objectivity and subjectivity. The element of constancy, determinateness, Cassirer, in general describes as the invariants, while the constant change and mutability, he studies from the point of view of relativity or the process of relativization. Hence, the two notions of relativity and invariance may be regarded as the two foci of the ellipse that is his theory of knowledge.

The two ideas of permanence and change, of invariance and relativity, are correlative and functionally interdependent. This interdependence could well be brought out in terms of the mathematical toeory of groups, as Cassirer shows in "*The Concept of Group and the Theory of Perception*".[4] As F. Klein formulates it, the principle of the group-theoretical approach may be formulated as follows : the geometrical properties of any figure must be describable in terms of formulae which do not change when the system of co-cordinates is changed ; conversely, any formula which in this sense is invariant with respect to the group of given transformations of the co-ordinatenes represents a geometrical property.[5] More abstractly, a set of transformations is said to constitute a group if and only if, given two permissable transformations A and B, the product A-B also belongs to the group and such that for every transformation A, there is a converse transformation $\bar{A}$ which also belongs to the set. From this point of view, each system of geometry is characterised and distinguished from other geometries which logically are equally possible and equally justified, by the fact that it is defined and delimited by a set of transformations. As Cassirer notes Euclidean geometry considers a principal group of transformations and investigates the invariant properties with respect to

this group.[6] A group of transformations may be looked upon as a set of conceptual operations which divides the sensuous properties of figures into the two classes of the essential or necessary and the inessential or accidental properties. Thus, the property of absolute size or magnitude would be an inessential, a mere 'topographical' and not an essential or 'geometrical' property from the point of view of the Euclidean group of transformations. What is to be regarded as a geometrical property, in fact, is defined and delimited by the group under consideration. But the principal group of ordinary metric geometry is the most restricted in a system of classes of much wider scope. For example, the group of projective geometry is much wider than that of ordinary metric transformations. In turn, the operations of analysis situs comprise a much wider set of transformations than that of projective geometry. In fact, each system of geometry could be arranged in a hierarchy according to the scope and range of the corresponding transformations. When we move from one group to another, properties which were regarded as essential or necessary become inessential and drop out. As Cassier writes "what in the geometrical sense must be taken as 'identical' and what as 'different' is by no means pre-determined at the outset. On the contrary, it is decided by the nature of the geometrical investigation, viz the choice of a determinate group of transformations".[7] "The progressive separation of a affinitive and projective geometry from metrical geometry" writes Klein, "may be compared to the procedure of the chemist who, by applying more and more powerful decomposers isolates more and more valuable elements from a substance; our decomposers are first, the affinitive then the projective transformations".[8] As Cassirer remarks, the elements separated out by a group of transformations could be regarded as more 'valuable' only in the sense that they are more invariant than the other elements.[9] From this point of view, group theory could be regarded as a technique for isolating the invariants of a given manifold; but seeing that the possible group of transformations could be arranged in a hierarchy of increasing range, the invariants of each group are only relatively invariant, for a constant of one level or one group becomes an inessential modification of another. In short, group theory teaches us that relativity and invariance are correlative and inter dependent.

In one sense, it could be said that Cassirer's theory of knowledge is an application of group theory to the problems of the objectivity and truth of empirical cognition. Cassirer himself draws our attention to this feature of his work when he writes "just as the geometrician selects for investigation those relations of a definite figure which remain unchanged by certain transformations, so here the attempt is made to discover those universal elements of form that persist through

all change in the particular material content of experience. The categories of space and time, of magnitude and the functional dependence of magnitude etc are established as such elements of form".[10] Truly, it can be said that what we have here is nothing less than a 'universal invariant theory of experience.'[11]

Such a point of view, when taken in connection with the epistemological analysis of empirical cognition leads to a changed emphasis on the opposition between objectivity and subjectivity. The two, instead of remaining irreconcilable metaphysical opposites, become correlative stages of a process, aspects of the same tendency towards determination. This relativization of the opposition between the objective and the subjective is the most characteristic feature of Cassirer's theory of knowledge. As such we shall seek to trace out the steps by means of which such a relativization is achieved. We may first try to bring out the elements of constancy or invariance involved in empirical thought and after this isolation of the universal or invariant element in empirical cognition, we shall similarly try to isolate the variable or impermanent aspect and finally we shall see how the isolation of the permanent from the changing is a constant ever renewed process of transformation. This would give us a clue to the relativization of objectivity that we noted earlier.

According to conventional empiricistic accounts of the nature of the nature of knowledge it would appear that while logical and mathematical truths do have necessity and universality, judgements of concrete fact are merely valid 'here and now'; their truth is determined by presently given experience and hence they are conditioned by the particularities of the concrete situation. But, as Cassirer remarks, no empirical judgment as understood in science seems to be merely particular or singular in this sense.

In every empirical determination there is an aspect of eternity in the sense that a concrete judgment of scientific fact is not about the play of ever shifting sense impressions, but purports to describe the properties and characterestics of objects and events; it is not an assertion about sense but an assertion about objects. This objectivity or objective reference, though given in the manifold of sense yet contains an element of existence and permanence. "The proposition that sulphur melts at a definite temperature means even in its simplest terms (that) ... as often as the conditions embraced by the subject concept are realized, the consequence expressed in the predicate concept will be always and necessarily connected with them".[12] It is this reference beyond the temporal moment of givenness that is the element of eternity involved even in a simple empirical judgement of

fact. This 'eternity' or invariance is well brought out in terms of Kant's distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience.[13]

As Cassirer remarks, it would appear as if Kant's distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience accepts the mere contingency of perceptual judgments, for such judgments are said to have only a subjective validity, conditioned by a momentary individual experience. The connection of concepts in such a judgment is more a matter of association than of objective necessity. But as Cassirer remarks, this conception of a perceptual judgment is to be understood as a 'limiting concept' rather than as a descriptive one; it is designed for a purely didactic purpose, namely to bring out by means of an artificial and purely conceptual contrast, the real nature of all judgments.[14] For Kant, every judgment claims a certain measure of objective validity, no matter how limited. "Even the individual 'a posteriori' judgment always contains an 'a priori' element in the necessity of connection which it affirms".[15] It is this element of necessary connection that is the goal of inductive procedures. Induction, understood merely as a process of summation of particular cases could hardly be sufficient for this purpose. "The mere accumulation of elements cannot change their conceptual meaning...There must be a factor concealed in the particular case that raises it out of its limitation and isolation".[16] In other words, the necessary pre-supposition of legitimate induction is that experience is a system and not a mere aggregate. A particular is related to a whole certainly, as a part, but as part of a continuous and not a discrete whole. In a discrete whole, says Cassirer, the parts precede the whole and are distinguishable apart from it, whereas in a continuous whole, the part gains its nature only from its relations to the totality of the system.[17] Thus, a line, no doubt, can be defined as a manifold of points, but then we must remember that the point itself is a pure expression of a positional relation. It gains its determinateness by means of these relationships. Similarly, an individual fact or a given instance is made determinate and specific because of its relations of various types and orders to other instances. Only insofar as it enters into such constitutive relations with other items, only insofar as it is a part of a definite system of experience, does it have any objective significance or worth. These constitutive relations are the structural bonds that we call laws of phenomena and it is the establishment of these bonds that is the purpose of the inductive method. These bonds are functional relationships and an individual can be apprehended only in terms of these relationships. "The fact 'a' is only accessible to us in a functional form as $f(a)$, Φ (b), Ψ (c), in which $f\Phi\Psi$ represent the different forms of spatio-temporal and causal connection".[18]

The search after invariance assumes, in scientific methodology, the form of a search after causal laws. Maxwell, in particular, laid stress on this aspect of the causal principle. Maxwell explains that the customary formulation of the causal principle as 'same causes same effects' is futile, since the identical event can never recur; rather, the real meaning of the principle is that mere differences of space and time are irrelevant. "The difference between two occurrences does not depend upon the pure differences of the times and places in and at which they occur, but only on the differences in the nature, configurations and movement of the bodies involved".[19] In other words, the causal relation is invariant with respect to mere changes in space-time values, such that in establishing such causal connections, the particular specifications could be ignored.

It is precisely because of this invariance that a particular case or a set of cases could be regarded as the sufficient basis for the relation. A functional relation f(a,b) is, of course, given in a particular here and now, but insofar as the relation itself is concerned this specification is extraneous and accidental. " A functional relation f(a, b) that is directly established for one point of time or for a plurality of discrete times t1, t2——t3 is freed from this limitation and removed from dependency on any individual moment of observation"[20]. The real aim of the inductive method therefore is not to manufacture a generalization out of a set of discrete particulars, but rather to free the invariant time independent character of the relation with which in any concrete case, is overlaid with extraneous and accidental limitations of the here and now. It is this invariance of the connection, the real bond between events that the causal principle seeks to formulate.

From this point of view, the significance of analogy in induction receives a deeper interpretation and legitimation. The analogical inference has been regarded as an essential part of the methods of science and as Cassirer remarks, even Kepler commended it as 'his truest guide and preceptor from which no secret of nature is concealed'.[21] But the value of analogy does not lie in guiding the perception of similarities and likenesses between phenomena. A truly genuine or useful analogy cuts deeper and reveals an underlying basic identity of relational structure, which is 'shown' by the sameness of equations that govern the two fields, as in electricity and magnetism. Thus, the same invariance that every empirical law seeks to uncover is also exhibited by the analogical method in science; everywhere it is the constancy and identical from of connection that is the object of science.

But this process of distinguishing the essential connections from out of the matrix of their givenness is a perpetual one; at no stage is

the separation completed and perfected. This means that the permanents or invariants are only relatively and not absolutely so. They are constants from a certain point of view; a certain level of cognition, but they themselves are drawn back into the flux of changing non-essentials as thought advances and presses onward to a deeper level. This transformation of the constants of one stage into the variables of a higher order is illustrated in the transition from rules to laws. Thus, the inductions of Kepler regarding the elliptic orbit of the planet Mars appear to be mere empirical rules from the point of view the more generalized laws of planetary motion as formulated by Newton. " In Newton's theory, we find the ellipse not merely as the real form of the orbit of Mars but we survey at a glance the whole of " possible " orbits. The Newtonian concept of a centripetal force that diminishes according to the square of distance, leads to a perfect disjunction of the empirical cases in general ... Thus, the 'law' of gravitation contains in itself the field of facts it rules ... while the merely empirical rule of planetary motion allows the particular cases to stand in loose conjunction without sharp delimitation ".[22]

But while at any given stage or level of exact cognition, we may thus distinguish and differentiate between the empirical rules of its procedure and the laws or principles of its form, taken over a period of time, from the view point of the development and progress of thought, this distinction between rules and laws is but a temporary or rather a shifting line of demarcation. Every rule has within itself a nisus or tendency to raise itself to the form of a law, while, on the other hand, every law in the course of further development may suffer limitations and qualifications and survive in a wider context only as an empirical regularity rather than as an invariable law. This ascent from rules to laws and the descent from laws to rules constitute, as it were, the basic rhythm of the development of thought.

This process of development, Cassirer describes as the transformation of constants into variables. As he formulates it, the problem " is to raise from the flux of experience elements (certain invariants) that can be used as constants of theoretical construction ".[23] But the dynamics of exact thought presses onward to deeper and yet deeper levels of connection in search of constants of a higher order.

This process of ascent has, as it were, a negative rhythm whereby the fixed connections, the elements of constancy and invariance are dissolved back into the flux and become variables from the newly attained perspective. This constant process of transformation, whereby all

certainties are again and again melted and all fixed connections dissolved in the ever flowing flux of theoretical change may at first seem despiriting. "We grasp permanent being only to lose it again ... what we call science appears not as an approximation to any 'abiding and permanent' reality, but only as a continuously renewed illusion, as a phantasmagoria in which each new picture displaces all the earlier ones, only itself to disappear and be annihilated by another".[24]

But this scepticism is unwarranted for the succession of theoretical pictures and perspectives is no empty flow or pointless displacement but the change is ordered and structured according to certain inner bonds of continuity. There are certain serial principles of connection which unify the changing perspectives such that what comes later and displaces the earlier is yet in response to the tensions and problems felt at the earlier stage. The later perspective answers the earlier questions and as Cassirer remarks this one element is enough to give continuity and order to the process of change. "The new form must contain the answer to questions proposed within the older form and this one feature establishes a logical connection between them and points to a common form to which both are subjected".[25]

But this responsiveness to earlier questionsi mplies both change and invariance; the change is necessary precisely because the earlier questions and dilemmas could not be solved in terms of current presuppositions and constancies. A wider and more general framework is required and in this shift of standpoint the earlier level becomes an instance, a limiting case of the new. The connections and constancies, the laws and principles of the earlier level become, as it were, local specifications of the more general principles. The change therefore is essentially a widening and deepening of the foundations but the newer level is also responsive to the problems of the earlier stage and this implies that in this ascent and generalization certain norms and criteria are left unaffected for it is in terms of these norms and criteria alone that the new point of view connects itself with the older. The older and the newer systems become then increasingly satisfactory specifications of these universal forms and criteria. The new system does not repudiate all the presuppositions and principles of the old but rather seeks to differentiate the accidental limitations, the temporary and passing specifications to which those criteria had been put and frees these norms themselves from their accidental clothing. In this process, a hiearchy of systems or syntheses emerges in which there is continuity as well as change, invariance as well relativity. Cassirer writes "The transformation must leave a certain body of principles unaffected; for it is undertaken merely for the sake of preserving this body of principles and these reveal its goal. Since we never compare the system of hypotheses

in itself with the naked facts in themselves, but always can only oppose one hypothetical system of principles with another more inclusive more radical system, we need for this progressive comparison an ultimate common standard of measurement of supreme principles of experience in general ... In this sense the critical theory of experience would constitute the universal invariant theory of experience ".[26]

The procedures of a critical theory of knowledge can therefore be compared with the procedures of group theory. "Just as the geometrician selects for investigation those relations of a definite figure which remain unchanged by certain transformations, so here the attempt is made to discover those universal elements of form that persist in all change in the particular material content of experience. The categories of space and time, of magnitude and the functional dependency of magnitudes etc are established as such elements of form ".[27] These elements of form, the invariants of experience in general, are a priori categories in the sense that they give form and direction to the process of conceptual change. As Cassirer remarks they are a priori in the sense that they are principles of direction, criteria of orientation in the developement of thought.[28] They are, as it were, the regulators of conceptual advance for it is in terms of these standards and criteria that the changing theories and conceptual viewpoints are judged.

The categories therefore are the supreme invariants of experience in general and as such are immanent and functionally operative at every stage of development. The successive theories and conceptual view points may be looked upon as so many transformations by means of which these invariants are progressively articulated. But in this ever sharper and more precise articulation there is also the converse process of relativization, to which we may now turn.

As Cassirer remarks "the goal of all empirical knowledge lies in gaining ultimate invariants as the necessary and constitutive factors in each empirical judgment ".[29] But this goal is never fully and completely achieved and what we have therefore is a hierarchy of theoretical syntheses which could be arranged in increasing degrees of generality. In this series, at each level there is the seperation between the merely given and the constitutive formal elements of thought. But when we ascend from one level to another, the constants are relativized; the *objective* becomes subjective limitations of a now transcended specification. In this sense, the shadow of the search for invariance is constant relativization. Only, we must note that in Cassirer's system the opposition between the subjective and the objective, the relative and the invariant, is no final metaphysical opposition but an ever shifting line of demarcation, a fluid boundary, something

which is itself relative. In other words, the meaning and significance of subjectivity is determined at each level in terms of the invariants of that specific level. For each level, that which is subject to the changes of the here and now, those elements of flux which are regarded as the accidental specifications of experience, are relative and subjective while those elements of form and connection which persist inspite of phenomenal change are regarded as objective. Thus, from the view-point of even sensuous experience, the constancy of properties would be regarded as objective as against the variability and subjectivity of the acts through which these are apprehended. But from the point of view of empirical cognition it is the individual thing or object in its independent existence that would define the sense of objectivity as against the constant play of perceptions. Each standpoint therefore has its own immanent criteria of the objective, in terms of which certain aspects are singled out and stabilised as the true form of experience. But " there are no absolutely changeable elements of experience at any stage of knowledge we have reached any more than there are absolutely constant elements. A content can only be known as changeable with reference to another with which it is compared and which at first claims permanent existence for itself. At the same time, the possibility always remains that this second content will be corrected by a third and thus may no longer hold as a true and perfect expression of objectivity but as a mere partial expression of being. Thus, we are not concerned here with a fixed line of division seperating two eternally sundered fields of reality but with a moving limit which constantly shifts in the progress of knowledge ".[80]

Metaphysically considered, the subjective and the objective are irreconcilable opposites between which the only possible relation would be a simple 'either-or'. But in the critical formulation, the opposition becomes a contrasting emphasis rather than a total exclusion. Subjectivity is not an inalienable characteristic or feature of certain data such that they must for ever and in every context be regarded so: rather, a datum is labelled as subjective or objective only in a context and in terms of the dominant directions of thought at that level. Subjectivity becomes a functionally determined value and equally, objectivity is an insignia of epistemological worth. Cassirer brings out this relativity of subjectivity in his discussion of sensuous qualities. " Each partial experience is accordingly determined as to what it means for the total system; and this meaning determines its degree of objectivity. In the last analysis, we are not concerned with what a definite experience 'is' but with what it is 'worth' i. e. with what function it has as a particular building stone in the structure of the whole ".[81] From this functional point of view, it is obvious that we have a logical gradation or series of objectivity, a series determined by the immanent

criteria and standards of developing thought. The opposition therefore far from being a barrier and unsurmountable obstacle to thought becomes precisely an instrument of progress, a way of organization by which experience articulates itself. From the point of view of a critical theory of knowledge, the process of relativization is of positive significance and worth; relativization is the mechanism or process by which objectivity is aimed at.

This positive role of the process is described by Cassirer in his account of the objectification of the higher level. Elements, such as sensations, which at the first determination of empirical cognition are separated out as subjective, are not however left completely behind, but rather, once their variability itself has been determined in terms of a law, they claim a place within the system. Their variation itself becomes the object of consideration and the elements therefore are 'contextualised'. This 'contextualising' of the given is a way of conferring objectivity on them and insofar as each element is given an index which signifies its position within the whole, its objective value is thereby expressed.

It is in this sense that Cassirer speaks of the object as the determination of thought. But such determination or dependence does not signify a dependence upon the subject or the experiencing self, but rather the determination of the object by the immanent principles or 'axioms' of thought. Hence Cassirer could well accept the 'realism' of Volkelt when he urged that the object is not given in mere sensation but is based on 'intellectual necessity'. For Cassirer, this 'intellectual necessity' precisely because it is intellectual, signifies the determination and organization of the object by means of the criteria and norms of the mind. There is, of course, an element of relativity here for the 'truth' of the object now depends and is relative to the 'truth' of certain principles and axioms. But this relativity is no subjective dependence. The proposition 'being is a product of thought', for Cassirer, is merely a way and a misleading one at that, of expressing the truth that the content of knowledge logically depends upon the universal principles of knowledge. "If we analyse the definition of the 'object', if we bring to clear consciousness what is assumed in this concept, we are led to certain logical necessities which appear as the inevitable constitutive factors of the concept. Experience and its objects are conceived as dependent variables which are successively reduced to a sequence of logical 'arguments'; and it is this pure dependence in content of functions on their arguments, which is characterized in the language of idealism as the dependence of objects on thought".[82]

It would thus appear that relativity could be formulated either in an ontological or metaphysical idiom or in a critical or 'transcendental' idiom. Metaphysical or ontological relativism is the thesis that the object of knowledge is relative to and conditioned by the subject, that we know things only insofar as they are given to us in experience. Since we do not have any knowledge of things as they are in themselves, all that we know of them or can know of them is conditioned by the modalities of experience. The sceptical consequences of such a relativism are obvious and indeed from the time of Protogoras onwards, the relativity of knowledge and perception has been one of the favourite sceptical tropes. But paradoxical as it may seem, such a sceptical relativism is not thorough going and this indeed is responsible for its sceptical turn. It assumes that things exist in themeselves and substantially; only, we cannot know of such absolute existences by means of relations and interactions. For Cassirer, scepticism consists not in the relative or relational character of knowledge but in the dogmatic belief concerning the existence of substantial things prior to and independent of all relations. This becomes clearer when we consider the modern or Humean form of scepticism. Such a scepticism may be called a scepticism of laws as contrasted with the scepticism of antiquity, which may be called a scepticism of things. But here also, in the modern form, the basis is the dogmatic belief in the substantial existence of 'impressions' or elements of pure experience prior to all relations and synthetic connections. For classical scepticism outer things or objects, while for modern scepticism, impressions or sense data are the true substantial givens. But both forms, how ever employ the category of substance and it is this category that is the root of scepticism. "While antique scepticism rested completely on the tacit assumption of absolute things, that of Hume rests on the assumption of absolute sensations. The hypostatization in the one case concerns 'outer' being, in the other, 'inner' being, but its general form is the same. And only by this hypostatization does the doctrine of relativity of knowledge gain its sceptical character".[83] The root of scepticism, therefore, is not so much the doctrine of relativity, as the substantialist mode of thought. This becomes clearer if we turn to the critical or 'scientific' formulation of the principle of relativity of knowledge. Possibly, it is in Helmholtz that we have the clearest and most striking formulation of the relativity of all scientific cognition. He writes "Each property or quality of a thing is in reality nothing but its capacity to produce certain effects on other things — what we call a property always involves a relation between two things — an action never depends on the nature of one of the agents alone but always exists only in relation to and in dependence upon the nature of a second being on which the effect is exerted".[84] The view that scientific knowledge depends upon interaction does not merely imply that

things in themselves exist absolutely and substantially and that we come to have knowledge of them by means of relations; its meaning is more radical for what it affirms is that "we can only reach the category of thing through the category of relation".[38] Relations are constitutive of objectivity in the sense that the extent of functional relations that we are able to establish in experience marks also the extent of our objective knowledge. Understood thus, i. e. relations as instruments of objectivity, the doctrine of relativity is the positive ground of scientific knowledge and not the seed bed of scepticism.

But one might ask, if the changes in fundamental scientific conceptions and principles are held to be determined by changes in theoretical standpoint, if the object of cognition is functionally determined by the principles and postulates of thought, what is the place and significance of observation, of facts, in the story of the development of scientific thought. What is the role and function of experience in such a critical idealist epistemology? Cassirer moves into this question by way of a preliminary clarification. There can be no question as to *whether* a scientific theory is based on experience but only as to how it is based. The intent of a critical theory is not to deny the empirical basis of every scientific theory, but precisely to clarify what 'experience' means to science and how the various elements of a theory are related to the empirical basis.[39] For Cassirer, the essential function of experience in relation to knowledge is to function as 'an awakener of thought'. Plato had emphasized this role of observation when he wrote "much in perception is a paraclete of thought, while other perceptions are not—such an awakener of thought, namely, is everything which comes into sense at the same time as its opposite; but what does not, that also does not arouse thought".[40] The function of sensibility is essentially a 'dialectical' one; it is to force the understanding to come to terms with the tensions and disharmonies of perception. Only those perceptions which reveal the latent disharmonies and contradictions, only those 'facts' which pose a challenge to the accepted interpretations, have such a stimulating effect on thought. In terms of Popper's analysis, the function of observation in the epistemology of science is essentially a critical one.[41] Cassirer brings out this critical role of observation by way of an analysis of the development of the Special Theory of Relativity.

Behind the birth of the Special Theory there stands a fundamental conflict of observations and empirical findings—the conflict between the results of Fizeau and Michelson. Fizeau showed that the velocity of light in flowing water is greater than its velocity in water at rest. In terms of Lorentz's interpretation, this suggested a motionless ether not carried along by the body in its movement. But the negative

experiment of Michelson seemed to conclusively demonstrate that the motion of the earth through the ether could never be verified. Behind this conflict, stood an even more fundamental conflict of principles—the conflict between the principle of relativity in mechanics and the principles of electrodynamics.

The attempt to carry through the principle of relativity to electrodynamics seemed impossible. As Cassirer writes "physical investigation stood before the dilemma of giving up a fundamental principle which had been verified in all the phenomena of motion and which formed a cornerstone in the structure of classical mechanics—or of retaining it within its field but denying its applicability to the optical and electromagnetic phenomena—Here in fact the condition set up by Plato of the intellectual fruitfullness of experience was fulfilled; here experience stood at a point at which assured observations seemed directly to pass into its opposite. The conflict between the principle of the constancy of the propagation of light and the principle of relativity of mechanics became the paraclete of thought—the re awekener of the theory of relativity".[42]

It is of interest, from the point of view of epistemological analysis, to follow briefly Cassirer's comments on the means whereby the Special Theory of Relativity succeeded in overcoming this conflict of principles. As Cassirer remarks, the Special Theory arose when the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light was given primary place as a postulate of exact physical thought. This step led at once to the relativization of space and time on the one hand and to the principle of the invariance of physical laws in all systems in uniform rectilinear motion with reference to a chosen reference body K. The first step is a renunciation; it gives up the absoluteness of space-time measurements and of simultaneity. But this relativization is precisely the means by which constancy and invariance are regained at a deeper level. "The variations of the measurements of space and time constitutes the necessary condition through which the new invaraints of the theory are discovered and grounded".[43] These new invariants are the general forms of natural law. But the process of a deeper penetration of the level of invariance cannot stop merely with this, for "while the special theory contented itself with regarding all reference bodies K1 which are moving uniformly in a straight line relatively to a definite justified system K as equivalent for the formulation of natural laws, the General Theory extends this proposition that all reference bodies KK', whatever may be their states of motion are to be taken as equivalent for the description of nature".[44] By these means the forms of natural laws become truly invariant, since the choice of a reference frame no longer has the crucial significance it had for the

Special Theory. But this result is again mediated by a new relativization for, in terms of this newer perspective, even the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light becomes a consequential result, a local specification of the general structure as described by the theory. As Cassirer notes the Special Theory rests upon two fundamental assumptions, one, the principle of the velocity of light, and the other, the principle of relativiiy. In the Special Theory, these two principles one empirical and the other methodological or epistemological, are given equal rank, but in the General Theory, the epistemological principle gains the upper hand and even the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light becomes a deducible result; in this sense, it in turn is 'relativized' and the invariants of the new theory are shifted elsewhere. "While classical mechanics, like the Special Theory, distinguishes between certain reference bodies relatively to which the laws of nature are valid and certain others relative to which they were not, this distinction is now cancelled. The expression of the universal physical laws is freed from any connection with a particular system of co-ordinates or with a certain group of such systems. To be expressed the laws of nature always require some definite system of reference: but their meaning and value is independent of the individuality of this system and remains self-identical whatever change the latter may undergo".[45] If we are to indicate the true invaraints, the cardinal points of the new theory, we can no longer mention particular bodies or processes or phenomena, but only this systematisation and co-ordination, this constancy and covariance of the laws themselves.

It is this system of connections, this constancy of fundamental relations that is the invariant basis of the relativity theory. But throughout, the process is maintained by a balancing process of increasing relativization. Only when we take both the processes together and in harmony do we catch the rhythm of thought. Merely to emphasize the constant relativization would lead us to scepticism and despair of the intellect. We must, instead, be sensitive to the beating of the other wing; for only the two together, invariance and relativity, discloses to us the well spring of thought's creative advance. It is in this dual process that the meaning of 'truth' itself is clarified. For exact cognition, truth does not exist in an impossible adequacy of thought to antecedently given things, not in a vain copy of being, but in the mastery of phenomena by means of principles, in spelling out phenomena so that we may read them as experience. Truth, in short, for science, is the result and achievement of the autonomy of thought.

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R. Sundara Rajan

WITTGENSTEIN'S BLUE BOOK: A NEW MODE OF CRITICISM

Introduction

In certain respects Wittgenstein's *Blue Book* is the most interesting of his writings for it contains, for one thing, some of the ideas of the later *Philosphical Investigations* in a nascent form and as such is comparatively easier to understand. Secondly, apart from the ideas that it contains, in it we witness an exhilarating spectacle, the phenomenon of a highly subtle mind in the very process of thinking ; it is, in a sense, the most personal of his works, for while reading it, we almost nevr lose the sense of contact with the author. We are forcibly, strikingly, reminded of his constant environing presence by the way the ideas are refreshingly linked up, the questions posed, the answers suggested and the exhortations made.

We feel guided by a master craftsman at his work ; one could almost say that the *Blue Book* is a kind of ostensive teaching of philosophy. It preaches and practices the simple and yet fearfully intricate art of understanding what we say. And in this it has great pedagogic value, if only we get the hang of it and this mainly because it has an uncanny sense of touch for the trouble spots in our thinking. Wittgenstein surprises us frequently by dragging out eaxctly what we feel tempted to say when we are in difficulties, the manoeuvres and tactics that we feel like adopting. His sense for philosophical temptation, his unfailing touch for evasions and conceptual back slidings is astonishing and thus, the work reads like a confession the *we* could have made.

This is an important feature of the work for in philosophy, the self is revealed more in temptation and wish than in assertion and denial ; it is by what we feel tempted to say when we are faced with philoso-

phical difficulties, by the kind and quality of our evasions that the true measure of our controlling preconceptions is revealed and more than any other, Wittgenstein has the talent of a great confessor. By slight changes and transpositions of ideas, by ever so minute alternations in the form of expressions, by striking analogies and quaint figures, he leads us on to say out our philosophical temptations, our lurking conceptual wishes and fascinations with certain manners and ways of statement. He practices the technique of asking questions like a fine art and thereby elicits what we want to say but keep back.

But the great point of all this is not to convict us of gross confusion and error and infelicity, which are undeniable enough, but rather to enable us to take a true measure of the forces of bewitchment that hold us in thrall, to help us to shake ourselves free of these fascinations and thereby to come to terms with our own forms of life, with what we really are and with what we in fact do. It is this positive aim of helping us to free ourselves of the temptations and wishes that controls the long confessional and here we are reminded and cheered by what he has said in the *Tractatus*; that his work would be understood only by those who have similar thoughts. Now, it occurs to us, as a hopeful thought, that if one could have similar confusions, one could also hope some day to share in the clarity too, that one could have one's moment of lucidity when one would have similar thoughts.

It is thus that the *Blue Book* holds out a pedagogic promise. It is said of Protogoras that when he was consulted by Hippocrates as to what would happen to him if he associated with Protogoras, he (Protogoras) answered : 'Young man, if you associate with me on the very first day, you will return home a better man than you came and on the second day better than on the first and better every day than you were on the day before.' We may not be able to say the same of ourselves and the *Blue Book* but we can say 'if you read this book with your mind wide open and take time to stew in it or let it stew in you ; if with a little bit of luck it should cling to you and all the while the agitations keep you alert, then, inkling by inkling, chink by chink, and glimpse by glimpse, on the very first day ten years later, you will return home a beter man than you came. But what a difference that would be ; it would be a difference that makes, not for much learning but for a kind of understanding that absolves the intellect, that cleanses it of bewitchment and bewilderment. No wonder that ten years with brambles on us even is not too great a price for the gift of such an understanding. But unfortunately, there are sore trials awaiting us in our preliminary understanding of the work. It seems a kind of paradox that a work designed to cure us of misunderstanding ourselves should itself be so readily misunderstood. But it is undeniable that the sources of

misunderstanding are powerful and plenty. One of the sources of this difficulty is that the ideas that it contains are basic and fundamental ones; they have the simplicity of our ultimate presuppositions and it is always difficult to keep these steadily in view.

Connected with this is another feature of the work—that it gives us no proofs, no arguments, no demonstrations. It holds no point of view except the need to see clearly and steadily the intricate pattern of our concepts. And this absence of a theoretical armoury of proofs and demonstrations is likely to be a source of disappointment to us, for we take it to be a work in phiosophy and in philosophy we have been accustomed precisely to this theorisng and argument and debate. And if one should turn to this book with this preconception and expectation in mind, and ask what has the author proved, what are his arguments, where are his assumptions and postulates, one is likely to be sorely disappointed; he has neither proved nor failed to prove anything, neither refuted nor failed to refute anything. And this we cannot understand. We can understand a philosopher who sets out to prove a theory or even a sceptic who sets out to prove that it cannot be proved, but a man who does neither the one nor the other seems to be an intruder in philosophy. But surely, we ask, this is a work in philosophy, for it deals with such typically philosophical problems as the nature of meaning, of language of thinking, of mental processes and the problem of solipsism. Surely, these are philosophical problems which have puzzled and tormented others too.

In a sense, the book's concerns are clearly philosophical. But are they treated philosophically, i.e. as others treat such problems? And here we find a great difference, for where others advance arguments and demonstrations and theories, Wittgenstein constantly refrains from theory. One example of this restraint may be given. The idea that the meaning of a sign should be sought for in its use is surely fundamental to his own way of thinking and yet he introduces this idea thus: 'But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use'.[1] Here it is suggested that to *say* this is, as it were, only the second-best thing and this is true too, for there is a danger of misunderstanding, mis-applying this as if it were another theory of meaning.

Hence in another sense, the work is not a work in philosophy; it could be described as a descendant of philosophy and as such there are family resemblances. It has, so to say, inherited the subject matter from previous discussions but its way of treating them, its plan of attack, is its own unique feature. Wittgenstein himself was conscious

of the similarity as well as difference of his work from previous philosophy, for he writes 'One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called 'philosophy'.[2]

But what is new method that is distinctive of this work? What is the unique feature of it that so distinguishes it from other works in philosophy? Briefly, one might answer that this work teaches us, not a theory or a doctrine, but an art, a conceptual workmanship and skill and a new one at that; it teaches us a new mode of criticism based on and flowing from a new awareness of our language. And this new art is the simple and yet fearfully intricate one of understanding what we say. It is simple in the sense that it does not call for any recondite knowledge of abstruse matters of fact; it does not require a special mastery of an alien subject matter. Nor does it call for special devices of calculation, special modes of reasoning or logics. What we have to know and understand is, in one sense, what we already know and understand. Our problem is to see the pattern, the arrangement, the sense-giving organization of what we already know. And yet this can be fearfully difficult for the hardest thing in philosophy is to say nothing more than what is required, to say of what is that it is and of what is not, that it is not. This can be our greatest difficulty for we feel sorely tempted and urged by language itself to explain and mis-interpret what we do with language. The seeing of patterns, of sense-giving connections is like the solving of a jigsaw puzzle. 'It is no use applying force in fitting the pieces together. All we should do is to look at them carefully and arrange them.[3] This sounds simple in statement but in execution it can be fearfully intricate for to see the pattern, the organization of our uses, requires the presentation of sense. In one sense, to present the sense or meaning all that is required is to remember what we and others as a matter of fact do; it is to remind ourselves of what we have never forgotten — of the facts of our normal unclouded use of language. You speak English, don't you and you understand it, don't you? So, it should not be too difficult to present a sense in English. But it is precisely here that we stumble and have to catch ourselves. Of course, we can present a word or sentence but one has, as it were, for years been trained, bewitched to look through the words into the darkness, where no man can follow for the meaning. And it is difficult to break this spell, to exorcise this bewitchment and to consider what we do. To do this is to go against the grain of our natures; it does not come easily for our intellects have been trained and moulded and disciplined under the auspices of this bewitchment and to rid ourselves of this is to do battle against the fascination which forms of expression have for us. 'Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.[4] And so, the

art of understanding what we say is the difficult art of self-knowledge through a medium that has high spell binding powers. But it is through this and by means of this that we can come to know ourselves; we *must* listen to the songs of these sirens for, paradoxically, it is these songs that can ultimately deliver us.

This requires a new skill, of the need for which he himself has spoken. Towards the end of Moore's notes on Wittgenstein's lectures in 1933-34, there occurs the following: 'he went on to say that though philosophy had now been reduced to a matter of skill, yet this skill, like other skills, is very difficult to acquire. One difficulty was was that it required a sort of thinking to which we have not been trained, a sort of thinking which is very different from what is required in the sciences. And he said that the required skill could not be acquired merely by hearing lectures; discussion was essential. As regards his own work, he said that it did not matter whether his results were true or not; what mattered was that a method had been found'.[5]

I shall try to say something more about some of the aspects of the new method towards the end of the study but here we should remind ourselves that an art, although not a theory, has, it were, its conceptual 'nodes', points around which it is structured, which give it a kind of orientation. The relations between these conceptual positions contained within the art and the practice of the art itself are complicated for, in one sense, the practice of the art can go on, even if we do not acccept or admit the theoretical positions it seems to contain; this allows for a kind of dialogue between him and other practitioners of the art. But in another sense, what wins us over to this new conceptual art are these theoretical positions for, remember, the art is conceptual and that it seeks assent from us more than conformity. Hence the theoretical standpoints of the art cannot be readily dismissed as extraneous to the practice of it. Therefore, while giving an account of the aspects of this new art, I shall also try to state what appear to be its theoretical commitments.

But we can take a true measure of the art only by means of a consideration of the problems to which it has been applied; one must see it in use, as it were. Hence we must first give an account of some of the themes which are taken up for investigation in the *Blue Book*. I shall chiefly concentrate upon the following:

1. The general nature of language.
2. Rules and their interpretations.
3. The importance of analogies between forms of expressions.

1. The Problem of Language in the Blue Book.

Moore reports that in his lectures in 1930-31, Wittgenstein discussed at great length certain very general questions about language, but that he said more than once that he did not discuss these questions because he thought that language was the subject matter of philosophy. He did not think that it was. He discussed it only because he thought that particular philosophical errors or 'troubles' in our thought were due to false analogies suggested by our actual use of expressions and he emphasized that it was only necessary for him to discuss those points about language which, as he thought, led to particular errors or 'troubles'.[6]

From the account of the nature and direction of Wittgenstein's interest in language, it seems to me, three things stand out:

1. It is not language as it is, but rather, certain preconceptions that we have about its general nature and function that are philosophically important and relevant: it is these preconceptions or 'pictures' (to use a term frequently met with in the *Investigations*)[7] that cause us to mis-describe our actual use of words and sentences and it is these mis-descriptions of use that are the sources of our philosophical troubles.

2. This being so, our interest in language, as philosophers, is *therapeutic*; our task is to locate and analyse those features which are responsible for philosophical perplexity and bewilderment. It is not our task, so to say, to indulge in a science of use; our concern is piece meal and our task, odd-job analysis. But this does not mean that we can give isolated analyses and clarifications of individual problems and difficulties. As he points out, one of the sources of philosophical perplexity is that the use of concepts criss-cross each other; the criteria and rules of use form an interlocked network and in a certain sense, we cannot be said to have clarified any problem unless we take accoun of this complicated pattern of references and cross-references in the system of our language.

'......... no philosophical problem can be solved until all philosophical problems are solved; which means that as long as they are not all solved every new difficulty renders all our previous results questionable — every new problem that arises may put in question the position which our previous partial results are to occupy in the final picture. One then speaks of having to re-interpret these previous results and we should say: they have to be placed in a different surrounding'.[8] But nevertheless our interest in language is still a therapeutic one, for it is directed and controlled by those features and

analogies that cause the peculiarly disturbing form of bewilderment that is characteristic of philosophy ('the characteristic of a metaphysical question being that we express an un-clarity about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific question')[9]

3. From the therapeutic nature of our interest in language, it follows that our analysis of words and their use gets its point and relevance from these philosophical perplexities and problems.[10]

We may accordingly discuss some of the aspects of the nature and function of language that Wittgenstein regards as philosophically important in the *Blue Book.*

Wittgenstein brings out three main aspects of our conception of language which can seriously distort the true nature of our actual use and thereby give rise to philosophical difficulties; of course, these are not the only features that are mentioned by him as thus being philosophically relevant but I have singled out these specially because (a) they seem to have a special degree of importance and generality and (b) the other things that he says about language can, I believe, be related to these aspects. The features which I wish to single out are:

(a) our conception of the logical nature of language as a whole.

(b) our views regarding the nature of rules in language.

(c) The importance of analogies between expressions.

(a) *The Logic of Languages*

Wittgenstein points out that in philosophical discussions, we usually tend to regard language as a calculus, operating according to strict rules and definitions; we have an idea or pre-conception of language as a strict logical symbolism which is patterned after what we find in logic and the exact sciences, and in this light, we tend to regard our ordinary applications as loose and dis-jointed. We feel that it is our task to formalize or lay down explicit rules for the use of words. But this is a very one-sided comparison and tends to distort the actual application of our language for if it is true that we are unable to state clearly our definitions and rules in ordinary language, this is not because we do not know them but because there are no such 'real' definitions and rules. He writes 'this is a very one-sided way of looking at language. In practice, we rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage—of definitions, etc—while using language, but when we are asked to give

such rules we are'nt able to do so. We are unable to clearly circumscribe the concepts that we use, not because we don't know their real definitions but because there is no real definitions to them. To suppose there must be, would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball, they play a game according to strict rules". The idea that language must be a calculus of the sort described above has its source in several mis-conceptions, among which may be mentioned

(a) the pre-eminent place that we give to the procedures and methods of the sciences.

(b) the mistaken assumption that we have about the nature of rules and their function in ordinary language,

(c) the idea that language has only one pre-eminent function to perform namely, to dercribe and assert what is the case, and

(d) our disregard of the context and circumstances under which language has been taught to us and under which it is used.

Regarding (a) above, nothing much need be said here, since it will come in for consideration later on and (b) will be considered in the next section. But with regard to (c) and (d), we may point out that Wittgenstein introduces the idea of 'language-games' in the *Blue Book* to correct both sorts of mis-apprehension, i.e. when we think of language, not as a total monolithic structure but as a collection or 'family' of particular forms or discourse, we would clearly see (A) that the functions performed by the various forms or specialised activities cannot all be brought under any one single master function, but rather that language is used for a variety of jobs and also (B) that we are able to use language in such diverse ways because we have been taught such activities in such and such a manner and under such and such conditions, i.e. the consideration of the context of the teaching of the use of words is clearly brought out, when we view language as an on-going activity in which we participate.

In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein introduces the idea of language games: 'If we say thinking is essentially operating with signs, the first question you might ask is: what are signs? Instead of giving any kind of general answer to this question, I shall propose to you to look closely at particular cases which we should call 'operating with signs.' Let us look at a simple example of operating with words. I give some one the order: fetch me six apples from the grocer., and I will describe a way of making use of such an order; the words 'six apples' are written on a bit of paper, the paper is handed to the grocer, the grocer compares the word 'apples' with the labels of

different shelves. He finds it to agree with one of the labels, counts from the number written on the slip of paper and for every number counted takes a fruit off the shelf and puts it in a bag. ... And here you have *one* use of words. I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call 'language games'. These are the ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated every day language. Language games are the forms with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption and question, we shall, with great advantage, look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. When we look at such simple forms of language, we see activities, reactions which are clear cut and transparent. On the other hand, we recognise in these processes, forms of language not seperated by a break from our more complicated ones. We see that we can build up the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms.'[12]

Here, we might remark that it is not clear whether the model of a language game is to be taken as an analytical tool or as an actual historical stage in the development of the use of language.

II. The General Conception of the Function of Language.

In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein chiefly emphasizes five aspects of our general conception how language functions.

We tend to think that there are certain definite mental processes that are bound up with the working of language and that it is by inducing such processes (meaning, understanding etc) in us that our language functions. We tend to think that language consists of signs together with an activity of interpreting the signs that confers meaning upon them. 'We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an in-organic part, the handling of signs and an organic part which we may call understanding these signs, interpreting them, thinking. These later activities seem to take place in a queer kind of medium the mind, the nature of which we don't quite understand.'[13] But against this Wittgenstein repeatedly points out that (a) this assumption of mental acts or processes has been suggested by certain mis-leading analogies between certain forms of expression in our language,[14] (b) thinking, understanding, meaning are not mental episodes in time[15] and (c) that the meaning of a sign is

its use. 'But if we had to name anything, which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use'.[16]

'Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing the meaning of words. But let's remember that a word has not got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it.'[17] Connected with this neglect of use is another misconception about the function of words which is specially noticeable in our account of the way general words are used. We think that a general term, like 'games' must mean or stand for something that is common to all the things that we call particular games, that it connotes the common essence which is present in all the members of its class and it is this common property that justifies our application of the general term. But Wittgenstein points out that there is no one feature or set of features that is invariably present in all cases; rather, games form a family which have similarities and resemblances none of which however are either logically necessary or logically sufficient. But we think that a general term must stand for a general property and that this general property must be an ingredient in the things of which it is predicated. 'We are inclined to think that there must be something common to all games say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term 'game' to the various games; whereas games form a family, the members of which have family likeness ... The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up with other, too primitive ideas of the structure of language. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties.'[18] Another important misconception about the function of words is to think that all of them perform precisely delimited functions, that all have precisely defined areas of application and criteria of use. If we compare the functions of language to an institution, we must realise that some members of the institution have sharply defined roles, that their area of power and control, their spheres of privilege and authority are clearly defined, whereas there are other members who have no such demarcated functions, whose rights and duties are quite fluid. Similarly in the use of language, there are some words whose use is precise and other words whose use is nowhere determined by rules. Such words may be called odd-job words and it would be seriously distorting if we attempt to describe the function of such important odd-job words as 'meaning', 'truth', etc as if these were words with precisely defined roles.

Lastly, we may also note another misconception about the way words mean. When we ask what is the meaning of a word, what

we are really asking is : how is it used ; but we are likely to treat the use of the word as if it were another kind of object, beside the word itself. Thus, use gets hypostatised or reified and we think that the meaning of a word must be some kind of mental entity or object. 'We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign.'[19]

III. Rules in Language.

It seems to me that we can best appreciate what Wittgenstein has to say about the nature of rules and their functions in language under three heads :

1. Rules and their interpretation.
2. Rules of application as criteria.
3. The relevance of Rules in Language games.

1. Rules and their Interpretation

As we saw, we usually have a tendency to view language dualistically, as consisting of an in-organic part—a system of signs—and an organic part—an activity of understanding or meaning, which is performed on these signs and we are likely to conclude that a sign by itself is quite dead and inert and that what gives it life and meaning is the mental act of interpretation by which it is made to mean or stand for something. It is this mental act of interpretation or intending which directs the sense of the words we utter, for without this accompaniment they would be un-meaning marks.

Wittgenstein devotes a great many arguments to show this picture of language as consisting of a set of signs together with their interpretation is in many ways a misleading one. The chief point to realise is that it is misleading to think of meaning or understanding or thinking as an act or episode along with or beside the utterance of words. The first thing that we have to note is that the tendency to assume that understanding or meaning or thinking must be a mental process or act is that this way of speaking about the phenomena of the use of signs has been suggested, in the first place, by certain analogies between forms of expression in our language. For example, 'I say something' and 'I mean something' look similar in their surface grammar and this similarity leads us to think that just as in the first, so also in the second case, an act is involved, namely, the mental act of intending. Another feature, which, if realised, would go a long ways towards relaxing the hold of this particular misconception about the use of

language, is that we postulate such an act of interpretation primarily because we think that without such an act of interpretation we can never be sure how a word or sentence is to be meant; i. e. we think of the interpretation as giving us the key according to which we operate. Thus, if we represent a sign or an expression by an arrow, the act of interpretation consists in determining the 'direction' or sense of the arrow, as to how it is to be taken, for we feel that every sign, by itself, does not determine how it is to be taken and that a parallel act of interpretation in the medium of the mind is needed to specify the sense of the expression.

In this model it is assumed that while the outward expression by itself may be mis-understood, the internal act of interpretation is itself absolutely specific, and hence can never be mis-understood. 'What one wishes to say is: every sign is capable of interpretation, but the meaning must not be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation'.[20]

Now, it is this infallibility of interpretation that we must question. Let us take the simplest and surest example of an interpretation, an ostensive definition. Suppose, pointing to an object, I introduce a new sign ostensively and say 'This is a tove'. It looks as if this ostensive act has succeeded in giving the new sign a quite specific and unambiguous meaning. But if we look closer, we see that the ostensive formula 'This is a tove' is itself capable of many further interpretations: it can be taken to mean.

(a) This is a pencil

(b) This is round

(c) This is wood

(d) This is hard, etc, etc.

This possibility of taking the ostensive formula in different ways shows that no mere mental act can determine the way of application of the sign; how the sign is to be taken depends upon how it is actually used and no internal co-present act is needed or is able to determine this application.[21]

But to deny that there are such internal acts of understanding is not to deny that there is any difference between saying a sentence without meaning and saying it with meaning. Rather, what Wittgenstein shows is that we should not look for this difference in the wrong place, as it were, in the presence of a parallel process within the medium of the mind. 'Let us ask ourselves: if we say to someone 'I should be

delighted to see you', and mean it, does a conscious process run alongside these words, a process which could itself be translated into spoken words? This will hardly ever be the case'.[22]

The absence of such a parallel process is more clearly noticed in the case of an analogous situation of expecting some one. 'What happens if from 4 till 4.30, A expects B to come to his room? In one sense in which the phrase 'to expect something from 4 to 4.30' is used it certainly does not refer to one process or state of mind going on throughout that interval, but to a great many different activities'[23] Hence, the difference between a meaningful and a meaningless utterance should be made contextually; it is the conditions under which it is used that determine whether the expression is an un-meaning mark or not. The manner in which the sign is used may be regarded as a modulation or tonality or 'feel' of the utterance itself. 'A process accompanying our words, one might call the process of meaning them', is the modulation of the voice in which we speak the words, or one of the processes similar to this, like the play of facial expression. These accompany the spoken words as the tune of a song accompanies its words. This tune corresponds to the 'feeling' with which we say a sentence. And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said or some thing similar to this expression'.[24]

2. *Rules as criteria of application*

When we realise that 'meaning' or 'understanding' cannot be explained as performing an inner act in the presence of outward signs, we are forced to fall back upon external contextual factors themselves in order to determine the sense of an expression; i. e. we have to consider the use that is made of the expression under given conditions. Now, these rules of use may be of two kinds. Some rules give us the meaning or sense of an expression, while others merely give us additional details about the circumstances of its actual application.[25] The former may be called the criteria of application of the word and the latter, the symptoms. In this sense, to give the criterion of a word is to give its meaning or putting it in terms of objects, the criterion of x is what is called 'x'.[26] We are thus led to an important aspect of Wittgenstein's thought—his conception of criteria. As Mr Norman Malcolm remarks, the most natural introduction to Wittgenstein's conception of criteria is by way of an analysis of the teaching and learning of the use of words.[27] Wittgenstein constantly exhorts us to bethink ourselves of how we learnt the use of this or that word. The purpose of this constant appeal to the learning and teaching of language is to bring into clear view those features of circumstance and

behaviour which act as standards of the right application of the word in question. As criteria, these features of circumstance and behaviour supply the basis on which we judge whether the person has the knowledge he claims to have. Thus, although the process of learning and teaching are psychological processes, the real aim of the description is a logical one; it is to settle the validity and justifiability of the claims to knowledge that we make by the use of expressions. So, a criterion is some thing by which we are justified in saying that a thing is so or is not so. The notion of justification is the central unifying notion behind Wittgenstein's various formulations of the conception of a criterion.

The second important feature of Wittgenstein's conception of a criterion is that criteria, in general, are behavioural criteria. As he remarks in the *Investigations*, even if we picture a feeling of confidence as an inner process, still it requires outward criteria.[28]

The next important feature that we have to note is that he distinguishes between criteria and symptoms.[29] The falling barometer is a symptom that it is raining; its looking like that out doors is the criterion. Similarly, a process in a man's brain or larynx may be a symptom that he has an image of red; the criterion is what he says and does. This shows that the symptom of y is some item of experience which is usually or always associated with y. but that so and so is the criterion of y is a matter of logic and not of experience.[30] The satisfaction of the criterion of y establishes the existence of y beyond question. The occurrence of the symptom of y may also establish the existence of y but in a different sense. As Roger Albritton has pointed out, Wittgenstein does not hold that a symptom cannot be perfectly reliable. The point is that the reliability of a symptom is a matter of experience while that of a criterion is a matter of logic.[31]

These are the central features of Wittgenstein's conception of criteria but we must note some details of the conception now. Mr. Roger Albritton has argued that there are two distinct conceptions of criteria in Wittgenstein's works; one is contained in the *Blue Book* while the other is contained in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* and the *Philosophical Investigations.*[32] According to him, the notion of criteria as standards of justification is to be found in the *Remarks* and the *Investigations*, while the *Blue Book* gives us the mistaken view of criteria as explanations of meaning.

3. *The relevance of rules in language games.*

Here, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two senses in which a rule may be relevant to an activity. The first is the sense in which an

activity is in accordance with a certain rule and the second is the sense in which the rule is involved in the activity. We may illustrate the distinction somewhat as follows: there are many modes of human activity for which there are certain rules and yet in which the people who participate in them are unable to formulate these rules explicitly. In such circumstances, we can, in view of their pattern governed behaviour, say that their activity is in conformity with a certain rule; by this we mean that we can formulate a rule explicitly which would fit the observed pattern of behaviour. In this sense, the dance of the bee returning form of a field of clover is in conformity with a certain rule. In this sense, in so far as we do not explicitly or consciously formulate their rules of use, our application of the signs of our language is only in conformity with rules. Wittgenstein has previously pointed out how we apply certain terms without clearly distinguishing between criteria and symptoms.[33] Now, in so far as a criterion is involved, inspite of our lack of explicit statement of it, we could say that the application of the term is in conformity with a criterion.

But such situations in which our use of certain expressions is in conformity with certain rules are potential trouble spots for the philosopher. For given any pattern of activity, it is always possible to formulate differing sets of rules with which that pattern could be in accordance.

'Take an example. Someone teaches me to square cardinal numbers; he writes down the row:

1 2 3 4

and asks me to square them. Suppose, underneath the first row of numbers. I then write:

1 4 9 16

What I wrote is in accordance with the general rule of squaring; but it is obviously also in accordance with any number of other rules and amongst these, it is not more in accordance with one than with another.'[34] In such a situation, the philosopher has to extract a rule from the observed pattern of usage and extrapolate it to see whether it fits the further segments of the activity. But in view of the possibility of the activity being in accordance with differing rules, there is always an element of falsification involved in this task. Furthermore, his choice, when extrapolated upto a certain point may seem to fit the pattern of activities but further segments may begin to diverge. 'The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used and trying to apply this consistently comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results'.[35]

As against being merely in accordance with a rule, an activity may also involve a rule when 'the symbol of the rule forms part of the calculation'.[36]

Now, the importance of this distinction between the two senses in which a rule may be relevant to the application of signs is that where the application of signs is merely in accordance with a rule, to state the rule is to state a hypothesis; but where the rule is involved in the application, to state it is to give a justification in logic.

4. *The importance of analogies between forms of expression*

Wittgenstein repatedly stresses the fascination which analogies between forms of expression can have for us when we do philosophy. These analogies are misleading in so far as they tempt us interpret certain forms of expression on the pattern of certain other familiar ones. Thus, he points out that one of the important sources of the postulation of inner acts is the analogy that exists between say 'I say something' and 'I mean something'.[37] This similarity in surface grammar induces us to assimilate the logic of their use also and we think that the second form of expression also is about an inner mental act of meaning or intending. Another example of a misleading analogy that he mentions is between 'the colour of an object' and 'the meaning of a word'.[38] In this connection he warns us of the tendency to look for a substance whenever we have a substantive.[39]

'The existence of the words 'thinking' and 'thought' alongside words denoting (bodily) activities such as writing, speaking etc makes us look for an activity different from these but analogous to them, corresponding to the word 'thinking'.[40]

But how do we detect that a particular interpretation of language has been inspired by a misleading analogy? The person himself, obviously, is not aware of the fact that he is following an analogy and still less a misleading one. We have to find out that such in fact is the case. Wittgenstein says that we find this out if we can see that he would no talk as he does if he were aware of this difference in the grammar of such and such words, or if he were aware of this other possibility of expression.[41] And the ultimate success of our attempt consists in convincing *him* that it is so. Here a comparison with psycho-analysis may be illuminating. We might say in connection with psycho-analysis 'he would not do as he does if he were aware of what is in his past that he has forgotten that drives him to do this'. And the art of cure consists in refreshing his memory and bringing him

round to say for himself 'That is it'; with that recognition, he is free of the trouble. In the case of philosophical therapy also, the aim is to bring round the person who is misled, himself to recognise the analogy that has misled him. Only in the case of psycho-analysis, it is the past which one tries to bring back, whereas in the case of philosophical analysis, one investigates one's present linguistic environment.

Another feature that Wittgenstein emphasizes is that the misleading analogy is hidden; it is hidden from the person who is misled by it. Relieving him consists in getting him to recognise the analogy that has misled him and the clue that the analyst requires is to be obtained and extracted from a careful study of the form of bewilderment to which he is subject; it consists in getting a clear view of the picture of his confusion and perplexity in its intricate detail for, so to have the network of the bewilderment under which he functions, would suggest the model that is exercising its fascination over him. This is the art of philosophical diagnosis; the art of philosophical cure consists in getting him to identify for himself the misleading analogy. But here arises a fateful possibility. What if the analyst himself is, as it were a distorting mirror? What if his own form of bewilderment should project itself upon his observations and interpretations of others? Perhaps, it is because of this that one has to do one's own analysis in philosophy.

The Blue Book as a New Mode of Criticism

In the begining of this study, we saw that what primarily gets itself expressed in the *Blue Book* is a new mode of criticism: Wittgenstein himself refers to this as a new sort of thinking.[42] The *Blue Book*, we said, teaches us especially a new conceptual art. It remains to describe the main features of this art.

To look upon the *Blue Book* as teaching us a new kind of art serves to bring out two essential features of the work:

(1) Its unfailing resources of individual cases, examples, miniature models and thought experiments and the like. These are added not merely for the sake of esthetic appeal and elegance of the work, but they serve an essential purpose there for one cannot teach an art merely by precept and doctrine; one learns it by seeing how it is done, by watching expert hands expertly at work. Hence, the need for detailed executions, set peices of performance and so on and this is precisely the role of examples, figures, parables and the like in Wittgenstein. They allow us to see the new art of conceptual clarification at work, as it were.

(2) And let us remember that this is a new art and that teaching a new art is infinitely more difficult and exacting than teaching an established one, for in the case of established arts, one atleast knows what one wants to be taught. But in this case, we do not know what we want ; we have to be educated in our very needs and taught to ask what we want. Wittgenstein introduces us to a new art of which we have not heard and for which we have felt no need. We ask questions expecting answers, perhaps ; but he has to teach us to look at our questions from a new perspective, to question our questions, as it were. And for this he has to to bring out the queerness of our questions, train our sensitivity to deviations from sense, It is for this purpose that Wittgenstein uses his quaint figures and examples so profusely ; the aim is to shock us into a recognition of sense.

And what are the features of this new art? The art has been described in a variety of ways ; it is an art of disentangling meanings,[43] of finding one's way about in language,[44] an art of removal and riddance of false analogies and misleading pictures ;[45] it is an art of clarification,[46] of relief from the toils of confusion.[47]

One may distinguish three phases or moments in the practice of the new art, although Wittgenstein himself does not so distinguish them. First, he seeks to quicken our sense for the queer. Second, he is concerned to present the meaning of those words which are involved in a puzzling case and third, he seeks to un-cover the misleading analogy.

Consider the first phase. Ordinarily, a philosophical question such as 'what is truth' or 'what is the meaning of a word' does not strike us as being queer ; we have been accustomed to regarding them as questions, like any other to which we expect answers. Hence Wittgenstein has to make us *hear* the queerness of these questions ; he must train us to a more trained sensitivity which would be able to detect the deviation from sense involved in such questions. In order to make the queerness of such questions ring perceptibly to us, he uses four main techinques. Sometimes simply accentuating or emphasising the question itself will do ; 'what is the meaning of a word' — when this is repeatedly asked and we are told to look at it again and again, the queerness of the question begins to stir,[48] we become vaguely conscious that we are asking a wrong kind of question. Sometimes he brings out the queerness involved in the questions come out much more vividly by comparing them alongside of questions which are similar in form but which distinctively sound queer. 'what is the meaning of a word? What is the colour of number three?[49] At other times Wittgenstein brings out the queerness in the question by giving an

answer which seems to be formally in order but which, as soon as it is given, sounds queer. 'Thinking is a process which goes on invariably in your feet, while you are busy making words at the other end of the line'.[50]

The queerness of this answer suggests that *any* answer in terms of a process would be queer and this atonce suggests that the question itself is a misapplied one. Wittgenstein brings out the queerness of the question by giving a concrete answer. 'What is the meaning of a word? But when I ask you, 'what is the meaning of the word 'ogre' you tell me. So, we do know what the meaning of a word is, namely, the word 'ogre'. So what is it that we do not know when we ask: 'what is the meaning of a word?'[51] This reduction to the concrete brings out vividly that no factual answer is going to satisfy our question and thereby its true nature and intent are revealed. By these and other echniques, Wittgenstein hopes to bring out the queerness of the questions we ask in philosophy. This queerness may be looked upon as a deviation from sense; in order to show that it is a deviation from sense, it will be necessary to present the sense from which it is a deviation and this is the second phase of the art-the presentation of sense.

The principle involved in this second phase is smple. Some words go together in a certain order, taken together with other words etc, they make sense, but the same words, in a certain other order do not make sense.

'— we say that we don't understand the meaning of such a phrase. It combines well known words but combines them in a way we don't understand. The grammar of this phrase has yey to be explained to us.[52] Of course, the implication is that in typically philosophical uses of language, the grammar of such uses never really gets explained so that to the last, we do not know what the meaning is.

When we have presented the sense, we can begin to see, not merely that our original form of expression is a deviation from sense but also how that deviation was concealed from us, how it was able to create the illusion of sense. Wittgenstein holds that this illusion is the result of certain analogies between certain forms of expression. He notices a number of such analogies: 'we try to find a substance for a substantive.[53] 'The contradiction which here seems to arise could be called a conflict between two different usages of a word, in this case the word 'measure.[54] 'The existence of the words 'thinking' and 'thought' alongside of the words denoting (bodily) activities such as writing, speaking etc makes us look for an activity different from these but also analogous to them corresponding to the word 'thinking'.[55]

Wittgenstein shows that these analogies create an illusion of sense about the questions which we typically ask in philosophy. Thus, a man who says that thinking or understanding is a mental act has been struck by the resemblance between 'I say that —' and 'I mean that —'.[56]

But how does one, in general, know that the analogy is operative? As we have seen, it is no use asking the person, for he is not aware that he is being led by an analogy, much less a misleading one. The analogy is there, in language, but it is hidden from him. So it is no use asking him directly.

Wittgenstein appears to think that the operative analogy can be seen to be at work, in the form of bewilderment that he is under, that bewilderment or unclarity is no mere shapeless 'anomic' mass but that, so to say, it has certain typical forms or structures. A form of bewilderment can be seen and typified and recognised and identified much as forms of neuroses can be and that it is by noticing the form of bewiderment that we locate the misleading analogy.

'The cases in which we particularly wish to say that someone is misled by a form of expression are those in which we would say: 'he would'nt talk as he does if he were aware of this difference in the grammar of such and such words, or if he were aware of this or that possibility of expression'.[57]

But unfortunately the issue cuts deeper. For one thing, we cannot too lightly dismiss a preference for an exotic or unfamiliar form of expression. Such preferences conceal deep choices about ways of life: they can be symptomatic of basic differences in procliviiies and styles of life.

'— which form he prefers, or whether he has a preference at all, often depends on general, deeply rooted tendencies of his thinking'.[58]

'— we easily forget how much a notation, a form of expression may mean to us'.[59]

When such deep tendencies are involved in the preference of a particular form of expression, it becomes very difficult merely to brand it as a simple deviation from sense, especially when we remember that ordinary language, as it were, holds our minds in one fixed position, not allowing us to express certain aspects.

'Our ordinary language, which of all possible forms of notations, is the one which pervades our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position

as it were and in this position (we) sometimes feel cramped, having a desire for other positions as well. Thus we sometimes wish for a notation which stresses a difference more strongly; makes it more obvious than ordinary language does or one which uses more closely similar forms of expression than our ordinary language. Our mental cramp is loosened when we are shown notations which fulfill these needs. The needs can be of the greatest variety'.[60]

Secondly, the forms of bewilderment that are possible are many; some of them are gross and easy to detect, others subtle and deeply hidden. And since we are *all* subject to the fascination of the forms of expression, it could turn out, fatefully, that the analyst himself is under the spell of a subtle form of bewilderment, in which case he would be a distorting mirror. To avoid this, he must be in possession of 'complete clarity' in which all puzzles are dissolved. But this seems a remote possibility only. One begins to wonder then what the prospects of this new art of conceptual healing are. But certainly just as in psycho-analysis, a self-analysis is a pre-requisite here also.

'A philosopher is a man who has to cure *himself* of many sicknesses of the understanding, before he can arrive at the notions of the sound of human understanding'.[61]

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